The DDR programme in Sierra Leone was and is framed by the Lomé Agreement of July 1999, which was very accommodating of the RUF. Within all UN-assisted peace processes, DDR has been voluntary, and has depended for success on the unforced compliance of the parties to the conflict. Due to the stalemate on the ground at that time (mid-1999), the RUF simply had to be accommodated, despite the ensuing strident criticism that Lomé was far too lenient towards the RUF.

Overall responsibility for managing the DDR process in Sierra Leone rests with the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), which is chaired by President Kabbah himself. An Executive Secretariat, based in Freetown and headed by Dr Francis Kai-Kai, is responsible for the overall DDR programme design, and its implementation. The latter, of course, depends on close co-operation with key implementing partners, such as UNAMSIL (and initially also ECOMOG) and the donor community, who have been part of the NCDDR since it was established in 1999. Dr Kai-Kai has emphasised that the programme can only succeed in a peaceful environment that is conducive to a high level of compliance by the disarming parties.

The NCDDR Executive Secretariat has a highly computerised database, and maintains accurate statistics of those demobilised. It is also responsible for the production of identity cards, which become the demobilising individual's key to accessing the transportation benefit of approximately US$15, as well as the much larger reinsertion package, which is equivalent to approximately US$150.

The DDR process has gone through three phases, that can be categorised roughly as follows:

an initial phase lasting from 1998 up to the signing of the Lomé Agreement;


an interim phase spanning the period from July 1999 to May 2000; and


the third phase, which began on 18 May 2001, and has lasted to the present.

It is obvious that the events of May 2000 caused a serious and extremely regrettable one-year delay in DDR, which has had a knock-on effect on all the many layers of the peace process. Not least of these is the present hurried timetable for DDR to be completed in advance of the May 2002 elections.56

Following the Abuja II Accord (see Appendix B), DDR resumed in earnest on 18 May 2001.

The new round of DDR started in the Kambia and Port Loko districts, and has progressed throughout the country, according to a programme agreed and reviewed at regular Tripartite Meetings. These meetings (between the Sierra Leonean government, the RUF and UNAMSIL) were designed to take place monthly, in order to assess the level of disarmament and determine how to continue.

See Map 2: The districts of Sierra Leone

At the tripartite meeting held in Bo during July 2001, the parties agreed to finish DDR by the end of November 2001. The time frame agreed to allowed one month for each pair of districts to be disarmed in a consecutive fashion, after which disarmament would be 'officially' closed for the district concerned.

After Kambia district and the whole of Port Loko district had been disarmed, UNAMSIL moved on to the Kono and Bonthe districts, where the process was completed by early September 2001. By the third of that month, UNAMSIL had already supervised the 'disarmament' of 16,057 former combatants.57

At this stage, DDR in the Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts was proceeding, but was running behind schedule. The latter should have been addressed at the tripartite meeting of 6 September, but the RUF boycotted it as a strong signal of opposition to a government announcement that legislative and presidential elections would be scheduled for 14 May 2002. On 15 September, however, the RUF agreed to resume the meetings, and attended tripartite talks in Makeni on 19 September 2001 on the further implementation of the disarmament process.58

According to UNAMSIL, the Makeni meeting dealt with the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the question of a consultative conference on the political future, the extension of government authority, and freedom of movement for persons and goods throughout the country. The government informed the RUF that it had identified a building to serve as the RUF's political party headquarters in Freetown, thus removing a major obstacle to the RUF's registering as a party. The government delegation also said that the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace were holding consultations on organising a national dialogue on the way forward for the political process. After a discussion of the low turnout of combatants for disarmament in Koinadugu District, the parties agreed to extend the disarmament period in the district by two weeks. The meeting also endorsed the NCDDR's policy that no single or double-barrelled shotguns, or locally-made hunting rifles be accepted in the programme. The meeting agreed that a separate community effort would be instituted to collect such weapons.59

Although perceived as the key to the peace process, DDR remains a highly ambitious and vulnerable undertaking. One of the biggest problems is the inadequate facilities available for cantonment of the ex-combatants. Rudimentary but fairly adequate facilities have been available in the districts of Port Loko, Lunsar, Moyamba, Bo, Kenema, and Daru. However, the scarcity of suitable camps in the east and northeast has caused delays in the planned timelines.

The DDR effort has faced numerous setbacks, which have been resolved though patient and skilful intervention by UNAMSIL. For example, the disarmament in Moyamba District ran into difficulties a few days after it started on 15 Aug 2001. In Kovehun, the DDR camp was filled to capacity and the ex-combatants who had been demobilised were unwilling to leave the camp until they had received their benefits (ID Cards and travelling allowances). The DDR Programme could therefore not continue until the backlog had been cleared and vacancies became available for a new intake of ex-combatants in the camp. The programme resumed on 27 Aug 2001 when the camp had become decongested.

At Gandorhun, the reception centre had to be closed down temporarily on 29 August 2001, following disturbances caused by the CDF, whose leadership in Moyamba were reluctant to continue with disarmament under the new NCDDR guidelines. The dispute was about the surrendering of hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, and mines, which had been considered as ammunition and not weapons. UNAMSIL managed to resolve the issue, and the stalled DDR programme resumed on Monday 3 September 2001, ending on 22 October 2001, when a total of 2,490 ex-combatants had been disarmed (2,405 adults and 85 children).60

When the long-awaited disarmament process of the CDF in Bo District started on 24 September 2001, far fewer turned up than expected. The CDF cited concerns about armed RUF fighters in Tonkolili district to the north as the reason. Tonkolili shares a boundary with areas that were under CDF control, and the CDF fighters claimed that the RUF might start a war against them if they were the first to surrender their weapons. UNAMSIL promised to deploy in the no-man's land between the two districts, thus enabling the disarmament process to continue.

Disarmament in the northern district of Bombali got off to an even slower start, with only three rebels (RUF) handing over weapons on 24 September. The RUF had said they would prefer to use military barracks in the area to disarm rather than the school site (St. Francis Secondary School) chosen by the NCDDR, and this was given as the reason why so few fighters turned up. RUF also accused UNAMSIL of declaring some areas arms-free while armed CDF were still there in their hundreds. There was also concern expressed that the many CDF still in possession of shotguns would intimidate the opposition in the run-up to the elections.61

According to UNAMSIL, RUF protests about the DDR camps belie the consultative nature of the process they participated in, in identifying suitable encampment sites a process that involved the NCDDR, UNAMSIL, RUF and CDF. The final selection of sites was therefore based on a general agreement between all concerned parties. Moreover, where schools were used for cantonment, their facilities had been improved for the purpose, (to the ultimate benefit of scholars and teachers). Thus the RUF complaints about St. Francis School can be regarded as a pretext only. Nevertheless, UNAMSIL urged the NCDDR to reconsider, and a new location was agreed upon.62

The disarmament process appeared to be firmly on track when, at a tripartite meeting in Freetown on 11 October, the government and the RUF agreed to implement in good faith all the decisions agreed in prior meetings. At the end of the meeting, the government and RUF delegations also drew up a timetable for the completion of disarmament in the remaining districts of the country. They agreed to complete disarmament in the northern district of Koinadugu and the southern district of Moyamba by 22 October, and in the southern district of Bo and the northern district of Bombali by 31 October. They also adopted an accelerated schedule for the remainder of the DDR process, with disarmament of the western area from 1-9 November, the districts of Tonkolili in the central area and Pujehun in the south from 1-14 November, and the districts of Kenema and Kailahun in the east from 15-30 November. The participants confirmed that the CDF will disarm along with RUF combatants in their respective districts, and that the previously-established criteria for group disarmament would be applied uniformly. Leaders from both parties agreed to inform their combatants of the agreed criteria.63

See Map 3: Status of disarmament by district

Thus, of the 12 districts that make up Sierra Leone, ten had been through or were undergoing the disarmament process by early November 2001. An important feature was that the districts containing the greatest number of former combatants such as the Kono, Kambia and Port Loko districts were disarmed at the beginning of the process. Kailahun was the one remaining RUF stronghold still to be disarmed at the time of writing.

It is hoped that after the completion of the DDR programme in December 2001, the sectors will have been cleared of most weapons. However, to counter the threat of rearmament, UNAMSIL, in conjunction with the SLP, is preparing to conduct cordon and search operations, when credible information is available on the location of remaining weapons - especially shotguns and hunting rifles, since these weapons were not included in Phase III disarmament.64 After DDR, there will be a National Weapons Collection and Destruction Programme, aimed at retrieving weapons still in civilian hands (including shotguns), with which UNAMSIL will assist.

It is accepted that disarmament within the DDR process is far from perfect or complete. However, the destruction of surrendered weapons is an integral and non-negotiable part of the process. UNAMSIL engineers destroy these in situ, near the assembly points, and the finality of their destruction is intentional. To add to the symbolism, the German technical co-operation agency, GTZ, is sponsoring a programme that turns metal recycled from weapons into agricultural implements.

As far as the physical disarmament process is concerned, the 'front end' is handled by UNAMSIL MilObs (with security provided by force elements deployed in the relevant area). Once the MilObs have established the assembly points and completed initial registration of those demobilised, the NCDDR takes over responsibility for the remainder of the process. However, the sensitisation of commanders is done jointly by the Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR and UNAMSIL. At the demobilisation centres, some profiling of former combatants is done, and counselling services are made available by the NCDDR.

As far as numbers are concerned, the NCDDR estimates that some 28,000 former combatants will participate in DDR. In July 1999 (when the Lomé Peace Accord was signed), there were an estimated 45,000 combatants in Sierra Leone. Nineteen thousand and fifty-one were disarmed and demobilised prior to May 2000, when the peace process collapsed and resulted in a year-long delay in disarmament. On 15 May 2001, the combatant groups gave NCDDR and UNAMSIL the estimated total figure of 25,000 (that is, RUF 10,000 and CDF 15,000) to be disarmed. The NCDDR added another 3,000 for other groups, including the SLA, who were expected to be formally discharged. This brought the target for Phase III to 28,000 persons to be disarmed and demobilised. This estimate was based solely on information provided by the respective High Commands, and even at that time there were indications that this number would be exceeded.

While UNAMSIL figures are compiled at the reception centres when the combatants turn in their arms, the NCDDR records the numbers only when the documents are processed. Part of the processing includes documentation for identity cards. In other words, the figures that the Executive Secretariat has at any point depict those ex-combatants who have been documented once they have passed through the disarmament reception centres. The overall figures for Phase III (as of 20 October 2001) are presented below:65

Table 1: Phase III demobilisation statistics (20 October 2001)

Category demobilised	Adults	Children	Total*
RUF	5,847	1,491	7,338
CDF	12,318	1,360	13,678
Ex-SLA/Ex-AFRC	260	13	273
OTHERS (including paramilitary	145	30	175
TOTAL	18,570	2,894	21,464
*Those who have gone through the demobilisation process and have received transport assistance and/or a DDR Programme ID Card. Children do not receive transport assistance. Those going through Discharge are expected to register at NCDDR Reintegration Offices in Freetown, Port Loko, Lungi, Bo, Kenema, Koidu and Daru. A new Centre will soon be established in Mattru Jong. The figure is based on actual forms received from UNAMSIL and processed by the NCDDR Executive Secretariat.

NCDDR guidelines require at least two-thirds of any group of former combatants to present themselves with weapons in order to be eligible for DRR. This apparently lenient norm makes allowance for participation in the programme by categories of combatants who may have legitimately contributed to the war effort without bearing arms (such as intelligence operatives). The figures below indicate that this norm has been roughly maintained, if the figures above for children are left out of the equation:66

Table 2: Overall statistics for weapons and ammunition collected (up to 20 October 2001)

Weapons and Ammunitions collected*	Total
Hand Weapons	2,839
Assault Weapons	10,688
Group Weapons	666
Ammunition	436,619
*The figures are for all districts

Between the resumption of the disarmament process in mid-May and 30 October 2001, 24,079 ex-combatants had handed in their weapons nationwide. This number includes 8,518 RUF, 15,100 CDF and 461 others.67

In contrast, the official NCDDR statistics (which record a combined total at 15 October 2001 of 5,365 discharged child combatants for phases I, II, and III of DDR), the number of child soldiers over the ten-year conflict period is estimated by the UN to be up to 27,000.68 It is unclear whether this figure includes those who were recruited as children and are currently being demobilised as adults.69 Only careful data capture at the demobilisation centres, including information on length of service and age of recruitment, will reveal the true extent of the child soldier problem. It is important that the longitudinal aspects are not obscured through a failure to capture sufficient data at the time of entry into the demobilisation process, as any meaningful efforts to support reintegration through training must be informed by a comprehensive profile of the persons being demobilised. Failing this, profiling the demobilised population can be only partially achieved through costly research exercises after the fact.

Another area of concern is the possibility of 'voluntary' and unco-ordinated releases of child combatants by armed group in a bid to avoid the bad publicity associated with using children as soldiers. This leaves children without proper medical attention, psycho-social care or assistance in tracing family members. A case study prepared by UNICEF in 2000 cites the NCDDR's working figure of 5,400 children 'associated with the RUF' under the current DDR programme,70 while the total estimated number of child soldiers in the period of January 2000 to May 2000, of which only a quarter had been demobilised, is also reported as 5,400.71

The assumption that all child combatants were associated with the RUF is questionable, particularly in light of a figure reporting that 1,232 children were demobilised from the CDF camps in Moyamba and Bo, also between January-May of 2000.72 Inconsistencies and numbers that don't quite add up raise questions as to the accountability of government and CDF forces to the DDR process. Although it would seem logical that the NCDDR should have more accurate statistics on the composition and demobilisation of the SLA and CDF than on the RUF, where children are concerned, the numbers of those deployed at any given time still seem subject to speculation.73

In other UN missions in which DDR has been a central part, DDR has been conducted on a country-wide basis according to a number of sequent phases, each following upon the completion of the previous phase. Due to the district-based concept of disarmament for Sierra Leone in 2001, all the phases of DDR are being attempted concurrently, according to progress made in each district.

Once in possession of an ID card, demobilised ex-combatants are expected to register at a reintegration office in their home region, where they will be paid the reinsertion package. Before May 2000, the NCDDR was paying ex-combatants a Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA), which amounted to $300 per ex-combatant and was paid in two instalments of $150 worth of leones (at an exchange rate determined by the bank), the second after three months. Payment was suspended when the peace process broke down and donors were no longer willing to support the programme, since those who had gone through the DDR exercise had taken up arms again. The programme remained suspended until September 2001.74

The GoSL has given Le3.5 billion to the NCDDR as part of the Reinsertion Package that will be given to ex-combatants during phase III of DDR. According to the NCDDR Executive Secretary, Dr Francis Kai-Kai, modalities have been arranged for payments, and UNAMSIL has been requested to provide security for the NCDDR staff who will disburse them. Payment started in the Kambia, Port Loko, Kono and Western areas in September, before commencing in the Moyamba and Bonthe districts.

In June 2001, the NCDDR attended the Paris Conference, where a strong case was made for the necessity of providing an adequate Reinsertion Package. There were no immediate pledges made by the donors, but these were secured, after some further persuasion. Germany pledged DM10M (which is equivalent to $4.4M) and the European Union (EU) pledged 10m Euros ($8.6M). The Swiss Government had also committed itself to $385,000, while the Canadians have pledged 500,000 Canadian Dollars. This represents the total amount received by the NCDDR to date. These funds will be held by the World Bank.

However, the pledges made by donors are insufficient, as outlined in the UNSG's latest report on UNAMSIL:75

"...the provision of the reinsertion package that was accepted by donors at the Paris conference held in June 2001 has been delayed because of insufficient funding. While the newly pledged resources to the Multi-donor Trust Fund of approximately US $13.9 million are welcome, this amount falls short of the estimated overall programme funding gap of $32.7 million."

In addition to the approximately 24,000 combatants that have disarmed since May 2001, some of those who underwent the process before the May 8th crisis have not received their TSAs.

The new reinsertion package for each ex-combatant is a single payment of Le300,000. To be eligible for the benefit, the combatant must have been disarmed, demobilised and discharged in the programme's current phase III after 18 May 2001, or have completed the programme before that time but received no, or only partial, payment. Others who received full payment during phases I and II, along with ex-combatants who have joined the military or security forces, are deemed ineligible for these benefits.76

According to Dr Kai-Kai, sufficient money to cover the costs of the basic reintegration scheme have been pledged to the Trust Fund. However, the actual disbursement of this money to the NCDDR is urgently needed, if further potentially disruptive delays in the payment of reinsertion packages are to be avoided.77

Resettlement has also been problematic. Some disarmed ex-combatants from the south and east of the country were going to places like Koinadugu and Bombali districts, since they were afraid to return to the towns and villages they came from.

Although the idea is to move as rapidly as possible from demobilisation to resettlement, the period spent in the various demobilisation centres varies from area to area, depending on the level and nature of the safety and security concerns of the RUF ex-combatants. Many of these have not gone home, but have remained in the area where they were demobilised, staying with their former comrades and their commanders. The NCDDR is aware that the situation poses a significant security challenge, and that it is also likely to hinder electoral participation. The NCDDR is therefore busy developing strategies to address the resettlement problem.78 The demobilised CDF ex-combatants are already living in their communities, so for them the process basically involves disarmament and registration only, without the need for encampment and the resettlement dilemmas faced by the RUF.

However, the challenges to successful resettlement are also of an economic nature. For example, observers in Kono district estimate that the number of men mining for diamonds has increased some threefold since demobilisation began in this area. The transportation allowance of many of those demobilised is reportedly used to buy basic alluvial diamond mining equipment - a pick, shovel, and pan.79 Some suspect that the money generated from increased mining activity may be destined for RUF coffers, and used to re-arm the movement. However, it is equally conceivable that ex-combatants are reluctant to return home virtually empty-handed, and are attempting to amass something more substantial than the reinsertion package in order to gain acceptance when they return to their communities. (See chapter 10 'Peace with Diamonds?').

The challenges of reintegration into civilian life within a moribund economy are also daunting. To facilitate further service provision through the NCDDR, those undergoing the demobilisation process are asked to specify what they would really like to do in civilian life. Most requests have been for some form of vocational training, while many of the younger ex-combatants have requested assistance with schooling or with entering apprenticeship schemes. Others express a preference for making a living in agriculture. Some limited public works projects are in preparation for those who simply want any form of paying job.

Without going into detail on the viability of the various reintegration schemes, we provide an outline of the status of NCDDR-supported reintegration activities for discharged ex-combatants (as of 15 October 2001) in the tables below:80

Table 3: Ex-combatants Eligible for Short-Term Reintegration

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Total
Children	189	2,355	2,821	5,365
Adults	1,414	16,696	17,284	35,394
Total	1,603	19,051	20,105	40,759
* An estimated 3,000 SLA,CDF and RUF of this group are assumed to have been reinstated, due to security setbacks in May 2000, and hence are no longer eligible for assistance

Table 4: Number of ex-combatants registered at NCDDR RROs* and in Programmes

	Registered**	In Programmes
Vocational Training	10,785	5,310
Formal Education	4,817	3,019
Apprenticeships	2,4709	1,819
Public Works	167	152
Agriculture	4,001	2,342
Awaiting Trade Test	68	-
Total	22,308	12,642
* Regional Reintegratio Offices (Home Regions) ** Those eligible for assistance who have not registered fall into three main categories: Those who may have self-reintegrated and may never register, those who have rejoined the fighting forces and may form part of the caseload that will register at the RROs in the coming weeks, and those especially in the southeast who may have gone mining and will come to register during the rainy season.

Table 5: Additional opportunities already created

Vocational Education/SED	1,785
Agriculture	900
Apprenticeship	1,722
Public Works	1,430
Child Reintegration	-
Total	5,837

Table 6: Child ex-combatants presently in reintegratio programmes

Skills Training	255
Formal Education (CEIFP)	376
Total	631

The security situation continues to affect support of the various reintegration projects. Partners of NCDDR, who are brought together in a Technical Co-ordination Committee81 for reintegration assistance, are not at present able or willing to provide alternative reintegration support in Kono - nor indeed in many of the northern and eastern parts of the country - due to what is perceived as a volatile security situation. This will probably change as UNAMSIL entrenches its authority in these areas, and as more and more SLP deploy across the country.82

See Map 4: The changing landscape of disarmament and demobilasation

According to the Child Protection Advisor, there is still a great need for further policy development for girls. A number of small re-integration initiatives are under way for girl ex-combatants, but they are far outweighed by the interests and activities planned for boys, which include reintegration into schools, apprenticeships and vocational training.

Women and girls may require a greater degree of psychosocial support given the stigma of having been fighters. According to the UNAMSIL Child Protection Advisor, many women and girls have developed varying degrees of attachment to their commanders. Some of these relationships resemble those of true families in the traditional sense, while others are based on a strong loyalty built in combat. Other female ex-combatants have simply been abducted, then abandoned. These seem to be the ones who have suffered the most abuse, are in poor health and foresee few options for their futures.

However, 'officially' disarmed children constitute the section of the demobilised population that is most fully documented due to special procedures designed to process, reintegrate and reunify unaccompanied children with their families.

The danger in social reintegration comes not so much from demobilised soldiers' supposed reliance on violence as a means for survival, but rather from the persistence of social identities rooted in peer-groups of combatants and the difficulties experienced by ex-combatants in reinserting themselves into the social networks of a peaceful society. Studies on reintegration in other African contexts show a broad range of coping strategies, which are by no means restricted to the use of violence in pursuit of short-term gain. For example, social reintegration was a key factor for both government and opposition soldiers in Mozambique, a large proportion of whom sought to re-assert their identities within their families and communities, whether they lived with them or sought income opportunities in urban centres away from home. In the case of the Sierra Leone opposition forces, it is crucial that political and economic alienation is not exacerbated by the outright exclusion of the RUF from political processes. (See Chapter 9 'Electoral Issues')