Chapter 3

INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILISATION PROCESSES

The integration of seven armed forces to form the new SANDF was set in motion after difficult and complex bargaining between negotiators from MK and the SADF. While there were other actors involved, such as the TBVC defence forces and non-statutory forces such as APLA and AZANLA, the main stakeholders — both numerically and politically — were the old SADF, a considerably large and well-trained regular army, and MK, the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), which consisted of externally trained soldiers (mostly guerrilla but some with conventional training and deployment experience) and internally trained self-defence units (SDUs).

The Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC), which was co-chaired by both MK and SADF members, for the creation of the SANDF during early 1994, put the framework for the integration process in place. These former forces included the SADF (85 000 members) and the four TBVC homeland armies (10 000 members), which are referred to as the statutory forces. The non-statutory forces included MK (20 000 members); APLA (6 000 members) associated with the Pan Africanist Congress; AZANLA, the military wing of what is loosely referred to as the Black Consciousness Movement (a few hundred members); and the Inkatha VIP Protection Units (600 members) associated with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Members of all the forces, which had submitted CPRs by midnight on 26 April 1994 automatically became integrated into the new force. After negotiations with the IFP, the former KwaZulu-Natal self-protection police force (1 800 members) was later directly incorporated on a preferential basis and not integrated into the system. Although there was a difference in the manner in which these members were integrated into the new SANDF, all were integrated and all were equally new in the SANDF.

The former SADF, with its well-developed organisational ability and complexity in comparison to the other armed forces, provided the framework and infrastructure for the integration process. It was equipped with the established, complex and differentiated structures of a modern, conventional army and was expected to set the pace for the integration process, because it had the administrative systems for large-scale organisational management. This meant that, despite the ANC’s electoral victory, the SADF inevitably played a major — if not leading role — in the attempted transformation of the armed forces during the transitional period. The SADF’s doctrines, standards and procedures featured prominently in the framework that was used for rebuilding the new force.39 According to the new political dispensation that emerged after 27 April 1994, the new force now had to move towards building its own identity in accordance with the principles of a democratic South Africa.

This section on integration represents some of the empirical findings of an exploratory, qualitative study conducted into the integration process of the armed forces during the period October to December 1998. Some additional information was gleaned from other studies, publications and reports since then, as well as from unstructured interviews with current SANDF and former SADF and MK staff. The aim of this chapter is to report on integration as a process of social change, as well as to establish the functionality, or dysfunctional impact of integration on the new SANDF, in particular — and (perhaps) on South African society, in general. The sections on demobilisation and rationalisation of the SANDF are based on documentary studies of the SANDF.

A qualitative research procedure, which involved the study of content analyses of documentary sources on the integration process, was firstly conducted. Thereafter, an interview schedule consisting of 25 open, unstructured questions was compiled from the documentary sources. In-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted with ten high-ranking officers and commanders who had first-hand knowledge of the integration process. They had different political affiliations and were employed in different sections of the SANDF. Two directors of the Defence Secretariat in Pretoria were also interviewed to establish their opinions of the integration process. Five of the 12 interviews were conducted at training units in Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Potchefstroom, in order to research opinions and problems occurring at ground level. Confidentiality was guaranteed to all respondents. The advantage was that open and frank discussions were held with respondents. A qualitative analysis was undertaken of the 300 different opinions that were expressed. Categories were constructed and interpreted by taking norms of behaviour (similarities and dissimilarities) into account. For subsequent updating (1999-2001) reports, publications, media reports and unstructured interviews with former and current members of the SANDF and non-statutory forces were used, the latter inclusive of demobilised personnel.

The SANDF is analysed in this part of the study from a functionalist perspective. The main premise is that military matters of institutional nature were/are regarded as an organised system of activities directed to reach specific goals (integration) and functions in order to survive as a system in the greater South African society. For the purpose of this discussion, a summary of the opinions of respondents is given and put into context by also providing a brief background to the topic.

Complexities of the integration process

Initially, much of the transformation of the SANDF revolved around the integration of the so-called statutory (SF) and non-statutory forces (NSF). The primary objective of the integration process was to unite soldiers from various military backgrounds peacefully to establish an institution that was professional, efficient and representative. The integration of the seven forces was a complex process, because it involved different organisational structures and political affiliations among former adversaries, who still distrusted one another.40

In total, 24 intakes of military personnel were processed since 1994. Eighteen intakes, the last in July 1998, were processed at Wallmansthal, five at De Brug and one at Hoedspruit. The ‘assembly phase’ of integration was only then considered complete — except for individual former non-statutory force ‘late-comers’ who were belatedly integrated.

Integration was not achieved by merely combining the seven former forces into a single force. Personnel had to go through several steps before they were ‘fully integrated’. The integration process consisted of:

registering individuals on the PERSOL system;



determining bridging training requirements and, where necessary, undergoing specified bridging training;



entering into a contract with the SANDF; and



placing in a specific SANDF post and rank.41

Furthermore, none of these forces was to retain its original form or structure, but was expected to contribute its best attributes to the SANDF. Therefore, integration was also regarded as a process of social change. Old fears, misconceptions and impressions had to be discarded and a new start had to be made. Throughout, the integration process remained a complicated and sensitive process, fraught with difficulties. Soon after the democratic elections in 1994, the ANC and the National Party (NP) expressed that they were in favour of the quick integration and placement of soldiers, with the result that support structures were not readily in place to cope with the process:

"Neither side at grassroots ... fully understood the detailed mechanics of what had been decided in the JMCC ... Hence for much of its early history integration was almost entirely haphazard, largely experimental and a learning process for all participants."42

All intakes were broadly overseen by the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT), who assisted in the certification and adjudication of the processes.

Relationships between personnel of all ethnic groups, both male and female, were precarious, especially during the first few years of integration. However, as integration progressed, relationships improved. Agreement on its success remained tenuous:

"[W]hen questioned on the outcome of integration three years down the line, former NSF and former SADF personnel seldom concurred on whether, how and to what extent integration had ‘worked’ because the perspectives of each are largely ... rooted in different historical experiences, expectations — and indeed, without putting too fine a point upon it — a different universe of social and military world-views that directly mirrors the institutional origins of each armed formation."43

The process also took much longer than was originally anticipated. Approximately 25 000 MK and APLA members were eventually assembled from a total estimated list of 42 266 (the final figure on the CPR). Only 19 000 combatants had been integrated into the SANDF by July 1998. The vast majority (90.5%) were integrated into the South African Army.44 The rest did not turn up for integration for various reasons.

Different opinions were expressed, as is usually the case in unstructured or qualitative research, when respondents were asked whether they thought that the integration of the armed forces was complicated because it involved organisational integration. The majority of respondents (58%) were of the opinion that they were definitely experiencing both organisational and racial problems during integration, because of the organisational growth of several thousands of former adversaries who, simultaneously, still distrusted each other. Respondents stressed that some of the difficulties experienced were due to the fact that the various armed forces had different doctrines, organisational structures, and widely divergent political backgrounds. Previous military training also took place under widely divergent doctrines, which included British regimental approaches, Soviet, later Russian, Chinese, several Eastern European approaches, as well as influences from other African countries with their own doctrines. Following the unbanning of liberation movements and preceding integration, a limited number of combatants received conventional training in India, Britain, Russia and Uganda.

The race component also contributed to the complexity of integration. There were previously no black high-ranking officers in the SADF, but as officers were appointed to these top-level positions, no racial or ethnic problems were reported. There was the belief that politics was more of a controlling factor in the integration process of high-ranking officers than racism. Personnel in lower rankings, however, reported racial incidents. This usually happened when staff members were reprimanded for mistakes made or when they failed examinations. Black members felt discriminated against when instructors were white.45 These observations were regarded as important, but were not heeded at the time. In at least one reported incidence since integration, at the Tempe Base near Bloemfontein, did racism lead to a fatal shooting incident between officers.

In the training units, the positive binding factor for integration was the commonalities between similar specialist training, while the negative factor was the problem of former white SADF members who felt that they were not ‘properly integrated’, because their numbers did not start with 94 or higher like those of former non-statutory force members. They retained their old force numbers. They felt that they were discriminated against and would be disadvantaged in future promotions. Although no open animosity was reported between troops themselves, racial issues often came to the fore.

The general belief was that integration on the political, practical and administrative level had to be enmeshed in order to attain overall success. Practical integration, in terms of timeframes and schedules in which certain people had to be in certain positions by a certain time, had to be completed by the end of 1999 — two years after the original date set for completion. Full integration, however, took much longer. Only during 2000 was legislation introduced to finalise the process.46

The integration of the TBVC homeland forces was a smaller scale operation, in comparison to that of MK, APLA and the SADF. The integration was simplified by the structural similarities between these forces and the SADF. Due to their constitutional classification, alongside the SADF, as statutory forces, their integration was "far less disruptive, problematic and infinitely more regulated."47 The TBVC forces used the same military equipment and, to a certain extent, had been exposed to similar conventional training systems, doctrines and standards as the SADF, which saw them as "natural, albeit minor allies in the integration process."48

When respondents were asked whether they thought that the members of the TBVC forces integrated more easily because they could fit into the existing rank structure, both positive and negative viewpoints were held. A large proportion (58%) of respondents thought that the integration of the TBVC forces was achieved at greater speed and somewhat more amicable, because they were from conventional forces that had an established rank structure, unlike MK and APLA, which were liberation forces with different ranking systems or none at all. The latter was especially applicable to the SDUs that were trained inside South Africa during the 1980s. The TBVC forces were familiar with the SADF structure, since members of the SADF’s specialised training units previously trained TBVC soldiers on an annual basis and, on several occasions, joint training exercises and/or operations took place. They were therefore not unfamiliar with one another and the integration process went relatively smoothly, because of their common training and interests.

However, it was a disruptive process for the members themselves, because the TBVC forces previously received higher wages and allowances than the SADF. This meant that they now received less remuneration in the new SANDF. They were also transferred away from their home units, which had harsher financial implications for them. Some of these members then resigned and were demobilised because of their preference to live in a particular area and/or as a result of financial troubles. Those TBVC members who remained in the new SANDF, and were found to be suitable candidates, were promoted immediately after they had completed their suggested promotion courses. They had immediate parity as a result of affirmative action, which gave them preferential treatment to enable them to catch up with those from more privileged backgrounds. The SANDF was now striving to uphold and strengthen its equal opportunities programme.

The legitimisation of the new SANDF entailed, among others, the successful fusion of the former liberation and conventional armies in the eyes of the broader South African community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the international community. However, as one respondent said:

"This was not what really brought legitimacy to the new SANDF. It was the appointment of black officers of MK and APLA that contributed to the legitimacy. The SANDF now acted on their behalf and not against them like before."

Legitimisation therefore depended on and was underpinned by the representivity of integrated personnel from various backgrounds on all levels.

Credibility of the SANDF was seen in conjunction with legitimacy. For the SANDF to be credible, integration had to reflect the different national, gender, ethnic and language groups present within South African society. Credibility was strengthened by a new vision for a new unified force.

On the questions whether respondents thought that the integration of MK and APLA soldiers legitimised the new SANDF in the eyes of South African society, and whether the new SANDF had credibility in the broader society, different opinions were expressed. The majority (92%) of respondents affirmed that the inclusion of MK and APLA soldiers led to greater credibility and legitimacy for the SANDF. Previously, the majority of black people saw the SADF as the instrument of the minority regime (and, to a degree, the white population) to oppress them. Now the SANDF was seen in a different light, although all suspicions were not immediately removed. One former MK commander said:

"People must not think that we were absorbed and were tokens of the SADF. The more people understood that MK was in control and senior posts were filled by them, the more legitimate the SANDF would be in the eyes of the broader South African population."

More black people (men and women) were integrated and the broader population accepted the SANDF as their own defence force, despite ethnic and language diversities. The proportionate relationship between black and white was much better than before, but imbalances still had to be addressed.

One respondent was of the opinion that, although legitimacy and credibility were obtained over a period of time, both MK and APLA soldiers were still regarded by some as being inefficient. This perception arises from the disparities in the training and competency levels of integrated personnel (and perhaps because of the perception held by some, both inside and outside the military establishment, that training doctrines were/are incompatible). There was also the perception that black people perceived the SANDF as credible, but that segments of the white population thought that its credibility had deteriorated and that it had to be earned again, something that would take time and had to be earned through performance.49

Professionalism and high standards had repeatedly been emphasised by former SADF senior officers as prerequisites for the integration process. The assumption was that liberation and TBVC forces lacked the necessary professional standards. Former SADF integrated personnel feared that the lack of conventional training of the constituent liberation forces would have a serious effect on previous "high standards of professionalism."50 Although senior officers always believed in "professional standards at an international level,"51 integrated personnel occupying lower ranks saw these standards as measures for institutional demarcation of former non-statutory force members and the maintenance of former SADF leadership over the new force. The approach adopted was that standards would not be compromised but that those soldiers with potential would be given the opportunity to achieve these internationally accepted standards. Bridging training that would qualify individuals to meet appointment criteria in preparation for particular courses required for leadership development was therefore provided at the beginning of 1995. The notion of ‘accelerated bridging and training programmes’ underpinned this new approach, while it was seldom verbalised as such by former SADF staff. The training was available to all integrated personnel who wanted to pursue a successful career in the SANDF, but lacked the specific qualifications or expertise to do so.

Most of the respondents believed that the SANDF received a setback in terms of professionalism and training. Some expertise was lost when well-trained members resigned and took severance packages. However, professionalism was retained from the old SADF and transferred into the SANDF. Training units complied with internationally accepted standards and standardised training of integrated personnel took place.

MK members (and some APLA former combatants) felt that their somehow unconventional training and ideologies had to be incorporated and recognised as well. However, the standards (and perhaps the content and future role) of such training were questioned by the former SADF leadership and members. The prevalent belief seemingly was that guerrilla training was undesirable for the complex technological environment of a modern defence force. In retrospect, the benefit and potential inclusiveness that could have been effected by incorporating elements of the different training doctrines, training procedures and operational approaches, were sadly overlooked. South Africa, had integrated different military traditions into a unified defence force (Union Defence Force) at least once before in 1912, after the Anglo-Boer War. A potential warehouse of own lessons learned was thus regrettably overlooked.

There were numerous conflicts over standards during the integration process. The main belief was that standardisation of training within the force was imperative, especially when considering the diversity of training cultures, backgrounds and operational experience of the integrated personnel. The aim was that all integrated personnel should fulfil established course requirements before being appointed to specific ranks or posts. However, previously disadvantaged members were fast-tracked through the system by giving them preferential access to promotion courses. They were sometimes promoted without even doing the course first. This was mainly due to a backlog in bridging and senior staff training. However, since the belief was that promotions were traditionally in line with expertise and courses passed, complaints were received about the promotion of black members who had not yet completed courses, but were nevertheless promoted.

All the respondents agreed that race, ethnicity and culture were problems that would always be prevalent. Coupled with these was distrust. Yesterday’s enemies were now integrated into one defence force, where distrust prevailed as a result of competition for the same scarce resources. Racism on both sides was far from dead, particularly further down the organisational hierarchy on lower rankings.52 Many of the incidents of racism occurred at unit level between members of lower rank. Racism and ethnicity, however, were not regarded as real hindrances among the leadership or else their "ideals of integration would be in danger." In the exploratory study, a variety of demobilised members also complained about incidences of racism before their demobilisation. These complaints relate mostly to the lower rankings and occurred until 1999.

A complete change of mindset and attitudes over time is the only remedy for problems around racism and ethnicity in the SANDF. The development of mutual trust between all integrated personnel was the major challenge of the integration process. Failure to control feelings of distrust and racial tensions undermined effectiveness and cohesion. Ethnicity, however, still had a definite role to play in the SANDF, since proportionate ratios were officially used to determine guidelines for rationalisation.

The views of black and white officers on affirmative action differed. In general, white staff members felt that affirmative action undermined standards and competency. Former non-statutory force members’ training and skills were questioned as they had no experience and training in conventional warfare, and the perception prevailed of disparities in the training levels and competency of these members. The feeling was that equal opportunities did not as yet exist and that all promotions were surely not advanced on merit. As an interim measure, affirmative treatment was applied on various occasions. The need for preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged members led to this decision. One former MK general said that, "[i]f you base everything on merit, it would still be a white SANDF because black people were delayed in their training." The counterargument was that, if inexperienced members were put into positions of authority without the necessary qualifications and experience, it would undermine competency, standards and morale in the SANDF.

On the issue of discipline, some respondents suggested that discipline was lacking. This was mainly because it was guided by discipline in a transitional phase (pragmatic disciplinary approaches dictated by a transitional context). It was suggested that this had to be rectified in due course. Discipline in all military forces (inclusive of liberation armies) remains an important factor in order to maintain standards and legitimacy. The maintenance of discipline between black troops and white instructors, for example, was sometimes problematic. This was partly due to the use of language (another salient issue at the time) since some former MK and APLA integrated personnel were not fluent in either English or Afrikaans. The instructors at some infantry units experienced disciplinary problems with TBVC members because of what they chose to refer to as the ‘half-day culture’. The general viewpoint at the time was that TBVC soldiers did not integrate well into the infantry. Currently, these problems seem to have dissipated.

The crime rate in some training units was higher than before and regular court martials were conducted. Morale at ground level, nevertheless, was reported to be quite high. However, the morale of most of the former SADF members could be questioned, particularly at middle management level, where most resignations occurred, mainly because of insecurities regarding affirmative action, promotions and (lack of) perceived future career opportunities.

The process of change was reported to be conceptually complex for integrated personnel, because of insecurities and tendencies to hold on to the status quo. The general viewpoint was that officers wanted change to occur, but that non-commissioned officers resigned because of problems with affirmative action. There was the notion that change and promotions were forced onto previously disadvantaged, unqualified members because of political and social pressures. On the question whether national consensus had been built around defence, the responses were positive with regard to the White Paper on Defence to which everybody felt they contributed in a democratic way. Integrated personnel were compelled to accept change, otherwise it would be impossible to unite the armed forces into an effective, cohesive force.

On the question whether integrated individuals from different military backgrounds perceived themselves as a cohesive fighting force, some respondents indicated that a joint focus was still lacking, but others affirmed that cohesion was undeniably established during Operation Boleas in Lesotho. However, the comment was again made that some integrated members "carried the rank, but not the practical know-how to execute the task." The general perception is that it is:

"difficult to advance members through the ranks at an accelerated pace. The posts associated with these ranks require that incumbents have the necessary education, training or course qualifications, as well as extensive experience in a variety of roles."53

The perception that integration was a short-term process was obviously incorrect. The whole process started after the elections in April 1994 and the last intake at Wallmansthal only occurred in July 1998. The physical part of integration took about three years to complete, but the political part, which respondents referred to as the ‘psychological dimension’ where mindsets and attitudes had to be changed, would take much longer. Indeed, judging from some of the feedback in this study, this change of mindset is still a point of concern and perhaps requires more attention, especially among lower ranking officers. If not dealt with, some of the legacies of the integration process may linger on and/or impact on demobilised staff and their reintegration into the broader civil and economic community in South Africa.

Integration was noticeably successful as an administrative exercise. Although difficulties existed, substantial numbers of integrated personnel were processed and retrained according to requirements of the SANDF.54 It has been reported to have been one of the most successful integration processes in the world. However, some felt that it could have been done differently in some respects and faster in others but, when all the positive and negative points are considered, the conclusion was that it was successful and functionally effective. The SANDF now had more legitimacy, credibility and was more representative than ever before.

However, due to the enormous, unaffordable size of the new force after integration (more than 100 000 members), rationalisation became imperative. However, a few disgruntled comments were made about how "rationalisation was not done on merit, but on government decisions as they are trying to set the population balance straight." Younger white members interviewed felt that they could still be productive and deliver excellent work for the SANDF, instead of being rationalised too early.55

It is clear from the various findings that integration as a social process was functionally effective, sufficient and necessary for the SANDF, because it contributed to the peaceful and orderly change in the defence system. Furthermore, it could simultaneously be regarded as dysfunctional because of some integration problems that still need attention. The SANDF therefore has an institutional challenge to deal with issues of representivity, equality, racism, discipline and standards of training of all integrated personnel.

Demobilisation

The negotiated settlement between the NP and the ANC had a specific effect on the nature of the demobilisation process. An arrangement was made for MK, APLA and AZANLA soldiers to return to South Africa as ‘unarmed civilians’.56 No formal assembly of soldiers took place. When they arrived in South Africa, the only concern was for their economic reintegration. They were given R50 each and sent back to their respective communities. They had to wait two months before they received grants of R300 each administered by Khotso House. Most of the soldiers received six payments of R300 each. Some, however, were paid as much as R2 500.57 Some of the soldiers found alternative employment while they waited for the formal demobilisation process to start. Others lived in absolute poverty and suboptimum social conditions.

The formal demobilisation and reintegration of MK and APLA soldiers into South African society started after the April 1994 elections. Legislation to this effect was only passed in 1996. During 1994, the main concern was the integration of the seven armed forces. Planning for demobilisation only started when a crisis emerged over what should happen to the elderly and many other integrated personnel who had failed to meet the standards set for integration. Demobilised women also presented a problem, since their reintegration into civil society had to "surmount various gender barriers."58 Many of these women found themselves jobless on the streets once their initial severance pay was exhausted.

The SANDF demobilisation package had three components. The first was once-off gratuities that ranged from R42 058 to R12 734, depending on the period of service. The second was limited counselling on personal matters, careers, social services and finances that stretched over a period of two weeks. The third was an opportunity to join the Service Corps for 18 months, during which they would receive training in basic skills, life skills and adult literacy, without any further training or social integration offered.59 During the course of the exploratory study, the Service Corps was training at least 30% of the respondents. Others were unemployed, had part-time employment or some form of employment since demobilisation.

Joining the Service Corps was not compulsory and most MK and APLA soldiers decided not to join. The leadership of the SANDF, however, was concerned about discharging former combatants into civil society. In order to "discharge its responsibilities," the SANDF therefore established the Service Corps as a "centre-piece institution for rationalisation/demobilisation."60 The purpose of the corps was to provide training for both integrated and rationalised members of the SANDF in order to equip them for civilian life. The reasons for the lack of interest in the Service Corps varied. Some thought that the training was too basic and others thought they had adequate skills to survive as civilians (some MK soldiers were given the opportunity to study while in exile).

According to Mashike, there were those who took advantage of the opportunity to join the Service Corps and there were others who misused the opportunity.61 This gave rise to two groups, which Mashike referred to as the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.62 The winners were those who were integrated into the new SANDF and those who found alternative employment. The Service Corps was apparently intended to cater for the losers, as a form of long-term integration, which in the end proved to be inadequate in meeting the demands of former combatants. The skills training offered by the Service Corps was often abundantly offered in civil society, for example, motor mechanics and bricklaying, and finding a job was therefore nearly impossible. The chapter on the economic environment deals with some of these issues in more detail. Mashike is of the opinion that the current impetus towards a neo-liberal hegemony is dividing workers into the ‘core’ (skilled workers) and the ‘periphery’ (unskilled workers or less-skilled workers).63 Former soldiers are mostly seen as unskilled in a job market where everybody has to compete for scarce resources and, consequently, they remain losers. This hegemony of neo-liberalism is now unfortunately embraced by the ANC.64 This should also be seen as a corollary to the macro-economic approach (GEAR), of which one of the short-term effects is the loss of employment opportunities.

The failure of reintegrating former combatants into civil society due to improper planning is becoming a social problem that will haunt South African society for at least the next decade. Unemployment, poverty and, consequently, crime will be with all South Africans for a while.

Rationalisation

Rationalisation of the South African military started immediately after the Namibian/Angolan war in April 1989 when supernumerary posts, which had not been budgeted for, had to be filled by returning soldiers, previously paid for by the South-West African government. A defence budget, which had peaked at 3.4% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1989, had been slashed to 2.2% of GDP by 1995 — a reduction of close to 66% in real terms within six years. These factors led the South African government to decide, in the early 1990s, to rationalise the defence force as a state institution.65 Rationalisation was again instituted after the April 1994 elections by way of natural attrition (resignations, deaths, discharges, and freezing of posts).66 However, with further defence budget cuts, it was inevitable that the existing human resource structure had to be reduced accordingly. At the same time, seven armed forces were being integrated into one single united SANDF and a civilian-led Defence Secretariat was being established. This obviously led to an oversized and unaffordable force.

The integration process resulted in an almost 35% increase in personnel numbers which, in turn, resulted in increasing financial pressures.67 It became evident that, despite the effect of natural attrition and demobilisation, a process of rationalisation would be necessary. In the past, 57% of the defence budget was spent on personnel maintenance and restructuring was therefore necessary if the Department of Defence was to become more cost-effective.68 In accordance with new planning only 40% of the defence budget was to be allocated for personnel during 1999. This translated into a force consisting of approximately 70 000 people. The SA Army, which comprised approximately 48 000 members, had to be "rationalised to 42,700 by the end of 2001."69 Others argued that the social trade-offs in such a short, sharp reduction process are problematic, as can be seen from some international examples.70

A new phase in the rationalisation of personnel commenced in 1999. The defence budget was now only 1.6% of GDP.71 It was planned that, during 2000, 9 300 members would be retrenched with another 4 300 members during 2001, while still maintaining all services and support operations:

"These retrenchments will be over and above those leaving by way of natural attrition and by the selective termination or non-renewal of short and medium term service contracts."72

The staffing of the new structures of the Department of Defence resulted in members being identified for rationalisation. For this purpose, a Rationalisation Strategy Committee, representing all roleplayers, has been established to compile a SANDF Rationalisation Strategy.73 According to Allie, three possible options for rationalisation have been identified:74

The slow option, which allows for rationalisation by natural attrition, voluntary severance packages and non-renewal of contracts, will unfortunately take until 2008 to reach the desired effect. It will be expensive, because only 2 500 members leave the SANDF as a result of natural attrition every year.75 In order to utilise this option to its maximum effect, recruitment in the SANDF has been minimised only to the filling of critical posts.76

The fast option makes provision for a faster reduction of staff numbers by means of employer initiated retrenchment packages. This will run concurrently with the existing voluntary severance package option. Voluntary severance packages as an option have been successfully implemented since May 1996. With the employer initiated retrenchment packages, which have not yet been approved, retrenchment would be completed by the end of 2001. These packages will only commence, however, after all components of the new Department of Defence force design have been officially approved.77 The employer initiated retrenchment packages are expected to be less financially viable when compared to voluntary severance packages.78

The recommended option refers to the retrenchment of members through employer initiated retrenchment packages where the first group would leave in April 2000 (9 300) and the second group (4 300) in April 2001.79 This is the recommended option to downsize the SANDF to its envisaged new force design and structure.

It was planned that natural attrition would account for the reduction by approximately 5 200 members by the end of April 2000. Voluntary severance packages would account for another 1 100 members, while the envisaged employer initiated retrenchment packages would first involve 9 300 and later 4 300 members. Approximately 20 000 members will leave the SANDF by means of any one of these mechanisms by the end of 2001.80 However, experience from the integration and demobilisation processes indicates that this current rationalisation process may not proceed as speedily as is envisaged and that it may in fact last until 2003.

Since the Minister of Public Service, Ms Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, temporarily stopped voluntary severance packages during 2000 and only approved the employer initiated retrenchment packages for the SANDF during the last quarter of 2000, the force level will not be reached by the envisaged date. According to the personnel procurement office, the total strength of the SANDF was 78 701 by the end of April 2001. The original recommended figure for December 2000 was 70 000. It is clear that the rationalisation programme is already running behind schedule and that the target would not be reached by April 2001 as planned, but only by April 2002 at the earliest.81 It is also significant that the name of the original retrenchment package for the SANDF has been changed by parliament to the employer initiated package. This is new package, which is initiated by the employer, makes provision for the supernumerary employee to participate in making the choice.

All members of the SANDF were compelled to apply for advertised posts in the new structure. If they did not do so and declined the offer of another post in the new structure, they ran the risk of being declared supernumerary. If their posts were declared supernumerary, it meant that members would be retrenched if all other options such as remustering, retraining and transfers were exhausted and there were no other available posts for them in the system.82 However, if members did not find posts in the new structure, they could appeal against their possible retrenchment. Appeal boards were established at the various type formations, the SA Army Office, and at the Chief of Personnel. A special Labour Appeal Court was also created. BMATT (SA) representatives will be present at these appeal hearings to oversee the process of rationalisation.83 The legal procedure will start within the Department of Defence and can end up at the Defence Special Tribunal for both military and Public Service Act personnel for final decisions. The eventual aim is to appoint only well-trained experienced professionals, who will simultaneously be representative of the South African population. This will be in line with the core force design as promulgated in the White Paper on Defence and through the Defence Review process, where input from civil society was employed. The end result is meant to be a ‘leaner’ military with an optimum balance between all arms of service (army, navy, air force and medical services).

The implementation of the structural and personnel changes envisaged for the Department of Defence may seem harsh, but they meet the government’s transformation imperatives for a smaller, representative, affordable and more effective public service. An exploratory study such as this one therefore becomes important, since it may provide the initial information required, lessons learned, and perhaps even a prognosis on how to deal with the reintegration of demobilised soldiers and staff.

Conclusion

it is clear that the Department of Defence has come a long way since the first democratic elections in April 1994. It has had to overcome many obstacles in terms of the integration and transformation process, and it continues to face many challenges in terms of demobilisation and the proposed rationalisation process. Most of the restructuring has also been due to the steep defence budget cuts. The price that individual members have to pay so that the department can comply with the financial obligations and restrictions of the new SANDF is extremely high. Operational standards are also under pressure, while highly qualified members are leaving the SANDF. How successful the transformation process has been, remains to be seen. Indeed part of the success of the demobilisation (and the transformation) process depends on whether demobilisation or rationalisation leaves more satisfied than disillusioned or angered citizens. At the moment, the scale seems to be loaded against the former, given the tentative feedback reported in this study.

The demobilisation process may have been functional to the SANDF as a whole, but for those who were demobilised (individuals and their dependants on the receiving end) — and those who will be rationalised, the process appears to be largely dysfunctional. The challenge therefore is to reintegrate those on the receiving end successfully into an economy that has had jobless growth in the recent past.