Chapter 6

MONUC Phase II: Progress and Revised Concept

By April 2000, it had become apparent to Rwandan leader Paul Kagame that Laurent Kabila could not be overthrown, given the support of Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe, and that, in Shaba province, his RPA forces were overextended. The clashes with Uganda in Kisangani had also exposed the northern flank of the RPA. The weakness of the RCD-Goma had already forced Rwanda to take a much more direct role in the provision of what passes for security in this area. The situation called for a strategic redeployment of forces and led to the offer, during August 2000, of a 200 kilometre withdrawal — essentially a repositioning of forces to the strategic Kivus, but presented as a move to provide space for the deployment of MONUC. Movement would only start in February 2001, when troops of the RPA and RCD-Goma started to withdraw eastward to some 25 kilometres from their earlier positions in and around Pweto, monitored by a team of MONUC military observers. In March 2001, Rwanda informed the UN Secretary-General that the RPA would now implement its offer to move back as far as 200 kilometres. It subsequently became apparent that the Rwandan withdrawal of 1 000 of its 30 000 troops in the DRC was largely symbolic, and that these forces have most probably been redeployed to the Kivus.50

With Namibia planning to conclude the withdrawal of its 2 000 troops from the DRC by the end of August 2001, and the challenges of policing Zimbabwe in the volatile run-up to presidential elections in early 2002, the requirement for continued deployment of the ZNDF may rapidly decline. The ethnic composition of the Zimbabwean troops in the DRC may play a role in a decision to withdraw. If the ceasefire holds and MONUC succeeds in monitoring the NDPs effectively, the isolation of Rwanda as the only remaining external country with troops in the DRC in the event of a Zimbabwean withdrawal is unlikely to be lost on Harare. There is also some speculation that components of the ZNDF presence in the DRC may be privatised to ensure the protection of the concessions and interests with which the DRC has sought to reimburse Zimbabwe for its support. This would be an ominous development that could create a precedent for countries such as Rwanda and Uganda.

By June 2001, the UN had deployed a total of 2 366 military personnel, including 497 liaison officers and military observers. Liaison officers were stationed in the capitals of the states party to the Lusaka agreement, as well as at the headquarters of the DRC rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma). There were also 17 UN officers providing planning support to the JMC in Lusaka. Military observer teams of four officers each were positioned in 22 locations throughout the DRC, and all four sector headquarters were rendered operational by the deployment of infantry guard units provided by various countries at each headquarters. The composition of the guard units is as follows:

Kalemie— Uruguay, as of 29 March 2001

Kananga— Senegal, as of 4 April 2001

Mbandaka— Senegal, as of 27 April 2001

Kisangani— Morocco, as of 10 May 2001

Morocco has also been providing a guard unit for the logistical base at Goma since 10 May, while Tunisia deployed a protection element of 220 troops in Kinshasa itself on 20 May. The deployment at Mbandaka of a 176-strong riverine unit from Uruguay was completed on 4 June 2001, while South Africa began deployment of a 96-strong mission support contingent on 5 April 2001. The latter comprises seven staff officers, an aero-medical evacuation unit, an airfield crash/rescue unit, and six air cargo-handling teams.51

On 15 March 2001, there were some 280 military observers deployed. This figure stood at 520 by the beginning of August, a very encouraging development, as this was the ‘sharp end’ or real line function of MONUC. The Harare subplan had specified 96 new deployment points to which the antagonists would relocate, placing themselves between 30 and 300 kilometres from opposing formations along a loosely defined confrontation line. Of course, the 14-day timeframe specified in Harare for such relocation was unrealistic, owing not only to the logistics of redeploying such large numbers of troops, but also to mutual suspicions that redeployment would either not be reciprocal or used as an opportunity for territorial gain by opposing forces. Nevertheless, since April 2001, MONUC had verified the compliance of the parties with movement to 86 of the deployment points. The ten remaining points were not deeply worrying, as these were either linked to the specific unresolved political issues of Equateur province, or to Katanga, where forward force movements had happened after Harare, and the subsequent disengagement plan therefore differed from the terms of the Harare agreement.52

Although Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC troops had nearly completed their redeployment in Equateur province by the end of July, the MLC had not relinquished administrative control of the areas its military forces were vacating, thus effectively preventing government forces from moving forward to their designated positions at Losombo, Abunakombo and Djefera. However, government and allied forces had agreed to hold their current locations for the time being.53 On 4 August, the force commander talked to Bemba and reached agreement that MONUC would soon begin to verify the movement of MLC forces in Equateur to deployment points.54 In Kisangani, MONUC was engaged in efforts to persuade the RCD-Goma to withdraw its military forces from the city.

However, MONUC felt that the commitment on all sides to redeployment was fairly firm, and that it was time to make the transition from verification to monitoring of adherence to deployment points, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. This would require the urgent establishment of four new command centres and the deployment of an additional 100 military observers. Meanwhile, MONUC continued to investigate all reports of ceasefire violations and other incidents raised by the parties, except in areas where security considerations precluded the entry of unarmed military observers.

For example, it was felt that there was little that MONUC could do about the continuing attacks and incursions by armed groups in the east, such as those that occurred in early August when Rwandan-backed rebels of RCD-Goma reported that they had taken the town of Lokandu from militias backed by government forces. This fighting is not technically a violation of the ceasefire, as the Mai Mai and Interahamwe militias did not sign the Lusaka accord. On the other hand, MONUC cannot accurately monitor and report on such situations due to its poor presence in the east and the fact that RCD clearance and security guarantees for such monitoring are still lacking.

Regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces, by 8 June 2001, only Uganda and Angola had provided information on the numbers, disposition and armaments of their forces in the DRC. Uganda had initiated the process by submitting a detailed plan for UPDF withdrawal from ten locations across the northern part of DRC.

Uganda reacted vigorously to the release of the second Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC in April 2001. The report condemned Rwanda and Uganda in no uncertain terms for their exploitation of the riches of the DRC, although it tended to gloss over the situation elsewhere in the country. The panel recommended that the Security Council should immediately declare a temporary embargo on the import or export of various precious metals, timber, gold and diamonds from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. A further recommendation was that the Security Council should freeze the financial assets of the rebel movements, their leaders and companies, or individuals who were participating in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. The panel named Jean-Pierre Bemba as a key actor in this regard. Other measures called for were an immediate embargo on the supply of all military materiel to the rebel groups and their backers in the DRC and an end to all co-operation with those military forces at present in the DRC in violation of its sovereignty until those armies have withdrawn.55

President Museveni, whose brother Salim Saleh featured prominently in the report, was particularly incensed by the allegations, and threatened not only to withdraw his forces from the DRC, but also to disengage from the Lusaka peace process.56 Pressure from various leaders dissuaded him from acting on these threats. Uganda subsequently announced the withdrawal of two battalions at the end of March 2001. During April, President Museveni said he would soon pull out another two battalions. In June, those Ugandan forces who had left, returned to the DRC in support of Bemba who had been suffering military setbacks in clashes with the Mai Mai militias. Although the UPDF withdrawal has not been completed,57 UPDF support for Bemba has declined, causing him to return to the ceasefire lines that the MLC had bypassed in the weeks immediately following the finalisation of the ceasefire. During August 2001, Uganda’s defence minister expressed the hope that Ugandan troops would be out of the DRC by the end of the year, except for a ‘symbolic presence’ in Buta, Bunia and the Rwenzori mountain area.58 MONUC observers were monitoring the ongoing repatriation of Ugandan forces from Basakusu, Dongo, Lisala and Gbadolite in the DRC. However, UPDF forces would remain at Buta and Bunia, pending further evaluation of the situation, and accepted that a Ugandan military presence would be maintained on the western slopes of the Ruwenzori mountains until the country’s security interests had been addressed in accordance with the Lusaka agreement.

Zimbabwe has signalled on several occasions its willingness to withdraw, but this has been tempered by expressions of concern for the ‘chaos’ that would ensue if this was not done as part of a mutual exercise involving the withdrawal of ‘uninvited forces’, that is, the troops of Rwanda and Uganda. The Namibian forces had started moving by the beginning of August, and were effectively out of the DRC by the end of the month. The Angolan forces, estimated at 1 200 in number at the time of Laurent Kabila’s assassination, were reinforced by additional troops deployed to Kinshasa and environs shortly thereafter, both to secure the situation in Kinshasa and to forestall any sudden advance by Bemba from the north-east. The Angolans are the only foreign forces whose country is contiguous with the DRC, and observers regard the withdrawal issue as somewhat academic because the FAA have traditionally moved freely across the border.

Though Rwanda initiated the ‘unilateral’ withdrawal of some 1 000 troops early in the year, there had been no further movement from the RPA by August 2001. Rwandan engagement in the Kivus is an immediate national security issue for Kigali. Mass murder and the attendant flow of refugees have been recurrent themes in the history of Rwanda since 1959. Although the 1994 genocide is the most well known, it is not the only massacre that has occurred, and the Tutsis have not always been the victims, but have also featured prominently as perpetrators, particularly in neighbouring Burundi. Ultimately, Rwandan security is as closely linked to the Kivus as that of Israel to the occupied Palestinian territories. The results are equally messy. In the absence of a friendly government in Kinshasa, able to police and administer the Kivus, the alternative solution is permanent domination through occupation of the areas from which these threats emanate. As a result, Rwanda will not withdraw from the Kivus without very firm security guarantees, despite the evident resentment against Rwandan domination in the Kivus, and a long-standing suspicion among locals that the Rwandans are not only in the province to fight the Interahamwe or to profit from the minerals, but to annex it.

From the Rwandan perspective, the withdrawal issue is firmly linked to either the disarmament of the armed groups operating in the Kivus or to measures that would ensure effective border security. Nominally, Zimbabwean withdrawal has been linked to a Rwandan pull-out. Eventually, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups will probably not be a clear sequential process, but will involve uneven progress on both of these fronts.59 Indeed, the Harare subplan provides for such a situation, specifying that:

"[t]he following prerequisites must be met before a final withdrawal of foreign forces can take place:

Disengagement of Forces.



Disarmament of Armed Groups.



Holding of the National Dialogue and establishment of new institutions that will ensure the disarmament of illegally armed civilians."

It is up to all parties to the Lusaka agreement to create the conditions that will allow for the deployment of MONUC phase lll. In his 8 June 2001 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that the withdrawal and demobilisation plans developed by the JMC and Political Committee60 (as required by Resolution 1341 of 2001) would need considerable expansion and refinement before they could serve as a suitable basis covering a mandate for the third phase of MONUC deployment. Specifically, it was noted that the parties had failed to provide detailed information on the strengths, disposition and armament of all forces in the DRC, as requested by the Security Council Mission to the Great Lakes when it met the Political Committee in Lusaka on 22 May 2001.61

It was thus too early to consider entering the third phase of MONUC deployment — before the completion of the disengagement and verification phase, and without the benefit of realistic and approved plans for disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement or repatriation. On the other hand, it was felt that the momentum generated by the substantial disengagement of forces and the partial withdrawal of foreign forces should not be lost. The Secretariat therefore updated MONUC’s concept of operations to ensure that the mission had the necessary resources both to complete the current phase and to prepare for the complex and varied tasks envisaged for phase III.

The revised concept, as finalised during a DPKO visit to MONUC in April 2001, envisages a further mission build-up stage during which MONUC would prepare for the transition to phase III. During this period, MONUC would continue to monitor the disposition of forces in their deployment positions, as well as any further withdrawals of foreign contingents. To do this effectively would require at least 30 more military observer teams, as well as the establishment of helicopter refuelling facilities at Manano, Ilebo, Boende and Basankusu to meet the operational range of the Mi8 helicopters in use by MONUC. Each of these locations would require a protection element of about 200 troops.

The new concept also emphasises the economic importance of Kisangani, and the need to expand MONUC’s presence with more civilian personnel, military observer teams, and a commensurate increase in the size of both the UN armed security unit and the military and civilian logistics support units. The other three sector headquarters — at Kalemie, Kananga and Mbandaka — would also see a considerable expansion of civilian personnel, in order to make them integrated operational centres from which the full range of mission activities could be conducted. The idea is to deploy civilian officers wherever there is a MONUC military presence, and to extend the deployment of political officers to some of the regional capitals.62 As far as the latter is concerned, the initial plan is for political officers from MONUC’s headquarters in Kinshasa to visit the capitals of the parties for no more than five days at a time, starting in August 2001.63

About 15 new posts for political affairs officers had been authorised by early August, and these were slowly being filled. A similar expansion for human rights officers had been approved, as compared with the existing human rights co-ordinator plus seven officers (one of whom had been deployed to Kisangani, and one each to Goma and Kalemie). However, the identification of suitable personnel was an outstanding matter that was in the hands of the UN Office of the High Commisioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). There were also some 21 new posts for child protection officers authorised in the budget for 2001/2002. Finding suitably qualified individuals was proving difficult — a situation said to be exacerbated by an apparent turf battle between the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict. By early August, virtually all MONUC civilian staff outside of the headquarters in Kinshasa were administrative personnel who had nothing to do with the line functions of the mission.64

In order to acquire and maintain proper records of minefields and to conduct mine awareness training, a mine action centre was to be established at MONUC headquarters, with subsidiary cells at each of the sector headquarters.65 Not specifically mentioned in the revised concept, but accepted as necessary by mission headquarters, is the need for a military police contingent of about 75 persons to deal with force disciplinary issues in Kisangani and the other sectors.66 South Africa has subsequently announced that it will be sending 48 military police to MONUC.

Aware of the security gap that would be created in the areas to be evacuated by foreign forces, the revised concept envisages that the de facto Congolese authorities in place at the time of such withdrawals will continue to provide for civil administration and the maintenance of law and order, until such a time as longer term arrangements can be established. It is also recognised that in terms of training, resources and equipment, local police have been neglected for years, and many have become corrupt owing to insufficient salaries and irregular payment. The new operational concept therefore envisages the deployment of the nucleus of a civilian police component within MONUC, initially at mission headquarters. Under an interim police commissioner, this small unit would conduct an in-depth assessment of the Congolese policing institution and its capabilities and needs. This planning cell would then make recommendations for the eventual deployment of an expanded CivPol component wherever MONUC military personnel are deployed. The purpose would be to "advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibility to ensure the security of the population."67

A second riverine unit of about 200 soldiers from Uruguay is to be deployed to open the riverways further and to stimulate trade and the movement of people and goods. Another function is to reduce the operating costs of MONUC, which has hitherto had to rely entirely on expensive air transport.68 Significant progress has already been made in this regard, most notably with the voyage of the UN ‘peace barge’, the Boboto. Together with a World Food Programme (WFP) boat, the Boboto left Kinshasa at the end of July 2001, carrying 650 metric tons of humanitarian supplies bound for Mogalo (on the Lua river, a tributary of the Ubangui) in Equateur province, some 1 250 kilometres from Kinshasa. The boats were accompanied by MONUC peace keepers. The cargo included medical supplies, fuel, food, school supplies, construction material, clothing, seeds and tools. The Boboto will return to Kinshasa, which is suffering from a shortage of food, with a cargo of 1 000 metric tons of corn, courtesy of the European Union. According to the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), future projects of this kind are foreseen in anticipation of a complete return of free navigation on the vast riverine network of the DRC.69

MONUC is also to be strengthened during phase II with an integrated civil-military planning section to co-ordinate support for the demobilisation, disarmament, resettlement or repatriation of armed groups. This Co-ordination Unit is considered an essential part of the transition to phase III, in view of indications that MONUC may be called upon at a relatively early stage to assist with the repatriation or resettlement of former combatants quartered in government camps.

The public information capability of MONUC will also be expanded to enable it to explain and clarify UN intentions and activities — especially as the demobilisation, disarmament, resettlement or repatriation process and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue get under way. The intention is to establish a radio studio and FM transmitter in Kinshasa, with further transmitters at the four existing sector headquarters and at Goma. By August, the DRC government had finally granted authority for such transmitters, and the MONUC public information section estimates that they will be on air by January 2002

In summary, the revised concept of operations provides for

"a progressive build-up of capabilities in terms of personnel, logistics and equipment in order to position MONUC to respond in a timely and effective manner once the parties begin the process of withdrawal of all foreign troops and the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups."70

It envisages an increase of up to 2 500 military personnel more than the figure of some 3 000 authorised under the mandate of MONUC that expired in mid-June 2001, thus remaining within the force level of 5 537 approved by the Security Council in its Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000. On 15 June, the Security Council, in its Resolution 1355 (2001), approved the updated concept of operations and extended the mandate of MONUC until 15 June 2002.71

Theoretically, therefore, MONUC (phase II) can maintain a holding pattern for almost another year, while refining its concept of operations for phase III in accordance with the level of compliance by the parties and with progress (or not) with the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. There is a strong desire to ‘maintain the momentum’ and to ‘keep the peace process moving’, as well as to be adequately geared for a smooth transition to phase III operations. The most challenging aspect of the latter relates to demobilisation, disarmament, resettlement or repatriation, and the problematic security situation in the Kivu provinces. Before discussing issues around this challenge, it is therefore necessary briefly to summarise the situation in the Kivus, where a recent report published by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimated a war-related death toll of some 1.6 million people over a 22-month period.72