|
South Africa is a violent country. According to Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organisation, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. The South African Police Service records some 25 000 murders a year — almost 70 during an average day. A similar number of attempted murders are recorded by the police, while a quarter of a million assaults with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm are recorded per year. During a typical year more than 300 000 South Africans are murdered or seriously assaulted.
Between 1994 and the end of 2000 over 400 criminal detonations and explosions occurred in South Africa. These were caused by improvised explosive devices, commercial explosives, pipe bombs, hand grenades, petrol bombs, as well as stun grenades, capped fuses and even thunder flashes. Most of the explosions occurred in the context of internecine gang warfare and vigilante action against criminal gangs in the greater Cape Town area.
After mid-1996 the motive for some acts of violence in the form of bombings, drive-by shootings and assassinations changed. It would appear that the violence was no longer solely committed by gangs battling for territory and markets, or by vigilantes in their attempts to eliminate suspected drug dealers. This new violence sought to create a climate of fear and terror among the citizens of Cape Town. Moreover, after mid-1998, bomb attacks and assassinations occurred not only in the gang-ravaged areas of the Cape Flats but also in the city centre and tourist destinations of Cape Town itself. The violence increasingly began to target the state in the form of police stations, courts and personnel of the justice system, as well as popular tourist and entertainment areas, restaurants and the Cape Town international airport.
Compared to the criminally motivated crime and violence in South Africa, these acts of terrorism exacted mercifully few victims. The two-dozen bomb blasts that occurred in Cape Town between mid-1998 and the end of 2000 caused five fatalities (of which two fatalities involved the suspected bombers themselves) and about 120 injuries. The impact of terrorism should, however, not be measured in terms of its actual victims. Terrorism seeks to achieve precisely what the term implies: terror. With the right publicity one bomb brutally mutilating an unlucky restaurant patron instils more fear and insecurity in the general public than the 70 murders recorded on an average day.
In South Africa the majority of murders and assaults are committed by people who are known to their victims. By avoiding dangerous places and situations and choosing the right acquaintances most people are able to minimise their risk of becoming victims of violent crime. This is not the case with victims of terrorist acts of violence, however. Terrorist violence is random and arbitrary. A female cleaner, a male security guard, a young shop assistant, or a wealthy elderly shopper are all equally likely to be killed by the explosion of a bomb inside a shopping mall. Moreover, as acts of terror receive high levels of publicity the average person is more aware of a terrorist bomb explosion on the other side of the country than a murder in the same suburb.
A sustained terrorist campaign can rapidly undermine public trust in the state’s ability to protect its citizens. In liberal democratic states terrorist acts have the effect of eroding public confidence in the rule of law, the courts and the police. This leads to public pressure on policy makers to deal harshly with suspected terrorists and their sympathisers. In their desire to appease public opinion and to combat terrorist threats more effectively, governments are easily swayed to compromise on upholding certain fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. This frequently evokes an overreaction by states against suspected terrorists and the communities in which they live. This overreaction plays into the terrorists’ hands by escalating the cycle of violence in such societies.
In an interconnected world, pictures of terrorist atrocities are flashed across television screens across the globe. This detrimentally affects investor confidence in the victimised country — something a developing country such as South Africa can ill afford. Terrorist acts can also have a significant impact on tourism, a lucrative industry for many developing countries. Cape Town is South Africa’s premier tourist destination for hard-currency visitors from Western Europe and North America. The tourist market is sensitive, and indications of terrorist activities in a country quickly lead to cancellations. In Cape Town’s case this has serious repercussions for the local economy and employment levels. It is estimated that one job is created for every eight foreign tourists who spend their money in the country.
To illustrate the nature of urban terrorism and the state’s response as a case in point, this monograph explores the only significant series of terrorist acts that South Africa has known since 1994 — acts of urban terrorism in the greater Cape Town area.
This monograph begins with an explanation of what terrorism is. This is important in a South African context where it can be difficult to distinguish between terrorist as opposed to criminally motivated bombings and assassinations. The South African government defines terrorism as "an incident of violence, or the threat thereof, against a person, a group of persons or property not necessarily related to the aim of the incident, to coerce the government or civil population to act or not to act according to certain principles". Terrorists are motivated by a variety of factors. These factors, which are explored in this study, often determine the level of fanaticism and degree of persistence terrorists and terrorist groups show in their nefarious activities.
At the time of writing no group has claimed responsibility for the urban bombing campaign in Cape Town. Although some arrests have been made, few have resulted in successful convictions. Government ministers responsible for security and justice have laid the blame for the bombings firmly at the door of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad), a vigilante group that originated as a response to high levels of crime, particularly those associated with drug trafficking on the Cape Flats. The second chapter of the monograph looks at Pagad, its history, objectives and changing aims between 1996 and 2000 to establish whether the ministers’ allegations are justifiable from the available evidence.
Operationally the state responded effectively in stabilising the internal security situation in the Western Cape. Through special intelligence-driven joint police and defence force operations the security forces contributed to a significant reduction in terrorist-related incidents by the end of 2000. The third chapter of the monograph evaluates the successes of four distinct operations — Operations Recoil, Saladin, Good Hope and Crackdown — launched by the security forces to combat urban terrorism, criminal gangs and other forms of crime in the Western Cape.
The final chapter of the study looks at the state’s legislative response to terrorism in South Africa. An historic account is given of how previous South African governments between the 1950s and the 1980s promulgated a set of tough anti-terrorism laws. The heavy-handed application of these laws by the security forces saw an increase rather than a decrease in insecurity and acts of political violence. More than 30 pieces of legislation, still on the statute books, are discussed. This legislation can be used at any time to combat terrorism and related criminal behaviour. The chapter analyses the draft anti-terrorism bill, which seeks to create an omnibus statute to address the issue of terrorism and a variety of related crimes in one piece of legislation. Finally, operational weaknesses in the criminal justice system are identified as the source of what many view as the state’s inability to effectively combat terrorist activities.
|
|
|