Faced with weak and unco-ordinated opposition from the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF)8, the RUF, led by former army corporal Foday Sankoh, was able to overrun government forces, and began to seize diamond mining properties, the main source of hard currency for the government. By early 1995, RUF forces had effectively laid siege to the capital city of Freetown.

In the face of inaction by the UN Security Council, the Sierra Leone government had to rely on Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based private military company, to defend the capital. The company was originally contracted by the Sierra Leone government9 to deploy 160 of its personnel in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to March 1996.10 After training up company-sized contingents of the RSLMF and enlisting the support of the Kamajors, EO provided the leadership, helicopters and fire-support necessary prosecute a war against the RUF. By late 1995, the siege of Freetown had been lifted and the RUF headquarters at Makeni destroyed. The Koindu diamond area and the Sierra Rutile area had been liberated and were again open for operations.

Peace talks between the government and the RUF were initiated on 22 February 1996. Instead of the usual UN-prescribed pattern of ceasefire, peace agreement, disarmament, demobilisation, and then elections, the 'formal' peace process in Sierra Leone began with the staging of elections. The people of Sierra Leone went to the polls on 26 and 27 February 1996, long before there was any sign of a firm cease-fire or peace agreement. After two rounds of voting, and amidst gross intimidation of the electorate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) emerged as President in mid-March. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that this experiment with democracy ended on 25 May 1997, when Kabbah was violently overthrown by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in a typical palace coup d'etat.

The UN responded with immediate condemnation of the take-over, with the Secretary-General reiterating that the UN and the international community firmly uphold the principle that the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of governments and that democratically elected governments should not be overthrown by force.11

On 26 May 1997, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also condemned the coup, and called for an immediate restoration of the constitutional order, urging the leaders of ECOWAS to take immediate action against the coup makers.12 The operational mandate of ECOWAS' military arm, the West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was consequently extended from Liberia to Sierra Leone in order to prevent the total breakdown of law and order.

ECOWAS and Koroma's junta reached agreement, in Conakry, on a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone on 23 October 1997. This agreement provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for the supervision of the cease-fire by ECOMOG and UN military observers. The Conakry agreement also provided for the effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants as well as the restoration of the constitutional order and the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah as president and head of a more broadly based government on 28 May 1998.

However, the Conakry agreement was not respected by Koromah. In February 1998, in response to an attack by junta forces, ECOMOG launched an attack that finally led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. ECOMOG then expanded its force deployment in an attempt to secure the rest of the country. On 10 March 1998, President Kabbah was returned to office.

In June 1998, the UN Security Council decided to establish a small United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The mission was intended to promote national reconciliation and provide help with the demobilisation of former soldiers, in collaboration with ECOMOG.13 Little progress had been made towards the achievement of this mandate when, on 6 January 1999, rebel fighters belonging to the deposed Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defences and swept into Freetown, killing thousands of civilians and systematically dismembering and raping tens of thousands of others. The fighting resulted in the deaths of some 5,000 people; up to 150,000 people living in and around Freetown were displaced; and large numbers of public buildings and homes were put to the torch.14

The sacking of Freetown narrowly preceded the staging of the elections that were to free Nigeria from military rule. However, after a decade of providing the backbone of ECOMOG forces in Liberia and then Sierra Leone, Nigeria (represented by a new civilian government) could no longer sustain its ECOMOG commitments, and informed the world that it would be pulling its troops out of Sierra Leone. Although the RUF had been driven out of Freetown, they still controlled the countryside and the diamond-mining areas, and no peace deal was possible without their participation, and that of their leader Sankoh.15

The impending Nigerian withdrawal led to a frantic scramble among West African states, as well as Britain and the US, to broker a peace agreement. The UN Special Representative initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999. With coaxing from the UK and US, a controversial peace agreement was signed by President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999. The Lomé accord granted total amnesty to Foday Sankoh and members of the RUF, promised reintegration of the RUF into the Sierra Leonean army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, left the RUF in control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored elections.16

In exchange for senior government positions for its commanders and a blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the RUF pledged to disarm along with the pro-government CDF and other paramilitary units.

Despite the obvious flaws in the Lomé agreement, the UN was obliged to back it with a peacekeeping mission. The Lomé signatories specifically requested the UN Security Council to urgently: "...amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the tasks provided for it in the present Agreement; [and] to authorise the deployment of a peace-keeping force in Sierra Leone".17