Chapter 8

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISATION PART II:

RATIONALISATION

Background

The integration process in South Africa of former combatants coincided with a series of significant defence budget reductions and the approval of a programme to purchase new defence platforms for the air force and the navy. Consequently, the budget allocation for personnel expenditure became a key issue of contention. Following the 1997 Defence Review, it was decided to reallocate the defence budget according to the following formula: 40% for personnel (requiring a significant decrease from 57%), 30% for capital expenditure and 30% for operating costs. The 17% reduction on personnel costs, envisaged in the Defence Review, thus required a significant reduction in personnel.

The Defence Review emphasised that the newly integrated armed forces far exceeded the numbers required for the envisaged tasks in the region and in the post-Cold War low threat environment. It was also emphasised that the Department of Defence of the future had to be affordable as government spending priorities would shift to reconstruction and development from the past traditional high prioritisation of defence and security concerns. The original downsizing proposal contained in the Defence Review proposed a reduction of personnel from 98 806 (15 February 1997) to 70 700 over a three to four-year period.

The mechanisms for personnel reduction were identified as voluntary severance, contract expiration and employer initiated retrenchment. The voluntary severance initiative is based on severance packages depending on years of pensionable service and is thus not attractive to personnel who have only served for a short time. The Department of Defence also declined to re-enlist many short-term members whose contracts had expired. The employer initiated retrenchment programme was outlined in the Interim Constitution (1993), and intended to ensure the long-term rightsizing of the defence force in response to new budgetary and security considerations. The Defence Review emphasised that the retrenchment process would be done in a:

"fair and equitable manner which will satisfy the goals of representativeness, affirmative action and equal opportunities and ensure that the SANDF is seen to be legitimate and representative of the total South African population."

It was also emphasised that efficiency considerations, such as the assessment of potential, rank and age, would be taken into account.

During the annual defence budget Vote in parliament during March 1999, Minister Joe Modise indicated that approximately 37 000 members had left the SANDF since 1994. Of this total, 6 000 were former APLA, 1 700 former MK, 4 270 former TBVC and over 28 000 former SANDF members. However, the reduction in personnel through voluntary severance and contract expiration has been insufficient to meet the target of a smaller defence force. Consequently, an employer initiated retrenchment process was proposed by the SANDF personnel division aimed at reducing the overall size of the force by a further approximately 20 000. The long-term objective was to reduce personnel expenditure to 40% and operating costs to 30%.

The rationalisation process would be managed by three main roleplayers, the personnel division, the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) and the Service Corps. The personnel division would be responsible for identifying persons to be retrenched, providing notification and determining severance packages. SAMHS would take care of the transition support process and provide psycho-social support for those retrenched. Commanding officers would be advised by SAMHS on how to handle rationalisation with sensitivity. SAMHS is currently preparing to provide counselling for a large number of retrenched personnel. The Service Corps is intended to assist with providing a resettlement service through career guidance briefings, skills enhancement, job search assistance and marketing. The Service Corps was originally intended to provide extensive training for retrenched personnel, but due to the withdrawal of external funding, the Corps is presently only tasked with organising training and has limited ability to find suitable employment for former soldiers. Plans have been made to mobilise national and regional training institutes to assist in skills enhancement and vocational training.

The rationalisation strategy

The Personnel Rationalisation Strategy for the Department of Defence, officially approved early in 1999, details a comprehensive plan for the reduction of personnel to a strength of approximately 65 000-70 000, a reduction of 25 000-30 000 personnel. A significant reduction in personnel costs is the primary objective of the rationalisation strategy. The second objective is to assist former members to find suitable employment once they leave the military. According to the Department’s plan, rationalisation will be undertaken with the view to promote equal opportunities, affirmative action and gender equality. Moreover, constitutional and legal provisions aimed at transforming the public service into a representative, democratic institution providing effective and efficient services will guide the process. The conclusion of rationalisation is intended to produce a force broadly representative of South Africa’s population. The process is also intended to be gender sensitive, but the rationalisation of male and female members will be conducted according to the same criteria. Retrenchments in the Department will be carried out under the guidance and supervision of the Rationalisation Strategy Committee (DoDRSC) comprising representatives from the Department of Defence, other government departments, parliament, trade unions and interested NGOs. The committee reports to the Minister of Defence. Any member may appeal to the Minister of Defence or the Secretary for Defence if there is any dispute over rationalisation decisions.

Cabinet approved the following guidelines for rationalisation on 23 November 1995 in response to Cabinet Memorandum 23 of 1995:

As a point of departure, the future force design should constitute the first principle of rationalisation.



"Rationalisation would be effected through natural attrition, non-renewal of expired contracts and retrenchment."



"The process would call for volunteers which [sic] the SANDF could afford to release, where after the remaining supernumerary members would have to be rationalised, considering a number of factors such as, inter alia, operational readiness, the budget, Government policy with regard to representivity and legitimacy, successfully concluding integration, maintenance of morale and transparency. Criteria applicable to individuals would include aspects such as inter alia, expertise, past performance or potential, disciplinary records and domestic circumstances."



"Appropriate identification and appeal systems were envisaged, with involvement of the affected individual and British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in a monitoring and advisory role. PSAP would in the main be rationalised according to the provisions applicable to the broader Public Service. Some form of support for those being rationalised, was considered very important and their re-introduction into civilian life should be conducted in the same way as persons being demobilised i.e. be managed by the Service Corps."

In an address by Mosiuoa Lekota, the Minister of Defence, on the occasion of the defence budget vote in the National Assembly on 7 April 2000, he pointed out that the integration intake process of statutory and non-statutory forces was drawing to a close. Minister Lekota indicated that the process took much longer than was originally anticipated and confirmed that the rationalisation of SANDF personnel would be guided by the employer initiated retrenchment scheme. At the same time, the minister indicated that the composition of the SANDF had to be demographically representative. This also applied to the composition of the officer corps. This implied that training had to be shaped to ensure representivity and a balanced force for the future. The termination of the integration intake of statutory and non-statutory forces led to the Termination of Integration Intake Bill along with an amendment to the Demobilisation Bill.

At a parliamentary media briefing in Cape Town on 18 September 2000, Minister Lekota suggested that the South African Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the South African Defence Review demanded a "smaller, professional representative defence force, capable of performing its primary and secondary functions efficiently and effectively."63 The Minister emphasised that the scope of transformation covered the following areas:

integration and representivity;

civil control over the military;

civilianising the Department of Defence, defence policy and posture;

civic education;

efficiency; and

international and regional defence co-operation.

The rationalisation dilemma

With regard to integration and representivity, Minister Lekota reported a significant improvement of the racial mix in the SANDF. (In order to promote harmony within the force, the Department of Defence has identified the establishment of a shared value system as a key issue based on the institutionalisation of a code of conduct.) In 1994, the percentage ratio of whites to Africans, Asians and coloureds in the Department of Defence, was 45:55. By October 2000, this had changed to 26:74. The Defence Review guidelines set the ratio at 24.5:75.5. In an interview with Jane’s Defence Weekly in December 1999, Minister Lekota highlighted the key problem for future rightsizing when he posed the following questions: "Where do we slice off? Top, middle, bottom? In what proportions?" Lekota partly answered his own questions by pointing out that, if the SANDF cuts mainly at the bottom, former MK and APLA members will be mostly affected, creating the impression that the department is simply retaining former SADF personnel. Moreover, it would result in releasing a large number of individuals with insufficient economic skills back into society, in effect, transferring the problem without actually solving it.64 Given the present composition of the SANDF (see table 3), middle to upper management is predominantly white and former SADF, while the lower ranks, the most likely to be rationalised, are predominantly former MK and APLA. Any rightsizing will thus have to address this problem and take into account targets set in the Defence Review to ensure representivity (see figures 2-4). The challenge is to create upward mobility for black members of the SANDF while, at the same time, ensuring that the force retains the necessary skills and experience. Some observers suggest that the SANDF is top-heavy, largely for historical reasons, and requires a significant downsizing of senior ranks.65 Simultaneously, the restructuring of salary scales is suggested to improve remuneration without the necessity of promotion, as is the case in most military forces. The US, for example, has an ‘up-or-out system’ which requires that officers are promoted on merit into an available post within a limited period of time, or accept early retirement. This ensures that the best, most motivated individuals are promoted to the higher ranks, but prevents the military from becoming top-heavy and placing an inordinate burden on the defence budget.

Minister Lekota has confirmed the government’s intention to proceed with the purchase of strategic defence packages. According to the minister, the reason for acquiring defence equipment originated from constitutional obligations embodied in the White Paper and the Defence Review. Confirming the government’s intention to purchase new weapons signalled the requirement to reduce expenditure on personnel and, consequently, the need to rationalise the force. The significant defence budget increase of 28% announced in 2000 is intended to be allocated largely for the equipment modernisation programme and is not expected to alter the longer term objective of personnel rightsizing (see table 4).66 In the context of rationalisation, or rightsizing, the department has suggested that the Defence Review, financial limitations and parliamentary approval will determine the final force design and the shape of the department with regard to personnel requirements. At the same time, the department is expected to be guided by the need to improve the ratio of combat troops to support troops.67

According to the department’s 1999/2000 annual report, the integration of the armed forces since 1994 increased the size of the full-time establishment from 84 052 members in 1993/4 to a high of 102 600 in 1995/6.68 This resulted in the defence expenditure ratio with respect to personnel, operating and capital costs to change, respectively, from 32%, 40%, 28% in 1994, to 57%, 35%, 8%, in 1998. In order to re-establish the targeted budgetary balance, the department has allowed its personnel component to fall below 84 000 by making use of selective appointments, natural attrition, including the voluntary termination of short-term contracts and voluntary severance packages. Planning allows the department to continue reducing personnel numbers through natural attrition and voluntary severance mechanisms. Longer term planning assumes that an employer initiated retrenchment package will become available and that, with political approval for rationalisation, the department will reduce its personnel strength to 70 000 through this kind of retrenchments and natural attrition. The department estimates that the reduction in force levels will result in a decreased personnel cost from 52% of the total budget in 1999/2000, to 47% in 2002/03, excluding the effect of improvements in conditions of service. The costs and details of the employer initiated retrenchment programme fall within the ambit of Department of Public Service and Administration. The Department of Defence has established the Directorate of Separation to promote the efficient reintegration of military personnel back into civil society. Moreover, it has prepared a comprehensive plan for rationalisation and reintegration.

The future SANDF rationalisation programme is expected to use the following criteria to identify personnel for retrenchment:

Military readiness: poor health is likely to be important in this context.



Representivity: targets set in the Defence Review are expected to act as guide.



Level of expertise: this will count against the lower ranks.



Disciplinary record: soldiers with poor records will face retrenchment.



Gender distribution: this implies that only a small number of women, if any, will be retrenched.



Performance in the specific post: a poor record of performance will be a negative factor and may lead to retrenchment.

South Africa’s first demobilisation exercise was financed by the Department of Defence. However, the much larger rationalisation programme that is expected will require additional external funding to ensure its success. The department has indicated that it will identify and mobilise potential donors to this end.