Chapter 4

CASE STUDIES OF DEMOBILISATION IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR

Demobilisation in Central America

While there have been demilitarisation programmes in most Central American countries, including Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, those in Nicaragua and El Salvador are regarded as the two best examples. The change in the international climate after the end of the Cold War played a key role in promoting demobilisation, while other factors such as internal civil groups, businesses and NGOs were seeking constructive ends to conflict.

This chapter will examine how demobilisation took place and discuss in more detail the reintegration of the demobilised forces. Factors that will be considered include the role of the military after demobilisation and the issues aiding and hindering the reintegration of the armed forces and their families as constructive members back into civil society. This discussion will note both unforeseen and uncontrollable factors that need to be considered before compiling a list of the important lessons that can be learned from this by South Africa. The importance of a well-planned demobilisation plan is arguably the main lesson learned from these two case studies and the list of lessons will highlight those factors that need to be carefully considered in the planning of a demobilisation process.

Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing trend towards demilitarisation in Central America. This development followed the termination of the Cold War, shifts in ideologies and a subsequent decrease in military assistance to the countries of the region.19 The capacity of the militaries in the area had been historically powerful, but began to wane as the idea of a civilian controlled society was promoted by social institutions and business leaders.

These efforts and changes became clearly visible in the establishment of the Central American peace process, which began in the early 1980s and helped to establish the framework for change in the military forces of the region. This led to the establishment of a commission to oversee demilitarisation that, in turn, increased the transparency of the military and weapons stockpiles of the various armed groups. The Central American peace process also encouraged the international community to make a new commitment to the region and facilitated a more defined role for its participation. This allowed the various national, regional and international peace processes that were operating at the time to complement one another to better effect.

Regional commitment and shared circumstances played important parts in the demilitarisation of the individual countries, by calling international attention to the problems in the region as a whole and offering regional support between governments and NGOs. The shared reasons for a move to demobilisation in Central America included one or more of the following:

multilateral, bilateral or national peace accords;

defeat of one of the fighting parties;

perceived improvements in the security situation;

shortage of adequate funding;

perceived economic and development impact of conversion; and

changing military technologies and/or strategies.20

The Central American peace process commenced with a meeting on the island of Contadora in Panama in early 1983 that was initiated by the Mexican government.21 The peace process experienced several initiatives and processes before a consolidated plan could begin to take shape. The reaction of both Nicaragua and El Salvador - although both were stimulated and coached by the Central American peace process - followed different paths according to their own unique circumstances and problems.

This section will look at three different aspects of demobilisation first in Nicaragua and then in El Salvador. Practical aspects of the demobilisation of the various forces and the disarming of the various forces and groups will be discussed, as well as the role of the army and changes in its structure.

Nicaragua

Following the victory of Violenta Chamorro in the February 1991 elections, the Contras stated that there was no longer a need for conflict. A demobilisation programme was initiated, although its implementation suffered several delays. Renegotiation took place among all parties in the ‘security zones’ and their role and permanence (the general view was that these areas would be temporary and would only function during for the demobilisation process, whereas the Contras felt that the zones should be established as more permanent areas).

Based on this negotiation, the Sandinista forces would withdraw and members of the resistance were to disarm upon entering these zones.22 There would be no military presence in these areas except for the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (UNUCA). Due to several factors, the process was initially slow, most importantly the holding back of anticipated funds (totalling US $128.8 million) for tools, medicine and training.23 Added to this was the realisation that more Contras needed assistance than had previously been anticipated. The fact that demobilisation was also voluntary meant that the process could not be implemented with haste. An additional hindrance was the decision by the Chamorro government to keep General Humberto Ortega (who was the brother of the former Sandinista president) as head of the army, causing doubts over the safety of members of the resistance movement once they had disarmed.

The process formally ended in July 1990 with a total of 23 000 Contras demobilised and 17 000 weapons destroyed. By 1993, the 80 000-strong Sandinista Peoples’ Army (EPS) was reduced to 15 000 and by 1997 was further reduced to 12 000.24 Subsequently, several small groups resurfaced that attempted to rearm themselves. These groups — known as the Recontras, Recompas and Revueltos - were initially motivated by anger at the government for failing to provide adequate reintegration assistance.

As part of the disarmament process, members of the resistance turned their weapons in upon entering the security zones. These weapons were smashed, or cut into pieces. While the destruction of weapons went smoothly, the general disarmament process experienced some problems. Many of the weapons that were turned in were unserviceable or old and rusty and, as the Contras had been militarily supported by the US for a number of years, it appeared that newer weapons had been hidden by the Contras for future protection, or for future arms-trafficking as a source of income. The Special Disarmament Brigade later started a gun buy-back scheme among the groups that had resurfaced with some success. For instance, 300 Recompas members participated in a gun buy-back in exchange for cash and promises of homes and land.25 By the end of 1993, the Special Disarmament Brigade had confiscated or collected 142 000 weapons.26

Before president Chamorro assumed power, the new structure and role of the army were not specified. Once inaugurated, she also assumed the position of defence minister and ended the military draft, called for the army to be reduced by half and limited the terms in office of armed forces chiefs to five years. In an effort to change the image of the security forces, Chamorro also called for a restructured police force under civilian rule. She amended the law that gave most of the military power to the military chief, and brought the forces under her command. This limited the role of the military to defence of security on the country’s borders and to dealing with internal disturbances. Despite these changes, there were still some problems with the control of officers and a perception by most people that the army was just another political party and not an institution that protects the country. People found it difficult, in general, to separate the army and the Sandinistas in their minds.

El Salvador

In El Salvador, a country with a historically powerful military, the improvement of civil-military relations and a transition to democracy were vital. Under the Chapultec peace agreement, the security and armed forces were dissolved. The agreement also called for the dissolution of the military structure of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its transformation into a legitimate political party in the country.

Under the agreement, the demobilisation of the FMLN and the armed forces of El Salvador (FAES) was constructed in such a way that FMLN combatants would be concentrated in 50 designated points and the FAES in 100 designated points.27 Over the next weeks, the forces would be further concentrated into fewer verification centres in the areas they would normally occupy in peacetime.

There was a delay in the process because the FMLN refused to demobilise claiming that the government had not honoured its commitments towards, among others, humanitarian aid and infrastructure. Some of the main obstacles were land and land reforms such as the land on which the demobilised troops were kept and the transferral of land after demobilisation. Prior to the disarmament process, both parties were required to submit information of their troop strengths and weapons to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL). The verification of stocks and weapons, and the transparency of the process were important precursors to actual disarmament.

All the arms that were turned in during demobilisation were to be, reported and securely stored in lockers. These lockers were furnished with two locks of which the keys were kept by an UNOSAL and a FMLN commander. Combatants were allowed to keep personal weapons until they left their designated areas. Despite the inventories supplied before the disarmament process, a large arms cache belonging to a group of the FMLN was found in Nicaragua in 1993. They were then pressured to hand over other arms caches in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras and these were quickly destroyed. Following the demobilisation of the Contras in Nicaragua, arms were widely available in El Salvador and an abundance of arms is still visible.28

Unlike Nicaragua, the structure of the army was discussed and negotiated fully before the signing of the Chapultec peace agreement. The most noteworthy change was a clear distinction between security and defence. Structural changes and reductions were made in terms of troops, branches, equipment and spending. The change in budgetary allocation was vital as El Salvador had a highly disproportionate expenditure on military needs, as opposed to education and health care.

The military has had to justify its existence through participation in non-military operations such as conservation and deforestation, but have also been involved in activities involving oil, mining, publishing, resort hotels and other economic activities.29 They have also assisted in policing activities because the newly formed police force has insufficient manpower and experience to handle particularly organised crime in El Salvador.

The reintegration of former combatants in Nicaragua began with a serious disadvantage due to the unstable economic situation in the country. This meant that demobilised soldiers were dissatisfied from the beginning with the contribution by the government which had insufficient available resources. An important aspect of the demobilisation programme in Nicaragua was that over 60% of the former soldiers were under the age of 25 and had been fighting for an average of five to ten years. They clearly had not learned any other skills, other than those required for combat.30

The core problem with reintegration was the land issue. Land has been historically disputed in Nicaragua and remained unresolved after demilitarisation. Many demilitarised soldiers were promised land that they never received and, at the same time, citizens who had not participated in the conflict felt that the soldiers were being overcompensated at their expense. Another serious problem in land resettlement in rural areas was the presence of landmines. Over 100 000 landmines were planted in Nicaragua and are still disabling many people today. Without a record of where the mines were planted, it is difficult for the government to provide safe new land. The delays in handing over land also meant that all follow-up programmes have been delayed, and thus the first planting season was missed resulting in a longer period of economic hardship.

Demobilised troops were promised two years of medical, housing and credit assistance by the government, but its inability to provide this increased their frustration with the process. This was compounded by the fact that approximately half of the entire population lived below the poverty line. These are some of the issues that prompted some groups to pressurise the government, while some resorted to banditry.

The biggest inhibiting factor behind the funding of demilitarisation, disarming and reintegration processes was the lack of national funding. This meant that the majority of efforts have been paid for with donor contributions. Although large amounts of foreign funding were pledged in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the actual payments were often very late, or were not actually made. In some cases, the international aid was slow in coming due to prerequisites that were attached to aid, such as the development of a free market system. Consequently, the government had to juggle the immediate economic needs of the soldiers and the stipulations of the limited donor funding. It was also of major concern that the reintegration process should ensure both short-term satisfaction and long-term sustainability.

In terms of social reintegration into society, the best results were achieved by smaller local and international NGOs that ran training workshops and undertook projects focused on skills-training, counselling, legal advice, community-building and reconciliation. In a society where the lack of employment and financial security cause social instability, it is also important to teach skills such as peaceful conflict resolution and tolerance.31 Included in the work of these NGOs was a project to train trainers so that new local leaders could be equipped with the necessary skills to enable them to fulfil their duties.

Problems arose among local and international NGOs due to the perception that some of these organisations had stronger sympathies with a particular faction. This impacted on both their community support and government assistance. Despite this, however, the role of NGOs was extremely important in the demobilisation process.

As was the case in Nicaragua, El Salvador also suffered from a lack of funding, even though external promises were made to this effect. Appeals for funding were also not met with much enthusiasm due to the shift in the focus of international aid away from Central America. There was a scepticism on the part of donor nations because financial aid had to be directed to the government that would allocate it to various projects. Land was also a key aspect of the reintegration of soldiers in this predominantly agricultural country. The delays and problems around the issue of land slowed the implementation of other parts of the reintegration process.

Impediments to successful reintegration

One of the major funding problems with reintegration in El Salvador was the fact that there were many more participants in the reintegration process than had originally been expected. Moreover, in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the situation of women added to the complexity of reintegration. In El Salvador, an estimated 11% of the demobilised combatants were women. In a male-dominated society, women had faced many hardships before the conflict and, while their roles changed during the conflict, tradition expected them to return to their previous status. As a result, women in both countries were holding jobs in societies experiencing high unemployment rates and this caused tension among unemployed males. After the conflict, a feminist movement developed and several women’s groups were established to offer support to those facing discrimination. In Nicaragua, mothers often held very important positions in conflict resolution with as members of the same family in many cases fighting on different sides. Their role in the reconciliation process was therefore vital.32

The long years of conflict left many of combatants with physical disabilities. Extra provisions and considerations were thus needed for their reintegration into society, as well as to fulfil in their specific medical needs. Employment for the disabled was even more rare than for able-bodied former combatants. Several unions were formed, often across previous allegiances to ensure that they received sufficient consideration.

The biggest threat to the success of demilitarisation in El Salvador was crime and extensive arms-trafficking. The inability of the police force and the judiciary to control crime made an already fragile process even more precarious. The wide availability of arms in Central America has helped to fuel the problem. In El Salvador, as in Nicaragua, training in social skills and conflict resolution was undertaken mostly by local and international NGOs and community organisations.

Perhaps the biggest failure of both demilitarisation efforts was the inability to secure the necessary foreign funding. The second major failure was the lack of clear planning in the case of the new role of the military and the actual events after initial demobilisation. The third most important failure of both efforts was the still large numbers of available arms. The instability that the presence of these arms and munitions created could nullify many of the positive successes.

The successes in both countries include the complementary linkages and co-operation between government, NGOs and local programmes. While government efforts were focused more on the practical aspects, NGOs have attempted to address social and personal issues. This was seen particularly in the clearer framework of El Salvador than that of Nicaragua. Calculating the accumulated arms and munitions stocks of all the parties was a success because it gave a clearer indication of the collected arms. Following up with ‘guns for cash’ programmes afterwards was also successful, as was the double lock system that promoted fairness in the collection and destruction of weapons.

Accepting that reintegration programmes that were only focused on business skills would be defunct and cause frustration in a society with very few available job opportunities was important. Agricultural and social skills were identified as being far more valuable.

Lessons for South Africa

Perhaps the most important lesson for any country wishing to engage in demilitarisation is the need to secure the necessary funding for the operation before commencement, to avoid dissatisfaction midway through the process. Without the necessary funding to complete reintegration, former combatants with fighting skills may resort to their previous lives or banditry rather than to accept the conditions of halting reintegration.

While South Africa is not as economically unstable as El Salvador and Nicaragua, using funds originally allocated to other areas causes dissatisfaction among those not involved in reintegration. Part of ensuring that this funding is available lies in balancing needs with the expectations of donor countries, NGOs and former combatants.

Correct and thorough planning is essential to ensure that the initial success of short- term-efforts is not lost in the longer term. The practical aspects, as well as the definition and perception of forces after demilitarisation need to be assured.

This includes having a clear understanding of the profiles of former combatants and knowledge that is as accurate as possible of available arms supplies.

Remembering that those involved in reintegration are not only male necessitates an understanding of the gender dynamics that is part of the situation and inclusion of all in reintegration training.

The disabled — whether still in action at the time of demobilisation or those who have been out of action for a while - form an important part of former combatants, and often constitute a large percentage of the total group. Their specific needs also have to be taken into account.

Much effort needs to be directed to the destruction of arms. At first, large-scale voluntary action should be undertaken, followed by direct interaction with reluctant groups, and the use of ‘guns for bread’ tactics.

Regional stability and support are important factors. These help to define the role and size of the military to a level that addresses past suspicions and fears. This also prevents unnecessary regional instability, as is the case with the large-scale arms-trafficking in Central America.

Finally, the teaching of vital social skills goes beyond training in basic business skills. Education and business skills need to be developed alongside social skills such as conflict resolution, tolerance and community-building. This is an ongoing process and sufficient funding and manpower have to be earmarked for such training, It should be undertaken through the involvement of a variety of NGOs and government institutions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are several lessons that can be learned from demilitarisation in El Salvador and Nicaragua. There are many factors to consider for a successful campaign, including economic stability, total disarmament and the training in a variety of social and business skills. Most importantly, for all these factors to be successful, there needs to be careful and detailed planning of the entire process.