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Chapter 3
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
The peacemaking process began virtually at the outset of the DRC war, long before many of the interlocutors understood the dynamics of the conflict. For example, an emergency summit of SADC leaders was convened in Pretoria on 23 August 1998. The leaders present decided to confirm their recognition of the legitimacy of the government of DRC and to call for an immediate ceasefire, to be followed by political dialogue aimed at securing a peaceful settlement to the crisis. The meeting mandated President Mandela, as chairperson of SADC, to organise a ceasefire in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
On 3 September, Mandela surprised observers by announcing at a press conference that SADC had unanimously supported the military intervention by its member states in the DRC.19 This announcement paved the way for a series of diverse regional meetings, involving both SADC and non-SADC players, that were intended to halt the conflict. At the 18th SADC Summit, held in Mauritius on 13-14 September 1998, the regional heads of state and government:
"welcomed initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security and stability in DRC, in particular the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives."
Significantly, SADC leaders "commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timeously providing troops to assist the Government and people of DRC."20 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was appointed by the SADC heads of state to lead mediation efforts, assisted by the presidents of Tanzania and Mozambique.21
On 6 November 1998, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame finally admitted that Rwandan troops were helping the DRC rebels. He justified this on the basis of national security concerns. According to media reports, in doing so, Kagame was acceding to a request by President Mandela to admit involvement, in a bid to advance peace talks. A month later, Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, along with Ugandan President Museveni, were verbally attacked by 34 African leaders for their invasion of the DRC during the 20th Franco-African Summit held in Paris from 26-28 November. Not to be outdone by diplomacy in Francophone Africa, French President Jacques Chirac announced during the summit that a ceasefire agreement would be signed the following month. Kabila dismissed his claim, while the rebels expressed their lack of faith in a deal reached in Paris without their participation.
In the absence of a ceasefire, Libya entered the fray. During 24-26 December 1998, Muammar Gaddafi held separate meetings with Laurent Kabila and Yoweri Museveni. Shortly thereafter, on 18 January 1999, a summit of five nations with troops in the Congo was held in Windhoek, Namibia. The presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola agreed on a ceasefire at this meeting. However, with Kabila not present and the RCD not invited to the summit, this agreement came to nothing.
By the end of February 1999, renewed enthusiasm for the peacemaking process was shown by regional leaders. Over the weekend of 27-28 February, at least five heads of state were engaged in different consultations to agree on the contents of a peace plan championed by President Chiluba. Namibian President Sam Nujoma was on a mission to South Africa, where he met President Nelson Mandela. Chiluba himself went on a visit to Rwanda to consult President Pasteur Bizimungu, while Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano (the vice-chairperson of SADC) travelled to Luanda to hold talks with President Dos Santos on ways of bringing peace to the DRC. South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Tony Lloyd, Britains Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, also travelled on separate missions to Luanda over this period. The United States sent Thomas Pickering, the Under-Secretary of State for political affairs, to Harare, Zimbabwe, where he met President Robert Mugabe as the first leader he consulted during his five-nation African tour.
Although the UN Security Council had issued three presidential statements calling for an end to hostilities in the DRC, strong UN concern over the lack of progress in the peace process was first exhibited on 9 April 1999 when the Council agreed on Resolution 1234. Some seven months after the start of the war, this resolution demanded "an immediate halt to the hostilities" and called for:
"the immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement allowing the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces, the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo throughout its territory, and the disarmament of non-governmental armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stresses, in the context of a lasting peaceful settlement, the need for the engagement of all Congolese in an all-inclusive process of political dialogue with a view to achieving national reconciliation and to the holding on an early date of democratic, free and fair elections, and for the provision of arrangements for security along the relevant international borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo."22
A tall order indeed, but the terms of Resolution 1234 were to be echoed (and amplified) three months later in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
No breakthrough was made until 18 April 1999, when presidents Museveni and Kabila signed a ceasefire accord in Sirte, Libya, under the mediation of Muammar Gaddafi. This agreement which provided for the deployment of peacekeepers, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the initiation of a national dialogue although welcomed by the Security Council, was rejected by both the RCD and Rwanda. However, on 4 May, President Chiluba agreed to work with Gaddafi to implement the Sirte accord, while Rwanda insisted that it recognised only the Chiluba peace initiative.23
The peace process was further complicated by an announcement on 17 May 1999 that the RCD had ousted Ernest Wamba dia Wamba as the chairperson of the movement. During April, Wamba had disagreed with the Goma-based RCD leaders on the continuation of military hostilities, and had relocated to Kisangani. Henceforth, peace makers would have to deal with three de facto rebel movements RCD-Goma, led by the new RCD President, Emile Ilunga; RCD-Kisangani, chaired by Mbusa Nyamwisi; and the MLC, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.
However, on the other side of the conflict, some 2 000 Chadian troops, who had been backing Kabila, began withdrawing on 26 May in accordance with the provisions of the Sirte agreement. Rwanda surprised observers with the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire due to come into effect at midnight on 28 May 1999. This was followed by an announcement on 31 May that a team of military experts from the DRC and Uganda would begin drawing up plans for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops, and that an intervention force would be deployed to secure the border between the DRC and Uganda. Although the latter did not eventuate, a team of 62 Libyan peacekeepers also arrived in Kampala at this time.
On 7 June 1999, a summit of DRC allies was held in Harare. At this meeting, the presidents of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe declared Rwandas announcement of a unilateral ceasefire null and void, as Kigali had intensified its military campaign in the eastern DRC in support of the RCD. However, it was noted at the Harare meeting that Kigalis ceasefire was a step forward, and that the opportunity provided by the prevailing climate should be seized to negotiate peace.
The military situation turned critical for Kabila in the midst of the Lusaka process. On 15 June 1999, RPA forces captured Lusambo in Kasai Oriental, and in doing so threatened to take the diamond-rich capital of Mbuji Mayi. Rwanda was induced to stop its advance and sign the ceasefire only by the application of intense international pressure. The situation continued to deteriorate thereafter, with the forces of MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba eventually threatening Mbandaka. Zimbabwean, and to a lesser degree Angolan, Namibian and DRC government forces were by now fighting in alliance with the Interahamwe and ex-FAR calling themselves the Armée de libération du Rwanda (ALiR), providing them with arms, training and other assistance.
South Africa became the focus of renewed peacemaking activities when the inauguration of President Mbeki provided an opportunity for President Chiluba to chair a meeting of regional leaders in Pretoria on Thursday 17 June. This meeting brought together leaders from the 14 SADC member countries, as well as from Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and Kenya. The UN Special Envoy for the DRC Peace Process, Moustapha Niasse, also attended the Pretoria talks, which paved the way for a DRC summit that was scheduled for 25 June in Lusaka, with the purpose of signing a ceasefire agreement.
The long-awaited Lusaka summit was subject to several lengthy delays, as the preceding meeting of foreign ministers struggled to reach agreement on the technicalities of a draft ceasefire agreement. After failing to deliver a ceasefire plan, as had been hoped, by Saturday 26 June, negotiations continued among regional ministers and rebel representatives throughout the following week in Lusaka. Delegations from the DRC government and three Congolese rebel groups eventually entered into direct talks in Lusaka on 2 July, independent of their respective allies and the Zambian mediators, in an effort to achieve some progress.
A third week of intensive negotiations elapsed before, on 10 July 1999, the agonising Lusaka process gave birth to a ceasefire agreement that was signed by the leaders of the six states that were parties to the conflict (the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda) but not by the Congolese rebel groups.
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provides for the following major activities:
- cessation of hostilities and disengagement/redeployment of foreign forces;
- orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- national dialogue and reconciliation;
- re-establishment of state administration over the territory of the DRC;
- disarmament of the armed groups;
- formation of a national army; and
- the normalisation of the security situation along the common borders between the DRC and its neighbours.
Some aspects relating to both the manner and content of these activities are discussed below, but it is important to bear in mind that subsequent UN Security Council resolutions concerning the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement reflect this bodys political will and its interpretation of the agreements feasibility and do not always adhere to the details reflected in the ceasefire agreement.
On 1 August 1999, Jean-Pierre Bemba became the first of the Congolese rebel leaders to sign the ceasefire agreement on behalf of the MLC. On 31 August 1999, the RCD eventually signed the accord, after a compromise agreement had been brokered under which all 50 founding members signed the document on the movements behalf. The peace process facilitator, President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, cautioned that this signing would not automatically bring peace to the DRC, and called on the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of a peacekeeping force "with a mandate commensurate to the task at hand."24
The ceasefire was due to come into effect within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement (commonly interpreted as 31 August 1999, when the RCD signed). The Joint Military Commission (JMC), representing all the signatories, was established under the ceasefire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities until the deployment of UN and OAU military observers. It was also to be responsible, with the military observers, for peacekeeping functions until the UN force had arrived to take over that function. The establishment of the JMC was long delayed by negotiations over the appointment of a chairperson and wrangles about RCD representation and procedural issues, as well financing and logistical problems. Based in Lusaka, the JMC comprised two members each from the belligerent parties, including the MLC and both of the RCD factions, as well as neutral observers from Zambia and representatives of the UN and OAU.

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