Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

In January 2001, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) contracted All Africa Consultants (AAC) to do an exploratory study of the reinsertion of demobilised SANDF personnel into the South African (civilian) economy. This study dealt with the ‘demand side’ and attempted to assess, as accurately as possible, within current social and structural constraints, the availability of job opportunities for demobilised soldiers (mostly former combatants) in the current South African economy. In conjunction to this study, the ISS also contracted the Wits Peace Studies Group of the University of the Witwatersrand to conduct a survey that would provide a profile of demobilised soldiers in South Africa. The latter study dealt with the ‘supply side’. While the two studies are distinct in many respects, they should be seen as complementary.1

It is trusted that the findings reflected in this monograph will assist in improving the understanding of the issues and challenges around the reintegration of demobilised personnel into the South African economy. It is hoped that this understanding will culminate in constructive steps to address the challenges posed by this process.

The South African transition from an authoritarian minority state to democracy through negotiation and non-racial elections in 1994, culminating in the acceptance of the new Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), was hailed by many foreign and internal observers as a small miracle. While the miracle introduced the basis for further transition, the management and sustaining the quality of such miracles are entirely different.

In terms of security sector restructuring the impact of the transition and, concomitant to this, the transformation of the defence establishment cannot be underestimated. South Africa succeeded in many ways in the institutionalisation of new codes of conduct regarding civil-military relations. However, the integration of former statutory force and non-statutory force members into the SANDF provided numerous challenges. Former adversaries had to be integrated into a new unified national defence force. In addition, the new defence force was to be rationalised along the stated objective of a modern, but smaller force, which would suit the new defence budget for peacetime purposes. South Africa — as had been the case in many other countries that moved from inter/intrastate conflict to a post-conflict mode — experienced the simultaneous integration and rightsizing of its armed forces and its military structures. However, the process of rightsizing meant that the defence sector, as one of many parts of the public sector had, and still has to shrink. Such shrinkage leads to job losses, something that any country can ill afford.

The integration and rationalisation of the new SANDF implied a rather quick expansion, before the defence planners could embark on the arguably needed contraction phase (rationalisation) of the SANDF. In effect, rationalisation implied a rather large-scale demobilisation process. While the integration process was technically and professionally hailed as a success — especially among the upper military and political echelons — for those negatively or adversely effected by it, the demobilisation process was much more traumatic.

The transformation of the defence establishment is generally regarded as a threefold process — the integration of the former separate forces, the reinsertion or demobilisation process (of former soldiers into civil society) and the necessary operational changes and adaptation of standards from an offensive approach to a defensive approach. All three processes are regarded (or at least perceived to be) functionally effective and necessary for the SANDF as a system. However, they are also dysfunctional for the individual members who are losing their livelihood. Hence, the demobilisation process and its medium to long-term effects became a growing cause for concern.

It is conservatively estimated that approximately 30 000 staff members would be affected by demobilisation in the period 1994 to 2003/4. Currently, it is expected that at least 12 000 people will be affected by 2003/4. This study refers to the 20 000 soldiers who have already been demobilised. The latest figures available indicate that the force size is at 78 000. It is expected that rationalisation will aim at a force of 65 000 to 70 000 members (at the peak of integration in 1994, there were 101 000 soldiers in the SANDF).2

Terminology

The term ‘demobilisation’ is used in most contexts to refer to the general demobilisation of soldiers after the end of an era of intrastate or interstate hostilities. Examples include the demobilisation of former soldiers in the United States after World War I and II and Vietnam, demobilisation by South African authorities after the same wars, as well as demobilisation in Eritrea after the Ethiopian and Eritrean wars. Several other examples can also be quoted.3

The terminology used for demobilisation in South Africa is rather unique. In contrast with other countries, the term demobilisation as used by the military refers mostly to the demobilisation of non-statutory forces (former combatants), who were nominally or administratively ‘integrated’ in order to be demobilised. Demobilisation in the South African context and discourse around demobilisation also — and sometimes exclusively — refers to former combatants of the non-statutory forces (MK, APLA, AZANLA, Inkatha VIP Protection Units, and others) who were nominally (administratively) integrated in order to be demobilised without entering service in uniform in the new SANDF. The demobilisation of the statuary force members refers to those who left the service of the SADF or the new SANDF by accepting packages (voluntary severance), as a result of natural attrition or for health reasons (dismissal or severance).

For the purposes of the study, an inclusive definition that accommodates aspects of the general or universal definition, but that also includes aspects of the South African usage in terms of the demobilisation of former combatants was opted for. For example, about three-quarters of the study sample were former combatants (non-statutory forces) and about a fifth former SADF and SANDF soldiers.4

Research aim

The aim of this exploratory study was to look at those who were adversely affected by the demobilisation process and who had to be reintegrated not only into civil society, but more specifically into the South African economy. This process has taken place at a time when the South African rand is in decline, inflation is expected to rise and the short-term effects of the new macro-economic programme (GEAR) include significant job losses. The latter phenomenon is expected to continue in South Africa for a while before the positive effects of the intended economic restructuring is felt in the medium to long term. The study explored the economic opportunities available for former SANDF personnel in terms of foreseeable job opportunities. The study also looked at how those without jobs could be assisted to re-enter the job market in a meaningful way and on a sustainable basis. Although the focus is on integration and the job market, the study also provides some insight into the experiences and needs of former soldiers.

Structure

This monograph introduces in the first chapter the need for the study and provides background to the demobilisation process. It also briefly looks at the effects of demobilisation. The next chapter outlines the methodology as an exploratory study with complementary qualitative and quantitative modes of analysis. Chapter 3 situates the study within the ambit of demobilisation (as part of overall restructuring) before a profile of the ‘typical’ demobilised soldier is sketched in chapter 4. This is followed by a context-bound analysis of the availability of job opportunities within the South African economy (nationally and provincially), before the monograph concludes with recommendations to address the situation of joblessness among demobilised former soldiers and combatants.