The new UNAMSIL Force Commander (Lieutenant General Daniel Opande of Kenya) and Chief of Staff (Brigadier General Alistair Duncan of the UK) arrived in theatre in November 2000, while the new Deputy Force Commander (Major General Martin Agwai of Nigeria) arrived in December 2000. UNAMSIL had been without a Force Commander since Major General Jetley's departure in August. The new Force Commander and his Deputy immediately embarked on a programme of visits to the demoralised contingents.

Following the departure of the previous Force Commander, the military elements of UNAMSIL, both in the headquarters and in the field, had done little but administrative work. Headquarters had no up-to-date plans or planning procedures and was short of manpower, as key staff officers had left and not been replaced. In short, the headquarters was dysfunctional and ineffective. In addition, the two largest contingents, Jordan and India, were shortly to leave the mission. Understandably, morale at all levels of the UN Force was low, and, in the eyes of the world, UNAMSIL was a failed mission.

The situation clearly demanded a return to military basics, and the operational level planning process was immediately shifted into top gear. Strategic guidance was provided by UN Headquarters in New York, and this had to be translated into military objectives and tasks, accompanied by other lines of activity. The most important priority to New York was force generation, to get the mission up to its authorised strength. For UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the main effort was focused on restoring credibility, in order to pursue the mandate specified in several of UN Security Council resolutions. The detail of these resolutions was encapsulated in a more concise overall Mission Statement, formulated as follows32:

"The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections."

In pursuit of this mission, UNAMSIL had to build up its capabilities slowly but surely. Some 31 countries are now represented within the UNAMSIL Force.33 All but one Sector are multinational. In March 2001, agreement was finally granted to increase the force level from 13,000 to the 17,500 needed to get the job done. The UN started to deploy into RUF-held territory for the first time in nearly a year, in April just after the Easter weekend. The current authorised strength of 17,500 includes 260 Military Observers (MilObs) and 60 Civilian police (CivPol).

A significant proportion of the 260 Military Observers are engaged in a variety of staff functions at mission headquarters, and the remainder are deployed in 11 teams across the country. The latter are literally the 'eyes and ears' of the mission, observing and reporting on ceasefire and human rights violations, but also on a wide variety of non-military issues. For example, while their main focus is presently on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), they also contribute information to family tracing and reunification programmes, and cover aspects related to the paramount chiefs, non-government organisations (NGOs), IDPs and returnees, as well as relations with the various groupings of local civil society.34

UNAMSIL CivPol began with a modest deployment of three officers to the mission, and rose to six observers in February 2000. The CivPol component gradually built up to a strength of 30-35 officers. However, with a current authorised strength of 60 (there are still two unfilled vacancies), CivPol has a different mandate. It no longer focuses on monitoring, but is now required 'to advise and assist' the SLP. The idea behind authorising a strength of 60 officers was to expand activities well beyond Freetown, and to establish CivPol team sites at key locations in the hinterland in conjunction with the deployment of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) to new areas.35

Though UNAMSIL is touted as the largest current UN peace operation on the grounds of its authorised military and police strength, it is also a multifunctional, civilian-led mission in every sense of the word. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji (of Nigeria), heads the mission, and exercises control though his two deputies - DSRSG (Operations and Management, or O&M), Mr Behrooz Sadry (Iran), and DSRSG (Governance and Stabilisation) Mr Alan Doss (UK).

Mr Sadry was appointed by the Secretary-General to assist the SRSG in the overall political leadership, operations and management of UNAMSIL and to assume the responsibilities of Acting SRSG in the latter's absence from the mission area. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who is responsible for all administrative, financial and logistical functions of the Mission as well as the UNV Programme, reports directly to the latter. The administrative component of UNAMSIL comprises the following Sections: Civilian Personnel, Finance, Procurement, Security and Integrated Services, which is responsible for telecommunications, transport, engineering, supply services, air operations and movement control, among others.

The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Governance and Stabilisation) was appointed in March 2001 to coordinate UNAMSIL's civilian components focusing on governance, recovery and reintegration matters in support of a cohesive approach to peace building. This has contributed to promoting peace building as an essential complement to the mission's peacekeeping role. The DSRSG also serves concurrently as the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, as well as the Resident Representative of UNDP. This arrangement enables the various elements of the UN system to come together in support of common humanitarian and development goals while ensuring a more effective sharing of resources and information.

The Political Affairs Section monitors and reports on political developments in Sierra Leone and provides input to the daily and weekly situation reports which are compiled by the Policy and Planning Section. The Section prepares, as appropriate, updates used by DPKO to brief the Security Council and troop contributing countries on the DDR programme, political trends and humanitarian issues. Political Affairs Officers liaise and maintain regular contacts with ECOWAS, the GoSL, the RUF, civil society, political parties, parliament, the humanitarian community, the diplomatic corps and other key players in the political process.

The Political Affairs Section is the focal point for the Mission's contacts with NCDDR, NCRRR and UN agencies. In that capacity, it represents UNAMSIL on the Working Group of the UN system. The Section also co-ordinates UNAMSIL's participation in the weekly videoconference with UNHQ, which was instituted in May 2000 to facilitate lateral information sharing with the headquarters. Participants include officials from the Military, Administration, Policy Planning Section, Public Information Section, as well as the Humanitarian Co-ordinator. Additionally, the Political Affairs Section, which works directly under the office of the SRSG, prepares position papers, talking points and speeches for his meetings. In its work strategy, the Section adopts a proactive approach by anticipating issues, brainstorming on them and preparing analytical papers for consideration of the Working Group chaired by the Policy Planning Section.36

The mandate of the Civil Affairs section is to assist the GoSL with the restoration of state authority, in all its aspects, throughout the territory of Sierra Leone. This is an extremely challenging task because for many years, there has really been no effective government in most of the territory. Even in the western area, governance and administration have been totally neglected since 1962. In fact, about 70% of the country has not seen an administrative representative for some 20 years. People from all regions in the interior have had to travel all the way to Freetown for the most mundane state services, such as the issuance of a birth certificate. As far as schools, clinics, and so on are concerned, these have been sustained by the churches and NGOs, rather than by government.37

The Civil Affairs section has a strength of 28, 12 of whom are headquarter personnel, based at UNAMSIL in Freetown, while the rest are deployed at seven provincial offices, as follows:

Western Area I (Freetown Urban)


Western Area II (Freetown Rural)


Northern Province I (Port Loko/Kambia)


Northern Province II (Tonkolili/Koinadugu/Bombali)


Southern Province (Bo/Pujehun/Moyambe/Bonthe)


Eastern Province I (Kenema)


Eastern Province II (Kono/Kailahun)

The Civil Affairs section plays a key role in co-ordinating humanitarian and developmental assistance, and works closely with the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the other agencies. It is responsible for conducting needs assessment missions in each of the districts, for convening round-table meetings with potential donors to secure funding, and for overseeing the implementation of various reconstruction projects. Civil Affairs officers were deployed to Northern Province well before there was any government presence there, and their role in reconstruction remains essential to the peace process.38

One of the main priorities for the Civil Affairs section in the coming months will be to enhance the level of sensitisation to the Special Court (See chapter 11 'Peace with Justice', p 87) among the general population. The Human Rights Section has already done a great deal of this work, but mainly among members of the RUF.

The Policy Planning Section focuses on overarching issues of the Mission's activities. It is responsible for strategic planning. Through its input into the work of the Working Group on Policy and Planning, the Section provides the substantive sections of the civilian component, administration as well as the military component with research manuals highlighting the overall activities of the mission. The Section brings together other substantive sections to discuss and map out common strategy on policy regarding political, military, human rights and civil matters. Hence, the Section acts as a secretariat of the Working Group. To that end, the Section prepares draft position papers and annotated texts and agenda for consideration by the Working Group on Policy and Planning chaired by the Chief of the Section.

While the pertinent sections monitor areas of their immediate interest in the complicated and multifaceted developments in the region, the Policy Planning Section monitors multifaceted aspects of developments in Sierra Leone and the immediate vicinity and prepares early-warning documents, including recommendations on the strategy to be considered. Furthermore, it participates in and makes advance preparation for negotiations with the parties to the conflict on cross-cutting issues. The Section also monitors the overall activities of the mission, anticipates risks and challenges ahead and prepares position papers for the consideration of the SRSG. As a section working under the direct supervision of the SRSG, the Policy Planning Section serves as a focal point for all reports of a multi-disciplinary nature. In this regard, it is responsible for the compilation and synthesis of the mission's daily and weekly situation reports as well as other periodic reports on the work of the mission, including the Secretary-General's reports on UNAMSIL.39

The Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL has an authorized strength of 20 with five posts currently vacant. This is a small number compared to the size of human rights components in other UN Missions. Haiti, for example, had more than 200 human rights officers. Nevertheless UNAMSIL has managed to establish two regional human rights offices in Kenema and Makeni and is planning to open four additional offices in Bo, Koidu, Port Loko and Kailahun. The Human Rights Section has implemented a three-fold approach to improving respect for human rights. It monitors and reports on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, conducts training for elements of the Sierra Leonean Police, the Army and civil society organizations, as well as in-house training for peacekeepers and CIVPOL. The Section also provides technical assistance in building the capacity of national institutions that promote respect for the rule of law, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this regard, the Section continues to expand the scope of its activities both in terms of monitoring and carrying out sensitization work on issues related to truth, peace, justice, redress and reconciliation.40

The Human Rights Section has a Child Right's Officer who is active in child rights protection and promotion. Child Rights are at the center of many activities of the entire mission, including the civilian and military components.

The Public Information Section is responsible for UNAMSIL's press releases, as well as UN Radio. It also has a community outreach cell, which is responsible for arranging concerts and cultural events in support of reconciliation and the peace process - even in towns in the hinterland, such as Makeni.41

FM radio is the principal means of reaching the majority of the people. UN Radio (103 FM) broadcasts regular news summaries, covering international and local news. Both, but especially the latter covers the progress of the peace process, such as reconciliation workshops, and visits to the mission by ambassadors and military chiefs of staff from TCCs. The top management of UNAMSIL - the Special Representative of the Secretary General and his deputies, the Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander and so on regularly address the nation and mission personnel on topical issues and recent events and milestones. The station is very popular among UN staff, with most radios in UN vehicles permanently tuned to 103 FM.

There is excellent public participation in the phone-in programmes that discuss a wide range of issues pertinent to peace and reconciliation. For example, one show monitored by the authors was devoted to the restructuring of the SLP and the role of UN CivPol.

UNAMSIL has received a great deal of bad press coverage (and has also been very negatively analysed in a number of academic articles), especially in the wake of the unfortunate events of May 2000. The Mission Spokesperson and Public Information Section have had to work hard to counter the assumption of failure, but this is a task that is becoming much easier as the mission's success record begins to speak for itself.

Nevertheless, given the need for accurate and regular information on the peace process among all constituencies - the parties, the population, the TCCs, the donors, and the mission personnel themselves - it is obvious that the Public Information Section should have been one of the first elements of UNAMSIL to be established, and not added as an afterthought.42

While most of the mission elements outlined above have become generic to all contemporary multifunctional UN peace operations, the unique role and functions of the Child Protection Advisor (CPA) in UNAMSIL deserves special mention and elaboration. Indeed, the (July 2000) Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict states that:43

"Children have often been overlooked in peacemaking processes, and the price of this neglect is becoming painfully clear. Without specific references to children during peace negotiations, post-conflict programmes and resources will not be adequately allocated to meet children's needs."

Moreover,44

"To ensure the implementation of the child protection dimension of the mandates of peacekeeping operations and to advise the head of the peacekeeping mission in a given country, the Security Council has adopted the proposal that Senior Child Protection Advisors be deployed with peace keeping operations."

The Terms of Reference for CPA's include a series of measures designed to ensure that the interests of children are given priority in all aspects of the mission, including funding and resources and information sharing. The role and functions of the CPAs are therefore extremely broad, ranging from advocacy aimed at giving priority to child rights and child protection in all aspects of the peace process, to hands-on training and sensitisation among peacekeeping troops. The CPA terms of reference include the following duties:

To enable the SRSG to ensure that the protection, rights and welfare of all children are a priority throughout the peacekeeping process, the consolidation of peace and the re-building of war-affected areas;



To facilitate information sharing among all relevant agencies and actors;



To help ensure that all personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities have appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children; and



To assist the SRSG in addressing complaints about the behaviour of UN personnel related to the infringement of child rights.

The UNAMSIL Senior CPA, Ms Bituin Gonzales, is widely and personally known throughout the mission, within the child protection community, and by the RUF leadership, with whom UNAMSIL and the United National Children's Fund (UNICEF) have successfully negotiated the release of hundreds of child combatants.

Evidence of the centrality of children to the Sierra Leone peace process goes back to the Lomé peace agreement, which contains articles of specific importance to children, including those dealing with:

release of prisoners of war and abductees (article XXI);


child combatants (article XXX); and


education and health (article XXXI).

The Abuja II Agreement of May 2001 also contained a commitment by both the CDF and RUF to release child soldiers.

Negotiating the release of children from armed forces is a highly sensitive undertaking, which has traditionally been carried out by UNICEF. However the CPA, wielding significant political clout in this context, has also been involved in the negotiations. This is clearly an area where close co-ordination with UNICEF and the various child protection agencies working in the field is critical, as mis-identifying abducted children can result in unnecessary delays. The imperative to have children released, processed and reunited with their families must be matched with adequate preparation, and the provision of facilities (Interim Care Centres or ICCs) where children can be cared for until the process is complete.

Although there are few documented and prosecuted cases of the sexual abuse of children by UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, there is evidence of the emergence of a vigorous commercial sex trade, involving child prostitutes, that caters for UNAMSIL personnel.45 This phenomenon has had time and fertile ground in which to take root: poverty, rural-urban migration and the prolonged presence of 'occupying' forces in both Freetown and the countryside are all contributory factors. That UNAMSIL members should be involved in this aspect of child victimisation presents challenges to child protection. The major obstacles in prosecuting UNAMSIL violators seem to be collecting sufficient evidence, and mustering the political will to prosecute them after they have been repatriated.46

Child rights training is continuously delivered to military observers and contingents of the force, as there are always new arrivals and rotations at UNAMSIL. Follow-up visits are made to the military observer team sites, to ensure that there is ongoing discussion of issues that emerge in different areas of operation, such as returning refugees, release of child abductees and combatants, and sexual violence against children.

Another tangible indication of the profile of children in the Sierra Leone peace process is the way in which former child combatants are handled during the demobilisation process. In each of the demobilisation camps, a child focus officer is appointed to see to the special needs of child combatants. Procedures have also been developed and disseminated by the National Council on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

There is still a need for support in the development of training materials and the translation of these into the diverse languages of the various military contingents, where English language skills are sometimes very poor. A UNICEF child protection officer pointed out that the high turnover in personnel on the mission compounded the language problem in child protection training. She suggested that this could be alleviated by appointing interpreters who can receive more intensive training in children's rights issues, which could then be passed along to the military contingents in their own languages, in a type of child-rights training focus group.47 There is clearly a wealth of experience in training within UNAMSIL, UNICEF and the child protection community in Sierra Leone, which should be captured and consolidated into a collection of best practices that can be used to inform other UN missions, whether ongoing or yet to occur.