The most important command and staff function for the new military leadership of UNAMSIL was to conduct a thorough mission analysis and estimate process, and to produce a detailed plan of operation that would allow UNAMSIL to achieve its mission in realistic stages over the months ahead.

The mission statement underpinning the resulting military concept of operations (CONOPS) for 2001, may be summarised as follows:48

"UNAMSIL's Mission is to deploy progressively and robustly within a coherent operational structure, dominating strategic locations and lines of communication, whilst affording and facilitating a degree of protection, freedom of movement and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians, in order to assist the legitimate Government to restore law, order, peace and stability throughout Sierra Leone."

CONOPS 2001 was designed to be implemented in four sequential phases, as follows:

Phase 1 - Demonstrate UNAMSIL's credibility and test the RUF's commitment to the peace process.



Phase 2 - Prove UNAMSIL's capability and choke the RUF's east/west supply route.



Phase 3 - Deploy a strong manoeuvre force to secure the RUF's centre of gravity and seal the eastern border.



Phase 4 - Consolidate the achievements of phases 1, 2 and 3; expand UNAMSIL's influence and support elections.

The undeniable success that UNAMSIL has enjoyed in the implementation of phases one and two can be ascribed to the new mission leadership and increasing success with force generation. Also, UNAMSIL began talking directly to the GoSL, instead of engaging it via the media. Contact groups with the RUF were also established later, in support of a key aspect of the mandate - to extend government authority throughout Sierra Leone.49

However, the success of the UNAMSIL deployment may also be attributed to a number of factors 'exogenous' to the mission and CONOPS 2001. Prime amongst the former was the escalation of combat operations by the Guinea Armed Forces (GAF). Starting in September 2000, the GAF had made a number of reprisal attacks (or pre-emptive strikes) on towns in the Kambia, Bombali and Koinadugu districts, from which they suspected dissidents and the RUF were launching raids into southern Guinea. Throughout February and March 2001, using Mi-24 Hind and Hughes 500-D helicopter gunships flown by Ukranian and local pilots, the GAF made a series of punishing assaults on towns in Kambia district. Many civilian casualties were reported, and as many as 40,000 people were forced to flee their homes.50

Although these developments had devastating humanitarian consequences and exacerbated the threat of regional war, they enabled UNAMSIL to begin deployment into the RUF-held territory of Lunsar and to extend its area of control into Kambia District from 1 March onwards. A month later, UNAMSIL was in a position to begin deployment into the RUF strongholds of Makeni and Magburaka, and start the active patrolling of these districts.

However, new troubles emerged in early May 2001, with reports of increased fighting in Kono District, and particularly of attacks by the CDF (Kono-speaking Donsos rather than Mende-speaking Kamajors) on RUF positions. After thorough investigation, UNAMSIL declared that the attacks were in violation of the Abuja Cease-Fire Agreement of 10 November 2000, and a threat to the peace process. A series of meetings was held between the Deputy Force Commander (Major General Martin Agwai) and CDF and RUF commanders in the Kono District. To allay mutual suspicions, it was decided to deploy UNAMSIL forces to Kono and commence with the simultaneous disarmament of both parties, ahead of the schedule originally agreed to on 15 May. (The latter had envisaged a steady progress from west to east, beginning with Port Loko and Kambia on 18 May, advancing two districts at a time, and ending with Kono and Kailahun towards the end of the year.)

By the end of June 2001, UNAMSIL had managed to implement phase 2, with forward deployment of forces to many new positions. The execution of this CONOPS has relied heavily on a steady increase in military resources, hence the preoccupation of UN Headquarters in New York with the issue of force generation. UNAMSIL's freedom of movement has improved considerably with the dismantling of RUF/CDF/SLA checkpoints and the continuation of robust patrolling by UN troops.

On 14 September 2001, UNAMSIL troops from the Zambian Battalion deployed for the first time in the diamond-rich RUF-held town of Tongo, 27 kilometres away from Kenema in eastern Kenema District. This was a major breakthrough, building on UNAMSIL's previous success the occupation of Kono, the heart of the diamond zone.51

With the deployment of the Pakistani battalion to Kailahun over the period 28-31 October 2001, UNAMSIL had just about completed phase 3 of CONOPS 2001. It will now be able to focus on phase 4 tasks. The latter entails consolidation and expansion of the tasks assigned in phases 1, 2 and 3, as well as a heightened focus on the provision of security throughout Sierra Leone, whilst gearing the force to provide additional support in the upcoming elections. Emphasis will also be placed on supporting the GoSL in its efforts to assert its authority throughout the country, whilst the SLA provides for border defence and maintains national protection against external threat.

The UNAMSIL military component is now deployed in five sectors, four of them with a multinational brigade. Sector 5, the exception, consists of an 'integral' Pakistani brigade of more than 4,000 troops. In addition, there are approximately 100 staff officers at UNAMSIL headquarters, supported by civilian staff members. All air assets are controlled by civilians. Sector 1's headquarters is located at Port Loko; Sector 2's in Freetown; Sector 3's in Kenema; Sector 4's in Magburaka; and Sector 5's in Koidu.52

See Map 1: UNAMSIL deployment by sector

UNAMSIL will continue its progressive deployment throughout country, whilst firmly establishing sector 5 and conducting robust patrols in every area under its control. The force will also continue to provide maximum support to the DDR process, while keeping the main supply routes open and providing security to the various UN agencies.

While the main effort of current operations remains concentrated on the DDR process, planning for future operations is under way. In the short term, the main effort will involve an expansion of sector 5 and re-deployments in sector 3, including the arrival of the Nepal Battalion (NEPBATT).53 The military component also recognises the need to keep in step with other UN Agencies, as well as to support the extension of government authority and assist the progress of the National Electoral Commission (NEC).

The force has learned the importance of being able to seize and maintain the initiative (as in Kono), and of having a logistical system that is responsive rather than inflexible. Most TCCs have opted for the 'wet-lease' system, whereby contingents are responsible for bringing their own weapons, vehicles and equipment to the mission, and for their proper maintenance. In turn, the TCC is reimbursed by the UN according to a fixed scale based on the capital value, depreciation, and maintenance costs of each item of equipment. The system is obviously attractive to poorer nations, because it means a flow of hard currency into the state coffers, but it is not always to the benefit of the troops on the ground. Self-sustainment is often too difficult from their home bases in Africa and Asia. Therefore UNAMSIL feels that the 'dry-lease' system (with the UN providing and maintaining major equipment items), should be more widely considered for this and similar missions in Africa.

If wet-lease is considered, then TCCs should have to prove beyond doubt that they are capable of adequately supplying and sustaining their contingents in the field. UNAMSIL is developing own best practices within the mission, such as the Ukrainian APC/truck augmentation scheme, which has successfully alleviated what were serious force mobility problems. The Force Commander has remained concerned about the welfare of the entire force, and has been very forthright in setting minimum standards of accommodation and personal equipment to be met by the commanders of the various contingents.54