Chapter 7

The Situation in the Kivus

Following the verification of the deployment to NDPs by MONUC, the Kivus are technically under the administrative control of RCD-Goma, initially led by Emile Ilunga and now by Adolph Onusumba. In reality, Rwanda calls the shots in the provinces. RCD support in the region, tenuous to begin with, has declined as the security situation deteriorates. This, in turn, is due to the large movement of Hutu groups (Interahamwe, ex-FAR, FDD and FNL) from the south-eastern regions of the DRC (Kabalo, Mbuji Mayi, Kabinda and Kamina areas) in Shaba and Kasai Occidental to Rwanda and Burundi, and a concomitant increase in RPA presence from some 4 000 to 6 000 troops in this area between May and June 2001. Fighting between these groupings has intensified, as have confrontations between Mai Mai, Interahamwe and RPA/RCD forces. The Kivus have a long tradition of rural militias, in particular the Mai Mai, which were created partly in the interests of self-protection and cattle-rustling, but which also reflect the extent of their marginalisation and the collapse of traditional and state institutions.73 The total number of Mai Mai remains a guesstimate (a figure mentioned by MONUC was 6 000), although it is apparent that they are increasingly co-operating with the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. The draft demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement plan mentions the intention to identify and locate the backers of the Mai Mai, persuade them to stop supporting them, and invite some of their leaders to participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. However, it is difficult to envisage how this could occur in terms of the Lusaka agreement.

Although the fighting between the RPA/RCD and the Mai Mai and Interahamwe is not technically a violation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the potential impact on the mission was demonstrated when a helicopter used by MONUC came under fire from unidentified gunmen between Kalemie and Uvira in the rebel-held eastern DRC. This was the second attack on a UN helicopter since MONUC began deploying peace keepers across the DRC.74 During September, two MONUC observers were held up and robbed outside Bukavu.

No one knows how large the Interahamwe forces are. According to the International Crisis Group, Rwandan commanders’ estimates are in the region of 15 000.75 Other estimates, including some within MONUC, are somewhat lower. Crucial to this is the actual number of ‘hard core’ Interahamwe that remain. Ongoing military campaigns have clearly decimated substantive numbers of the Interahamwe76 and there are some within MONUC who do not believe that there are many left. Since fleeing to the Kivus in the eastern DRC as part of the mass exodus of Hutus to avoid the advancing RPA and possible retribution, they reorganised in massive refugee camps in the eastern DRC, largely around Bukavu. Some have been integrated into the estimated six battalions of ex-FAR that operated mostly in and around Kaimina, Boende and Bolomba before apparently returning to Rwanda and Burundi.

In the Kivus today, RPA forces continue to pursue the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in their various guises. The latter constitutes an obvious threat to Rwanda, but it would appear that support to the Interahamwe and ex-FAR from within the pro-Kabila alliance may not have ended.

The resentment of the locals (including the Banyarwanda) against the increased RPA domination in South Kivu is palpable, as is their recognition of the weakening position of the RCD, which is increasingly blamed for its inability to contain the abuses committed by the RPA against the population.77 The ongoing extraction of coltan and other precious minerals to an annual value of some US $100 million from this region alone, and the entrenchment of associated political and military networks from all sides within this trade are massively complicating factors in any attempt either to collect, repatriate or resettle combatants from South Kivu. According to independent research done during late June,78 Kavumu airport (10 kilometres from Bukavu) serves a large range of commercial private aircraft involved in constant air traffic that shuttles to and from the interior of the province. More than 12 airline companies from Rwanda, the DRC, France, Belgium and South Africa have been identified. A similar trend is evident at Kilembwe airport where the same researcher reported evidence of ongoing military support to the armed groups.

Despite the deployment of MONUC, the security situation in South Kivu is bad, and alliances between belligerents follow an increasingly erratic course, exacerbating the desperate struggle for survival among large sections of the populace. The earlier, relatively close relationship between the Mai Mai and the RCD, for example, has been replaced by a general hostility toward the RPA (including the Banyamulenge with the Tutsi) in the Mai Mai, who increasingly side with the Interahamwe. It is also evident that the Interahamwe, FDD, ex-FAR and FNL continued to receive substantial support (training, logistics and possibly transport) until at least the end of June 2001, and that the disengagement of the RPA, which started in May, has been reversed.79 More recently, ALiR II became something of a factor to be considered. Generally regarded as being supported by Kinshasa, its numbers are estimated at between 2 000 and 10 000, generally located around Fizi in South Kivu. In the meanwhile, social cohesion among the local population is rapidly disintegrating under the pressures of war and violence that has become increasingly indiscriminate. As always, the local civilian population pay a heavy price and the desire for peace is high. Traditional authority in the Kivus has collapsed and the increasingly anti-Tutsi church and civil society has gained influence in the urban areas similar to that of the Mai Mai in the rural areas.

The regional instability within South Kivu is accentuated by the presence of some 35 000 Rwandan and 15 000 Burundian refugees in the province. However, recent months have seen a steady increase in the voluntary return of Hutu women and children from the larger refugee camps in the Kivus to both Rwanda and Burundi, although few men of combat age have accompanied those who returned. Rwanda has been actively promoting the return of Hutus who fled the country in 1994 as part of its counterinsurgency campaign, since they form a natural recruitment base for ALiR forces. For many of the Hutus the logic may be simple — why stay in a refugee camp in the Kivus? It would be better to return home, since Rwanda controls both sides of the border.80 This momentum may well ease the disarmament and demobilisation challenge, and help create the impetus for repatriation that will be needed when MONUC eventually moves to phase III of its operations. At this point, MONUC will have to explore the actual potential for reconciliation in the Kivus.