Conclusion



Published in Monograph No 63, July 2001
Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa



Three years of urban terrorism in the Western Cape have claimed five victims and injured one hundred more. Should South Africans consider themselves fortunate for having come out of the wave of urban terror of the late 1990s so lightly? To be fair, it is too soon to say, but probably not.

Certainly luck could have played a role in the terrorists’ lack of bomb-building skills and the fact that most targets were not surrounded by crowds of people when the bombs exploded; two factors that minimised the loss of life. Under different circumstances more powerful bombs exploding at different times could have led to a much greater loss of life. The loss of life and destruction of property constitute only one measure of terrorism’s success, and not even the main one at that. Because no group has claimed responsibility for the series of bombings and targeted assassinations at the time of writing, it is impossible to say with certainty what the terrorists’ ultimate objectives are. It is clear, however, that these terrorist acts have had a number of far-reaching consequences.

First, the rights and liberties for which many South Africans fought and died are under threat. Less than a decade after the country’s transition to a liberal democracy policy makers and politicians are giving serious consideration to introducing a detention-without-trial law for suspected terrorists. A similar law introduced by a previous South African government in the 1960s ultimately led to far-reaching human rights abuses, a blatant disregard for the rule of law and a worsening of the internal security situation. Draconian laws, whatever their motivation, easily lead to the sacrifice of civil liberties at the altar of expediency.

Second, the bombs and assassinations have impressed among most South Africans the disillusioning fact that even a multi-party democratic state, where people are free to peacefully express their views, is not immune from terrorist threat. Such disillusionment could rapidly — especially under a sustained and successful terrorist campaign — lead to a loss of faith in the country’s democratic institutions and law-enforcement agencies as the guarantors of freedom and security. This could further erode public confidence in the constitutionally enshrined rights and liberties on which the post-1994 South Africa is based.

Third, some commentators and politicians have come perilously close to blaming the Muslim community in the Western Cape for the terrorist acts committed there. Such comments, combined with heavy-handed security-force actions in predominantly Muslim areas, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy as ordinary law-abiding Muslims feel terrorised by the state rather than by the terrorists. Moreover, such comments and actions can bring about a feeling of alienation and isolation among the broad Muslim community in relation to the government and other dominant groups in the country. As one astute commentator on terrorism points out:
"... in many liberal states certain minority groups claim to have long-standing grievances against the majority institutions or against other groups. It is these aggrieved and allegedly under-privileged groups that constitute the potential constituencies for urban guerrilla movements. Such movements become a serious threat as soon as they begin to attract a degree of mass support, sympathy and tacit collaboration in particular strata."1
It is no easy task for liberal democracies to deal effectively with a sustained terrorist threat. Civil liberties, constitutionally entrenched rights and the rule of law come at a cost when it comes to fighting terrorism: the state has to expend considerable resources and patiently collect evidence over frustratingly lengthy periods of time to successfully convict the kingpins in a closely knit terrorist network. This requires excellent teamwork between the various intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, and a motivated and specialised investigating and prosecuting unit devoted to identifying and convicting terrorists.

The alternative is to apprehend and lock away suspected terrorists at all costs. This might seem the better way to some. However, to sacrifice individual rights and liberal values to combat acts of terror is to accept the terrorists belief that the end justifies the means.

People who commit acts of terror should be punished to the full extent of the law, but not at the expense of sacrificing the very values which they seek to destroy. It would be a mistake to introduce legislation that seeks to combat terrorism by diluting the rights of all South Africans. The country’s history is full of examples of tough temporary legislative measures becoming permanent fixtures on the statute books.
  1. P Wilkinson, Terrorism and the liberal state, Macmillan Education, London, 1986, p 29.