Chapter 7

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISATION PART I

Background

South Africa’s Department of Defence, consisting of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Secretariat of Defence, was established by the Interim Constitution of 1993. A process followed to integrate seven former military forces (including the KwaZulu Self-Protection Force) into a single SANDF. The integration process was designed by the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) of the subcouncil on defence of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). The TEC agreed that the six armed forces in South Africa - the South African Defence Force (SADF), the four ‘bantustan’ armies (TBVC states) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - were to be integrated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) originally stayed out of the negotiations, but the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) later joined the integration process after a cabinet decision and an amendment to the Interim Constitution. The original plan envisaged a termination of the integration process by the end of 1994, but the timeframe was later extended to three years.

The JMCC decided that the statutory forces (SADF and TBVC states) had completed the necessary training and had the qualifications for inclusion in the new defence force, but the non-statutory forces (MK and APLA) would have to undergo a training and selection process. All armed forces submitted a personnel list to the Certified Personnel Register (CPR), which formed the foundation of the integration process. Non-statutory forces were assembled at the military bases of Wallmansthal and De Brug to begin their integration into the SANDF. The application process was controlled by a placement board consisting of representatives from all the integrating forces, as well as members of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). Combatants who did not have formal military training, or adequate military qualifications were not integrated. Depending on training and qualifications, other combatants were accepted at different ranks. The application and placement process was followed by bridging training for former MK and APLA forces to prepare them for full participation in a conventional military force. Following bridging training, soldiers were sent to specific military units. There were a number of problems with the integration process, mainly because only former MK and APLA forces were required to undergo tests before acceptance into the SANDF. The general perception created by the application and placement process suggested that MK and APLA members were joining the SADF, rather than a newly created defence force as envisaged in the 1993 Constitution.52 BMATT indicated satisfaction with the integration process, but admitted that there had been problems which led to dissatisfaction among former MK and APLA members.

Sixteen months into the integration process, the Department of Defence initiated a demobilisation programme, described by the minister at the time, Joe Modise, as "the voluntary release of former non-statutory members, who are constitutionally part of the SANDF, but who do not wish to serve in the full-time force, or who are unable to do so."53 The demobilisation process announced in August 1995, was not intended specifically to reduce force numbers, but was rather designed to provide a mechanism to facilitate a way out of the military for former MK or APLA members. Demobilisation was applied to three categories of soldier: those not eligible for service in the SANDF based on age, education or health; those refusing integration into the SANDF; and those dissatisfied with rank or salary after acceptance into the SANDF. The demobilisation programme consisted of three key elements:

once-off gratuities;



two-week counselling on personal issues, career prospects, social services and finances; and



an opportunity to join the Service Corps for an eighteen-month training course on life skills and adult literacy.

Assessment of demobilisation

No comprehensive counselling, training, or job placement programme was offered to demobilised personnel. By the end of February 1997, 3 770 former MK and APLA soldiers had been demobilised. Gratuities received included the following:

0-4 years’ service: R12 734;

5-11 years’ service: R20 201;

12-17 years’ service: R28 721;

18-21 years’ service: R34 276;

22-23 years’ service: R40 657.

The demobilisation process cost approximately R69 million, compared to the original estimate of R250 million. Initially, average integration costs were estimated at R50 000 per soldier, almost R10 000 more than the highest gratuity paid to any demobilised combatant.

The demobilisation process resulted in 3 770 soldiers leaving the SANDF and returning to civil society. However, demobilisation was widely regarded as flawed and having failed to provide adequately for former combatants.

Jacklyn Cock, an independent researcher, found that the demobilisation process did not adequately address the psychological, educational or employment needs of demobilised personnel. In a survey of 180 former combatants, Cock found that the majority were unemployed, living in poverty and relying on their families for food and accommodation. Many of the respondents had emotional problems and suffered from depression. Cock suggested that many were suffering from post-traumatic stress disease and had not received adequate counselling. Only 11% indicated that they had received assistance for psycho-social problems. A number of former combatants indicated that they had been unable to find employment because of poor education and no skills or work experience outside the military.54

According to Tsepe Motumi and Penny McKenzie, the demobilisation of former non-MK and APLA forces carried out during 1996 had a number of weaknesses:

Lack of planning: The demobilisation process was not adequately planned and the process was conceived through a top-down approach with minimal involvement of former combatants. Only a limited effort was made to gain political support and civil society was also largely excluded from the process.



Lack of research: The limited planning that was undertaken was not informed by detailed research, such as a socio-economic profile of former combatants, education and training levels, skills requirements and career aspirations. Information was also lacking with regard to the families of former combatants, areas where individuals would live after discharge, reintegration possibilities and employment opportunities.55 Adequate research would have enabled sound planning and would have significantly enhanced the possibilities of successful reintegration into society. Employment opportunities in both the formal and informal sector were not investigated to match possible retraining with market demand.



Demobilisation packages: Demobilisation packages consisted of once-off cash payments, limited counselling and an offer to join the Service Corps. The packages provided immediate short-term relief, but were clearly not adequate to ensure successful reintegration into civil society. Clearly, the gratuities should have been accompanied by a range of reintegration programmes, involving skills enhancement and job search training.



Implementation: The actual implementation of the demobilisation programme was characterised by bureaucratic delays and legal problems.



Service Corps: The Service Corps was launched on 31 January 1995 to assist former combatants to integrate into civil society, via career-profiling and skills conversion for civilian employment. The Corps was intended to provide 18 months of training, consisting of three months literacy and adult lifeskills training, three months of vocational training and 12 months of practical experience. The Corps also established a vocational training centre to provide practical training. However, only a limited number of demobilised former combatants chose to complete courses offered by the Service Corps.

By all accounts, the first part of the demobilisation process in South Africa did not meet the needs and expectations of former combatants.56 Moreover, the process was not particularly successful in the economic reintegration of former military personnel. Arguably, the key failure was a lack of planning, compounded by poor communication and a lack of adequate political support.57

Predictions that former combatants would turn to crime once their severance packages ran out appeared to become a reality when, in January 1998, government officials indicated that they had ‘declared war’ on former MK soldiers who were perpetrating violent crimes. Sydney Mufamadi, Safety and Security minister at the time, said the government had no ‘sentimental attachment’ to former cadres who made use of military training to carry out cash-in-transit heists and bank robberies.58 In March 1998, a former MK member admitted to the media that he had helped to plan and execute several cash-in-transit robberies in which over R100 million was stolen and 12 people murdered. He claimed that former MK members along with criminal gangs were masterminding the heists.59 The editorial in the Saturday Star of 7 March 1998 suggested that demobilised soldiers were a ‘time bomb’ which could not be ignored. At the same time, the government was criticised for not making a ‘special effort’ to ensure that demobilised soldiers were integrated back into society as productive citizens. Former APLA and MK cadres told the media that their reason for turning to crime is simply that they have no alternative means of earning an income.60 In April 1998, Bob Tucker, the chairperson of the Council of South African Banks (Cosab), stressed that new measures to curb increasing bank robberies, including electronic surveillance and armed guards, were having little impact on a wave of military-style heists never seen before in South Africa.61 Former MK members have complained that, without marketable skills and adequate education, they have been forced to rely on military training to carry out robberies simply in order to survive.62

The frustration expressed by former combatants suggested that previous demobilisation efforts had not done enough to assist in economic reintegration. Transfer from uniform to civilian life has proved to be extremely difficult for many individuals. Successful economic reintegration obviously requires a comprehensive effort on the part of a wide range of stakeholders.