Chapter 8

MONUC III: Facing the 'D3' Challenge81

The focus of phases I and II of MONUC has been squarely on the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement or redeployment of the parties’ armed forces in the DRC. Once progress with these aspects is deemed satisfactory, the Lusaka agreement lists the next set of requirements:82

orderly withdrawal of foreign forces;



national dialogue and reconciliation;



re-establishment of state administration over the territory of the DRC;



disarmament of the armed groups;



formation of a national army; and



normalisation of the security situation along the common borders between the DRC and its neighbours.

While the planning and execution of most of these activities will inevitably overlap, the timely resolution, through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, of those issues that relate to the establishment of local civil administration and the provision of security (particularly in the Kivus), is seen as the essential prerequisite for meaningful progress in all other areas of activity. MONUC planners therefore see the UN’s primary function as that of catalyst, with mission personnel "seeking solutions to unlock difficulties and promoting attitudes by the Parties to keep the peace process moving along."83

The envisaged centre of gravity for MONUC III military operations conforms to the orthodoxy of UN peace operations of the past decade. In the ritual calendar of events, as reflected in Security Council resolutions and mission mandates, the perceived key to stabilisation has always been the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. The unstated purpose of these measures has been to wrest power and the means of violence from local militias and warlords, and to locate these within a legitimate and empowered state. In other words, the success of the whole intervention process has hinged on the degree to which the warring factions can be effectively disarmed. The report of 15-26 May 2001 of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, confirms that:

"The disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups is the key to ending the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Resolving the remaining problems would remove any need for foreign troops to remain in the east of the country, immeasurably improve the security and quality of economic life for the area’s inhabitants, and neutralise a dangerous source of conflict and instability in the region."84

According to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement:

"There shall be a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups, including the genocidal forces … all Parties commit themselves to the process of locating, identifying, disarming and assembling all members of the armed groups, commit themselves to taking all the necessary measures to facilitate their repatriation."85

The Lusaka agreement further includes the granting of amnesty, but not for genocide. MONUC is expected to meet this most difficult of challenges by creating a 33-person Co-ordination Unit responsible for demobilisation, disarmament and durable solutions, also known as D3. This would be a multidisciplinary team with expertise in a wide range of issues, including military, humanitarian and human rights issues, public information, civic programmes and international funding. The Co-ordination Unit would help to oversee the execution of the D3 process and would be responsible for the co-ordination of all aspects of D3, such as information management; identifying requirements including resources and infrastructure; determining the benefit packages for demobilisation, mobilising funds, facilitating deployment of monitoring teams in the receiving countries; and encouraging the convening of a Great Lakes conference on reconciliation.

The political framework for D3 is still under consideration by the Political Committee, and has not been completed. The purpose of an April 2001 draft D3 plan is:86

"To disarm, demobilise, repatriate, reintegrate (resettle) all armed groups in the DRC; hand over mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and disarm all Congolese civilians who are illegally armed."87

The ‘armed groups’ include all forces other than the government forces, RCD and MLC. In other words, they include ex-FAR, Allied Democratic Forces, Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda National Rescue Front ll, Interahamwe, Former Uganda National Army, FDD, West Nile Bank Front, UNITA, ALiR and so on.

At this stage, D3 is based on a voluntary process. Reference to forced compliance is "to be worked out by a force that will carry out this task,"88 based on the results of the voluntary compliance process. The entire D3 process is, in turn, dependent upon the provision of information on the armed groups by the signatories to the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Sufficient and reliable information is a crucial prerequisite for D3 planning, and MONUC has started with some independent data collection and studies that could serve to verify and supplement the information eventually received from the signatories.89

The process thereafter is relatively simple in theory. After details of amnesty provisions have been finalised, and the infrastructure of the various incentive packages and mechanisms established, the actual work will begin. An intensive media campaign is intended to induce combatants to report to assembly areas where they will be registered, disarmed and moved to separate camps according to gender (separation of males and females), age (child soldiers to be separated from adults) and combat status (combatants and non-combatants).

A screening process "by the relevant international agencies" will follow immediately to identify and apprehend those who are suspected of "genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes."90 Suspects will be handed over to the International Court of Justice in Arusha. Those remaining will receive counselling to determine their future intentions, skills, aptitude, choice of country for resettlement or reintegration, preferred skills training, and so on. All of this is supposed to occur within 30 days from assembly, and will form the basis for subsequent movement, training and reintegration, to be completed within a total period of one year. Monitors in the resettlement countries will support the process.

Of course, there is no guarantee that the international community will accede to all the tasks that the signatories to the Lusaka agreement demanded. It is already clear that MONUC does not wish to become involved in the screening of Interahamwe for genocidaires, and that it would rather pass this challenge on to Rwanda.

The prospects for D3 in the Kivus remain contingent upon other developments — it is a virtual prerequisite for Rwandan withdrawal from the DRC. The Security Council will probably not approve the start of the D3 process until such a time when sufficient political momentum has been established through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the withdrawal of foreign forces. Local ownership and regional political support are critical factors for success. For obvious reasons, the various factions of the Interahamwe (and other targeted groups) reject a plan imposed upon them in terms of an agreement to which they were not party.

Inevitably, D3 will be premised upon UN co-ordination between agencies and an expanded and co-ordinated mission far larger than any peace excuse attempted elsewhere. D3 will have to involve other agencies not answerable to the UN, and possibly bilateral donors such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID), but definitely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Following a recent visit to the DRC by Britain’s Minister for Development Co-ordination, Clare Short, it appears that the UK may be prepared to assist in the resettlement and reintegration of combatants in Rwanda.

But the D3 process cannot be used to favour returning Hutu Interahamwe above those communities that remained in Rwanda. The country is extremely poor and faces enormous development challenges, not least of which is the downsizing of its own army (in the event of peace). This is also the case in neighbouring Burundi. Given the nature of the economies of the DRC and the Great Lakes countries, traditional approaches to reintegration have limited chance of success. The donor community may have to look at supporting long-term labour-intensive national works programmes that could give employment to the majority of former combatants.

Perhaps even more significantly, successful repatriation to Rwanda would also impact upon national reconciliation there, which would be feasible only if a government of national unity was instituted. Inevitably, the peace process in the DRC and domestic developments there make the Kagame government in Kigali more vulnerable.91

In a benign environment, the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the D3 process are mechanistic functions for the military. However, the situation in the Kivus is unlikely to be benign. The presence of non-compliant armed elements and the associated risks will have to be factored into MONUC’s planning. Rather than adopting the slow process of assembly, disarmament and demobilisation that has characterised other missions such as the UNMission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), MONUC’s planning team envisages a rapid process, calling for robust, well-trained and appropriately equipped forces, speedy disarmament, and rapid identification and reintegration projects. Apart from the logistic and other physical preparations that this would require, MONUC also plans a massive information campaign, including the establishment of a forward headquarters in the east, probably at Kindu or Goma.92

In past UN operations such as in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Cambodia and Mozambique, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process was instituted once a political solution to an armed conflict had found expression in a comprehensive peace agreement. Typically, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration have applied to the signatory parties of such peace agreements, who were mostly nationals of the country in transition. In the DRC, the agreement in place (Lusaka) is a ceasefire agreement, and the subjects of demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement are not the signatories, but members of other armed groups — many of whom are not nationals of the DRC, but of neighbouring countries. This contradictory situation creates enormous problems of accountability in presenting forces for disarmament, and of incentives for doing so.93

While this situation is different from and probably more challenging than any previous demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration experiment, the military component of MONUC realises that it is capable only of implementing the mechanical aspects of voluntary disarmament and demobilisation (registration of those being demobilised, weapons collection, and so on). It is not capable of addressing the more complex issues of resettlement, reintegration or repatriation. These are seen as an essentially civilian challenge. The immediate task of the military is simply to ‘fix’ the situation as a precursor to screening former combatants.94

Although the emphasis will continue to be upon verifying and monitoring, rather than supervising or enforcing agreed arrangements, MONUC planners have admitted that

"Whereas verification and monitoring of the DR Plan is essentially a technical military operation of limited scope, the range, complexity and interdependency activities in a third phase of deployment bring immeasurably greater difficulty and risks."95

There is thus a clearly recognised requirement for enhanced MONUC force protection capabilities. The latter is especially pertinent in the Kivus, which has been identified as the key area of D3 operations for phase III. Even in the best scenario, MONUC planners realise that there will be a continued presence of non-compliant elements in the Kivus.96

For many of these people, repatriation holds the prospect of prosecution, and it is envisaged that "the only way to get them to come forward would be to go into their secure areas and bring them out."97 The MONUC concept of operations does not expand on how the latter would be accomplished. Indeed, it states in a rather contradictory fashion that:

"It is assumed that any MONUC phase III military operations will be restricted to a Chapter 6 mandate. Tracking down and disarming non-compliant armed groups is not a task that MONUC would perform."98

On the other hand, it is envisaged that firm assurances of compliance would be demanded before MONUC troops deployed to temporary cantonment sites, perhaps based on the existing headquarter locations of the various armed groups. Such sites would need to be defended by something akin to reinforced infantry battalion groups. The anticipated risks of the operation and the need for a robust UN protection capability mean that the probable requirement will be for four to six infantry battalion groups (in addition to the various subunit-sized protection elements currently deployed at sector level), including a rapid reaction force.99

While this outlines the broad concept of the main effort for phase III operations, detailed planning can only commence when MONUC has comprehensive data on all armed groups operating in the Kivus. On the one hand, the parties are expected to provide detailed data on the disposition of particular armed groups before MONUC will agree to start with the process. This would imply that, initially, the focus of the D3 effort will have to be on armed groups who are under the firm control of one of the signatory parties.100 On the other hand, there is some recognition that none of the parties, including the DRC government, has detailed information on the numbers, location and armaments of the armed forces that they are alleged to be supporting. Actual contact with the leadership (once identified) of these groups would also be required to determine the willingness of their followers to enter the D3 process.

‘Adequate consent’ of the various armed groups to disarm is regarded as a primary precondition for execution of the disarmament and demobilisation programme, but, as the MONUC planners concede, "when this level of consent is deemed to have occurred will be a major judgement call."101 Past experience also indicates that consent can be withdrawn far more rapidly than it is granted. All disarmament commitments in peace processes have tended, at least at the outset, to be based on consent — regardless of whether peace support forces deploy under a Chapter VI or VII mandate. However, the idea of voluntary disarmament is challenged by issues such as the security concerns arising out of disarming combatants and the deficient troops-to-task structure of the peace support forces. Faced with non-compliance with the disarmament provisions of the mandate, intervention forces have exhibited two basic reactions. The first is acquiescence in the face of recalcitrance, combined with a shift in the mandate that allows the peace process to proceed regardless. The second approach has been to apply limited coercion to recalcitrant parties, while attempting to preserve the consensual nature of the intervention at the strategic level.

Cambodia and Angola provide classic examples of the acquiescent approach, while Somalia and, to an extent, Bosnia are good examples of attempted (and unsuccessful) coercion. Regional and UN operations in West Africa have been characterised by a perplexing mixture of coercion and acquiescence, while the approach to disarmament and security challenges in the UNMission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) operation defies logical analysis. None of these examples, however, can provide positive conclusions about the ability of intervening military forces to achieve meaningful disarmament where there have been strong incentives for protagonists to hold onto their weapons.

Progress with the D3 process is also very much dependent upon the course of events in Bujumbura. At the time of writing, a common momentum appeared to be building up between the peace processes in Burundi and the DRC, cemented by the integration of FDD combatants into Kabila’s military. But the risk of an implosion in Burundi is very high and the knock-on effect that this could have on Rwanda and the DRC is serious. In many ways, Burundi is the weakest and most fragile of the countries bordering on the DRC. It is under threat from a loose coalition of forces that share the same backers and funders, have a common ethnic enemy and identify themselves in a common manner. These groupings, the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, FDD and FNL and their supporters will present a regional threat if they are not included in a settlement process, disarmed and repatriated.

Fighting in Burundi has intensified in recent months, fuelled by the return of thousands of FDD and FNL from their bases in the neighbouring DRC and Tanzania. Inside Burundi, a combined assault by the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and Parti pour la libération des peoples Hutu-Forces nationals pour la libération (Palipehutu-FNL) on Bujumbura may be imminent. Co-operation between the anti-Tutsi forces has intensified, as is made evident by reports that CNDD-FDD invited Palipehutu-FNL to a recent congress in Lubumbashi in Shaba province. This was followed, in early August, by statements made by the Rwandan defence minister, Emmanuel Habyarimana, that Hutu rebels were preparing to launch a new offensive on Rwanda from bases in the south-eastern DRC. State-run Radio Rwanda quoted the colonel as saying that more than 40 000 ex-FAR and Interahamwe were on the move from Kamina and Kabalo toward south-west Rwanda.102

Various agencies and analysts have pointed to the degree to which FDD forces have returned to Burundi in recent months, ready and apparently convinced that they can overthrow Pierre Buyoya and gain power in this troubled country. Buyoya’s direct negotiations with the rebels are deeply unpopular within his own Tutsi-dominated military, and this has already resulted in two failed coup attempts in recent months. Should the FDD/FNL consider a military option as viable, the opportunity to strike would come earlier rather than later when a momentum has built up on disarmament in the DRC peace process, where a large portion of FDD forces are still based. While Paul Kagame is no friend of Pierre Buyoya, a successful assault on Bujumbura carries the danger of Rwandan military intervention — although the Burundian army is probably still capable of withstanding such a threat. The regional percussions of such a development could stall the DRC peace process and further threaten stability in Rwanda.

These dangers are counterbalanced by the fact that, in recent months, a breakthrough in the deadlock in the Burundi peace process has been made. On 23 July in Arusha, Nelson Mandela’s team chose Pierre Buyoya and Domitien Ndayizeye as President and Vice-President of Burundi for the first phase of a three-year transition, to start on 1 November 2001.103 This period may well lay the foundations for a successful transition period. Developments in this arena will have to be monitored in parallel with the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which is scheduled to begin on 15 October 2001.104