Chapter 6

DEMOBILISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Key lessons for South Africa

The analysis of demobilisation in a number of developing countries presented above suggests a number of key lessons applicable to all countries, including South Africa, which are contemplating demobilisation programmes. These lessons include:

The transition from soldier to civilian is divided into three distinct phases: demobilisation (separation from the armed forces), reinsertion (return to the civilian community) and reintegration (securing long-term employment). During each of the different phases, the needs of former combatants are different and a variety of support interventions are required.



The success of demobilisation is contingent upon effective rehabilitation and consistent follow-up.



Significant financial support for demobilisation and reintegration programmes is vital for success. The necessary financial resources should be ensured well in advance of the start of demobilisation. A rapid donor response can substantially contribute to the success of demobilisation and reintegration. The co-ordination of donor support is also important for success.



Any reintegration programme should be compatible with the national development process.



The key elements of a demobilisation programme are provision of an assistance package, simplicity of delivery, a decentralised programme for implementation, and building on existing social capital.



Socio-economic surveys are important to identify the needs, aspirations and capabilities of former combatants. Quality information is essential for the design of demobilisation programmes. Surveys should be conducted during programme preparation. Studies of the reintegration of former combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda clearly indicated that the establishment of a socio-economic profile of soldiers that identifies their capabilities, needs and expectations is crucial.48



Former combatants should be classified into different target groups based on their specific needs, requirements and aspirations. This facilitates the development of specific, relevant and cost-effective interventions. Once again, sound socio-economic data is essential for effective classification.



Vocational, technical and management training for former combatants is important for the reintegration process.



Demobilised soldiers should be given a package to assist them in the early stages of resettlement. The package should also include assistance in developing specific plans for long-term employment. Flexible credit schemes should be available to fund specific small business proposals. Possible components of a reintegration support programme include:



cash payments

transport to the resettlement area

orientation on the resettlement area

food (for a specific period)

access to health care

health care advice

family planning advice

support for children’s school fees

civilian clothing

basic household utensils

building materials

tools, seeds and agricultural implements

counselling

stress and conflict management training

information packages

legal advice

banking advice

business advice

credit facilities

job placement advice

housing support

assistance to find accommodation

wage subsidies

skills enhancement training

educational training support.49

Reintegration support programmes usually last between several months and two years. Programmes may have to be specifically designed for physically handicapped veterans. The German Agency for Technical Co-operation [GTZ] supported a number of micro-business activities among former soldiers in Ethiopia through a financing mechanism managed as an ‘open fund’. The fund provided support to 44 000 former combatants with agricultural equipment, labour intensive construction schemes, training for self-employment and small low-cost housing projects. In this case, the keys to success were flexibility, a high degree of autonomy along with continuous dialogue regarding the progress on projects and small business activities. GTZ’s philosophy was to support a large number of small projects, despite the obvious risks of failure, to maximise former combatants’ involvement, rather than to concentrate on a few larger projects.

HIV/Aids should be a key concern for reintegration management. Awareness campaigns should specifically include former combatants and their families.



Major consideration must be given to psycho-social problems of former combatants.



Civic education, designed to give former combatants a knowledge of civil society, has proven useful in some cases.



An information and sensitisation programme is useful for both former combatants and the communities into which they are to be reintegrated.



A transitional safety net (mainly adequate financial support) should be provided to bridge the gap between demobilisation and reintegration.



Communities play an important role in problem-solving through community advisory committees. Such communities can also provide guidance to former combatants. Every effort should be made to maximise community support.



Demand-driven training should be prioritised and linked to specific job placement programmes.



Urban reintegration has proven to be more difficult and requires a more diversified approach with comprehensive planning. Key components for success are counselling, job placement and referral, vocational and apprenticeship training, along with employment subsidy schemes.



The regular provision of useful information to former soldiers about skills enhancement and educational and job opportunities can significantly enhance economic reintegration.



The potential impact on the communities into which former combatants settle needs to be carefully assessed with the aim of providing a corrective intervention if necessary.



Detailed co-ordination within government and between government and other relevant actors (NGOs) is important to maximise the effectiveness of reintegration programmes. The best administrative model appears to be central co-ordination complemented by decentralised implementation. At the same time, transaction costs should be minimised in order to maximise benefits for demobilised personnel.



The entire demobilisation and reintegration programme needs to be monitored in order to redesign, or redirect interventions where necessary, and to ensure transparency, public confidence and accountability.



From the outset, strong political commitment and support, along with a delivery of promised resources, are essential for the success of any demobilisation and reintegration programme. Several case studies suggested that it is counterproductive for a government to promise more than it can deliver.

The demobilisation model

Based on numerous case studies of demobilisation in the developing world, it is suggested that, if no other option exists, former combatants may use their military skills to make a living through crime. Demobilised soldiers in El Salvador and Nicaragua became extensively involved in robbery, kidnapping and drug-trafficking during the late 1990s.50 The use of former soldiers as mercenaries is also a common phenomenon in developing countries. As the World Bank’s demobilisation model shows, there are three distinct phases in any demobilisation programme, with other analysts suggesting a fourth phase:

preparation: planning and mobilising support;



demobilisation: the actual separation of combatants from the military;



some observers suggest an additional phase — relocation: the suggested additional phase, when former combatants are relocated to chosen civilian accommodation; and



reintegration into civil society (a process which may take a number of years).

During the final phase, temporary relief aid (usually for a few months to two years) should lead to the provision of formal employment, or assistance in establishing a micro-business. According to the World Bank, failure to find suitable employment may result in long-term unemployment and poverty for former combatants, or the resort to banditry to ensure survival. The provision of employment for former combatants is thus regarded as crucial to avoid social instability and increased poverty.

Figure 1: Demobilisation model