Chapter 10

Conlusion

A Political, economic and social exclusion lies at the heart of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. According to Lemarchand:

"the central pattern that recurs time and time again is one in which ethnic polarization paves the way for political exclusion, exclusion eventually leading to insurrection, insurrection to repression, and repression to massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, which in turn become the vectors of further instability. The involvement of external actors … is inseparable from the perceived threats posed by mobilized refugee diasporas to their countries of origin as well as to specific communities within the host country."123

In the report of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region of May 2001, the delegation noted that:

"there will be a durable peace only if all the countries of the region are successful in defining among themselves the rules by which to promote security and development. When the time comes, a conference on the Great Lakes region would allow for a close and continuous examination of these questions and would also bring together contributors from the donor countries."124

During his meeting with members of the mission, President Kabila’s foreign affairs minister expressed support for the idea. It is also a requirement referred to in various subplans of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as well as in UN Security Council Resolution 1355 (2001).

The DRC peace process will also require the early establishment of a DRC regional peace alliance involving the heads of state and supporting working ministerial groups and officials of all countries bordering the DRC. It should also include those engaged in, or with an interest in the DRC, such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Central, Southern and East African states will have to work in collaboration with MONUC and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue if peace is to be realised in the DRC.

It is well known that Kigali and Kampala disapprove of such a plan, fearing that they will be outnumbered by a combination of Francophone countries and those in alliance with Kinshasa. Nevertheless, a way has to be found to engage neighbours in the common cause of making peace.125

Apart from the Rwandan and Burundian refugees in the Kivus, there are also 10 000 refugees from Uganda in the DRC, and 26 000 Rwandan, 361 000 Burundian and 110 000 refugees from the DRC in Tanzania. A normalisation of relations implies the creation of sufficient security for these people to return to their countries of origin. More than 2 million Congolese are internally displaced; roughly 400 000 are refugees in neighbouring countries. Sixteen million Congolese have critical food needs, and 21% of the population suffers from malnutrition. Maternal mortality is 1 837 per 100 000 live births and a quarter of the population have no access to medical facilities. Two out of three children are unable to attend school, while cholera and bubonic plague are endemic, and cases of hemorrhagic fever and monkey pox have been reported.126

The international community will have to make a spectacular effort to help rebuild the DRC. The World Bank has already approved a US$50 million post-conflict grant to establish new investment codes and to support governance and public revenue management reforms.127 More importantly, if peace is to involve more than the armed élite presently masquerading as liberators and purporting to act in the interests of a hapless population, it will require a massive process of social engagement. This will involve the mobilisation of peoples and communities whose only experience of governance has been a brutal, corrupt and exploitive one. This is not something that will occur this year or the next, but progress should be slow and steady, and is the only route to long-term stability. There is no quick-fix for the site of this complex emergency and humanitarian disaster called the DRC.

If MONUC is to continue to play a pivotal role in such a process, it will have to stay the course and be prepared to adapt to ever-changing circumstances. Attempts have been made following every concluded peace operation to assess what can and what cannot be done, and to establish new limits and boundaries for such operations. However, every time a new crisis arises, the lines thus drawn prove to have been drawn in the sand. The DRC bears testimony to this; MONUC is a mission without any recognisable precedent.

It is true that phases I and II of MONUC deal with the observation and monitoring of a ceasefire agreement, as did the classical ceasefire observation and/or interposition missions so typical of the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping. However, the Lusaka agreement is not between two state parties. It is also not between a beleaguered government and an armed opposition movement. The agreement is between a beleaguered government, five other governments that are party to the conflict, and two ill-defined and ever-shifting armed internal resistance movements. Moreover, there are a plethora of extremely dangerous and troublesome armed groups that are party to the conflict, but not party to the ceasefire agreement. Consent is thus very delicate, and the threat of violence and non-compliance ever-present.

Furthermore, the UN deployed what is essentially an observer mission amidst an extremely complex and devastating humanitarian emergency, which demands the attention and involvement of the full range of humanitarian and development actors integral to the large-scale peacebuilding type missions of the 1990s. This creates a need for levels of interagency and civil-military co-operation that were absent in the classic observer missions.

The envisaged phase III deployment is also without precedent. It is aimed mainly at the disarmament and demobilisation of non-state and non-signatory protagonists. Moreover, mission planning has proceeded without the benefit or guidance of a comprehensive peace agreement. All other attempts by the UN to undertake demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration or resettlement have been predicated upon existing peace agreements that addressed the size and shape of new military forces, and included modalities for ‘disposing’ of supernumerary armaments and soldiers. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue may well deliver such an agreement, but progress with this process will be agonisingly slow, and meaningful outcomes will probably emerge, if at all, after years rather than months of negotiation.

The idea that demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants will somehow sterilise the DRC and protect it from conflict is therefore one that should be treated with caution. This is especially the case in a society where the formal economy hardly exists, and the vast majority of people survive either through subsistence agriculture or the exploitation of natural resources.

Despite the general realisation that a long-term approach is imperative to the success of such a multidimensional and multilayered process, donor patience is always a finite commodity. Impatience occurs when there is a perceived lack of progress or an increasing awareness of the complexity and intractability of the situation to be handled. The international efforts towards implementing the Lusaka Protocol in Angola are a case in point. Although the first two years of the process were well supported by donors, willingness to contribute funds to the international efforts waned as tensions gradually grew and the lack of co-operation between the local counterparts became more apparent.

However, there is reason to be optimistic that MONUC may indeed provide a catalyst for a more lasting form of peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. The mission has contributed to the freezing of offensive operations by the parties, and is slowly but steadily increasing the size of its military and humanitarian footprint in the DRC. Of course, the chance of reversals and setbacks will increase as the mission gets closer to phase III, and perhaps ‘durable solutions’ are simply not available. However, no peacekeeping operation has ever been perfect, and none is likely to be so. None has ever achieved all of its aims, but some have achieved at least some of them. At a time when peacekeeping in Africa is suffering from the backlash of exaggerated expectations, MONUC deserves all the support it can get. There are unprecedented prospects for peace in the DRC and Great Lakes region.