Chapter 6

RECOMMENDATIONS


Published in Monograph No 61, August 2001
Demobilisation and Its Aftermath II, Economic Reinsertion of South Africa's Demobilised Military Personnel

This chapter provides recommendations that emanated from the exploratory study conducted among former SANDF staff and combatants. The recommendations are aimed at the following:
  • government and policy-related issues, including intergovernmental co-operation;

  • job creators or suppliers — companies, NGOs, community organisations, civil society agencies, including trade unions;

  • funding and empowerment agencies;

  • specific proposals — project-oriented and preceded by pilot projects; and

  • the Citizen Force.
The recommendations will be fourfold:
  • general recommendations related to policy and policy formulation;

  • recommendations related to the need for the further training and reskilling of former combatants;

  • recommendations that have crystallised after interviews with key persons and business, labour and military institutions, as well as limited feedback received from companies in response to a short questionnaire; and

  • recommendations and proposals relating to the Citizen Force, which may benefit demobilised soldiers and former combatants.
Given the findings of the exploratory study, proposals or recommendations need to be both flexible and holistic, as well as generic. The issue at stake is a serious matter, and solving the socio-economic problems created by demobilisation is immensely complex. No single recipe or solution will serve as a panacea. Rather, a directed effort that is context-bound and, to some extent, pragmatic needs to be considered without delay. Learning from the experiences of other Latin American and African countries (Uganda, Eritrea and Namibia, for example) may also prove useful.117

The present government cannot divest itself in any way from the responsibility of playing a major (if not leading) role in attempting to address the issue of the reintegration of demobilised military personnel. The government should include community organisations, businesses, the labour movement, NGOs and the Citizen Force in its attempts to address the situation.

It is important that each of the proposals and recommendations listed below should be seen in the spirit in which it is intended, that of providing a solution to the current socio-economic problems caused by demobilisation. No single initiative or proposal should be seen as too small or irrelevant without due consideration. It could be argued that the escalating crisis around demobilised soldiers, and its real and potential effects, have grown to such an extent that no proposal, however big or small, emanating from whatever quarter, should be demeaned before it is given due consideration, its viability checked and the possibility to facilitate its implementation is explored.

Central to these recommendations is the importance of co-operative governance, interdepartmental co-operation and partnerships (public/private; government/ business/labour; provincial/local).

It has to be mentioned that a simple transfer of the responsibility for demobilised soldiers to a single department or institution (such as the Department of Labour or the National Youth Commission), in the light of the profile of the demobilised former combatant, will be insufficient. The responsibility for an attempt to redress the situation of demobilised people both in the micro and macrocontext may require an office and a centralised point of execution dedicated to the reintegration of former soldiers into society. Given the profile as illuminated in this study, such an office will have to be able to co-operate with different departments on various levels of government. Such a task should not be delegated to an understaffed and undercommitted executive office, which already has its hands full with implementing other directives.

Policy-related recommendations

While the integration and demobilisation process was fairly successful and benefited the new defence force (and presumably the remaining staff), the net effect of demobilisation was negative for the majority of those who had to leave the force. It has become crucial that the situation of those who were negatively affected by the demobilisation process should be addressed. This will require a clear policy shift away from the mere transformation of the security institutions towards a policy that is aimed at and benefits those who were adversely or will be affected by the changes. Particular attention should be paid to those who remain jobless or poverty-stricken, since the potential security threat lies with these disgruntled demobilised personnel. It is important that this applies to all the affected (and those to be affected) who reside in the jobless and/or lower skilled category, regardless of whether they are from the former statutory or non-statutory forces. The implementation of a new policy focus should in no way be seen as benefiting certain people more than others. Redressing the situation should be presented — and implemented — as being non-partisan and inclusive.

The new policy approach will have to be developed, implemented and executed in all spheres and levels of government and will have to depart from the basis of co-operative governance and interdepartmental co-operation. It could include public-private partnerships if deemed necessary.

Some elements of the approach are discussed below.

Company guidelines and incentives

Guidelines and incentives could be provided for companies (for example, in the engineering and construction sector) to make use of labour-intensive measures, rather than mechanisation, and to deploy a certain percentage of former combatants on an agreed voluntary reciprocal basis in executing projects (‘movable labour force’ concept). Sectors should perhaps be considered where mechanisation is less financially profitable, such as road works and other types of construction and disaster management.

Employment in growth and development areas

Studies on the employability of unemployed former combatants in specific development and growth areas could be initiated and/or sponsored. This could include, for instance, the Maputo Corridor and other major provincial and local development projects such as the utilisation of former soldiers in metropolitan police services. Of great importance in this regard is proper market research of potentially profitable and sustainable markets for agriculture, manufacturing, arts and tourism in specific geographic areas and type-specific project areas.

Renewal of the Service Corps

The revision, strengthening and transformation of the Service Corps’s current approach should be undertaken to enable a greater net output in terms of training. In order to achieve this, the following options could be considered:
  • Public-private partnerships can be formed in order to increase and enhance the training of former combatants, especially in skills that are needed for production and service delivery.

  • The earlier mooted point of a National Service Battalion consisting of former combatants (from the current jobless category) could be reconsidered. The National Service Battalion will facilitate and execute training corollary to community service in rural and peri-urban areas (the same approach was used with some success after World War II in South Africa following demobilisation). It is suggested that such national service battalion(s) should reside with the SANDF (interdepartmental co-operation should be imperative), while training of selected members can be partially outsourced. However, deployment of these members in development projects should not be outsourced, but should remain the responsibility of the SANDF. Entrants should be allowed to exit the programme when they obtained employment and/or obtained an acceptable level of reskilling or multiskilling.

  • The demobilised and jobless category of former combatants could be purposefully involved in agricultural initiatives, local development and other agricultural projects. This should preferably take place on a pilot project basis and strive for self-sustainability before new projects are embarked upon.

  • Training and access to training for former combatants and demobilised soldiers should be enhanced through the Service Corps and outside the Service Corps (the enhanced role of sectoral education and training authorities (SETAs) could perhaps be considered in this regard).

  • The earmarking of specific projects should take place on a case-by-case basis to ensure that such pilot projects are duly and responsibly funded, executed through the utilisation best practice and proper procedures to become self-sustainable. Projects are to be duly monitored and evaluated for performance to ensure viability and sustainability. Funding could be via the government (such as SETAs (DIDETA) and provincial skills plans), the private sector or other available sources.

Involvement of former combatants in areas of origin

A conscious approach should be adopted to involve former combatants in projects in areas where they originated from. For example, in the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, North-West and KwaZulu-Natal, they could become involved in activities related to tourism, agriculture and service delivery. This could include (new) ventures in nature conservation, eco-tourism, tour guide training, as well as arts and crafts marketing training. Local and provincial governments, as well as the private sector and NGOs should facilitate co-operatives in this regard or provide basic entrepreneurial training. It is necessary to identify, through market research, the specific geographic areas and type-specific project areas where this could take place.

Involvement of national, provincial and local forums

The matter of demobilised soldiers should be addressed as a priority by forums on national level such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), on local level within the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and on provincial level in interprovincial forums. This should tie in with the Fifteen point programme of action, 1999-2004 of the Ministry of Labour.

Training and education-related recommendations

While many of the points made here may relate to policy, training and education recommendations are discussed separately to stress the importance of a directed focus in this area.

The exploratory research showed clearly that there were both a strong need and an interest among former combatants to be trained, skilled or reskilled. Given the nature of the South African economy as discussed above, it is clear that the majority of demobilised personnel (without relation to any specific previous force of service) are the least educated and are unemployed. It is also evident from other research that the current South African job market needs higher or highly skilled people. The implication is that a directed effort is needed to assist demobilised soldiers who are semiskilled to become specifically or multiskilled. Unskilled or lower skilled soldiers have to be assisted to become at least semiskilled, preferably in a predetermined niche area that corresponds with needs in the South African labour market.

The analysis of skills needs indicated that, while no major increase in semiskilled workers is expected, the market needs will remain fairly stable. Thus, the need for clerical, artisan and semiskilled occupations such as metal and engineering artisans, building trade artisans, printing trade artisans, technical assistants, food processing and catering, transport, trade and communication assistants will either rise moderately or remain stable. The implication for demobilised soldiers is that training needs to be purposefully directed towards the trade sector (inclusive of clerical jobs), the artisan sector and the manufacturing sector, since these sectors are more likely to be in need of reskilled personnel.

A point to consider is the establishment of a trust fund for training purposes specifically for demobilised soldiers. Such a fund — if duly administered, monitored and evaluated for best practice — may be able to assist in funding the training of former combatants and demobilised soldiers, or where such persons cannot benefit from it themselves, then for their children or next-of-kin.

Proposals for project-related initiatives

Smaller or medium-scale projects have to be identified and initiated with the assistance of government, foreign donors and, to a lesser extent, business concerns. Smaller and medium-scale projects based on sound financial management, regular monitoring and evaluation should be embarked upon. Projects should preferably be small-scale and assisted through co-operation and capacity-building in order to make them sustainable.

The list below contains proposals for some projects that can be initiated. However, this list is not exhaustive and can be expanded to include many other projects:
  • Agriculture: specific projects to be identified and piloted.

  • Bio-agriculture: specific projects to be identified and piloted.

  • Security companies: a needs analysis and joint strategy between veterans’ organisations, security companies, national and provincial governments, NEDLAC and other stakeholders should be considered.

  • A ‘moving labour corps’ (contract-based): the core idea behind the intended project is to provide a trained group of persons at hand to be contracted by the government, parastatals or private companies on short notice. If a pilot project succeeds, the project basis can be expanded.

  • Possible limited ‘ring-fencing’ of jobs in security-related work: municipal or metropolitan police, traffic officers, security guards for governmental institutions and parastatals, as long as such strategies for ring-fencing can be mutually agreed upon by the government and other stakeholders. This recommendation may be viewed as politically sensitive by some political stakeholders or actors and acceptance should be duly investigated, discussed and agreed upon before implementation. Consensus-based agreement seems to be acceptable to avoid worsening some socio-political faultlines and to prevent the process from being seen as partisan, nepotistic or preferential. Various political actors across the spectrum have to be consulted before agreement on implementation is reached.

  • Tourism and bio-tourism: specific pilot projects.

  • Co-operatives in arts, crafts and eco-tourism: specific pilot projects.

  • Potential for export co-operatives in arts and crafts: specific pilot projects.
The projects listed above should be implemented on a pilot (even experimental) basis. Funding should be conditional. Projects should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Only if a specific project has become sustainable after due monitoring and evaluation, (similar) others could be embarked upon. The ideal is that project-specific ventures should become both manageable and self-sustainable before money (donor funding) is invested in new ones. Needless to say, benchmarking and regular evaluation of performance should form part of each individual project approach to ensure long-term sustainability.

Recommendations related to the Citizen Force

The following proposals are for the consideration of policy makers, the Citizen Force Council and the Department of Defence.

The exploratory study has shown that, although there is some disillusionment with the SANDF, a significant number of individuals who were demobilised have retained positive feelings towards the SANDF and the Citizen Force. The Citizen Force is a potential window of opportunity that could supply part-time income to former combatants through involvement in its activities. This may boost their morale and self-esteem and assure some continued involvement of trained men and women in the primary and corollary roles of security and defence.

Following the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War, the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912 accommodated various military and regimental traditions (inclusive of different modes of training and doctrines) by establishing commandos and several Citizen Force regiments, which retained some autonomy and self-chosen ‘identity’ within the newly united Union Defence Force. The pragmatic approach followed by both the Boers and the British after the Anglo-Boer War was borne out in lessons learned, contextual wisdom and the acceptance of some levels of freedom of association among the military (inclusive of the Citizen Force).

While Citizen Force regiment and commandos may be able to market themselves more effectively, the argument is that different historical traditions give rise to different (and sometimes) negative perceptions of the citizen force, such as those encountered in this exploratory study.

In view of this, it is suggested that consideration should be given to the establishment of two or three Citizen Force units that are situated in the tradition of the armed struggle. In terms of training, doctrine and composition, such units should be able to assume the identity of Citizen Force regiments or units that reflect the past (the identities of and associations with the struggle). While such units are to be fully incorporated into the defence network, their tradition and mode of operation (‘regimental’ tradition) should reflect the guerrilla and mobile tradition and elements of the ‘peoples’ soldiers’ (the so-called ‘proletarian rifles principle’). Needless to say, in terms of command and control, such units are to be regarded as exactly the same as other Citizen Force units, bound by a professional code of honour and professionalism, and under strict observance of the Constitution, relevant defence and security regulations, and standing orders.