Sierra Leone has a population of some 5.3 million people, with about 1.2 million living in the sprawling capital of Freetown. 60 percent of the nation is Muslim, and 30% Christian. Over 17 tribes are to be found in Sierra Leone but two, the Temne and the Mende, are pre-eminent, each of them comprising 30% of the population. Life expectancy in Sierra Leone is 38.3 years, the adult literacy rate is 32% and the GDP per capita is US$448. With a majority of unemployed and disaffected youths becoming increasingly alienated from an ageing and stagnant government in Freetown, Sierra Leone was ripe for armed insurrection at the turn of the last decade.

The spark that ignited the conflict came in March 1991, when Liberian warlord (now president) Charles Taylor armed a group of dissident Sierra Leoneans. His motive was to hit back at the Freetown government for allowing its territory to be used by Nigerian planes on bombing missions against his forces.

Though the belligerent parties in the Sierra Leone civil war contain individuals from all of the tribes, the Mende are dominant in government.1 Although the Temne is the second largest ethnic group and provides the bulk of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) support, the Sierra Leone conflict is not ethnically based, and could probably be better described as an inter-generational conflict. The strongest demands of the young relate to viable employment opportunities.

During the conflict, the civilian population was brutally abused to further the aims of all belligerents, and the scars left by ten years of civil war run extremely deep. Some 2.5 million people, nearly half the population, were made refugees or were internally displaced because of the sheer horror of the conflict. An estimated 27,000 children were enlisted as combatants in a war of terror which resulted in 70,000 deaths and left 20,000 citizens maimed as a result of violent amputation.

The people of Sierra Leone are the victims of all parties to the conflict, but also suffer international neglect. This is shown by the uneven and unco-ordinated responses to its civil war. When the United Nations (UN) finally authorised a multinational intervention force at the end of 1999, it did not succeed in stemming the violence. The UN force arrived in dribs and drabs, and the available troop strength was too low to allow a widespread deployment. The lack of commitment by the RUF, the essentially peacekeeping nature of the mission, and the need to quickly fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of a regional intervention force contributed immensely to the mission's predicament. Following the RUF's offensive against the peacekeepers in May 2000, the entire peace process reached an impasse. A bi polar situation persisted, with the RUF controlling the north and east of the country and the government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) or the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) controlling the west and south.

The RUF's aggression against the peacekeepers, culminating in widespread hostage taking in May 2000, made UNAMSIL realise that compliance with peace accords and Security Council resolutions cannot be taken for granted, and that the force needed an effective deterrence capacity. The operation conducted in Kailahun by the Indian contingent to free hostages was very effective, and provided good lessons on the value of military combat capabilities.2 UNAMSIL began to follow a 'carrot and stick' approach, confronting potential spoilers with military force, whilst also engaging them in political negotiations.3

After a six-month hiatus, the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, signed on 10 November 2000, allowed negotiations on the detailed implementation of the peace process to begin.4 The agreement emphasised military issues, and amounted to a list of demands on the RUF, framed by UNAMSIL. For example, it required the return of all UNAMSIL weapons and equipment seized during the May crisis.)5 However, it was the Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement of 2 May 2001 (Abuja II), facilitated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), that provided the real breakthrough in the peace process.6 In it, the GoSL and the RUF reviewed the implementation of the agreement signed on 10 November 2000. They agreed on a simultaneous disarmament of combatants belonging to the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), and stressed the need for the government to restore its authority in areas previously under RUF control, where UNAMSIL had begun deploying.

During the Abuja II meeting, the leader of the RUF delegation, Omrie Golley, agreed to withdraw from Kambia District in northern Sierra Leone, which had been used by insurgents to enter Guinea. This would make possible the deployment of troops from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) to stop armed incursions from across the border, as well as increased patrolling by UNAMSIL in Kambia with a monitoring team including RUF unarmed observers, and immediate involvement of RUF elements in the DDR programme with a view to absorption into the SLA after screening. The RUF also agreed to return by 30 May 2001 all outstanding equipment and vehicles seized from UNAMSIL

The Sierra Leonean delegation, led by Attorney-General Solomon Berewa, also agreed to consider a request for the urgent release of RUF personnel, imprisoned after an outbreak of violence in Freetown in May 2000. (See Appendix B for the details of the Agreement.)

The participants agreed to meet again in Freetown on 15 May 2001, to set a timetable for the implementation of the country's disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme.

In his eleventh report to the Security Council on Sierra Leone,7 the UN Secretary-General specified four conditions that should be met before elections could be held in Sierra Leone:

the completion of disarmament;



the transformation of the RUF into a political party;



the restoration of civil authority throughout the country; and



the deployment of UNAMSIL and the guarantee of freedom of movement throughout the country.

He added that the resettlement of returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) also needed to be made a factor in the electoral equation, and that consequently, all parties should accept a postponement of elections to May 2002.

The purpose of this monograph is to report on advances made in the peace process in Sierra Leone, with specific emphasis on the present role of UNAMSIL in support of the Abuja II Agreement. It also assesses UNAMSIL's progress towards meeting the electoral criteria set by the Secretary-General. However, it is impossible to highlight the remarkable turn-around in the fortunes of the UN mission over the past six months without making brief references to earlier phases of the peace process, and to key external actors, both of which have had an impact upon the fortunes (and misfortunes) of Sierra Leone. While the focus is clearly on the political-military process geared towards taking the people of Sierra Leone to the polls in May 2002, attention is also paid to a number of interrelated but thorny issues-such as the diamond trade and the debate over whether war criminals should be prosecuted or given amnesty.