INTRODUCTION

The backdrop

Of all the challenges facing post-conflict societies, few are more challenging and enduring than that of demobilisation. While forces may be downsized over time, weapons inventories disposed of effectively, and the legacy of conflicts gradually fade from public memory, demobilised soldiers continue to remain with a society in political, psychological and practical terms.

Demobilisation is rarely an easy process to manage. It involves the intersection of many factors - the socio-economic status of those being demobilised, the capacity of the economy to absorb former combatants, their acceptance into the broader community and, always, the psychological needs of those being reinserted into the community.

To ensure that the post-conflict reintegration process is successful, the active involvement of many actors is required. Decisive political commitment and high levels of political will are imperative to ensure that a country accepts the importance of demobilisation and the need for resources to be allocated to this process. It demands a high level of understanding and commitment from the government to ensure that, across all its policy sectors, it can contribute to the creation of an enabling environment within which an orderly demobilisation strategy can occur. It should expect that the private sector (macro, medium or micro-enterprises) harness its energies in support of the demobilisation process not only because of the skills that former military personnel have to offer, but also to mitigate against the potentially disruptive effects of political and social instability that can be occasioned by frustrated war veterans.

A critical role must be played by civil society because it is ultimately within civil society’s terrain that demobilised soldiers need to re-establish themselves and create livelihoods characterised by dignity, productivity and cultural and spiritual acceptance. It is ultimately on the farm and in villages, suburbs and towns, the churches and beer halls that former combatants need to make their homes in such a manner that they play a constructive part in the ongoing development of these communities.

In essence, a successful demobilisation strategy includes of necessity a wide range of roleplayers within its orbit, demands the involvement of many different public and private institutions and should be characterised by high levels of public awareness and sympathy for persons about to be demobilised. It is equally important, however, to acknowledge that demobilisation cannot be successful unless certain broader political and strategic conditions are in place, if not entirely then at least partially. These are analysed below.

Defence conversion and demobilisation: Two sides of the same coin

Demobilisation is an inseparable component of a broader process of what is increasingly referred to as ‘defence conversion’. Defence conversion can best be identified as the purposeful conversion of existing, surplus or redundant defence capabilities towards human security and development ends. Six areas of conversion have been identified in international disarmament and demilitarisation processes. These include the reallocation of financial resources, reorientation of research and development (R&D) functions, restructuring of defence industry, demobilisation, military base closure and redevelopment, and the disposal of surplus weapons. Some analysts include another element in this list - normative conversion - and assert that, without a significant mind-shift in people’s attitudes towards both conflict and war, the areas of conversion indicated above will continue to emerge in one form or another in the future.

Six major areas of conversion have been identified in the current South African demilitarisation process, which correlate to the processes identified above (with the exception of the reallocation of financial resources that has not occurred in a systematic and planned manner). These include defence industry conversion, demobilisation, surplus arms disposal, base closure, land redistribution (this being of particular political significance in the South African transition) and R&D reorientation. These processes all relate directly to attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to reorient military resources primarily for non-military uses.

The progress with the conversion of these capabilities towards civilian-centred development goals has been uneven and asymmetrical — itself a product of the different institutional responsibilities for such conversion within the state, the relative inexperience of the new government and, as stated above, the absence of a unifying, integrated and practical strategy capable of operationalising the new thinking in security, which underpins much of South African policy. These processes, their strengths and weaknesses, existing and suggested strategies for the future, are therefore critical to the ultimate success of any demobilisation process.

Political and strategic conditions for a successful demobilisation strategy

A demobilisation process is unlikely to be successful unless the following broad conditions are present:

A stable and resilient political culture should exist with robust and legitimate political and civil institutions in the country concerned. Without this precondition, the ability for demobilisation to take place in an ordered and stable environment will be greatly reduced.



Stable civil-military relations with a high level of trust must exist between the civil authorities and the military élite. The preparedness of the armed forces to accept cuts in their budget and their willingness to support demobilisation initiatives will be bedevilled, unless a mutual recognition of the importance of demobilisation within the broader security equation exists between both parties.



A relatively high level of interaction should exist between the state, political society and civil society over the formulation and implementation of defence policy. Without these internal confidence and security-building measures, the ability of the state to ensure effective ‘buy in’ and legitimacy for its endeavours will be severely limited.



The prospects for regional stability, peace and development must be reasonably good. Where such short-term prospects are ill-defined or non-existent, the long-term prospects for a stable demobilisation strategy will be short-lived. The successful demobilisation programmes conducted in Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia during the early 1990s were rendered redundant with the remobilisation of these forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Eritrean conflicts, respectively.



A relatively high level of political and institutional will should be evident in both the state and political society to ensure that demobilisation, and not simply the severance of military personnel is implemented.



The extent to which a coherent and integrated human security policy exists within a government which proves capable of integrating the diverse elements of security (political, economic, social, military and technological) of which demobilisation is a key component, is crucial to the success of demobilisation programmes.



A degree of policy and strategic coherence must exist regarding demobilisation among donor agencies, international financial institutions and international organisations.

If these conditions are largely, or even partially present, then it is vital that an appropriate demobilisation strategy, with the requisite levels of political and institutional support, is formulated and implemented.

Demobilisation phases

To be successful, most demobilisation strategies need to follow a generic series of phases. These phases are not inviolable and are strongly influenced by the political, social and psychological profiles of the country concerned. Key elements in any process should include at least most, if not all, of a number of steps.

Firstly, it requires a clear acknowledgement that the time for demobilisation has arrived. This recognition is, however, not always as self-evident as it seems. Many post-conflict societies do not automatically engage in demobilisation processes. Armed forces continue to retain bloated force levels for a variety of reasons. Some of these are pragmatic and relate to the belief that members of the armed forces can be used for different non-conflict roles - reconstruction and development tasks for instance. These types of strategy, while viable in the short to medium term, fail to address the appropriateness of the armed forces for these tasks and, indeed, the cost-effectiveness of such strategies.

Governments are sometimes simply scared or reluctant to demobilise former combatants and, accordingly, lack the political will to ensure that a sustainable demobilisation strategy is developed. Legions are the examples of bloated armed forces that persisted well into peaceful post-conflict scenarios in both the developed and the developing world alike. Many argue that the armed forces in the United States have still not managed to adjust their force levels to those appropriate to post-Cold War tasks. Tanzania still possesses the legacy of force levels that can be traced, at least partially, to its invasion of Uganda in 1979. The inflated level of the current officer corps in the South African armed forces is a twin product of its integration process and the substantial force levels of the pre-1990 South African Defence Force (SADF).

Secondly, it remains important to ensure that a durable cease-fire is in place. Without this guarantee, demobilisation processes that are hastily initiated may terminate with equal rapidity.

Thirdly, it is important to identify persons eligible for demobilisation. This is a difficult process for politicians and force commanders alike and exposes them to the risk of unpopularity and, in more extreme cases, accusations of treachery. Such a process needs to take place, not on the basis of patronage, but on the basis of a scientific assessment of the roles and tasks envisaged for the force in future, the force levels required for such a force, and the functional levels of competency demanded by those persons in the different posts within the proposed force structure.

In the fourth place, it is vital that an assessment of the profiles of persons nominated for demobilisation should be compiled. This will include an assessment of their socio-economic background and status, skills base, aptitudes and psychological status. This will contribute to the more effective placement of such individuals in society.

Furthermore, appropriate programmes should be instituted within the armed forces to prepare persons for demobilisation. To a certain extent, an attempt to rectify this situation has been made with the creation of the Service Corps. Its mission is to assist with the reintegration of former service members into civil society by uplifting their standard of education, helping them to find employment, career guidance and assistance with reintegration, where possible.

However, the Service Corps has been stymied by a number of interrelated factors. The first is the fact that, to date, it has largely concentrated on rationalised and demobilised personnel from the lower end of the military hierarchy. As such, its focus on skills provision lies predominantly in the private and junior non-commissioned officer range. Secondly, the perception exists, and this is partially confirmed by the membership of the Service Corps, that it has become a ‘dumping ground’ for former liberation force members. The legitimacy of the Corps to a broader range of demobilised personnel and, indeed, its capacity to provide conversion and accreditation skills for both the officer and non-commissioned officer corps are therefore limited at present.

While the services of the Service Corps need to be retained, and its focus should continue to be on the reintegration of more junior members of the armed forces into civil society, a more ambitious programme needs to be instituted within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) that will extend beyond the cash payments and basic skills-training provided by the Service Corps.

The armed forces of the US and the United Kingdom have developed some innovative military career transition programmes. In particular, the armed forces need to focus on conversion strategies such as alternative certification programmes whereby the substantial organisational, managerial and technical skills of service members can be converted for use in the civil sector. Alternative certification is defined as follows:

"Simply put, alternative certification refers to programs designed to facilitate the entry of college graduates with appropriate subject matter expertise into classroom teaching or administrative positions in the schools ... Alternative certification programs allow arts and sciences graduates to participate in intensified programs which do not require the typical accumulation of credit hours, to demonstrate competency requirements, and or to gain the necessary expertise through field-based experiences while holding a teaching position."1

While the focus of alternative certification in countries such as the US, Germany and the UK has exclusively been on converting the skills and capabilities of former officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) into classroom-based competencies, the concept is used in a wider sense here. It refers to the possible conversion of the skills and capabilities of all former service members into a wide range of competencies including managerial and administrative capabilities within both the private and public sector, possible conversion into teaching and instructor-based competencies, as well as the conversion of technically-related skills into similar areas.

Alternative certification programmes in the US, for instance, take place within the broader context of defence downsizing. Downsizing has had profound effects on force levels within all US arms of service. To prepare military personnel for a second career upon severance, a variety of military career transition programmes have been instituted. Although many former military officers and NCOs find direct employment within the private sector upon severance from the organisation, a large number want to go to university or college, while others desire retraining in a new skill.

Skills that could be developed and converted through such alternative programmes could include leadership and management skills, effective written and oral communication skills, team-building, strategic capabilities, and an ability to work with large groups of people. Most senior and middle-ranking officers from all integrating forces possess graduate qualifications from civilian tertiary institutions, and have completed a variety of staff courses at defence force staff colleges (the latter providing extensive background in managerial, strategic, financial and administrative techniques). Junior officers and senior NCOs, for their part, have completed a range of military courses in areas of functional specialisation, leadership and basic management skills.

The advantages are evident of alternative career certification programmes as the dominant human resource conversion strategy in South Africa. It can contribute to the creation of a national skills base, which can be used in various areas of national reconstruction and development. It can also ensure that demobilised soldiers are peacefully reintegrated into the community and are not tempted to use their ‘not inconsiderable’ skills towards other, more violent ends. Indeed, the real and alleged involvement of former soldiers from throughout Southern Africa in ongoing crime, even during the early stages of demobilisation, should provide South African defence planners with food for thought.

Reintegration is the sixth major phase and consists of many different components. The first is undoubtedly an attempt to ensure that appropriate opportunities exist outside the employment of the armed forces that would enable former combatants to find meaningful — not degrading — employment. This does not necessarily entail reinsertion into the formal economy but, at least, requires an appreciation of the elasticity of both the formal and informal boundaries of a country’s economy. The second, as stated above, is to mobilise as wide a range of stakeholders behind this process as possible - whether public, private or community-based. The third is the ongoing monitoring of this process for decades to come, for it is ultimately only when veterans pass away that the responsibility of both the state and society towards them ceases.

Obviously, none of this can be accomplished unless adequate resources are available and an integrated national demobilisation strategy is in place. Resources are critical, but do not need to be abundant - indeed, in many countries resources are simply not available. A creative utilisation of resources that avoids undue expenditure on bureaucracy, aims at developing the long-term capacity of individuals as opposed to the invariable short-term nature of cash ‘hand-outs’, and relies on the collaboration of a range of funding agencies, can generate immensely creative solutions.

The formulation of an appropriate national demobilisation strategy should reflect two factors. The first is the fact that demobilisation is not simply a military challenge — indeed, it is not even primarily a military challenge. Demobilised persons, once they leave the employ of the armed forces, become citizens and their travails and needs are articulated within this broader civil infrastructure. The military does not possess the capacity to address these concerns. However, there are a plethora of organisations which do and that, in the normal course of events, attempt to assist all civilians grappling with similar problems.

The second is the fact that, without a national focus and an appropriate national level of co-ordination, demobilisation programmes run the risk of becoming lost in a welter of bureaucracy and/or organisational dissipation. In the opinion of respondents involved in this survey, this is where one of the key challenges lies that will face the demobilisation process in South Africa in future.

The future?

The SANDF has undertaken and anticipates substantial further reductions in its force levels. People about to leave the armed forces have to be catered for, but those who have already left should not be neglected. It is crucial to determine the status of their personal circumstances. Indeed, issues around demobilisation do not arise in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, but often in the following decades. Although the conflict in Zimbabwe is mainly about land issues, an equally importantly component of the problems in this country is the government’s failure to deal with its own demobilisation process, dating back to the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army in 1980.

This monograph explores some of these issues by examining the challenges confronting the reinsertion of former SANDF personnel into the South African economy and society. It also considers demobilisation processes in other countries in the developing world, and draws lessons from their experiences. It is hoped that the insights provided here will make a contribution to the emerging policies, strategies and literature on the challenges of South African demobilisation.