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Chapter 1
Operational Priorities for the Force During 200255
Published in Monograph No 68
Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight
UNAMSIL has been looking ahead to operational priorities for the coming year, and has already developed a draft concept of operations for 2002. CONOPS 2002 was developed upon the basis of the following assumptions:
- there will be no deliberate resumption of hostilities;
- disarmament will be completed in all districts by the end of 2001 or early 2002;
- SLP/GoSL authorities will continue to deploy throughout the country progressively during 2002;
- elections will be held in 2002; and
- the withdrawal of the UN Force will commence within a reasonable time frame after elections that are widely accepted as free and fair.
Operational priorities are aimed at supporting the scenario that emerges from these assumptions, and the Mission Statement underpinning CONOPS 2002 reads as follows:
"UNAMSIL is to maintain a coherent operational structure until full withdrawal, enabling complete freedom of movement, guarding against security threats, whilst affording a degree of protection to other agencies and civilians, lending selective assistance to other agencies, particularly during the elections, in order to assist the Government to restore and maintain law, order, peace and stability, throughout Sierra Leone."
This mission is to be achieved through a five-phased CONOPS that may be summarised as follows:
- Phase 1 - Balance UNAMSIL for the effective execution of expected tasks in support of the elections.
- Phase 2 - Give support to the electoral process.
- Phase 3 - Provide security after the elections.
- Phase 4 - Restructure the Force for withdrawal.
- Phase 5 - Withdraw.
Phase One (balancing the Force for elections) will entail a continuation and enhancement of UNAMSIL's country-wide deployment. Lines of communication will have to kept secure, and command nodes will be established parallel to the structures of the NEC and the UN and International Election Observers. The present sector boundaries will also have to be slightly re-aligned, so that they coincide with those of the districts. UNAMSIL will also be required to provide strong support to the SLP and other GoSL authorities during this very sensitive stage of the peace process. It will also have to place a stronger emphasis on disseminating public information aimed at sustaining popular participation in the democratic process.
Preparations for phase 2 will also have to be made during phase 1. These include enhanced information gathering and the creation of a Force reserve with reserves at each of the sectors that can react to any emergency. UNAMSIL will also lend support to the envisaged cordon and search operations aimed at removing as many illegal firearms as possible ahead of the elections, to reduce the possibility of violent intimidation. While the latter will be SLP-led, the Force will be required to provide security for the local police, as well as safe storage for collected weapons.
During phase 2 (the election period), the troops will be far more widely dispersed, in smaller sections than is presently envisaged for phases 3 and 4 of CONOPS 2001. The potential vulnerability of peacekeepers deployed in this mode will be countered through deployment of the Force reserve and/or the sector reserves where necessary. One of the primary tasks of the Force during this phase will be to assist the SLP and to provide wider security for voters and for all those involved in the management of elections. Obviously, the Force will also have to assist with the mobility and basic 'life support' of UN and International Observers. Throughout phase 2, close liaison with SLP and SLA will be essential, as will ongoing public information operations.
During phase 3 (the provision of post-election security), the focus will be on deterring any possible security threats. It will also involve the finalisation of planning for Force withdrawal, which must obviously be done in concert with the SLP and SLA, to eliminate the likelihood of any form of 'security vacuum'. No readjustment of the Force structure on the ground is envisaged during this phase.
Restructuring the Force for withdrawal will occur only once a transition to Phase 4 has been made. It will obviously be very important during this phase to continue to foster confidence and bolster the faith of the people in the achievements of the peace process - through the actions of the Force as well as dedicated information operations.
The actual withdrawal, during phase 5, will be progressive in nature, and will have to take into account planned troop rotation schedules for the various national contingents. Once again, there will have to be tight co-ordination with government institutions, and the Force must remain positive and responsive throughout this final phase.
In the short term, the way forward will involve the conducting of logistical checks of staff(military and civil), to measure the size and nature of the Force against the standards set in the recently released Election Assessment Mission Report. The latter should contain guidelines for the delineation of responsibilities directed to all the key facilitators of safety and security for the elections: SLP, UN CivPol, SLA, and the UNAMSIL Force. Logistical demands will have to be confirmed before the necessary generation of Force and civil assets to meet these needs is begun. A joint (military and civil) Elections Planning Cell is being established to co-ordinate the entire process.
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