Chapter 2

The Prime Suspects?

The Metamorphosis of Pagad

Introduction

The greater Cape Town area has been plagued by numerous incidents of urban terrorism. Starting in the late-1990s, the targets of the bombing campaign have shifted from the Cape Flats to central Cape Town, including many of the city’s most popular tourist destinations.

The bombing campaign is shrouded in mystery. No group has claimed responsibility, and while arrests have been made, few have resulted in successful convictions. Government ministers responsible for security and justice have laid the blame firmly at the door of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad), a vigilante group that originated as a response to high levels of crime, particularly wide-scale drug trafficking on the Cape Flats.1

In September 2000, safety and security minister Steve Tshwete and justice minister Penuell Maduna spoke at a special parliamentary debate on bombings in the Western Cape. Both ministers said that their intelligence had identified Pagad as being responsible for the bombings. Maduna said that 42 cases involving acts of urban terror involved Pagad members, but that the government did not have the "necessary evidence that will bear up to judicial scrutiny".2 Tshwete was even more categorical, saying the police "are not looking anywhere apart from Pagad... there is no evidence pointing anywhere else".3

In response, an editorial in one of the country’s national dailies urged caution in jumping to hasty conclusions about the identity of those responsible for the bombings. The editorial conceded that there is circumstantial evidence to justify the inference that many of the bombings are the work of militant extremists of the sort who have found a home in Pagad. This evidence includes targets such as American-linked firms or bars frequented by gay people, messages phoned into public radio stations and public statements. Moreover, a number of Pagad members have been convicted of offences ranging from murder to possession of explosives and illegal weapons. However, the editorial warned, it "would be shortsighted for the police to take their eyes off other possible perpetrators of criminal violence in the region".4

Should caution be exercised when seeking to identify those responsible for the bombings? Or, are the ministers correct in their views that the evidence leading from the blown up cars, restaurants and police stations point in one direction only? What real evidence is there to link Pagad, and the people associated with it, to the acts of urban terror in the Western Cape? By exploring the events that led to Pagad’s formation, Pagad’s links to other organisations, its aims and organisational structure, and the activities of some of its members, this chapter seeks to answer these questions.

Pagad was established in Cape Town in November 1995, in response to popular dissatisfaction with high levels of crime. Pagad’s initial stated primary objective was to serve as a broad anti-crime front. Under its banner a variety of organisations and concerned citizens of diverse ideological, political and religious persuasions sought to combat the criminal gangs and drug dealers who had for many years plagued the impoverished communities of the Cape Flats area on the outskirts of Cape Town. Moreover, the organisation also appealed to the middle class by proposing to reverse the perceived moral decline that was argued to lie at the root of much of the gang activity and crime plaguing the greater Cape Town area.

Pagad was thus initially established by a group of anti-crime activists with militant tendencies, although it also included members of existing neighbourhood watch structures. The aim was to rigorously oppose suspected criminal gangs and drug dealers under the banner of a popular anti-crime sentiment in the Cape Peninsula in and around Cape Town. It was only in mid-1996 that the Pagad campaign established a formal organisational structure and began to promote itself as Pagad, with Farouk Jaffer as co-ordinator, Nadthmie Edries as organiser and Ali ‘Phantom’ Parker as head of operations.5 Pagad’s support base was initially located in Athlone, but rapidly spread to other areas in the Cape Peninsula such as the Bo-Kaap, Heideveld, Retreat, Mitchell’s Plain, Lansdowne, Salt River, Kensington, Pelican Park and Manenberg. In time, Pagad also managed to attract support in areas further removed from the Cape Town metropolis, such as the Strand, Clanwilliam, Worcester, George, Paarl and Beaufort West.

From the outset, Pagad must be distinguished from other anti-crime structures such as community police forums. First, many of Pagad’s actions are a form of organised vigilantism and are illegal. Second, the organisation adopts a policy of non co-operation with the law enforcement agencies of the state. Third, it rejects community police forums and anti-crime forums as being ineffectual. Finally, it perceives the government to be unwilling and unable to effectively curb crime.

This chapter will begin by exploring the historical context that made the sudden appearance of an organisation such as Pagad possible. Pagad’s initial objectives and how these changed, causing divisions within the organisation, will be analysed. These divisions ultimately led to the formation of two different factions within the organisation: a ‘moderate Pagad’ faction and a ‘Pagad — Qibla’, or militant faction.

This chapter will also deal with Pagad’s modus operandi, which provides an insight into the organisation’s dual strategy: the first being that of an overt mass movement which is open to all who want to fight crime and gangsterism, and the second being that of a covert organisation within a structure that adopts a hard-line approach, including the use of violence. A supplementary objective of this chapter is to analyse the possible involvement of Islamic extremist elements in Pagad.

Historical background

Pagad was not the first formal anti-crime structure in the Western Cape, nor was it an organisation that appeared unexpectedly as a reaction to rising levels of crime in the region. The involvement of ordinary citizens in an anti-crime structure in the Western Cape began with the Salt River Co-ordinating Council against drug abuse (SRCC).

Cape Town’s first mass anti-drug march took place in April 1990 under the leadership of the SRCC. This spawned similar community-based anti-drug initiatives in Cape Town suburbs such as the Bo-Kaap, Wynberg, Surrey Estate and on the Cape Flats. Pagad emerged only in 1995 and did not have any organic link with these earlier anti-crime movements, either in respect of the individuals involved or the strategy used.6 However, organisations such as Qibla and other Muslim organisations played a significant role in the establishment of Pagad.

Although Pagad is not an exclusively Muslim organisation, it is significant that the majority of its members are Muslims. Muslims make up approximately 2.5% of the South African population, and an estimated 33% of the population in the Western Cape. According to Sheikh Ebrahim Gabriel of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) in the Western Cape, Muslims are divided into two groups. The majority of Muslims in the Western Cape and South Africa as a whole are Sunni Muslims (99% of Muslims in the Western Cape), while Shi’a Muslims make up only some 1% of the Muslim community in the Western Cape.7

With its establishment in 1995, Pagad members and supporters represented diverse backgrounds and interests. The main identifiable groups within Pagad at the time were:

citizens (mainly but not exclusively from the Muslim community) concerned about the high levels of crime and criminal gang activity;



populist moderate Muslim community leaders (such as Nadthmie Edries and Farouk Jaffer);



Islamic extremists, usually members or supporters of the older organisation, Qibla, and



populist militants who later became involved in Pagad’s inner core of G-force members.

There is also a possibility that a small group of members were themselves drug dealers and used Pagad to eliminate competitors.

Pagad and Qibla

Qibla (initially called the Qibla Mass Movement) emerged in South Africa in the 1980s as a militant pro-Shi’ite fundamentalist force, inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Qibla (which means ‘the true direction of prayer towards Mecca’) was created to promote the aims and ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa. Qibla sought to propagate, defend and implement the strict Islamic principles associated with the Iranian revolution among Muslims in South Africa and to transform South Africa into a fully-fledged Muslim state (theocracy), under the slogan "One Solution, Islamic Revolution".8

Since the establishment of Pagad in 1995, numerous allegations have been made by the media and by elements in the Cape Muslim community, that Qibla has infiltrated Pagad and is using Pagad as a vanguard organisation for mobilising the Muslim community to achieve the aims of Qibla.9 Qibla is a secretive organisation and is not prepared to divulge information on its structure and membership, or on its connection with Pagad. Allegations that Abdus Salaam Ebrahim and other leading Pagad figures are also members of Qibla could not be substantiated at the time of writing. However, through interviews with members of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), statements made by Qibla leader Achmat Cassiem during Pagad marches, and statements in the media, it would appear that the relationship between Pagad and Qibla is stronger than it at first glance appears.

During the anti-apartheid struggle Qibla simultaneously supported the black consciousness movement in South Africa — in particular Pan Africanism — and the notion of an Islamic revolution in South Africa. A symbiotic relationship developed between Qibla and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Qibla supported PAC insurgents inside South Africa in return for PAC-sponsored military training for Qibla members.10 At the time the PAC had ties with groups in Libya who were instrumental in arranging military training for Qibla members in several Islamic countries, including Libya, Iran and the Sudan.11

In April 1986, 12 Libyan-trained PAC guerrillas were arrested at Athens airport carrying Scorpion machine pistols, AK-47 rifles, TNT explosives, detonators and ammunition. According to the minister of law and order at the time, Adriaan Vlok, those arrested included members of Qibla. In December 1986, two Qibla members were arrested in Cape Town. The two members — Achmat Cassiem and Yusuf Patel — together with five PAC members were charged with 24 counts of terrorism, membership of a banned organisation, attempted murder and possession of arms and ammunition.12 Achmat Cassiem was incarcerated on Robben Island, and was later to become the driving force in extending Qibla’s influence over Pagad.

In the 1990s, Cassiem had become the Amir (Arabic for ‘leader’) of Qibla and the organisation continued its close relationship with militants in the PAC and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), with the intention of broadening its support base among local Muslims. The objectives of Qibla are not clearly spelled out, due to a lack of information. However, under the banner of "One Solution, Islamic Revolution" the possibility of an Islamic revolution in South Africa as a long-term objective needs to be seen as the primary goal. The influence of Qibla on Pagad was possibly established when Pagad formed an informal alliance with the PAC in 1996.13 Allegedly, the reason for this alliance can be attributed to the relationship Qibla had had with the PAC’s military wing, the Azanian People’s, Liberation Army (APLA) and with the PAC during the armed struggle against apartheid. According to Brümmer: "Qibla has strong relations with Pagad, among them the fact that the two bodies share a number of their top leaders."14 Sheikh Sedick, the secretary-general of the Muslim Judicial Council, is of the opinion that ideologically, Pagad’s establishment in 1995 was directly linked to the inability of Qibla to develop into a mass-based organisation for the promotion of an Islamic revolution.15

It is interesting to note that after the establishment of Pagad, other structures were formed with similar aims: People Against Prostitutes and Sodomites (Papas), Muslims Against Global Oppression (Mago), and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (Mail). It appears that the leadership of these organisations consists of the same people, all with links to Qibla. Each of these organisations represents a different challenge or problem faced by Muslims in the Western Cape. Each organisation thus has a specific target market from which small numbers of extremists can be recruited. Qibla’s connections with Mago were demonstrated during a Qibla march in January 2000 to the Russian embassy in Cape Town in protest against the killing of Muslims in Chechnya. Mago members participated in the march. Qibla leader Achmat Cassiem led the delegation.16

In September 2000, members of Mago marched to the US embassy to voice their dissatisfaction with the South African government’s proposed anti-terrorism bill. According to Yusuf Abrahams, spokesperson for Mago, the bill was nothing more than a reincarnation of the terrorism legislation of the apartheid era that had resulted in state-sponsored oppression. Mago members shouted slogans in support of the release of Pagad supporter Dawood Osman, who was convicted on charges relating to the killing of alleged gangsters at the entrance to the V & A Waterfront shopping complex in Cape Town.17

In the mid-1990s, Cassiem was instrumental in forming the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) — an umbrella organisation that seeks to represent South Africa’s Muslim community. The first president of the IUC was Sheikh Toffar, a moderate cleric. A year later, after the IUC-launched moratorium on the election of office bearers had elapsed, Cassiem was elected president. The IUC has a community radio licence for Radio 786, which broadcasts in the Cape Town area. Radio 786 routinely adopts a pro-Pagad stance in its broadcasts.

Qibla’s influence on Pagad was further demonstrated in March 1996 when the IUC initiated a protest march against crime, drugs and gangsterism, in collaboration with the Surrey Estate and Athlone neighbourhood watches. The march turned into a threatening confrontation with the then justice minister, Dullah Omar, at the latter’s home in Athlone. Some of the armed marchers were identified as members of Qibla and Pagad’s militant wing, G-force. In May 1996, members of the IUC, together with neighbourhood watch members, marched to parliament under the auspices of Pagad to protest against the availability of drugs in the community.

Although Qibla and the IUC have publicly distanced themselves from Pagad (as, for example, Sheikh Achmat Sidique, the director of the Muslim Judicial Council), there are many in the Muslim community who believe that Pagad is fully under the control of Qibla. As one commentator noted: "Whatever Cassiem’s involvement with Pagad, he remains — as the South African originator of a radical agenda based upon a revolutionary reading of the Qur’an — the movement’s ideological father."18 Such accusations of Qibla’s alleged involvement with Pagad contributed to a split in the ranks of Pagad.

September 1996 Pagad split

During September 1996, Pagad was split by an apparent power struggle between Nadthmie Edries (Pagad Western Cape leader), Farouk Jaffer (Pagad Western Cape spokesman) and Ali ‘Phantom’ Parker (Pagad operational commander) on the one hand; and the militant Pagad populists and the fundamentalist and political extremist Qibla faction on the other. The split came about when Pagad members began to question whether the fight against drugs deserved to be called a ‘jihad’ (holy war). According to Jaffer, the original Pagad vision for fighting crime and drugs was more moderate and intended to restore community values "through planning and constructive action such as the building of rehabilitation centres".19 According to Sheikh Sedick of the MJC, who was involved in negotiations between these two Pagad factions, "Parker, Jaffer and Edries came out strongly against elements within Pagad who they said were not interested in dealing with the authorities in the fight against crime. They claimed Qibla had an anti-state rather than an anti-crime agenda."20

The divisions within Pagad resulted in a flurry of contradictory and confusing statements from the organisation’s leadership. The moderate and militant populist groups issued public statements to the effect that Pagad had severed all ties with Qibla. Moreover, statements made by the Pagad leadership that they were "willing to die" for the "One Solution, Islamic Revolution", were contradicted by subsequent statements that they were "sensible, ordinary people who are fed up with drugs", and who dismissed the idea of an Islamic state as "laughable". According to Esack: "… this reflects the tension between a leadership position being exercised from a safe distance, and the ostensible one which is exposed to the public and, incidentally, one which has not had a historical or ideological relationship with Qibla".21 Although the Pagad leader is called ‘Amir’, the followers of Pagad do not display the ideological coherence characteristic of Qibla supporters. On the other hand, Pagad’s core leadership are individuals who have a long-standing commitment to Qibla and who play an active role in the Islamic Unity Convention.22

The final break between the two factions came when Ali ‘Phantom’ Parker claimed on 20 September 1996 that Qibla was in control of Pagad. Parker released a statement that would lead to his suspension, as well as that of Jaffer and Edries from Pagad, effectively neutralising the moderate faction of the Pagad leadership corps. Parker’s statement alleged that:

Qibla members within Pagad were trying to assassinate him;

Qibla was responsible for hijacking Pagad to promote their "hidden agenda";

Qibla members used blackmail and extortion on businessmen to raise funds for Pagad; and

Qibla was trying to overthrow the government.

A broader split also emerged among Pagad members over the means used when dealing with gangsterism and drug dealers. The radical faction coalesced under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, who advocated confronting gang leaders in a violent manner, and even eliminating some of them. The moderate faction sought to co-operate with the police in crime prevention functions and rejected militant strategies.23 It would appear that the Pagad leadership was aware of the covert and violent activities of the former faction, and condoned its activities.24

After September 1996, Achmat Cassiem began to attend and participate openly in Pagad meetings. Moreover, it became apparent that the post-September 1996 period saw a shift in Pagad’s emphasis. The emphasis shifted from the inability of the state to deal with crime, to the necessity to establish an Islamic state by way of revolution.

While Pagad began to adopt a more radical position, it still managed to attract support from members of the public. This was so for essentially two reasons. First, Pagad’s ability to focus international attention on the escalating crime situation in South Africa and highlight the government’s inability to deal with the situation. Second, although moderate and progressive Muslim organisations such as the Call of Islam and the Muslim Youth Movement play an important role in the wider Muslim community in South Africa, they are losing their influence for a variety of reasons, the most important of which are a lack of funding and the inability to develop a theology of reconstruction after liberation.

Objectives of Pagad

The objectives of Pagad are clearly encapsulated in a memorandum that the organisation delivered to the minister of correctional services in September 1996:

"One of the most important functions of government is to see to the safety of all its citizens and non-citizens. Unfortunately, this is not the case... We, the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, have embarked on this mass demonstration to:



inform the people of South Africa of the escalation of drug addiction and gangsterism;



make the people of South Africa aware that something is being done about the cancerous growths of drug addicts and gangsterism;



alert the government that urgent and drastic steps must be taken to curb, stop and eradicate the upsurge of gangsterism and drug addiction;



galvanise the entire population to be prepared to take alternative steps if the situation does not improve in the near future; and



inform the entire population of the extent of corruption within the police and judiciary."

In March 1997, Pagad’s national body approved the following aims and objectives for the organisation:

to propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society, in accordance with the divine will of The Creator;



to co-operate with and to co-ordinate the activities of people and people’s organisations which have similar aims and objectives [to those of Pagad];



to make every effort to invite/motivate/activate and to include those people and peoples’ organisations who are not yet part of Pagad; and



to raise funds for the aforementioned aims.

It was also agreed that Pagad is a non-profit-making movement. Its assets, income and donations shall be used to carry out the aims and objectives of Pagad.25

In May 1998, Dr Allie of the Pagad secretariat was asked whether Pagad was a vigilante or pressure group. According to Allie:

"Pagad could be regarded as both a pressure group by putting pressure on the government and the police during marches and meetings to comply with its demands, and as a vigilante group. My understanding of a vigilante group is a person who reacts to a situation, and whose legitimate right it is to react to a situation because nobody else wants to. The latter is based upon the fact that Pagad members as individuals and members of a structure stand up to crime and drugs within the community. I will use my legitimate right to defend myself and by whatever means possible, whatever it takes... We need to mobilise all the people of South Africa to stand up and address crime in South Africa. We want to get rid of crime, totally."26

Pagad’s primarily overt function is that of an anti-crime structure to combat and eradicate crime, gangsterism and drugs. According to Pagad, its actions are the natural responses of citizens who daily experience the failure of the state to protect them — a fundamental right in any society and upon which a state’s legitimacy depends. According to Father Clohessy, a Pagad founding member, the community’s frustration is based on the fact that it realises that "a non-confrontational approach to this particular problem [the activities of gangsters and drug dealers] is no longer a viable route — and that those who are empowered by law to confront these social evils are simply not able to function in a way that bears real fruit. There is no doubt; therefore, that Pagad arose with an agenda that included both confrontation and force. In itself, force can be classified as extreme pressure, and is not necessarily violent."27 Pagad has a two-pronged strategy to combat crime: confrontation directed at government, and confrontation directed at those who perpetrate crime.

The first prong of Pagad’s strategy of confrontation is directed at government incompetence — it is believed that if the government is not fulfilling the mandate of the people and is unwilling to be challenged or criticised, then people have a moral right and obligation to defend their lives and property.28

Pagad has consistently alleged that the government has failed to effectively curtail gangsterism and drug trafficking. During a Pagad protest march to Cape Town International Airport in December 1996, Pagad’s commander-in-chief Aslam Toefy said the march had been organised because Pagad wanted to put pressure on the authorities to step up security checks at the airport to prevent drugs from entering the country. "Pagad is a pressure group and will continue to apply pressure to rid this country of gangsters and drugs," Toefy said. He also accused the authorities of being swift in their action against Pagad but of doing very little to arrest the drug lords and to deal with the high crime rate in the country.

The second prong of Pagad’s strategy of confrontation is directed against those who perpetrate crime. The Pagad leadership believed that as pressure on the government was insufficient to combat crime, they would have to deal with the crime situation in the Western Cape themselves. As a result, Pagad members began to ‘visit’ drug dealers and gang leaders. During these ‘visits’, ultimatums were issued to the drug dealers and gang leaders to stop their illegal activities or "face the consequences". In interviews, Pagad members would not provide direct answers to questions regarding the way in which drug dealers and gang leaders would be dealt with by the community if such ultimatums were not complied with.29

In 1996, Pagad initiated a programme of petitioning the government and the police to take action against gangs that had targeted Muslim youths as buyers of their drugs. The programme also incorporated campaigns in the form of ‘ultimatum marches’. That is, Pagad would hold a public meeting to discuss the problems of gangs and drugs in the community. At the meeting, members of the public were asked to identify known gang leaders in the community. Pagad would then organise a march to the house of an identified gang leader in the community to deliver a 24-hour ultimatum stating: "We are giving you 24 hours to clean up your act, or we will come back for you". Posters carried by the marchers emphasised the seriousness of their threats by declaring: "Kill the merchant. One bullet, one peddler". The ultimatums generally demanded that all illegal activities by the ‘identified’ gang leaders had to stop or they would have to face the consequences. Pagad conducted 54 such protest marches between August and December 1996. Thereafter, fewer protest marches were held and subsequently Pagad’s actions tended to become more violent.30 This was due to a cycle of violence and the formation of cell structures with ulterior motives. A lack of control over more militant elements by Pagad’s leadership also contributed to more acts of violence.

Pagad’s organisational structure

Pagad’s activities in the Western Cape contributed to the establishment of similar organisations in Port Elizabeth (People Against Drugs and Violence — Padav), Johannesburg (People Against Crime and Drugs — Pacad) and Kimberley (Pagad). Pagad formed a national structure known as Pagad United in December 1996, under the chairmanship of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim. Aslam Toefy was elected as the national chief commander of Pagad United. During the Pagad national conference it was decided that Pagad’s national executive would consist of a representative from each of the regions. The most important feature of the conference was to set up a command substructure, which would report to the executive.31

In reaction to the initial success of Pagad in the Western Cape, similar independent structures were formed in other parts of the country. To enhance its effectiveness, Pagad Western Cape became more involved in the other organisations, to broaden its support base and influence. During the Pagad national conference, Pagad Western Cape established its control over the other similar organisations in the rest of the country. Pagad Western Cape leadership figures were elected into key positions. For example, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim was elected as the national Pagad co-ordinator.

The national office of Pagad United is in Cape Town. Although Pagad has a strong national identity, most of its supporters are based in Cape Town, as most of the national executive is originally from Pagad Western Cape.32 Furthermore, Pagad Western Cape is better structured than elsewhere. Each regional structure has an executive member serving on the national body, although each region maintains its autonomy to carry on with its anti-drug and anti-crime operations as it did before the conference.33 While all the different Pagad-related structures have equal rights, Pagad Western Cape dominates them all.

It would seem that the new national structure enabled Pagad Western Cape to access new sources of explosives and armaments from Pagad branches in other parts of the country. In August 1999 members of the police found a M26 hand grenade, 96 fuses used for setting off explosive devices (including pipe bombs), seven R1 magazines filled with ammunition, 25 pentalite boosters used to boost detonator charges and 11 pipe bomb caps in Gauteng.34 This assumed link between Pagad and the cache was borne out in the trial following the arrest of Ayob Mungalee (Pagad’s Gauteng co-ordinator), Nizaam Sheikh, Yassiem Adjouhaart, Jacob Jacobs and Afzal Karriem in February 1999 for being in possession of illegal firearms, explosives and a bullet-proof vest in a roadblock near Beaufort West in the Karoo. They also had in their possession a manual on how to manufacture explosive devices. Ayob Mungalee, during testimony at his trial held later that year, revealed that he had delivered 2.5kg of explosives to the Pagad structure in the Western Cape. All of these men were members of the Pagad structure in Johannesburg and were on their way to Cape Town when they were arrested. Although they were acquitted for being in possession of detonators, they were sentenced to eight years imprisonment in November 2000 for the possession of illegal firearms and explosives.

The formation of Pagad United extended its influence more widely so it was able to deal more effectively with its campaign against gangsterism and drugs. The national executive was also in a position to negotiate with the SAPS and government at national level rather than at a regional level. The national structure enabled Pagad to present a stronger and larger front against drug lords and gangsters who would attack the organisation or its members.35 According to Spannenberg and Holtzhausen the national executive co-ordinated the activities of the various Pagad-related structures throughout the country and used its national base to raise funds on a national level.36

Pagad’s Western Cape structure

Although Pagad has a national structure, it is in its traditional home base in the Western Cape that the organisation is strongest, and it is from here that Pagad’s national organisation is controlled. What follows in this chapter will focus almost exclusively on Pagad’s activities and structure in the Western Cape.

Pagad’s working committee and other substructures are engaged in the organisation’s overt anti-crime activities, while its security council conceptualises and plans the organisation’s more covert and illegal activities. It would thus appear that Pagad has adopted a dual strategy to achieve one objective: to combat, intimidate and violently oppose suspected drug dealers and gangsters.

After the split in September 1996, Pagad began to develop more formal internal organisational structures. Pagad Western Cape consists of a working committee and eight substructures (Figure 1). The working committee is responsible for the entire campaign against gangsterism and drugs. This committee consists of approximately 30 members, including a chief co-ordinator, a chief commander, a chief of security, and the co-ordinators and secretaries of the various subcommittees. It is the responsibility of the working committee "to see to it that all substructures fulfil their duties to the community. At the same time they are collectively responsible to the people. Similarly they are directly answerable to the people."37 Each substructure is responsible for its own field of operations but is directly answerable to the working committee. "All decisions which affect policy or Pagad strategy must be put before the working committee to be scrutinised and subsequently authorised or not."38 Eight of the Pagad substructures are listed below.39

Secretariat

The secretariat primarily has an administrative function, dealing with the co-ordination of all activities within Pagad, including organising meetings, marches, mass rallies, prayer-meetings, conventions, and advertising, in addition to community notices. It is also responsible for all correspondence to and from the organisation.41

Legal department

The legal department deals with all legal matters that involve Pagad and its members. In 1997, Pagad’s legal expenses came to about R500 000. According to Pagad’s national secretary, Abidah Roberts, stringent bail conditions and harassment by state law enforcement agencies, such as regular raids conducted by the police on Pagad members and their homes, have contributed to high legal fees for the organisation.42

Social welfare department

The social welfare department deals with educating the community about drugs and gangsterism. This is done in the schools at pre-school, primary and secondary level, and among workers in factories. The department also organises recreation opportunities for Pagad members and the community in the form of prayer meetings, outings and sporting events. The department further assists in the rehabilitation of drug addicts and provides support to their families. A support group exists which provides social support to Pagad members injured or maimed during Pagad activities.

Finance department

The finance department is responsible for controlling and managing Pagad’s finances. The department invests Pagad funds, organises fundraising projects, and collects money at Pagad meetings and mass rallies.

Security department

The members of the security department operate in ‘cell’ structures. The department and its cells are responsible for protecting the areas where Pagad members live. Every cell has a commander who is accountable to the security department.43 Each geographic area thus has its own structure and co-ordinator. The security department also has a ‘special unit’ consisting of the most disciplined and well-trained members of every cell. Senior members of the SAPS and members of parliament are of the opinion that the security department and its cell structures are responsible for violent attacks on suspected drug dealers and gangsters.44

Jeremy Vearey, the commander of police intelligence co-ordination in the Western Cape, had the following to say about Pagad’s security structure:

"Pagad formed its ‘paramilitary wing’, also called the G-force, into small cell structures at neighbourhood level, which have the capacity to operate undetected and independently from central organisational control. Some cell members are said to be veterans of armed Islamic campaigns in hot spots like Bosnia, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Pagad seems not to be in any position to control the actions of its members. There is very little centralised control... and the energy unleashed by the Pagad cause could reproduce itself in a pattern of militancy with a life of its own independent of direct structural ties to Pagad."45

Media and public relations department

The department deals with all Pagad newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, memoranda, and press statements and media liaison.

Medical unit

The team is responsible for assisting Pagad supporters who sustain injuries during Pagad operations and events. The medical unit also looks after the medical needs of detained and imprisoned Pagad members.

Education department

The education department is responsible for developing a syllabus on the subject of gangsterism and drugs. The department is also responsible for assisting educators by providing additional classes on subjects such as biology, science and mathematics.46

Support for Pagad

According to Pagad’s national secretary, Abidah Roberts, Pagad’s support grew from 6 000 in May 1996 to an estimated 100 000 during 1997.47 It is possible to distinguish between active and passive support. Active support is given by individuals who are directly involved in the various activities of Pagad, such as participation in Pagad protest marches. Passive support or ‘in-principle support’ is not translated into physical action. In interviews with members of the Muslim Judicial Council and senior police officers in the Western Cape, the consensus emerged that large parts of the community identified with the objectives of Pagad during the initial phase of the organisation’s existence. However, as Pagad’s image changed from an anti-crime organisation to one that engaged in illegal activities the majority of community members began to distance themselves from Pagad. One way to calculate the changing support of Pagad in the community is to analyse the support Pagad received during its protest marches. In 1995 and 1996 it was, for example, not unusual for Pagad to attract between 2 000 and 5 000 supporters to its protest marches and rallies. By the late 1990s, attendance figures at Pagad marches and rallies had declined considerably — attracting at most a few hundred people at a time.

An Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) survey on public support for Pagad on the Cape Flats between September 1996 and April 1997 revealed that public support for Pagad decreased as the organisation’s actions became more forceful and violent. This decline in support could be because the majority of ordinary Pagad supporters were opposed to the violent tactics of Pagad’s G-force. Many members also became dissatisfied with the organisation’s shift away from its original purpose: the combating and eradicating of drug- and gang-related activity.

According to the IDASA survey, support for Pagad ranged from 88% in respect of petitions demanding action on crime, to 55% for the use of violence against criminals. Nevertheless a majority of respondents in the IDASA survey supported the use of intimidation (70%) or violence (55%) to rid their neighbourhoods of suspected criminals. Only one-quarter (24%) of the respondents opposed the use of marches to pressure or intimidate undesirable elements in the community, and slightly more than one-third (38%) opposed the use of violence and force, and activities that are clearly illegal, dangerous and a serious threat to the rule of law and the democratic state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.48

Pagad’s modus operandi

Throughout its existence, Pagad has adopted a militant approach to achieve its objectives. This is evident from the organisation’s paramilitary style attacks on the homes of suspected drug dealers — primarily by Pagad G—force members, and mass marches by Pagad supporters. The marches are intended to serve as a popular show of force, and to present suspected drug dealers with threatening ultimatums to cease their ‘nefarious’ activities.

Pagad employs a dual strategy, and so it is hardly surprising that it has also developed an organisational structure in line with its strategy. On the one hand Pagad engages in a number of ‘overt’ and largely legal activities. At the same time some members of the organisation engage in ‘covert’ activities that are violent and illegal. Such a dual strategy allows Pagad’s overt leadership to publicly dissociate itself from the illegal activities of its ‘covert’ members. A danger inherent to this strategy is that the ‘covert wing’ of the organisation could attempt to operate independently and beyond the control of the organisation’s formal and ‘overt’ leadership. That is, individuals in the organisation’s ‘covert wing’ could lose sight of the aims and objectives of the larger movement and develop their own agenda for action.49

The leadership of Pagad denies the involvement of Pagad members in cases of violence and intimidation perpetrated by members of the organisation’s cell structures. According to the Pagad secretariat: "It is not the policy of Pagad to attack people such as drug lords and gangsters, but if people act beyond the command or the intention of the working committee, one cannot take responsibility for those actions."50 The question is — who is responsible for these attacks? According to Pagad’s working committee, Pagad is not responsible, but they will not condemn people within the organisation who commit such acts of violence: "By whatever it takes they will get rid of crime; by every means necessary. If the people should decide to take the law into their own hands, we wish them the best of luck."51 According to the Pagad leadership, one of the reasons for the organisation’s success is the fact that it "took the fear that the community had of gangsters and drug dealers and placed it back into the hands of the criminals". 52

Figure 2 indicates the involvement of suspected Pagad members in shootings and bombings between 1996 and 2000. Between 1996 and 1998, Pagad’s cell structures limited most of their attacks to drug dealers. While a decline in the number of Pagad-related incidents was recorded after 1998, innocent civilians increasingly became the targets as the violence took on the form of urban terrorism. The different phases of suspected Pagad activities are described below.

1996 — 1997: The fight against drug dealers

It is a widespread perception within communities in the Western Cape that Pagad’s campaign against drug dealers led to a decrease in crime in the Western Cape. According to Farouk Jaffer, (Pagad’s spokesman before the 1996 split) during Pagad’s anti-drug campaign between November 1995 and November 1996, crime in the Western Cape decreased by 23%.53

Between July 1996 and December 1997, Pagad’s covert structures were allegedly implicated in 222 acts of violence against suspected drug dealers and their property. Explosives were used in 124 of these incidents in comparison to firearms that were used in only 98 incidents.54 According to an IDASA study, community support on the Cape Flats for the use of aggressive and violent forms of collective action increased over this period.55

During this period the more militant faction within Pagad targeted mosques to gain support from the Muslim community. In 1997, the militant Qibla supporters within Pagad began to target Muslims who opposed Qibla. At the behest of the Pagad leadership, attacks by members of Pagad’s G-force were allegedly carried out not only against gangsters and drug dealers but also against former Pagad members.56

1998: Reaction or outspoken opposition?

Up to and including May 1998, targets for alleged Pagad attacks focused largely on suspected drug dealers, gangsters and shebeens (illegal taverns). In June 1998, Muslim-owned businesses became the targets of attacks, while in July, academics and clerics critical of the tactics of Pagad’s G-force were attacked. Over the same period, the personnel and facilities of the state’s security and intelligence community were identified by elements within Pagad as the ‘enemy’ and were subjected to threats and physical attacks. Before the August explosion in Bellville in front of the office of the SAPS special task team on Pagad, two other police stations were targeted by pipe bombs: in February 1998 the Lansdowne police station was targeted, and in June 1998 Mowbray police station. These three pipe bomb attacks on police stations were preceded by the arrest of key members of Pagad’s G-force. Since June 1998, a number of police stations have received anonymous telephonic threats suggesting they were to be similarly attacked. In detonating the explosion outside the offices of the police special investigation task team on 6 August 1998, the nature of Pagad’s activities developed, indicating that Pagad was no longer a vigilante group or even a pressure group within the boundaries of legitimate dissent. The increasing selectivity of targets by perpetrators of these acts of urban terrorism reflected a noteworthy qualitative shift in strategic objectives.

In August 1998, the United States launched missile strikes against a suspected bomb-making installation and the bases of Osama Bin Laden in both Sudan and Afghanistan, in revenge for the bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The US government claimed that Osama Bin Laden was the mastermind behind the embassy bombings. In response to the US missile strikes, militant Pagad members allegedly began to target businesses in the Cape Town area that were in some way linked to the United States — even if it was in name or image only, such as the bombing of the ‘Planet Hollywood’ restaurant.

1999 — 2000: Restaurants and public places

There was a significant change in suspected Pagad-related acts of violence after 1998. The number of bombing incidents declined from 93 in 1998, to 16 in 1999, and the number of shootings decreased from 86 in 1998, to 44 in 1999. While fewer in number, the bombings and shootings took on a more serious form during 1999. Attacks were no longer focused on drug dealers and gangsters but tended to target public places and places of entertainment.

The change in target selection was accompanied by changes in the explosive devices used in attacks on police stations and restaurants during this period. For example, the use of cell-phones as remote controlled detonators for explosive devices introduced a new level of sophistication into the bombing campaign. Car bombs hidden in cars parked along busy public streets were also used increasingly during 1999. Unlike the pipe bombs that were used before in a targeted manner to intimidate drug dealers, the new form of bombings in 1999 was nothing less than indiscriminate acts of terrorism against the public at large. The level of violence and destruction unleashed by acts of terrorism during 1999 was much higher than that produced by pipe bomb attacks and drive-by shootings popular between 1996 and 1998. Between January and August 1999, six bomb explosions injured 81 people, while 17 armed attacks killed 17. Acts of terrorism committed during 1999 included, among others, eight incidents. These are listed below.

1 January: a car bomb exploded at the V & A Waterfront shopping and entertainment complex, injuring two people. It is possible that the bombing coincided with the screening of the Hollywood produced film ‘The Siege’. The explosive device detonated while the film was showing at a cinema in the shopping complex. Prior to the screening of the film, members of the Muslim community protested against the showing of it because it portrayed Muslims as terrorists.



8 January: a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet was petrol-bombed in Athlone.



28 January: a car bomb exploded outside Caledon Square police headquarters injuring 11.



30 January: a woman was injured and a police car destroyed in a blast at the Woodstock police station (the explosive device was thrown).



9 May: a car bomb exploded outside the Athlone police station.



6 November: nine people were injured in a bomb explosion outside a bar patronised by Cape Town’s gay community, the Blah Bar.



28 November: 48 people were injured in a powerful bomb blast in St Elmo’s pizzeria, a popular tourist place in Camps Bay.



24 December: seven police officers were injured when a bomb exploded in a refuse container outside a restaurant in Greenpoint. The officers had responded to an anonymous call and were ambushed at the restaurant when the bomb was triggered remotely by cell-phone as the officers came within metres of the refuse container.

An organisation by the name of People Against Prostitutes and Sodomy (Papas) claimed responsibility for attacks on gay bars in 2000. Although Pagad denied any links with Papas, the explosive devices used in the attacks on gay bars were similar to those used in other explosions where the suspects were Pagad members.

During 2000, a new development in terrorist bombings was the repeated use of domestic fertiliser (ammonium nitrate) as a component in the explosive material of the bombs. According to the police, traces of fertiliser were found at the Constantia shopping centre, the Bronx night club, Heerengracht Street near the US consulate in Cape Town, and in the Obz Café bombings. This shift in explosive mixture from gunpowder to fertiliser could be because the latter is, in large quantities, a potentially devastating explosive, and the bombers had the intention of causing greater damage than in the past. Fortunately, the bombers did not manage to get sufficient chemical mixture to maximise the explosive impact of the bombs. (The April 1995 Oklahoma City bomb in the United States contained the right mixture of ammonium nitrate fertiliser and racing fuel. The massive bomb destroyed a multi-story building and killed 168 people.) However, it is possible that the Cape bombers shifted to the use of fertiliser as an explosive because the law enforcement agencies were investigating the buyers of larger quantities of gunpowder at the time.

In 2000, at least 14 prominent acts of terrorism, listed below, took place.

12 January: a bomb attached to a motorbike exploded in front of the Wynberg magistrates’ court, injuring one person. The explosive device was detonated by remote control by means of a cell-phone. The explosion occurred as a bail application for two Pagad members, who were arrested in December 1999 for being in possession of explosive devices, was taking place inside the court centre. Two Pagad supporters, Faizel Felix and Ashraf Saban were arrested in January 2000, in connection with the theft of the motorbike that was used in the bombing.57



14 May: Ebrahim Gollie, a key witness to the explosion on 12 January (above) was shot and killed when four gunmen stormed into his house and started shooting.58



22 May: police deactivated a pipe bomb outside the New York Bagels restaurant in Sea Point.



10 June: a car bomb was detonated outside the New York Bagels restaurant, injuring three people.



18 July: a small explosive device placed in a dustbin detonated at Cape Town International Airport, causing minor damage. The explosion coincided with the court appearances of two prominent Pagad members.



11 August: an explosive device in a motor vehicle detonated outside the Zanzibar coffee shop at the up-market Constantia Village shopping centre, injuring two people.



19 August: a car bomb exploded outside the Bronx nightclub, injuring five people. After this incident, Juan Uys, the national leader of the executive board of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA), stated that the GLA had been threatened by Papas in the past. However, Pagad’s legal co-ordinator, Cassiem Parker, claimed that he had never heard of Papas. "Pagad has no affiliation with Papas," Parker said.59



29 August: a car bomb was detonated near the United States consulate in Cape Town, injuring seven people.



7 September: regional court magistrate, Piet Theron, who was the presiding officer in a number of Pagad trials, was assassinated outside his home.



8 September: a car bomb exploded outside the Obz Café, a popular student bar in the Cape Town suburb of Observatory. No one was injured.



12 September: a bomb placed in a tree exploded a few hundred metres from the Samaj Community Centre in Gatesville where, moments before, the premier of the Western Cape, Gerald Morkel, had arrived to address a public meeting.60



18 October: a bomb exploded near the offices of the Democratic Alliance, South Africa’s official opposition party.



3 November: a bomb was defused at the Keg and Swan Pub in Bellville. A staff member found the explosive device among the chairs and tables outside the pub at 06h30.61



26 December: Yusuf and Fahiema Enous, enrolled in the witness protection programme, were assassinated. Both were key state witnesses in the trial of alleged Pagad members Faizel Waggie and Nazeem Davids, who were charged with terrorism and attempted murder for placing an explosive device at the Keg and Swan pub in Bellville.

A question of Pagad’s involvement

The question needs to be asked if the above acts of terrorism are the work of Pagad members. Circumstantial evidence tends to indicate that Pagad members and supporters were involved in a number of illegal acts of violence. What other evidence is there to link Pagad to these acts of violence and terrorism?

A continuation of Pagad’s modus operandi since 1996?

From 1996 onwards, numerous suspected drug dealers and members of criminal gangs were warned by Pagad, in the form of ultimatums, to cease their suspected illegal activities. When the ultimatums were not complied with, violent assaults and attacks on the homes and vehicles of such suspected drug dealers and gang members followed. Some of the victims of such attacks have identified their attackers as active Pagad members.62

Moreover, the following former members of Pagad have alleged that Pagad was responsible for the following attacks:

The residence of Mr F Meyer was attacked on 7 August 1997 when gunmen opened fire on his residence in Hanover Park. Mr Meyer was a former member of Pagad.63



On 7 August 1997 a petrol-bomb was thrown at the residence of Mr Shamiel Mohammed in Rocklands, Mitchell’s Plain. Mr Mohammed was a former G-force commander.64



On 10 August 1997 a case of attempted murder was opened at Manenberg, after suspected Pagad supporters threw a petrol-bomb and fired shots at the residence of Mr Jubayda Venos, in Surrey Estate, Manenberg.65



On 21 September 1997 a case of attempted murder was opened at Bishop Lavis, after suspected Pagad supporters threw a petrol-bomb and fired shots at the residence of Mr Ismail Stevens, a former member of Pagad.66

In the following three cases, Pagad members were identified as being involved in the attacks.

Two Pagad members were identified as responsible for a kidnapping and assault on 7 January 1997.67 Anton Julies, Clint Delmarcus, Sabastian Delmarcus and Donovan Olivier were kidnapped by eight individuals and assaulted. Mustapha Jacobs and Faizel Kossain (Pagad members) were identified as two of the perpetrators.



A case of attempted murder was registered at Manenberg police station on 14 March 1997 after a drive-by shooting at the residence of Mr G van der Heide. Mr Van der Heide was previously warned by Pagad and one of the attackers was identified as a member of Pagad.68



The residence of Moegamat Madat, leader of the ‘Americans’ gang was attacked by Abdullah Salie, Ebrahim Davids, Kamaldien Basardien, Rashaad Salie, Sulayiman Sieed, Ismail Sieed, Moegamat Sieed and Abdullah Sieed on 25 August 1997. Eyewitnesses identified the attackers as being members of Pagad.69

Explosions associated with Pagad

In July 1998, a pipe bomb exploded in the passenger compartment of a vehicle driven by three Pagad members, killing two and injuring one. The police later recovered a .38 revolver, a 9mm pistol and a two-way radio inside the badly damaged vehicle.70 It appears that the occupants of the vehicle were on their way to detonate the pipe bomb at a predetermined target and that the bomb was mistakenly activated by one of the occupants of the vehicle. On 30 July 1998, at 12h45, a pipe-bomb exploded in the passenger compartment of a vehicle being driven by four Pagad members, killing two (Faizel Hendricks and Nululla Allie), and injuring one (Moegamat Anwar Francis). Yusuf Salie was not injured. According to the police, the bakkie was used in earlier pipe-bomb attacks recorded by eyewitnesses.71 Francis and Salie were charged with being in possession of explosives. The fact that the number plates were inside the vehicle was regarded by police as ‘sinister’. Although the two accused denied being members of Pagad, Francis had been seen at several Pagad meetings and Pagad posters and pamphlets were found inside the vehicle.72 A similar explosive device detonated in the hands of Abubakar Desai, a member of People Against Drugs and Violence (Padav) in April 1997, killing Desai. The Padav co-ordinator, Wasief Lagerdien, and Yusef Ahmed, a Padav member, were present when the explosion occurred.73 (Padav has close links with Pagad, and the two organisations share similar aims.)

Since its establishment, Pagad has been implicated in a number of pipe bomb explosions. For example, Pagad members Moegsien Barends, Riedewaan Hendricks and Faried Mohammed were arrested on 30 September 1998, after two pipe bombs were found.74 They were charged with being in possession of explosives.

Bomb-making materials

In December 1999, Pagad members Said and Nazier Mhatey were charged with being in possession of a pipe bomb and a grenade. According to the investigating officer in the case, information from informers revealed that the accused were involved in the manufacture of pipe bombs and were active members of Pagad. The investigating officer also revealed that the Blah Bar, St Elmo’s and Mano’s restaurant, and Wynberg magistrates’ court bombs were all detonated with the use of cell-phones. Forensic tests revealed that the explosive devices in these cases were made up of a combination of pipe and petrol bombs, bound together with cable ties. Similar shrapnel, consisting of triangular bits of metal and chopped-off nails, was also found at the scene of all these bombings. Forensic testing conducted on the pipe bomb found in the Mhateys’ garage concluded that its metallurgy matched that of other pipe bombs used in attacks in the Western Cape.75

However, the Mhatey brothers were not convicted as the state could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pipe bombs belonged to them. It is interesting to note that Said and Nazier Mhatey were convicted in 1987 for murder, robbery and attempted murder, after they shot and killed a security guard at a tavern in Athlone and robbed him of his firearm. They were sentenced to 29 years in prison, but were released in 1992 as part of an amnesty granted to political prisoners.76

Bombs at court appearances of Pagad members

On 12 January 2000, a bomb exploded before two Pagad members, Said and Nazier Mhatey, were to appear on charges of possession of a hand grenade and pipe bomb.77 According to safety and security minister Steve Tshwete, the car bomb explosion on 11 August 2000 occurred in retaliation for the arrest of four suspected Pagad members.78 On 18 July 2000, with the second court appearance of Said and Nazier Mhatey, an explosive device detonated in a dustbin in the parking lot at the Cape Town International Airport.79

Charges against Pagad members

Between July 1996 and December 1997, some 296 criminal cases were recorded by the police in which the suspects were members of Pagad. These resulted in 153 arrests.

Up to 11 October 2000, some 14 members and supporters of Pagad had been acquitted of terror-related crimes, while 16 had been convicted of such crimes.80 The convictions are listed below.

Moegamat Fakier was convicted on 15 February 1999, and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.



Abdul Heuwel was convicted in the Mitchell’s Plain regional court of intimidation. He was fined R3 000 (or a year in jail) with two years’ imprisonment suspended for five years.



N Abrahams, M Kamaldien and S Bester were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment each for the possession of an explosive device.



Abduraghman Thebus and Moegamat Adams were convicted of the murder of Chrystal Abrahams, aged six, and two charges of attempted murder.



Dawood Osman was convicted of the murder of Shaheem (Schubert) Daniels, a member of the ‘Junior Mafia’ gang, and three teenagers at the entrance to the V & A Waterfront in March 1998.



E Hendricks was convicted of the illegal possession of ammunition and fined R3 000 in November 1998.



Dedrick Botha paid an admission-of-guilt fine of R1 500 on charges of the possession of an unlicensed firearm.



Nasieg Pietersen was convicted on charges of attempted murder after a pipe bomb attack and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, three of which were suspended.



Moegamat Fakier was convicted for the possession of an unlicensed firearm and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.



Afzal Karriem was convicted for the illegal possession of ammunition and fined R3 000.



Zainab Ebrahim, wife of Pagad national co-ordinator Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, was convicted of possessing an unlicensed firearm and fined R4 000.



R Shaik was convicted of possessing an explosive device and given seven years’ imprisonment suspended for two years.



Ismail Edwards was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment after being convicted on charges of armed robbery and attempted murder.

In October 2000, criminal cases were pending against the Pagad members listed below.81

Three members of Pagad’s G-force, Ebrahim Jeneker and brothers Abdullah and Ismail Maansdorp. Collectively they were facing, inter alia, nine charges of murder and attempted murder, 19 charges of robbery, eight charges of malicious damage to property, and three charges of kidnapping.



Moegamat lsaacs and three others, who were facing 23 charges, including three of murder arising from a drive-by shooting in June 1999.



Moegamat Zain Cornelson and alleged G-force member Anees Adams for the murder of Sedicka Hendricks and the attempted murder of her father.



Pagad’s national co-ordinator, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, and the Pagad chief of security, Salie Abader, for the murder of Hard Livings Gang leader Rashaad Staggie. Ebrahim was also charged with nine other crimes, including terrorism, murder and attempted murder.82



Ismail Edwards and Ebrahim Jeneker for the murder of Pagad investigator Captain Bennie Lategan in January 1999.



Mansoer Legget and Ebrahim Salie were facing 10 charges of murder and seven of attempted murder.



Moegsien Barendse, Riedewaan Hendricks, Lionel Jacobs and Farried Mohammed, faced two charges of attempted murder, the bombing of the Wynberg synagogue, the illegal possession of a shotgun and two charges of motor vehicle theft.



Faizel Waggie, Nazeem Davids, Michael Snyders, Yusef Enous and two other Pagad members were arrested after a bomb was defused under a pot plant at the Keg and Swan on 3 November 2000.83 They were charged with attempted murder and the illegal possession of explosives.

Conclusion

Muslim extremists in the Western Cape have used the issues of gangsterism and drugs to garner popular support for Pagad. Should the government be able to effectively combat gangsterism and drugs it is likely that such extremists — particularly in the Western Cape — will find other issues to bolster public support for their violent opposition to the liberal-democratic order in South Africa.

It is unfortunate that Pagad’s actions against drugs and gangs in the Western Cape, and its initiatives to establish community centres, are overshadowed by its members’ involvement in acts of terrorism and violence. Although Pagad is allegedly responsible for numerous attacks on gangsters and drug dealers, attention also needs to be given to Pagad’s reasons for opposing the government, and combating certain criminals through the use of violence and intimidation. Gangsterism and drugs are prevalent in the poorer areas of greater Cape Town, fostering turf wars between rival gangs, assassinations, kidnappings, murders and general high levels of crime.

By comparison, gang violence is more responsible for instability in the Western Cape than Pagad. Drug-peddling and drug-abuse, gang violence and high levels of violent crimes are found throughout South Africa. The situation in the Western Cape is unique in the sense that gangster subcultures have proliferated throughout the entire region.

According to the police’s Gang Investigation Unit, in 1998 there were between 35 000 and 80 000 active gang members in the Cape, belonging to 137 gangs.84 For example, between July and August 2000, gang-related violence resulted in 15 deaths and six injuries in the Western Cape.85 In comparison Pagad was allegedly responsible for seven injuries as a result of three bombings over the same period. This comparison places the violence committed in the Western Cape in a different context. Violence and crime must be considered as a manifestation of a much larger problem such as, for example, the poor socio-economic conditions in parts of the greater Cape Town area. However, in the case of Pagad it is debatable whether an ideological motivation provides another substantiation for urban terrorism.

Although the extent of Qibla’s involvement of Pagad is not really known, a proxy organisation could be created as was done with Mago and Mail, closer to Qibla, if Pagad cannot be turned around to regain the popular support it once enjoyed. This may also serve to remove the stigma that Pagad acquired as an alleged terrorist organisation. The modus operandi of such a grouping would probably follow the same path as Pagad, initially trying to garner widespread support and then embarking on terrorist type activities.

The majority of Muslims in the Western Cape do not support extremism in the form of terrorism. Islamic extremism is an international phenomenon and international developments around Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and other sensitive regions involving Muslims may result in protest actions and violence in South Africa.

It is debatable whether a lack of initial robust response on the part of the government and the South African Police Service contributed to the development of Pagad’s violent activities. One almost feels that the government and the SAPS did not know how to deal with Pagad. During the early stages, police accompanied Pagad during its marches to the houses of drug dealers during which firearms were carried. Laws were openly broken under the supposedly watchful eyes of police members. The lack of reaction from the government and the police could have been interpreted as tacit approval of Pagad’s actions.

Notes

M Shaw, Theatre of terror: Responding to the Cape Bombings, Crime and Conflict 21, Spring 2000, p 5.



W Misbach, Help prove it’s Pagad — Maduna, Sowetan, 13 September 2000.



A Koopman, Tshwete says Pagad are the only suspects in police investigation, The Star, 12 September 2000.



Fighting terrorism, Business Day, 13 September 2000.



Interview with Superintendent W Holtzhausen, liaison officer, South African Police Service, 7 May 1998, Cape Town.



A R Omar, Police, politics and anti-drug strategies: From Salt River to Salt River, in R Galant and F Gamieldien, Drugs, gangs, people’s power: Exploring the Pagad phenomenon, Claremont Main Road Masjid, 1996, p 49.



Telephonic interview with Sheikh Ebrahim Gabriel, Muslim Judicial Council, 30 November 2000.



N Jeenah, Pagad: Fighting fire with fire, Impact International, 26 (9), 1996, p 9.



In researching these allegations numerous attempts were made by the author to contact the leader of Qibla, Achmat Cassiem, all of them without success.



T Lodge and B Nasson, All, here and now: Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s, David Philip Publishers, Claremont, 1991, p 197.



Ibid, pp 196—197.



G Moss, Alleged guerrillas and activists in court, Work in Progress, 47, April 1987, p 18.



PAC defends its Pagad alliance, The Star, 20 January 1997.



S Brümmer, Pagad, gangs mix it up with politics, Mail & Guardian, 13 (18), 1997.



Interview with Sheikh Achmat Sedick, secretary general of the Muslim Judicial Council, 6 May 1998, Cape Town.



A Smith, Cape Muslims march on embassies, Cape Argus, 7 January 2000.



No author, Terrorism bill prompts Muslim march, Independent Newspapers, 30 September 2000, <http://www.iol.co.za>.



M Gevisser, The Imam of the Flats, Mail & Guardian, 16 August 1996.



F Jaffer, presentation at the Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 28 February 1997.



Interview with Sheikh Achmat Sedick, secretary general of the Muslim Judicial Council,
6 May 1998, Cape Town.



F Esack, Pagad and Islamic radicalism: Taking on the state? Indicator SA, 13 (4), 1996,
pp 7—11.



Ibid, p 26.



Interviews with Sheikh Achmat Sedick, secretary general of the Muslim Judicial Council, 6 May 1998, Cape Town; and Superintendent W Holtzhausen, liaison officer, South African Police Service, 7 May 1998, Cape Town.



Interview with Superintendent W Holtzhausen, op cit.



Pagad history, Pagad, 1998, p 1.



Interview with Dr G Allie, Pagad secretariat, 4 May 1998, Cape Town.



C Clohessy, Thoughts on Pagad, in R Galant and F Gamieldien, Drugs, gangs, people’s power: Exploring the Pagad phenomenon, Claremont Main Road Masjid, 1996, p 78.



Interview with Dr G Allie, op cit.



Interviews with Dr G Allie, Pagad secretariat, and A Roberts, Pagad national secretary, 4 May 1998, Cape Town.



Interview with Superintendent Spannenberg, SAPS: Pagad Task Team, 7 May 1998, Cape Town.



The Pagad national executive, Pagad, 1998.



Pagad history, Pagad, 1998, p 2.



Interview with Abidah Roberts, Pagad national secretary, 4 May 1998, Cape Town.



Arnes, Terror — bomb cache found in Gauteng, Cape Argus, 13 August 1999.



Interviews with Dr G Allie and A Roberts, op cit.



Interview with Superintendent W Holtzhausen, op cit.



Pagad regional structures: Western Cape, Pagad, 1997, p 1.



Ibid.



Pagad news bulletin, Pagad, 1997, p 4.



Pagad’s organisational structure is based on information provided by Pagad in interviews with Allie and Roberts in May 1998, and documents provided by Abidah Roberts.



Pagad news bulletin, Pagad, 1997, p 4.



F Schroeder, Seed sown by six people intent to service, Cape Times, 18 February 1998.



Pagad regional structures: Western Cape, Pagad, 1997, p 2.



Interview with Superintendent W Holtzhausen, op cit.



S Brümmer, op cit.



Pagad regional structures: Western Cape, Pagad, 1997, p 3.



B W Haefele, Islamic fundamentalism and Pagad: An internal security issue for South Africa? Crime and Conflict, (11), 1998, p 10.



C Africa, J Christie, R Mattes, M Roefs, and H Taylor, Crime and community action: Pagad and the Cape Flats, 1996—1997, Public Opinion Service Reports, (4), June 1998, IDASA, pp 22—23.



W Laqueur, Postmodern terrorism, Global Issues: Targeting terrorism, 2 (1), 1997, pp 9—10.



Interview with Dr G Allie, op cit.



Ibid.



Interviews with Dr G Allie, Pagad secretariat, and A Roberts, Pagad national secretary, 4 May 1998, Cape Town.



R Rossouw, Pagad hampering crime, Mail & Guardian, 1 November 1996.



R Friedman, Govt blamed for lack of action as war escalates, Cape Times, 24 January 1997.



C Africa, J Christie, R Mattes, M Roefs, and H Taylor, op cit, p 2.



No author, Pagad, gangs ‘infiltrated’: G-Force pursuing own agenda, Cape Times, 22 October 1997.



Two in court over the theft of bomb bike, The Star, 18 January 2000.



Gunmen assassinate key explosion witness, Cape Times, 15 May 2000.



Cops quiet about probe and alleged Papas link, Independent Newspapers, 21 August 2000.



Seven hurt in Cape Town blast, Independent Newspapers, 12 September 2000.



No author, Bomb found in pub leads to two arrests, Cape Argus, 3 November 2000.



A Botha, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad): A study of structures, operations and initial government reactions, unpublished MA Thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 1998, p 59.



Ibid.



A Smith, Pagad-eight held in prison, Cape Argus, 1998 <http://www.iol.co.za>



Pipe bomb explodes in South Africa, 30 July 1998, BBC, <http://www.bbc.co.uk>



J Schronen, pipe bomb probe stepped up as 2nd injured man is held, Cape Argus, 4 August 1998. <http://www.iol.co.za>



A Smith, Bomb trial men deny Pagad links, Cape Argus, 1998 <http://www.iol.co.za>



W Kemp, Bom wat Padav leier by huis gevind het werk soos Pagad s’n, Die Burger, 25 April 1997.



H Coetzee, Goodwood man getuig hoe Pagad pypbomme maak, Die Burger, 6 October 2000.



G Abarder, Pipe-bombs now sophisticated weapons, Cape Times, 25 January 2000.



Arms charges — Pagad brothers acquitted, Independent Newspapers, 3 October 2000 <http://www.iol.co.za>



Pagad-trial court rocked by blast, The Star, 12 January 2000.



No author, CT bombs linked to arrests, Dispatch Online, 12 August 2000 <http://www.dispatch.co.za>



Deja-vu: Pagad men in court as bomb goes off, Independent Newspapers, 19 July 2000.



E Ellis, G-force suspects face over 40 murder charges, Cape Argus, 11 October 2000.



Ibid.



H Geldenhuys, Pagad leaders locked up until trial in May, Cape Times, 22 November 2000.



D Carew, Two more held in connection with pub bomb, Cape Argus, 10 November 2000.



Friedman, From back streets to business empires, Cape Times, 18 February 1998.



E Brits, Kaapse bendegeweld dwing regering tot aksie, Die Burger, 15 August 2000.



Ibid.



H Geldenhuys, Pagad leaders locked up until trial in May, Cape Times, 22 November 2000.



D Carew, Two more held in connection with pub bomb, Cape Argus, 10 November 2000.



Friedman, From back streets to business empires, Cape Times, 18 February 1998.



E Brits, Kaapse bendegeweld dwing regering tot aksie, Die Burger, 15 August 2000.