Chapter 6

SCOPE AND THREAT OF ORGANISED CRIME IN THE SADC REGION

A number of questions aimed at establishing what police agencies in the different SADC countries saw as the nature of organised crime in their countries, how they perceived the threat posed by such criminal activities, what specific crimes posed the greatest threat, as well as the involvement of foreign nationals in organised criminal activities. The survey also attempted to establish whether organised crime had increased in the region over a period of five years.

Nature of organised crime in the SADC region

An attempt was made to establish the range of organised criminal activities occurring in SADC countries. Respondents were asked to choose the specific crimes which such groups were involved in and to indicate whether a particular activity could be categorised as a crossborder crime.

The questionnaire provided a list of 34 crime categories from which respondents could select those crimes prevalent in their countries (see tables 5, 6 and 7 for the responses of police agencies in the different countries). Some of the respondents chose not to respond to all the questions. The responses were therefore not as comprehensive as they could have been. It must be accepted that the conclusions that can be drawn from these responses have their limitations. Some parts of a fairly large puzzle are not in place, but sufficient information was provided to identify the range and nature of organised criminal activities in the countries concerned.

Despite their limitations, the responses in the tables that follow, contain a valuable source of information for further analysis. The fact that different or sometimes no definitions of ‘organised crime’ were used in completing the questionnaire, means that a comparison of the extent of organised crime in different SADC countries on the basis of the above responses will not carry as much weight as would have been the case if similar criteria had been applied by the respondents. Nevertheless, the wide range of crimes committed by organised criminal groups provides an indication of the overwhelming challenge faced by many of these countries.

Not only are organised criminal groups engaged in a wide variety of criminal activities, but the responses also indicate that crossborder criminal activities are extensive. The notion of transnational organised crime is therefore very real in each of the SADC countries that participated in the survey. For example, Botswana, a country with a relatively small population of 1 576 470, and a criminal investigation department consisting of about 600 detectives during 2000, indicated that, of the 34 categories of crimes listed in the questionnaire, 20 involved crossborder or transnational organised criminal activities. Politically and economically, Botswana has been one of the most stable SADC countries during the past two decades. It has been better placed than most SADC countries to make resources available for combating crime and has developed a good track record in this regard. However, even if it was able to devote more resources towards the combating of organised crime, Botswana will find it very difficult to curb organised crime without the more extensive involvement of other countries in the region.

The importance of developing a more effective regional response to organised crime becomes apparent when considering that, in the nine respondent countries, organised criminal groups are often engaged in similar criminal activities. A sharing of expertise and intelligence, and a harmonised regional legislative approach in the SADC region will be required to increase the risk for organised criminal groups and to make the combating of organised crime more effective.

The information below indicates the extent to which organised criminal groups in the nine countries were involved in similar criminal activities (see figure 1).

Counterfeit notes

In a report published early in 2000, the US Treasury stated that South Africa was becoming a ‘major producer’ of counterfeit US currency and that the US Secret Service, the agency responsible for policing this crime, had established an office in South Africa to deal with the problem.18 Counterfeit notes worth US $16.7m were seized in South Africa in 1998, representing nearly a quarter of worldwide seizures outside the US that year. The only country where seizures were greater was Italy, where notes with a face value of $37.5m were seized.

Figure 1 suggests that the problem of counterfeit notes is not contained to South Africa, but that it is widespread throughout the region, with organised criminal groups active in dealing in counterfeit notes in each of the nine SADC countries that participated in the survey.

Smuggling of firearms, armed robbery and vehicle theft and hijacking

These categories of organised crime also occur in each of the nine respondent countries. The armed conflicts in some Southern African countries during the past two decades have been the main contributing factor towards the proliferation of firearms in the region. Firearms, as well as stolen motor vehicles, are trafficked throughout the region and are used by criminal groups as a currency to pay for other illicit goods such as narcotics or diamonds. A further consequence of the wide availability of firearms has been the rapid growth in armed robberies in the region.

While most of the stolen and hijacked vehicles that are trafficked in the region originate from South Africa, none of the other SADC countries have been spared by this phenomenon. During 2000, a total of 100 647 motor vehicles and motorcycles were reported stolen to the police in South Africa.19 In addition, a total of 14 999 cases of motor vehicle-hijacking — the removal of a vehicle from the driver through force or the threat of force — were recorded. A total of 115 646 motor vehicles (and a very small percentage of motorcycles) were therefore channelled from legitimate ownership into the criminal market during 2000. It is common cause that organised criminal groups were mainly responsible for the theft and hijacking of the overwhelming majority of reported cases. The police estimate that close to 50% of stolen or hijacked vehicles are smuggled across South Africa’s borders to Southern African countries and beyond.20

The smuggling of firearms, armed robbery, and vehicle theft and hijackings are therefore organised criminal activities which facilitate the commission of a number of other criminal activities in the region. A report from Malawi, pointing towards the interlinkage of these three categories of criminal activities, illustrates how this country experiences the impact of these crimes:

"[The recruitment of additional police] comes amid an outcry from the public that crime has reached uncontrollable levels in Malawi. Armed robbery was virtually unheard of in the single party era … After ... the country’s democratisation in 1994, not a day has gone by before a grisly armed robbery or murder is reported involving powerful assault rifles like AK-47. Carjacking is also taking root, with Malawi becoming an outpost for international car robbery rackets. The country is also increasingly becoming a conduit zone for hard drugs like mandrax, heroin and cocaine."21

Smuggling of ivory and rhino horn

A surprising eight out of the nine countries reported that organised criminal groups were involved in this crime. It appears to be far more prevalent in Southern Africa than is generally known, despite the widely held belief that poaching has stabilised or decreased in Southern Africa during the 1990s. Warning lights should continue to flicker when it is considered that the police agencies in seven out of the nine countries reported that organised criminal groups were involved in poaching. Close to 85% of the world’s rhinoceros have been killed since 1970 and no other animal species has been so rapidly depleted for profit.22

The smuggling of rhino horn is frequently interlinked with other forms of crime. In 1991, several citizens of the DRC were captured smuggling 29 horns into South Africa to exchange for stolen cars.23 Poaching is not a crime that results in immediate human victims and is therefore unlikely to evoke the type of public response which armed robbery or vehicle theft might do. However, it has serious longer term consequences for the ecology, nature conservation and tourism in the region.

Corruption in government departments and the business sector

Five of the police agencies reported that organised criminal groups were involved with corruption in government departments and four mentioned that such groups were involved in corrupt practices in the business sector. The questionnaire specifically enquired about the involvement of organised criminal groups in corruption and not about corruption perpetrated by individuals. The responses suggest that criminal groups have managed to penetrate government departments in five of the countries. For developing and least developed countries, the consequences of such penetration are potentially far more damaging than for developed countries with stable political and economic systems. It undermines the gains of democratic transition in a number of ways, including the negative impact on the delivery of basic services to the poor and by deterring potential foreign investment. As a result, the consolidation of democracy is delayed and economic growth retarded. A recent report from Zimbabwe illustrates this point:

"But by far the worst corruption case involves the alleged siphoning of more than 1 billion Zimbabwean dollars from a state-owned oil company by senior managers, leading to a national fuel crisis, which is still affecting the country.

Top officials at the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe are alleged to have stolen fuel and sold it on the black market, and sourced the commodity at above market prices from suppliers who paid them hefty kickbacks. This resulted in the company, which enjoyed a monopoly in oil import, accumulating a staggering debt of 20 billion Zimbabwean dollars because of the unrealistically high price at which it procured the fuel. "24

In another case, the Sun City international hotel group abandoned multibillion dollar plans to build hotels in Zimbabwe, in favour of Zambia, after Zimbabwean government officials allegedly persisted in demanding kickbacks to approve the project. As a result, the country lost direct investment worth Zim $5 billion, and estimated annual earnings from the project of more than US $30 million.25

The Zambian ministers of Home Affairs, Finance, and Works and Supplies have been implicated in the diversion of 2 billion kwacha from parliament, which was allegedly used to fund the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s national convention held in April 2001.26

Although a draft SADC Protocol on Corruption is to be considered for adoption at the SADC summit of heads of state in August 2001, the region needs to guard against creating its own comfort zone behind regional and international conventions. While these are essential in developing co-ordinated responses to corruption, it is the political will that is displayed at national level and then manifested through a solid record of implementation at national level that will determine whether or not corruption will be combated effectively.

Implications of the crossborder occurrence of these crimes

Table 5 to 7 above therefore highlight the extent to which a wide range of criminal activities cut across all national boundaries, impacting on the region as a whole to a far greater extent than has perhaps been acknowledged. The long list of crossborder criminal activities goes far beyond trafficking in stolen vehicles, narcotics, weapons or diamonds. It includes crimes such as smuggling counterfeit notes, forgery, poaching, trafficking in women and children, money-laundering, insurance scams, bank fraud, computer fraud, intellectual property theft, and corruption in the business sector. The far greater extent to which transnational organised groups ignore boundaries to use the entire region as their operational terrain should serve as a warning to decision makers that more co-ordinated and focused regional policy and operational responses are required from governments. No longer can any single country in the SADC region hope to combat organised crime effectively within its own borders without simultaneously linking up with other countries in the region and internationally in its efforts. Although this fact has been recognised in the SADC region, it will require new SARPCCO initiatives which specifically focus on regional organised crime.27 Possible initiatives that should be explored will be discussed in the conclusion.

Perceptions of the threat posed by organised crime

The extent to which police agencies in the region perceive specific organised criminal activities as a threat to their country was probed in the survey. Respondents were asked to consider the crime categories provided before and to specify the ten which they regarded as constituting the most serious threat to their country (see table 8).

6	7	8	9	10
Corruption in business	Ivory & rhino horn	Fire-arms	Illegal immi-gration	Intellectua theftl
Bank fraud	Illegal Immi-gration	Fraud	Dagga	Corruption in business
Diamonds	Robbery	Fire-arms	Insurance scams	Loan sharks
Firearms	Robbery	Murder	Theft	Burglary
Firearms*	Rape	Vehicle theft	Theft	Fraud
Poaching	Firearms	Gold	Bank fraud	Corruption in govern- ment
Prostitu-tion	Counterfeit notes
Gold & emerald	Money-laundering	Poach-ing

Although the above response accurately reflects the assessment of the threats posed to their respective countries by organised criminal activities made by the respondent police agencies, their responses have to be approached with caution. The need for caution emanates, among others, from the very general nature of the question. No objective criteria were provided on which to base their assessment of the threat. For example, no common definition of organised crime was suggested as a point of departure. Nor were they asked to indicate what definition they relied upon when formulating their response. From the discussion of definitions of organised crime provided above, it is already known that, at the time when the threat assessment was made, five of the police agencies had not adopted a definition of organised crime, while the remaining four used different definitions. Although the drafters of the questionnaire anticipated these problems, it was nevertheless decided to proceed with a general question in order to make a start at collecting this kind of information, irrespective of the anticipated imperfection of the responses.

It must therefore be assumed that there are considerable discrepancies in the criteria applied by the different police agencies when deciding whether specific crimes were committed by organised criminal groups or not.

Respondents were also not asked to indicate the methodology they had applied in arriving at the threat assessment. The information on which the threat assessment is based is therefore not known. Respondents were not requested to indicate, for example, whether they relied on crime intelligence assessments or whether crime statistics formed the basis. Nor did the question probe whether proper threat analyses were relied upon, what such processes consisted of, and to what extent the approaches to threat assessments differed from country to country. It is therefore not known to what extent some of the assessments were based on the subjective assessment of specific individuals in the various police agencies.

The uncertainty about what weight to attach to the priority list of crimes in table 8 above therefore arises from the generality and vagueness of the question. As the questionnaire was the first of its kind to be administered among Southern African police agencies, the decision was taken to err on the side of caution rather than to adopt a more meticulous approach that might risk a non-response. The fact that nine police agencies took the trouble to respond to this question stands to their credit and forms a good basis for more detailed questions to be raised in future. The process of developing coherent and reliable regional mechanisms for the assessment of organised crime will be lengthy and complex, and may take years to perfect, particularly in a region with limited resources. The experiences of other regions illustrate how difficult such a task can be, even if the availability of resources is not a constraining factor. Member countries of the European Union started with the process of measuring and assessing organised crime in 1993. A brief case study of their experiences during the first three years of this exercise is instructive and could provide an indication of the difficulties that still lie ahead for SARPCCO and SADC countries. The case study also indicates how difficult it is to rely on questionnaires during the initial phases of the process.

Case study of early efforts by EU member states to develop a common assessment mechanism for organised crime28 With the view to improve police co-operation between EU member countries and to get an idea of the nature and extent of organised crime in Western Europe, a process commenced in 1993 with an attempt to develop a common definition of organised crime and to obtain reliable data about the phenomenon. The EU Council prioritised the development of an assessment mechanism that was to focus on the approach to and analysis of international criminal organisations known to member countries. 1993 annual situation report The EU Council decided in 1993 that it would like to receive an annual report on the scale of and trends in international organised crime. This formed the basis for the first attempt to measure the nature and extent of organised crime in the EU. The resulting report contained substantial flaws. Problems that contributed to the flaws were identified as follows: There was no standard structure for the national collection of information which takes the specific aspects of the organised crime situation into account. There was no standardised structure for the preparation of national contributions and the overall EU report. The use of different definitions, criteria and parameters in national efforts to collect and analyse information resulted in a situation where the information gathered from member countries could not be reliably compared. The analysis of the information, as well as the assessment of the analytical results were also very restrictive. 1994 annual situation report Subsequent to the tabling of the 1993 report, meetings of experts were held and a strategy plan was endorsed in December 1994 in which the main goal of the next annual report was defined as the identification of the scale of and trends in international organised crime. This included, among others, a list of topics to be dealt with in the annual national reports. In 1995, this mechanism was put into use for the first time. Only six of the 15 EU member countries were able to provide quantitative data on organised crime for 1994. The attempts to compile an annual report were again not very successful as there were still a number of problems to overcome in order to establish a common assessment mechanism. For example: Not all member states had a national criminal intelligence service with data on criminal groups. The gathering and analysis of relevant information raised methodological as well as organisational problems. The annual reports from some countries were based on criminal intelligence data, while other member states used ‘hard’ data derived from formal protocols or crime statistics. Despite these problems, the results provided a better view of organised crime in Europe than the previous report for 1993. Because of the many differences in the magnitude, analysis and treatment of the phenomenon among countries, However, it appeared to be very difficult to establish common trends and to formulate recommendations on the combating of organised crime. 1995 annual situation report At an expert meeting in February 1996, the methodology used in the different countries was discussed. A number of EU member countries had introduced questionnaires in order to assess the organised crime situation for the 1995 annual situation report. Progress was made in perfecting a common mechanism for the systematic analysis and collection of the type of information required. Nevertheless, in the annual situation report that was presented shortly thereafter, the authors stated that the analysis was influenced by the substantial differences between national situation reports with regard to their extent, analysis and view of organised crime. Some provided no quantitative data, others did not address all the topics in the questionnaire, and many did not identify trends observed during the year under review. However, significant progress had been made since the 1993.

This brief case study illustrates that attempts to develop a regional assessment mechanism for organised crime are likely to go through lengthy phases of trial and error before a reliable common approach can emerge. This is a task that SARPCCO should address in earnest. At present, the SARPCCO constitution states as one of its objectives: "[t]o promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications."

However, the concept of ‘crossborder and related crimes’ is very general and there appears to have been no concerted attempts to develop a common definition for organised crime among SARPCCO members or to start the process of developing an assessment mechanism for organised crime in the region. At present, SARPCCO, in co-operation with the subregional Interpol bureau, gathers regional information about trends and patterns of organised crime by way of questionnaires or through intelligence gathered during joint operations in the countries of the Southern African region.29 The obstacles and problems that EU member countries grappled with during the first few years of developing an assessment mechanism remain unaddressed in the Southern African region. The information available to SARPCCO about organised crime in the region can therefore not be very reliable or accurate. The same must apply to the information on organised crime that was elicited through the questionnaire discussed in this monograph.

Despite its imperfections, this questionnaire could assist in improving and refining future attempts at assessing organised crime in the region. The information that was supplied in response to request to prioritise the ten most serious crimes threatening the region is therefore important as it provides a first, very tentative, indication of which organised crime activities are perceived to constitute the most serious threat to the nine SADC countries in question.

The views of five of the 14 SADC countries on organised crime in their country remain unknown as their police agencies either did not respond to the questionnaire or were not surveyed. The Mozambican and Angolan police agencies did not respond, and the survey was not administered in Mauritius, the Seychelles, or the DRC. It is in any event unlikely that Angola and the DRC would have been able to supply reliable country information on organised crime, as large parts of their territories are out of reach for police agencies due to ongoing conflict.

Under the circumstances, the responses from the nine SADC countries listed in table 8 provide a reasonable basis from which to extrapolate a regional threat assessment. An attempt to use this information to identify regional threats is presented in figure 2.

From the above exercise, the prominence of vehicle theft and hijacking as the most serious organised crime threat to the SADC region is noteworthy. Regional police agencies have been prioritising this crime category for some time. SARPCCO, identified the theft and smuggling of stolen vehicles as a priority for joint police operations in the SADC region since its inception.

Since 1997, SARPCCO has organised at least nine joint police operations in Southern African countries targeting motor vehicle theft, drug cultivation and trafficking, firearms-trafficking, wanted criminals, diamond-smuggling, illegal immigrants and any other crimes. However, the common denominator in all nine operations was the focus on stolen vehicles. An example of such an operation was Operation V4, conducted during February to March 1997, and covering Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A total of 1 576 stolen vehicles were recovered over a period of 12 days. Out of these vehicles, 1 464 originated in South Africa.30

Similar joint operations were conducted in all 12 Southern African members of SARPCCO. Despite the focus on stolen motor vehicles, it was also acknowledged that organised criminal groups involved in the theft and crossborder smuggling of vehicles in Southern Africa are frequently also involved in the trafficking in drugs, firearms, diamonds and illegal immigrants. These forms of criminal activities are closely linked and, except for the trafficking in illegal immigrants, feature prominently among the five most threatening organised crime activities in the region as reflected in figure 2.

Joint police operations that focused on stolen motor vehicles therefore often resulted in arrests for other criminal offences. As a result of the close links between vehicle theft and other crimes, valuable crime intelligence relating to a wider range of criminal activities was obtained during SARPCCO joint operations.

The prominence of robbery among the five most serious organised criminal activities in the SADC region is probably due to the ready availability of firearms in the region. The ongoing supply of cheap firearms from the regions’ conflict areas is likely to continue for some years even if the conflicts abate soon. Not only have robberies become more violent and lethal as a result of the widespread use of firearms, but significant increases have been experienced in this crime category in most SADC countries. Reference has already been made to the increase in robberies in Malawi.31

In Tanzania, armed robbery is resurfacing after a lull that had prevailed since the mid -990s.32 In Botswana, the National Police Commissioner is contemplating the establishment of a specialised unit to combat armed robbery.33 South African crime statistics show that reported cases of robbery with aggravating circumstances had increased from 97 173 in 1999 to 110 590 in 2000.34

‘Indigenous’ and ‘transnational’ organised criminal groups

Indigenous organised criminal groups

The threat assessment reflected in table 8 and figure 2 relates to the activities of organised criminal groups, in general, without any distinction being drawn between indigenous and international criminal groups. In an attempt to obtain information about the extent to which international organised criminal groups are active in SADC countries, the survey administered among countries’ police agencies contained some questions that distinguished between ‘indigenous’ and ‘transnational’ organised criminal groups.

Respondents were asked to specify the five most serious criminal activities — those that constituted the greatest threat to their country — in which indigenous organised criminal groups were involved. They were further requested to indicate whether these criminal groups operated only within their own countries’ borders, or whether they were involved in crossborder crimes (see table 9). In the introduction to the questionnaire, it was suggested that the following very broad definition of indigenous organised criminal groups should be used when responding to this question:

"’indigenous organised criminal groups’ are those that are made up primarily (but not exclusively) of nationals from your country and that are involved mainly (but not exclusively) in criminal activities within your borders."

It could be argued that the distinction between indigenous and transnational organised criminal groups is somewhat artificial and serves little purpose. However, when incomplete information is available to assess the extent and nature of organised crime committed by domestic organised criminal groups, such an exercise proves useful. The finger is often pointed at international organised criminal groups as the primary perpetrators of organised crime, while the increasingly active role of domestic organised criminal groups is downplayed. Table 9 not only provides an indication of the wide range of serious criminal activities engaged in by domestic groups, but also points to a surprisingly active role played by indigenous groups in crossborder criminal activities. This is the case in all nine countries surveyed and applies to virtually all categories of organised criminal activity. Domestic organised crime groups are therefore clearly transnational with regard to their criminal activities in the SADC region.

In an attempt to gauge which criminal activities committed by indigenous criminal groups constituted the most serious threat in the SADC region, the responses in table 9 were differentially weighted in order to arrive at a regional assessment. The weighting is based on points ranging from 5 to 1 allocated to the five crime categories that constituted the most serious threat to each of the countries. The crime category that constituted the most serious threat was therefore allocated five points and, on a sliding scale, the category that constituted the fifth most serious threat was allocated one point. The same grounds for caution that were raised in relation to the information set out in figure 1 and figure 2, apply to table 9 and 10.

Transnational organised criminal groups

Having considered the role of indigenous organised criminal groups, police agencies were asked to reflect on the role of transnational organised criminal groups. It was suggested that these groups, for the purpose of the questionnaire, should be defined as:

"those that are made up primarily (but not exclusively) of foreign nationals or of individuals who originate from countries other than the respondent country and who are involved in cross-border crimes."

It was further suggested that in cases where there was a mix of the two categories, the respondents should classify such a group as a ‘transnational organised criminal group’ if the influence of foreign nationals or those with foreign links was substantive. If the influence was negligible and the majority in the group are local nationals then the group should be categorised as an ‘indigenous organised criminal group’.

Respondents were therefore asked to specify the five most serious criminal activities — those that constituted the biggest threat to their country — in which transnational organised criminal groups were involved which operated from their territory. Respondents were also requested to confirm whether the criminal activities referred to could also be classified as crossborder crimes. Responses are set out in table 10 and are illustrated as regional threat priorities.

Once again, vehicle theft and hijacking feature as the most threatening criminal activities of transnational organised groups. The reason why this form of criminal activity is regarded as such a threat is not only because the theft of motor vehicles is widespread but, as mentioned before, because this crime is closely intertwined with the trafficking of drugs, firearms, diamonds and other illegally obtained goods. Stolen vehicles constitute a ready currency in exchange for a wide range of illicit goods. Southern African police agencies appear to regard the theft of and trafficking in vehicles as the most serious threat posed by both indigenous and transnational organised criminal groups. The regional networks of both groups stretch across a number of SADC countries making it difficult for any country to curtail their activities on its own. The head of the Interpol’s Subregional Bureau in Harare described their operations as follows:

"All countries in the region have supplied intelligence that has been analysed by Interpol and by the countries themselves. There are very clear relationships and interlinking factors between crime syndicates operating in Southern Africa. It is not a secret to law enforcement agencies of the region that the criminals in the region have better co-operation links that the police officers.

They seem to know who to contact at all times and budgetary constraints, foreign currency shortages, visa problems or governmental authority to travel do not control their movements.

For instance, during the V4 operation, the operatives of the four countries dealt with two very clearly structured syndicates. Both syndicates had ascertainable links in Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa and Botswana. Many of the leading figures were arrested during and after the operations, but there is nothing to suggest that the operations were effectively curtailed. Many of the operations are run as family businesses. Thus, when one on top is arrested, the remaining members continue with the business until they have been arrested as well. In many instances, the different syndicates help one another or share business, although there may be conflict at times."35

Most of the international focus on Southern African organised crime is on drug-trafficking. This category of organised crime is regarded by regional police agencies as a significantly less serious threat than the theft of and trafficking in motor vehicles. The discrepancy is linked to the domestic interests of developed countries who are keen to see action taken against drug-trafficking in different parts of the world before drugs are smuggled across their borders. In 1996, the US Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Gelbard, described Southern Africa as a transhipment centre for drugs:

"Southern Africa has the potential to play a number of roles in the international drug trade. At this point, however, it is primarily a transhipment center for heroin, cocaine, and Mandrax — a synthetically produced sedative made from methaqualone powder and antihistamines. And it is a growing market. If the problem is left unchecked, the trend will almost certainly be for Southern Africa to grow into a major support center, offering important money laundering, chemical production and distribution, shipping services, and eventually a base for powerful international narcotics brokers."36

He described South Africa as "understandably at the hub of the region’s drug trade." Although other countries in the region played a less significant role, they:

"collectively … offer substantial additional trafficking opportunities and alternatives to the South African trade. Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have already made their mark as significant transit points. Of the remaining countries in the region, Malawi appears to be experiencing the most active drug trade. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland currently appear to play only minor roles in the regional trade."37

In a more recent assessment, the head of the Interpol’s Subregional Bureau in Southern Africa confirmed that:

The international impact of drug traffic in and through Southern Africa therefore elevates it to the most serious organised crime threat in Southern Africa from the perspective of the developed consumer countries and international organisations such as the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP). Their assistance programmes and representatives in the region therefore tend to focus more on drug-trafficking than on the theft and hijacking of vehicles.

A comparison between the activities of indigenous and transnational organised groups, as reflected in table 9 and 10 above, is of some interest. The most distinguishing feature is that indigenous groups do not appear to be involved in the illicit trafficking of firearms to any significant extent. This criminal activity does not feature at all as one of the top five threats posed by indigenous criminal groups. However, table 10 indicates that transnational criminal groups were perceived to be heavily involved in this activity to the extent that, among their other activities, trafficking in firearms constituted the third most serious threat. The international dimension attached by police agencies in the region to the trafficking in firearms explains why Southern African governments have been vocal in supporting tougher international measures against such traffic. At the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, held in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001, African representatives urged the international community to adopt a comprehensive action plan to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.

There also appears to be a considerable involvement by both indigenous and transnational criminal groups throughout the region in the illicit smuggling of diamonds and other semi-precious stones. The recent international attempts to curb the flow of ‘blood diamonds’ face significant challenges in Southern Africa, as it must be assumed that some of the diamonds trafficked in the SADC region originate from conflict areas such as Angola and the DRC.

Involvement of foreign citizens in organised criminal groups

The survey sought to obtain an indication of the nationalities of members of criminal groups. This information could indicate whether crossborder or transnational organised crime in the region is primarily the preserve of citizens of Southern African countries and to what extent individuals from other parts of Africa and beyond are involved. The questionnaire provided a list of 18 countries from Africa and other parts of the world. Respondents were asked to indicate whether individuals from any of the listed countries were active in organised criminal groups in their country. In addition, space was provided to mention any other country whose citizens were members of organised criminal groups in their jurisdiction. They were requested to name such countries and to categorise these countries, for example, as other neighbouring states, Europe, and others.

The responses reflected in table 11 also included those countries additional to the 18 listed in the questionnaire.

A number of respondents did not make any choice in respect of some of the listed counties. Table 11 accurately reflects both responses and non-responses. In the absence of explanations from respondents (except for Malawi) for refraining from making a choice, no inferences can be drawn from the non-responses. The response to this question is therefore incomplete, but it nevertheless provides some very useful information. It suggests a significant involvement of citizens of the following countries in organised criminal groups in the SADC region: South Africa (7 countries), Nigeria (7), Pakistan (6), the Far East (China/Hong Kong/Taiwan) (5), and Zimbabwe (5).

Of interest is the equal prominence of both South Africans and Nigerians as members of organised criminal groups in the region. If the involvement of South Africans in organised crime within the country’s own borders is added, then South African criminals appear to be involved in more SADC countries than Nigerian nationals. This conclusion needs to be noted by those South Africans who tend to point a finger at Nigerian organised criminal groups or networks as the main perpetrators of organised crime in the country. The above response by SADC police agencies suggests that South Africa is, in fact, a major exporter of organised crime to other member countries in the SADC region. Although table 11 provides no indication of the extent or nature of the involvement by either South African or Nigerian citizens in organised crime, it suggests that South African criminal networks have managed to establish a noticeable presence in more SADC countries than Nigerian networks. This has implications for regional law enforcement, as well as for relations between South Africa and other SADC states. It is clearly in South Africa’s interest to ensure that effective mutual legal co-operation agreements exist between itself and other SADC countries and that extradition agreements function properly.

Threat assessment of organised criminal groups with foreign members

A follow-up question in the survey attempted to establish whether and to what extent those criminal groups that include citizens of other countries constituted a threat in the respondent countries. Respondents were requested to list the three countries posing the greatest threat to their country in terms of foreign involvement in organised crime, based on the responses provided in the previous question. Responses appear in table 12. The Malawi police agency did not respond to the question.

Unfortunately, the question did not ask respondents to list the nationality of members of organised criminal groups in the order of the seriousness of the threat that they posed. It is therefore not appropriate to deduct which of the criminal groups constituted the most serious threat. What is again clear, however, is that South Africans featured among the top three groups that constituted the most serious threat in the eight countries that responded with the exception of Swaziland. Organised criminal groups consisting of citizens from Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe also featured prominently. This information does not throw any light on the nature and extent of their criminal activities and is therefore of limited use to decision and policy makers. It is the nature and extent of their activities that will determine what the response ought to be of law enforcement agencies.

Increase or decrease in organised crime during the past five years

Two questions were intended to probe the extent to which organised criminal groups had penetrated private sector businesses, business organisations and local, provincial and national government structures in the different countries during the past five years.

Police agencies were asked to describe the extent to which organised crime has increased or decreased in their country during the past five years, and were provided with several possible options: ‘decreased slightly’, ‘decreased significantly’, stayed the same, ‘moderate increase’, or ‘major increase’ (see figure 5).

The responses have significant limitations as the question was very general and unqualified. Respondents were not requested to indicate on what basis they assessed increases or decreases, or what definition they applied of organised crime, if any. To draw reliable comparisons between different countries is therefore not only risky, but would not serve much purpose. The responses are of interest in so far as they reflect the perception of police agencies about organised crime, even though these perceptions were likely to have been determined by the different police agencies using different criteria. A thorough study involving crime statistics, court records, seizures of illicit goods, crime intelligence and interviews with various roleplayers would be required to arrive at a more objective assessment of the growth or decline of organised crime in SADC countries.