Chapter 9

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue
The Key to Peace?

According to article 19 of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement:

"On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Government of the DRC, the armed opposition, namely the RCD and MLC as well as the unarmed opposition shall enter into an open national dialogue. These inter-Congolese political negotiations involving les forces vives shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be under the aegis of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese parties."105

Although the Lusaka Peace Agreement is not clear on the exact structures and modalities for such negotiations, it binds the parties to agree on:

a timetable and rule of procedure;



the formation of a mechanism to establish a new Congolese National Army after the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue; and



a new political dispensation, including a constitution, to govern the country after elections.106

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue itself was planned to last a mere 45 days, and new institutions are to be established immediately thereafter.107 Even after the encouraging preparatory talks in Gaborone during August 2001, adherence to this schedule will require nothing short of a miracle. It would not be unrealistic to expect a process that lasts much longer.

Many hurdles had to be crossed before the Gaborone preparatory meeting, most of which were created by Laurent Kabila, who signed the Lusaka agreement under extreme military pressure. It would be five months, for example, before former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, was approved as facilitator. For several months, Laurent Kabila, who sought to obstruct and delay movement on the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, denied him facilities or even common courtesy.108 Kabila refused all co-operation with Masire, requesting the appointment of a new facilitator and even seeking to launch his own national dialogue to circumvent the Lusaka agreement. All of this changed with Joseph Kabila’s accession to power. Masire was able to strengthen his office in Kinshasa, headed by Mr Hacen Ould Lebatt, former minister of foreign affairs of Mauritania, and momentum was restored to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. But the obduracy of Laurent Kabila was not the only challenge facing the facilitator: the initially lukewarm support received from the international community was another.109 The pressure from MONUC, eager to maintain the momentum of its functional mandate, may also cause tension between MONUC and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in future.

The first significant outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, after the assassination of Laurent Kabila, was the publishing on 4 May 2001 on a Declaration of Principles, much of which reiterated content already included in the Lusaka agreement, as detailed below:

A commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. This implies that there will be no discussion of the formal adjustments to borders, despite the effective lack of central government that has characterised the DRC for several decades.



The inclusion of the government, RCD, MLC, the political opposition and representatives from civil society in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This is likely to prove the most difficult of the challenges, since the country remains sharply divided along regional, ethnic, historical and personal lines, with most civil society groupings of a very localised nature. The divisions within the RCD, discussed elsewhere, were to prove a particular challenge in the days immediately prior to the preparatory talks in Gaborone.



The freedom of the Congolese parties, in all the provinces, to elect their representatives to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in a just and equitable manner, as witnessed and verified by an independent authority. Since elections were obviously not possible, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue team spent eight weeks touring all 11 provinces to help identify those members of civil society and the unarmed political parties that should or could participate in the preparatory meeting in Gaborone. The result was the selection of 14 political parties, roughly divided between pro-government and anti-government aligned groups.



The adoption of the principle of consensus within the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This implies at first blush that any single party has the right of veto — but in practice, the ability of civil society organisations to hold the process to ransom is doubtful despite their volubility during the meeting in Gaborone. Earlier the Lusaka agreement had stipulated that: "all the participants in the inter-Congolese political negotiations shall enjoy equal status."110 The meeting in Gaborone would subsequently spend half a day discussing and analysing the nature of consensus. It would be prudent to expect that a final modus operandus will be adopted during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that reflects ‘sufficient’ but not complete consensus. Inevitably, the challenge in this process will be to find a balance between the two groups represented by the armed groupings (including the government, MLC and RCD) who claim control over specific territories, on one side, and the unarmed opposition groups such as the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS), on the other, which claims national support but can demonstrate no control over any specific territory.



The organisation of free, democratic and transparent elections in the DRC. This challenge will probably fall to MONUC as part of phase lll of its mission. A few days prior to the start of the preparatory meeting in Gaborone, DRC foreign minister, She Okitundu, summarised what many would consider an extreme position: "Before we hold elections we will need a new constitution, and before we adopt the constitution we will hold a referendum. And of course before we hold a referendum we will need a new population census. With all this groundwork to be done, it will not be possible to hold elections for, say, three years."111 His remarks were subsequently criticised by a number of other leaders, who demanded that elections should be held much earlier. Not surprisingly, his position was supported by the Rwandan-backed RCD, which probably has the least interest in speedy progress without firm security guarantees for Rwanda. Practically speaking, elections in the DRC would not require a voters’ roll, and it is possible to move directly to elections on the basis of a new constitution drawn up by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It will be the Inter-Congolese Dialogue itself that will have to pronounce on these issues.



The formation of a new, national army, composed of the government forces, MLC and RCD, which is to follow the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.



National reconciliation. Although the issues of justice and amnesty do not feature in the Lusaka agreement, it is difficult to envisage a peace settlement in the DRC that does not provide for some accountability or at least reflection on the past.

Once it was reactivated, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process required the liberalisation of politics in the DRC, particularly in Kinshasa and in the rebel-held territories, including major towns such as Kisangani, Goma, Lubumbashi and Gbadolite. While considerable international attention focused on Kinshasa, it is probably in the rebel-held territories that the greater challenge lies. Thus, the decision to repeal Decree Law no 194 (which had restricted the activities of political parties), announced by President Kabila on 17 May, was an important development. The new law required that parties should be ‘recognised’ and ‘credible’. Establishing the legal ownership of party names proved to be only one of many hurdles to be navigated, since any number of pretenders had registered the names of established parties as their own. Even the largest opposition party, the UDPS of Etienne Tshisekedi, found that three or four other groups had claimed the same name. Political parties were also required to inform the government in writing that they intended to resume activity. When some refused to do so and attempted to stage a political march late in July, 32 people were detained by the police.

On 3 June 2001, the DRC adopted a Congolese Charter for Human Rights that abolished capital punishment, ‘introduced democracy’ and ‘ensured equality’ for all citizens. Early in August, Kabila issued a presidential decree setting up a commission "to oversee the preparation and organization of the national dialogue." The three tasks of the commission, chaired by Balanda Muekin, are to draw up necessary and timely measures for the holding of the national dialogue, to work with the groups relating to the national dialogue, and make recommendations to the government.112

The worsening relationship between Rwanda and Uganda, once firm allies in the war in the DRC, is an important factor in future developments to the extent that the common view between the rebels on the negotiations (formalised in the January 2000 Kyankwanzi Accord) may have become meaningless. The two governments are increasingly wary of each other’s regional ambitions after the armed clashes in Kisangani. In March 2001, during his electoral campaign, President Museveni went so far as to accuse Rwanda of being a ‘hostile nation’, and of harbouring anti-Ugandan government elements. To some degree the attempted consolidation of Ugandan influence in the DRC through the establishment of the FLC reflected this competition.113

The MLC and RCD factions have been embroiled in many splits and much infighting. Despite the intervention of a number of countries to attempt a consolidation of the various factions, Nyamwisi announced a coup in November 2000 and a second only a few days before the start of talks in Gaborone. At that point, he declared the alliance dead, and proclaimed himself President of RCD-Kisangani, replacing Wamba dia Wamba. Nyamwisi also used the opportunity to state that the FLC arrangement was not suitable for the population from Butembo to Isiro, which he subdivided into three provinces. As a result, the Gaborone meeting provided for six additional representatives for the various RCD and MLC factions. Elsewhere, Rwanda has embarked upon a programme to build the capacity of RCD-Goma. This is unlikely to bear fruit in the short term.

The original intention was to start the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process earlier, probably in June/July, but the final date set in Gaborone was 20-24 August.

The participants chosen for the preparatory talks in Gaborone included 13 representatives from the DRC government, led by Leonard She Okitundu, minister of foreign affairs. The MLC sent 13 delegates under its leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, while Dr Adolphe Onusumba led a group of 13 members representing RCD-Goma. Six other persons represented the various MLC and RCD factions led by Jean-Bapiste Tibasimi Mbogemu Atenyi, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and Nyamwisi. Thirteen representatives were from civil society (les forces vives). The unarmed political parties were eventually represented a delegation from the parties considered to be the largest:114

The UDPS, represented by Valentin Mubake, has its centre of support in Kasai Oriental and is the largest national party. The leader of the UDPS is Etienne Tshisekedi, formerly a minister of the interior under Mobutu in the 1960s. He founded his own party in 1982, and gained popularity when the Sovereign National Conference elected him prime minister in 1991.



The Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR) for Kasai Oriental was represented by Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo. The MPR is Mobutu’s former party, and although it suffers much of the blame for the associated excesses and ruin of his regime, is probably the only other party with some pretence at a national following.



The Parti démocratie et social chrétien (PDSC) was represented by André Boboliko. Regionally, the PDSC is centred in Bandundu and split between northern and southern factions. It is considered to have significant support among intellectuals.

The participants subsequently agreed to release all political prisoners and organise the free movement of goods between government and rebel-controlled territories. Perhaps optimistically, DRC Minister She Okitundu pronounced that "soon, we should organize direct commercial flights between Kinshasa, Gbadolite and Goma."

Initial planning for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue envisaged four commissions:115

a humanitarian/economic and social commission, which was to come up with a reconstruction plan for the Kivus;



an electoral commission, which was to plan for a national census before the elections (to be funded by the EU);



a constitutional commission, which was to build on the work done in 1992 to prepare a new post-election constitution; and



finally, a military commission to design a plan for demobilisation and disarmament.

Once the Inter-Congolese Dialogue starts in Addis Ababa on 15 October 2001, the commissions are to meet in parallel.

Significantly, the meeting in Gaborone added a fifth commission to deal with reconciliation. This committee will have to deal with the most obvious issue outstanding with regard to a sustainable settlement in the DRC — that of justice. It is estimated that 2.5 million people have died in the eastern DRC from war-related causes in the last four years, as the conflict trapped thousands of civilians in the fighting. The DRC government has formally submitted a request to the UN Security Council for the creation of a UN International Tribunal for the DRC. But the comparative example of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in Arusha, Tanzania, is not encouraging. Seven years after its establishment, following the genocide in Rwanda, it has to date handed down verdicts on only nine individuals. Of 69 indicted suspects, 45 have been arrested. Not one of the alleged masterminds of the genocide has been brought to trial. Most of them are able to live without fear of reprisal in countries nearby, including the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and Kenya.116

The International Crisis Group is harsh in its comments on the ICTR:

"With more than 800 employees, three trial chambers presided over by nine judges, and a budget of around 90 million US dollars, the performance of the ICTR is lamentable … Five judges out of nine have spent more than a year and a half without hearing a substantial case and one of them had managed by last March to attain a record 28 months without hearing a substantial matter."

Yet "[i]t has provided indisputable recognition of the Rwandan genocide and has politically neutralised the ‘Hutu Power’ movement’s agenda of Tutsi extermination."117

The enlargement of the mandate of the ICTR to include crimes committed in the DRC or in Burundi, as discussed in some circles, would not make sense in a situation where its task in Rwanda remains substantively incomplete.118

One of the most hotly debated issues in Gaborone was that of venue. The eventual decision in favour of Addis Ababa as the location for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was difficult, not least since the obvious site was inside the DRC. For various symbolic reasons, many favoured Kisangani as the designated location for talks, but a decision in favour of the town eventually fell victim to the logistic challenge and the inevitable delays that would have followed such a choice. Since the rebel forces could not be satisfied with the proposed security guarantees in Kinshasa, the choice was Addis Ababa, with its excellent, though rather expensive, conference facilities and its location as a diplomatic hub in Africa.

In Gaborone, the final documents were signed by three people on behalf of the RCD-ML: Wamba dia Wamba, Tibasima and Kadima.

The preparatory talks in Gaborone signal a positive start to a process that may still have a long way to go. It is important to bear in mind that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue will not be an elected body, as was the South African constitutional assembly. It is composed of representatives and persons with divergent interests, some with an own agenda, others in close alliance with specific groupings. Nor is the Inter-Congolese Dialogue a negotiated interim government of national unity as is planned to commence in Burundi from 1 November 2001. For many, the central issue is therefore whether the Inter-Congolese Dialogue will allow the process of dialogue to go forward, or whether it will ‘govern’ in its own interest, eventually seeking to assume executive powers. In this sense, the limp provision in the Lusaka agreement for a degree of national as opposed to sectional authority in the different areas controlled by the rebels and the government will probably prove an advantage.

"There will be a consultative mechanism among the Congolese Parties which shall make it possible to carry out operations or actions throughout the national territory which are of general interest, more particularly in the fields of public health … education … migrations … movement of persons and goods."119

Paragraph 18 states that "upon conclusion of the Inter-Congolese political negotiations, state administration shall be re-established throughout the national territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo."120

Unfortunately, few of the participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue have much to gain from, or a true interest in genuine democratisation. Although a recent poll in Kinshasa appears to point to the popularity of Joseph Kabila, no one really knows to what extent the young president is his own man. He has little support within the military, and has yet to found his own political party to replace the ill-conceived attempt by his father to create the Congolese People’s Party (CPP). However, through his conciliatory actions, he has impressed many in the international community. He continues to strengthen the peace process by pledging US $1 million of government funds to the dialogue.121

But beyond the face of Joseph Kabila, powerful interests continue to lurk in the background in Kinshasa. Many of these concern illicit activities. None of the key families in Kinshasa have anything to gain from democratisation, transparency and expenditure on development. They stand to lose if the diversion of state funds to personal wealth accumulation is ended. It is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of the DRC economic activity is of an informal and often illicit nature, designed to avoid state control and attempts at regulation. Bringing these into the fold of government regulation is a massive task for a country the size of the DRC and with its lack of civil administration powers.

One of the novel elements in the DRC peace dialogue is that the appointed facilitator of the internal process, Sir Ketumile Masire, is operating in parallel to, rather than as part of the peace mission. There is thus the potential of some divergence between his office and the role of the incoming Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Amos Ngongi. Arguably, this arrangement will serve to separate the military and the humanitarian components of the dialogue, but the two processes will require close co-ordination, compatible personalities and a great degree of mutual understanding. Already, the divergence between the speed with which MONUC wishes to move and the much slower process necessitated by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue has led to some irritation in MONUC. It is not improbable that a lack of progress in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue could see the development of a disjuncture between the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which has the more important task but no direct authority, and MONUC, which has all the backing and power provided by the UN system but must await progress in a process that it does not control.

The UN Security Council has repeatedly emphasised the need to ensure that progress in the political sphere (notably the Inter-Congolese Dialogue), is made in parallel with the military aspects: the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed groups. This view may not always hold sway in practice, since it is equally possible that progress in the field could impact upon the negotiations. As President Chiluba has noted, "we can only eat what is in front of us," implying that interlocutors can deal with only some, but not all issues at any given point.122 Not all within MONUC appear appreciative of the importance of the political process. Time will tell whether the UN and the office of the facilitator will be able to operate in tandem with each other, and not in competition.