After a disastrous first six months, and a subsequent hiatus of nearly a year, it is clear that UNAMSIL has, since May 2001, made significant strides towards achieving its stated objective of:

Western military thinkers have readily conceded that in a joint and multinational intervention of long duration, involving many civilian organisations and agencies, military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the desired political end-state or an actual element of that end-state. In fact, the NATO and British peace support manuals emphasise that:195

It may be argued that UNAMSIL is currently adhering to just such an approach, and it is somewhat ironic that the UK has, hitherto, been one of the most vocal critics of the UN's concept of operations in Sierra Leone. However, British peace support doctrine also emphasises the common wisdom that has emerged from the peace operations of the past decade, which is that, if an intervention force is to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of operations, has therefore depended on the belligerent parties' assessment of the force's ability to accomplish the mission.

If the legitimacy of an intervention depends in large measure on internal support, then the ultimate success of an intervention depends heavily on relations between the intervening forces and the local population - and particularly on local perceptions of force credibility. Credibility, in turn, will derive from what the military is expected to do, and how effectively it goes about doing it.

Actual mission mandates for UN operations conducted over the past decade have covered such ambitious projects as disarming and demobilising warring factions; transforming regular and irregular forces into a unified army; reorganising and retraining the police; re-establishing or reforming the judiciary; providing food, water, sanitation, medical services, housing, and road repairs; and conducting or observing national elections.

It is small wonder, therefore, that the various 'lessons learned' seminars conducted in the wake of the peace operations of the 1990s reflect consensus on one absolutely key prerequisite for mission success - the need for a realistic and well-defined mandate, supported by the necessary means or resources for its accomplishment. These lessons are well summarised in the Brahimi Report.196

The key to stabilisation and security has always been seen as the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The unstated purpose of stabilisation measures has been to wrest power and the means of violence from local militias and warlords, and to recentralize it at a much higher level. In other words, the success of the whole intervention process has hinged on the degree to which warring factions can be effectively disarmed.

However, disarmament has been one of the most difficult tasks to implement in all prior multifunctional UN operations. To collect all weapons, even at the end of an armed struggle, when the conditions of insecurity that prevail create high incentives for the maintenance and acquisition of light weapons and small arms by the community at large, is an extremely challenging project. The credibility of threats against non-compliance can only be maintained by a 'heavy' military presence, combined with the political resolve and military operational capability to respond swiftly to violations.

UNAMSIL is now up to its present authorised strength of 17,500, and is better led and more fully equipped than at any time since its inception. The Pakistani brigade and the Russian air wing have provided the mission with a powerful deterrent capacity, and the re-trained and re-equipped SLA, with BRITFOR in the wings, have undoubtedly contributed to the overall ability to deal firmly with any potential spoiler of the peace process. Because the 'top management' of UNAMSIL - the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, the Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander, CivPol Commissioner, and so on - are all from the region, they have been able to earn the respect of the parties to the conflict, as well as the general populace.

Of all the multiple military tasks deriving from convoluted and shifting mission mandates in previous missions, the critical performance areas of the military component may be summarised simply as:

ensuring that belligerents hand over their weapons according to the agreed timetables; and



providing protection and safe passage to other mission components, and generally enforcing agreed rights of freedom of movement.

Disarmament has proceeded apace in Sierra Leone since May 2001, and should be completed by the end of the year. However, the lessons of Mozambique indicate that the cordon and search operations to be conducted as part of CONOPS 2002 need to be very effectively executed, in order to combat violent and organised crime after the withdrawal of the UN force.

UNAMSIL has already succeeded in deploying to all the districts of Sierra Leone, and the mission statement underpinning the military concept of operations (CONOPS) for 2001 emphasises the second key performance area as follows:

"UNAMSIL's Mission is to deploy progressively and robustly within a coherent operational structure, dominating strategic locations and lines of communication, whilst affording and facilitating a degree of protection, freedom of movement and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians, in order to assist the legitimate Government to restore law, order, peace and stability throughout Sierra Leone".

While disarmament and freedom of movement are primary military concerns, the demobilisation and reintegration into society of former combatants is widely recognised as a civilian challenge. This aspect of the Sierra Leone peace process remains problematic, in a society where the formal economy hardly exists and the vast majority of the population eke out a living either through subsistence agriculture or the exploitation of natural resources. The lure of diamonds is, and will undoubtedly be, an important factor in the decisions as to means of earning a livelihood taken by former combatants on all sides. It is therefore recommended that the existing body of knowledge and literature on 'best practices' for reintegration be augmented by urgent research into the diamond micro-economy in Sierra Leone. Understanding its nature will be essential if the government is to balance the need to regulate the industry against the danger of closing off one of the few viable civilian opportunities for former combatants.

On 18 September 2001, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend UNAMSIL's mandate by an additional six months, as reflected in resolution 1370 (2001). Council encouraged the government and the RUF to continue to take steps towards dialogue and national reconciliation. These were to include the reintegration of former RUF combatants into civil society, and the transformation of the RUF into a political party. While there are many structural and objective impediments to meaningful reintegration - not just of the RUF, but of all former combatants and civilians disrupted and displaced by the war - there is no logical reason why the RUF should not enjoy meaningful assistance in converting itself into a political party.

The latter is surely a sine qua non for mission success, if there is any truth in the notion that the political should take precedence over the military in any peace process. Yet this has been one of the most neglected aspects of engagement in Sierra Leone. This omission may well come back to haunt those who would like to see the RUF marginalized in the forthcoming elections. There is a real opportunity for countries that have not contributed to UNAMSIL to support a crucial, but largely overlooked or ignored element of the peace process by providing technical advice and training that will enable the RUF to participate in the elections in a constructive and convincing manner. Only if the latter is achieved will the electoral outcome be truly 'free and fair'.

Perhaps the neglect of the RUF's conversion process has been an inevitable outcome of the emphasis placed on the extension of civil authority, that is GoSL authority, throughout the territory. That has been seen as the more important benchmark to be achieved before the staging of elections. The extension of civil authority has become a core element of recent reports of the UN Secretary-General, Security Council resolutions, and indeed, the mandate and mission statement of UNAMSIL. For example, in resolution 1370 (2001) Council called on UNAMSIL "to accelerate and co-ordinate efforts to restore civil authority and basic public services throughout the country". However, international assistance continues to focus on the military and the police, with little attention devoted to the broader aspects of civil administration - such as health, education, and social welfare.

Access to justice remains one of the acute problems facing Sierra Leoneans, especially for rural residents. Of special concern is the need to begin a sustainable longer-term process of judicial reform, as a necessary adjunct to the Special Court and the TRC. This would involve a process that could take at least ten years, and will require further bilateral and multilateral support, as UNAMSIL is, by definition, a short-term intervention.

It is fairly commonly accepted that the roots of the Sierra Leone conflict lie in poor governance, which was responsible for a disappearing formal economy, youth unemployment, grinding poverty, poor education and a weak infrastructure. If this is so, then it is important to look beyond the elections and to muster ongoing international support for fostering good governance practices and long-term economic development. This is absolutely vital if the enormous investment in peacekeeping and emergency assistance is not to be squandered.

Despite the general realisation that a long-term approach is imperative to the success of the multidimensional Sierra Leone peace process, the reality is that donor patience is always a finite commodity. Impatience occurs when there is a perceived lack of progress and/or a major setback to a mandated process. The hostage-taking of May 2000 is a case in point. Nevertheless, the international community, the UN, and especially the leadership of UNAMSIL have stayed the course, and turned what appeared to be abject failure into a very visible (though qualified) success.

UNAMSIL is indeed on the home straight, the electoral finish-line is in sight. The mission seems to have plenty of wind left: it is nicely up to strength, and better resourced and led than ever before. However, it's too early for the celebratory party (or a definitive 'lessons learned from successful missions' seminar). Even the finest athletes have been known to pull a muscle or a hamstring on the final straight, or to simply give up the will to finish. For this reason, we should not relax, or look away, but rather intensify support for the mission as it enters a phase where the stakes are higher than ever before: they are the future of Sierra Leone and all its people.