On 21 September 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had approved a three-year $169 million loan to Sierra Leone to assist with economic recovery. The loan will be used to support a poverty-reduction strategy for Sierra Leone, which was designed with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. The programme aims to increase economic growth to rates of six to seven percent annually. During the year 2000, the Sierra Leone economy grew at a rate of 3.8%, compared to an 8.1% contraction in 1999. Inflation has also improved, with a 2.7% decline in prices in 2000 compared to a nearly 37% increase the year before. Sierra Leone will strive to reach five percent growth in 2001 and six percent growth in 2002, while limiting inflation to eight percent in the first year and five percent in the second.136

Improved government control of the diamond trade undoubtedly contributed to the signs of economic upturn during 2000. Sierra Leone exported a total of 132,394 carats between October 2000 and May 2001, earning US $17.34 million since a new certification system, aimed at curbing the illicit trade in 'conflict diamonds' mined in rebel-held areas, was introduced last October. This compares to only US $1.5 million for the preceding year and, according to Mineral Resources Minister Mohamed Swarray Deen, "...clearly indicates that the use of certificates of origin for diamond exports has improved sales".137

However, responsible government control over diamond extraction and the diamond trade is not only an issue of economic recovery. Diamonds have provided the resources and much of the motivation for ten years of war. Hence control of the industry is seen by many as an essential key to the Sierra Leone peace process, but one which has often been ignored because of the sheer complexity of the issues at stake. However, according to such commentators as Pratt:138

"The ultimate test [of the peace process] will be the diamond areas of Kono and Tongo Field. Until both the RUF and the ... CDF cede full control of these areas to ... UNAMSIL and full control of diamond mining to the Government of Sierra Leone... , it would be premature to believe that peace has been achieved."

As outlined in previous sections, UNAMSIL has already deployed, with credible forces, to Kono district and the Tongo Fields in Kenema. The re-establishment of a SLP presence in these areas has also been a priority for the GoSL, and is being supported by UNAMSIL. However, Pratt points out that neither the army nor the police have controlled the diamond areas in the past, and has warned that "giving the SLA or the ... SLP responsibility for security in the diamond areas now would be an invitation to return to the days of rampant corruption, national decline and war".139

In the past, the government has required mining firms to provide their own security rather than providing it for them. Only very large mining companies could afford the kind of professional security force required for effective operations, and smaller companies tended to use less well-regarded firms who were attracted to the diamond fields as the security conditions began to deteriorate. However, the approach of the latter to security was often dubious.

With the recent progress made with UNAMSIL and SLP deployment, the prospects for a return of reputable security companies have improved considerably.

On 9 August 2001, the GoSL announced that the Canadian-registered company, DiamondWorks Ltd. which has a 60% stake in a 25-year lease on the Koidu concession will resume diamond mining in Kono with at least a $40 million investment. The main part of the DiamondWorks concession in Koidu involves Kimberlite pipes, and the GoSL expects the annual output to be about 300,000 carats, worth well over $30 million.140

However, the larger security concerns - paramount among them the possibility of a return to war - have little to do with Kimberlite mining, but relate to the RUF's presumed ability to maintain control over its alluvial diamond mining activities, and to use the proceeds to re-arm and re-mobilise. As Pratt puts it:141

"There is a real possibility that the RUF peace offer may be based on an idea that UNAMSIL will not, in fact, become engaged on the diamond issue. It could be that the RUF believes that UNAMSIL will simply act as a police force in the diamond areas to make diamond mining safe for successor RUF organizations."

Similarly, Ian Smillie recently expressed a concern that the RUF may still be mining in order to buy weapons. He noted that while some RUF combatants had given up their weapons, the movement had not relinquished control of the diamond-producing areas, where illicit mining was continuing unabated. Because of the UNAMSIL presence and reduced harassment, he argued, former RUF combatants are now capable of digging more diamonds now than during the war.142

Many recent reports, and the authors' own observations, confirm that mining continues openly, despite a government ban. The GoSL defends its position by asserting that the moratorium on mining allows diamonds to be mined as long as the proceeds are not used to buy weapons. However, it has created a certification regime to check the trade in 'blood diamonds', and has issued around 96 certificates to diamond exporting companies to curb smuggling and illicit trade. Under the scheme, all diamonds exported have to be accompanied by a certificate of origin signed by officials of the mineral resources ministry and the central bank.

UNAMSIL's 'defence' against allowing the illicit mining to continue is simply that:143

"Everybody is mining in this country except UNAMSIL and it is good for unemployed people. ... The government and the rebels had said they would monitor each other but they haven't. We came here to keep peace. Our mandate is not to control diamond mining, it is up to the government to do so."

This perspective is realistic. UNAMSIL has neither the mandate nor the manpower to control alluvial mining, which has been likened to a farming operation that involves tens of thousands of workers, and is virtually impossible to control. Since diamonds were discovered in the 1930s, the industry has never been fully regulated, and the 'harvesting' of diamonds remains the only source of income for a large proportion of the population.144

While the RUF has blamed Freetown for the failure of the ban, it is alleged that the RUF is making at least $100 million a year from diamonds, which are sold in places such as Abidjan, Banjul, Liberia, Antwerp, and New York. The UN team of experts that visited Sierra Leone in September 2000 estimated the volume of the 'blood diamond' trade as earning between $25 and $125 million a year. Such estimates are very imprecise, and it should be noted that that the RUF is but one of many players engaging in the illegal exploitation and exportation of diamonds. Focusing the problem of control too narrowly on the RUF (to the exclusion of the CDF, ex-SLA and AFRC, as well as host of unscrupulous 'civilian' operators) is unproductive.

Moreover, reports of the numbers of diggers increasing exponentially over the past months could have a variety of less sinister explanations than the need to fill the RUF war coffers. For example, there may simply be an influx of demobilised fighters seeking personal economic opportunities. Relative calm in the countryside and the prospect of a re-established government presence could be the spur behind the frenzy of digging, in an attempt to reap the maximum benefit before government begins the difficult but critical task of regulating the industry.

The diamond areas of eastern Sierra Leone have historically supported a multi-ethnic population which includes Liberians, Fulani and Mandingo traders and Lebanese merchants. This may provide a further reason why these areas are attractive destinations for disarmed combatants from a variety of ethnic groups, many of whom have already traded their meagre subsidies for the tools necessary for digging.

However, the main factor is economic, the lure of diamonds is and will undoubtedly be an important motive in the livelihood decisions taken by former combatants on all sides. The diamond micro-economy should therefore become a subject for research and investigation, as understanding its nature will be critical if future governments hope to achieve a degree of regulation over, and assured income from, this contentious source of wealth.145

The level of social cohesion, the nature of localised power structures and the existence of trade and smuggling networks will have a deep impact on the government's influence in the diamond areas. That portion of the population formed by demobilised combatants remains among the most vulnerable and potentially volatile in future political configurations. The average youthfulness of this sector of the population and the prolonged lack of social services such as health and education, particularly in rural areas, both present daunting obstacles to achieving any degree of social stability.146 An in-depth study conducted over the next months of the life histories and aspirations of former combatants who find themselves in the diamond fields could therefore provide an important aid to assessing the reintegration needs of this particular group.

It is obvious that the issue of diamonds is one that relates not only to economic and security concerns: it also has a deep sociological dimension that should not be ignored during the longer-term phase of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. The short-term concerns of the 'security first' lobby are indeed valid, but need to be viewed in a holistic context.

Given the history and nature of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone, and the fragility of the present GoSL (and probably of the government that will replace it), there is probably greater hope of regulation through the type of 'demand-side' controls evolving from the Kimberly process than through any short-term attempts to impose strict 'supply-side' controls. In any event, the control and regulation of such an industry is obviously beyond the (already wide) mandate of UNAMSIL. The mission cannot be held responsible for successes or failures in this area.