A key prerequisite for the success of the peace process, and the characteristic staging of more or less free and fair elections in Sierra Leone, is the re-establishment of government authority and administration throughout the country. This was not writ large in the Lomé Agreement, which envisaged an interim government that would include the RUF. However, some attention was paid to the need for service delivery by any kind of government. For example, on the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, article VII states that "...the parties agree that the Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone".

However, the issue was included, in the context of the current peace process, in the Abuja Cease-fire Agreement of 10 November 2000, article 5 of which states that:

"The parties undertake, with a view to restoring the authority of the Government throughout the entire territory of Sierra Leone, to ensure free movement of persons and goods, unimpeded movement of humanitarian agencies, and of refugees and displaced persons."

The same point was strongly reiterated during the Abuja II meeting in May 2001, where:

"The meeting took note of UNAMSIL's recent deployments to Makeni, Magburaka, Lunsar and Mano Junction, as well as obstacles to a more extensive deployment, reiterated the need to have the extension of GoSL authority throughout Sierra Leone as a corollary to such deployment and appealed to the RUF to commit itself to the permanent presence of government structures throughout the country, as well as unfettered access by the civilian population to all facilities provided by Government."

Moreover, the extension of GoSL authority has become a core element in recent reports of the UN Secretary-General, Security Council resolutions, and indeed, the mandate and mission statement of UNAMSIL. However, international assistance with this work has focused on the military and the police, with little attention devoted to the broader aspects of civil administration. An immediate concern is that a vacuum in service delivery could arise as the DDR process forges ahead.

The recent progress achieved in newly accessible districts through the National Recovery Programme is nevertheless noteworthy. In Kambia, Kono, Port Loko, and Koinadugu districts, restoration of state authority, recovery initiatives, rehabilitation of infrastructures and resettlement of displaced persons are underway. The National Recovery Committee that brings together all major partners in the recovery of the country under the auspices of the Vice President was established in June 2001. It organises needs assessment missions and partners' roundtables where the assessments are reviewed and assistance is prioritised and coordinated. Significant advances have already been made on the ground in Kambia district, and the process has gained momentum, closely following disarmament. It is now planned that core administrative services should be functioning three months after disarmament is completed.

Longer-term concerns centre around the possibility of another coup, if the reformed military and police forces are widely perceived as more proficient administrators than are the other arms of government. (This is not to deny that improving the military and police is a very urgent and appropriate concern, in a volatile security and crime environment).

By 1998, when most of the SLA had become little more than an armed mob, with a reputation for corruption, creating mayhem and overthrowing governments, the GoSL decided to demobilise the majority of the army and start constructing a new military force, with international assistance. Like the army, the SLP has been seriously compromised over the years by corruption and mismanagement. More recently, its ranks were depleted by murderous RUF/AFRC attacks on police posts throughout the country, which systematically destroyed police infrastructure, records and communications. It is the SLP that will have to deal with the growing crime wave, that is likely to gather strength as the number of demobilised combatants increases.83

In most other UN-led peace processes, military reform or transformation (or the creation of a new national defence force) has occurred after complete demobilisation of the belligerent forces, as a post-conflict peace-building step. In Sierra Leone, military and police restructuring has occurred simultaneously with the demobilisation process, and before the staging of elections. Moreover, the UK has assumed total responsibility for military reform (latterly with some support from International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) partners, as discussed below), and is also providing the bulk of assistance to the Sierra Leone police. Both aspects of British involvement have been an essential adjunct to UNAMSIL, but are also a source of potential conflict.

The Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

British military support for the enhancement of short and longer-term security in Sierra Leone involves ongoing support to UNAMSIL (Operation Turner)84 and a programme (Operation Basilica), whose declared objective (in the short to medium term) is "To train selected personnel and provide strategic and operational advice and support to the GoSL in order to enhance GoSL Forces capability".85

The overall concept of operations in support of this mission involves the integration of UK military advisors into GoSL forces; close co-ordination with UNAMSIL and the SLP; and the enhancement of the combat effectiveness of GoSL forces through ongoing advice and training. The short-term training teams present a 12-week training package for each intake, and have handled nine SLA intakes since the middle of 2000.86 This training was admittedly not an instant formula for creating a professional and effective military - it was designed, instead, as a 'first aid' package to address a very specific and immediate short-term security vacuum. The concept included a 'train the trainers' approach, for the purpose of helping SLA leaders to meet continuation training needs. It was acknowledged that the SLA could only be 'reborn' through structural development and continued training at all levels, over a lengthy period.

Since 1999, the UK has undertaken a series of induction and training programmes under what is now called the IMATT. It is expected that basic training will be provided to about 12,500 soldiers (including the air and maritime wings), with more specialised training in logistics, communications, command and control and other techniques offered to a smaller number. Some officer training is being provided in Ghana and the UK.87

A total of 320 officers and 9,800 troops had undergone the training programme at the time of writing. These soldiers have joined the units and formations currently deployed in the field. The Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) has been busy with a course for some 50 new instructors for the past five months, and also offers training on the use of battalion support weapons, such as mortars and medium machine guns.

The BMATT engagement, which began in 1999, was conceived in peace, but was overtaken by a wartime situation. This development necessitated the attachment of brigade and battalion level advisors to SLA units and formations deployed in the field.

As to the oft-posed question of whether BRITFOR may be presiding over the next coup, the frank answer of the British is that this is always a risk. However, IMATT is working to disconnect any strong political links within the military, especially among the middle-ranking officers. Creating a professional military culture that will continue after the of UK forces have withdrawn is also a significant challenge. Many aspects of local culture are odds with British military culture and tradition: For example, the British custom that commanders eat only after their subordinates have been fed does not gel very well with the Sierra Leonean culture of ascriptive privilege under the chieftainship system.88

The IMATT provides more than military training, however. It deals directly with virtually every aspect of security sector reform, an issue that has emerged as high priority in many states in Africa. Among other aspects, it involves a complete reconstruction of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the military apparatus. This means building a culture of loyalty, service and respect for human rights within the armed forces. It also means a complete departmental overhaul to ensure appropriate civilian oversight and probity: this is necessary because senior Sierra Leone MOD officials and officers have been removed on grounds of corruption. Also policies have had to be introduced to cover the performance of such essential functions as, procurement, the payment of salaries and benefits and the removal of 'ghost soldiers' from the payroll. It is generally agreed that this process of restructuring and reform will be a three- to five-year undertaking.89

The IMATT operates according to the objectives of UK foreign policy, and any nation that shares these aims is welcome to contribute to the training team. Its strength is approximately 150 personnel, including 11 Canadians, 4 Australians, and 3 Americans. A number of other countries (such as Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal and France) have been considering contributions. IMATT is designed to stay in Sierra Leone for as long as the GoSL requires its assistance.

At the time of writing, IMATT was assisting SLA instructors at the AFTC, Benguema, with the training of a new intake under the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP). This programme is designed to integrate into the new SLA former RUF and CDF combatants who have been through the disarmament and demobilsation process. There is mix of IMATT and SLA instructors, with the latter very enthusiastically presenting drill, musketry and first aid training. The numbers are fairly modest (about 1,200 have been trained or are undergoing training - some 70% ex-RUF and 30% ex-CDF). The MRP is, however, significant in two respects. Firstly, it lends credence to the notion of the SLA as an army of reconciliation. Secondly, it provides a meaningful form of vocational training for those ex-combatants who genuinely wish to pursue military careers.90

A maximum of 3,000 ex-combatants will be considered for the MRP. If this target is indeed reached, it will bring the total strength of the SLA up to some 15,500, meaning that ex-RUF and ex-CDF will constitute about 15% of the force.

The British training team peaked at a strength of about 600 in September 2001, these numbers including the short-term training team members. However, with the end of the short-term training scheme and the expansion of the proportion of the country under the control of the GoSL, the numbers will drop to an interim level of 300 to 400. After the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2002, it is envisaged that a core of 100-150 trainers will remain indefinitely.91

While there is much appreciation for the British training assistance to GoSL forces within UNAMSIL, it is no secret that the GoSL/BRITFOR agenda and strategy for 'dealing with' the RUF has diverged from that of UNAMSIL, and, by implication, from that of the amorphous 'international community'. There are also some strong suspicions that the BRITFOR has colluded with GoSL and others in attempts to subvert the goals of the UN mission. For example, some feel that the circumstances surrounding the GAF bombardment of Rokupr on 28 May (the day phase III of disarmament commenced in Kambia District) merit further investigation. With artillery rounds landing within some 400 metres of the 110 MilOb's and peacekeepers and the scores of RUF and CDF fighters that had reported for disarmament, the attack clearly placed the entire DDR programme at great risk. It has been suggested that because the UK had no faith in the DDR process at this stage, and that the SLA had a liaison officer in Conakry, the place and timing of this attack were not coincidental.92 Similarly, it is suspected by some that the skirmishes initiated by the CDF against RUF rebels in Kono were orchestrated by the GoSL.

According to Brigadier Nick Parker, the current Military Advisor/Commander BRITFOR, it would be fair to say that there was a certain amount of tension between UNAMSIL objectives and those of BRITFOR in the period between November 2000-March 2001. However, while the UK policy objective is still to press ahead with elections as soon as possible, UNAMSIL and BRITFOR are no longer perceived as having differing agendas. The remaining area of concern, (rather than tension), is that BRITFOR feels that the SLA is at the point where it needs to be trusted and used as an integral part of the security effort, while UNAMSIL remains mistrustful, fearing the GoSL may 'unleash' the SLA and cause a reversal in the current peace process.93

On the other hand, it should be realised that UNAMSIL is likely to begin its withdrawal soon after the elections (as outlined in CONOPS 2002), and that only the SLA will be left to fill the inevitable security gap. It may, therefore, make sense to begin with a gradual or graduated sharing and transfer of responsibility.

The RUF is obviously far more critical of the British presence than UNAMSIL. According to the RUF leadership, the UK is essentially running Sierra Leone, with the exception of the large proportion of the country that has been under RUF control for the past ten years. Obviously, the RUF questions the appropriateness for the people of such blatant UK dominance of the country. Unbundling 'Sierra Leone Inc.' would certainly be on the agenda should the RUF win the elections.94

The Sierra Leone Police (SLP)

It has become common wisdom to shift attention to police reform and issues of criminal justice once the military threat recedes. Post-war societies tend to become plagued with high levels of criminality in the aftermath of armed conflict. Moreover, in many war-torn African countries, and Sierra Leone is no exception, the boundaries between crime, corruption and conflict have become blurred during the course of the civil war. Without the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law, all the other investments in the fragile state, and the peace process that is to culminate in democratic elections, will come to nothing.

Much has been written about the need to bolster the criminal justice system - the police, the judiciary, and the penal institutions - during war-to-peace transitions. However, the latter two elements of the criminal justice triad have been sadly neglected in far better-resourced peace missions than UNAMSIL. So it is not surprising that for the time being, and in the context of Sierra Leone's most urgent needs, maximum effort is being put into supporting the 'sharp end' of criminal justice. This is something which should be loudly applauded, for it is sorely needed at this critical juncture in the country's history. Britain supported the SLP transformation long before the establishment of UNAMSIL, by deploying an experienced, talented, and tenacious 'top cop' to assist the GoSL. The present Inspector-General of Police, Mr Keith Biddle, was first sent to Sierra Leone from the UK in 1998, to provide emergency support to the ailing SLP. Such support was overdue for a police department that had been run down by years of war, and undermined by a culture of corruption, exacerbated by the neglect of successive governments who had systematically starved the police of the most basic resources. After a stint as Commissioner of Police, Mr Biddle took over as Inspector-General (I-G) of Sierra Leone's police force in July 1999.

One of the I-G's first tasks has been to root out corruption. A number of senior officers have been removed or retired, and a major effort has gone both into training and a complete revision of rules, regulations and procedures. National standards and guidelines on discipline, rank and structure, and a programme to raise police awareness in areas such as spousal and child abuse, are being instituted. Equipment, including radios, motorcycles, Land Rovers, trucks, weapons and uniforms, has been provided by the UK. However, the task that lies ahead remains enormous.

The pre-war strength of the SLP was 9,317, comprising a majority of unarmed general duties officers and a paramilitary Special Service Division (SSD). Approximately 900 members of the SLP were killed in the ensuing ten years of war, and a considerable number suffered the amputation of limbs by the rebels. The SLP's strength was reduced to a low of 6,600, after which it has seen a slow build-up to the present strength of some 6,900. It is envisaged that a further three to five years are needed to build the SLP up to at least its pre-war strength. The exact desired and affordable level will be determined by a thorough review of the policing requirements for Sierra Leone. (Sierra Leone's population is some 5.3 million people with about 1.2 million living in the capital, Freetown. At present it has a ratio of 130 police per 100,000 citizens.)95 The requirement will probably be assessed at more than 9,300 police.

Beyond the numbers issue, there is also a need for the psychological rebuilding of a police agency that has been deserted in the face of danger by the SLA and later ECOMOG. More recently, during the May 2000 crisis, there were instances where UNAMSIL forces beat a hasty retreat ahead of what they perceived as rebel advances, abandoning unarmed SLP members who were manning stations in their area of deployment.96

The force structure presently provides for four provincial commands, coinciding with the administrative provinces of Western Area, Northern Province, Southern Province, and Eastern Province, each under the command of an Assistant Commissioner (equivalent to the rank of colonel). At the next level of organisation are the police divisions at the district level (five of which have been established in the wake of successful disarmament). The idea is to expand the police divisions to all 12 districts as the peace process progresses. The SLP is also considering establishing approximately 30 community-level policing units.97

The SLP has deployed in Kambia district without any problems, and has also experienced few problems with its deployment to Lunsar - except for strident objections by RUF Spokesman Mr Gibril Massaquoi after he had visited the district and found that SSD elements had been stationed there. The SLP is also deploying in Koidu as UNAMSIL establishes its presence in that district, and 82 members had arrived in to Kono by 26 October 2001. The idea was to reinforce this element with the further addition of 6-8 members per day (as passenger space on UNAMSIL flights allowed), until the planned strength of 160-180 SLP members in Kono is reached. About 30 of these police officers will be SSD members. Deployment to Makeni was conducted on 15 November, without incident.

The SLP is planning to send police officers to the remaining districts as soon as disarmament has been completed. The next priorities will be Tonkolili, Magburaka, and Kailahun. Deployment to Kenema, especially at Tongo fields, is expected to be difficult.

The SLP does not have the capacity to assume responsibility for border policing. Consequently, there is no option but for the SLA to provide for border security, even if this is theoretically not an appropriate role for the military.

Like any police agency, the SLP also has specialist branches, such as a criminal investigation department (CID) and traffic police. The SSD will not be disbanded, but is going to be 'repositioned' to act in support of community policing, rather than being used, as it was in the past, as the armed wing of the ruling party. Disbanding the SSD is not an option, because the unarmed police of SLP need a professional, armed support group for rapid reaction, VIP protection, escort duties, and so on. Arming the rest of the force would be too expensive, in terms of the purchase price of appropriate side arms and the cost of thorough firearms training. Moreover, given the high proportion of SLP members who are illiterate, there are obviously other, more urgent training priorities.98

In 2000, the UK emergency support project was converted to the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which is providing longer-term training, support and advice to SLP. The CCSSP, with substantial funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), has been able to capture a lot of the media limelight.

It has a budget of some US$ 22 million, and its work is carried out by three permanent team members, augmented by eight regular consultants and a number of ad hoc consultants contracted to address specific needs. An example of the latter is a recent contract to provide training to deal with sexual offences, which was undertaken by a clinical psychologist from the UK. However, the CCSSP budget does not cover the maintenance or construction of buildings, police stations, holding cells or processing centres, all of which are either in bad condition or nonexistent,99 and its assistance has been largely limited to the Freetown area.

The relationship between the CCSSP and the Civilian Police (CivPol) component of UNAMSIL has been somewhat confused to date. Whereas the UK has been intimately involved in local policing issues for nearly three and a half years, the extremely multi-national UN CivPol is only just beginning to grasp policing priorities in Sierra Leone.100 The CivPol 'advise and assist' mandate was vague from the start, and was obviously inspired by the UN CivPol experience in the Balkans, where the local police had been party to the conflict, were ethnically imbalanced, and were suspected of having committed serious human rights violations. In contrast, the SLP has not been involved in any coup plots, and has not committed atrocities as an institution. Moreover, the SLP has always tried to uphold the constitutional order - sometimes in a very brave manner. For example, the SSD saved the life of President Kabbah in May 1997, by holding off attacking army elements until they ran out of ammunition. The Balkan model of close monitoring and reconstruction of the police force is thus inappropriate as a guide to the work of UNAMSIL CivPol in Sierra Leone.

As a result the UN CivPol have never really got to grips with the dynamics of policing in Sierra Leone, and have constantly written to New York with new proposals on how best to contribute to advising and assisting the SLP. One such report recommended the introduction of the community policing concept in the SLP, oblivious of the fact that the SLP is already some distance down this road, and has already appointed a head of community policing. It is futile to waste time and energy on conducting assessments that have already been made, and on recommending what is already being implemented. Another probable disadvantage of this lack of information on UN CivPol's part is that New York may be getting a very skewed perception of the SLP, one which negates both the progress already made and the role played by the CCSSP.

Equally frustrating for the I-G are UN CivPol complaints about lack of co-operation from the SLP in areas where the latter simply do not have the capacity or resources to provide assistance. For example, CivPol complained that the SLP were not supplying them with accommodation in Kabala, but the simple fact is that the SLP budget does not stretch to meeting these needs.

The UNAMSIL CivPol Commissioner has also been hindered in executing his mandate by the force generation process directed from New York. CivPol recruitment does not match the functional needs on the ground, and the associated skills and experience profile. A number of totally inappropriate officers have been sent to join the mission. For example, one officer was mustered into UNAMSIL with only 18 months' experience in his national police force, whereas the SLP has a number of very experienced officers within its ranks. Also, a number of officers who cannot communicate in English have arrived from non-English-speaking countries. Such officers are obviously unable to play any kind of advisory role in the English-speaking SLP.

On the positive side, the I-G had much praise to bestow on some of the CivPol initiatives, such as assistance to the CID and select training programmes, that have been very professionally presented, for example in Kenema. He also has a high regard for the Commissioner of CivPol and a number of his officers who have displayed a high level of professional competence. One such officer101 has submitted for comment by the I-G a detailed SLP needs assessment. The relationship between the SLP, the CCSSP and CivPol seems to be entering a far more productive and symbiotic phase. The CCSP is well funded, and CivPol can provide high quality human resources: these could be merged to form a 'smart' partnership.

Given the strong presence and engagement of the CCSSP in Freetown, CivPol is concentrating its efforts on providing advice and assistance in the more remote areas of the country. For example, since early August 2001, CivPol officers have been deployed in Koidu, where they have had to deal with local resistance to the return of the SLP to the area. Similar though more daunting challenges are expected when CivPol deploys to areas such as Kailahun, from which the SLP has been totally absent since 1991. In addition to being forced to submit to rebel 'law', the inhabitants of such areas have had to rely on those chieftains and tribal authorities that managed to maintain some form of law enforcement throughout the war. Re-establishing respect for the authority of the SLP is therefore not expected to be an easy task.102

As far as training assistance to the SLP is concerned, CivPol has been instrumental in organising a number of specialised training workshops. In addition, it has a team attached to the Police Training School, which assists in teaching a variety of subjects and in the marking of exams. CivPol members are also in the process of developing an evaluation programme for the SLP.

CivPol is currently co-operating with the UNAMSIL Human Rights (HR) Section on the development of a manual to guide the training of SLP officers for election and HR monitoring duties. However, if CivPol is to play a meaningful role in the elections next year, it will require authorisation for, and the contributions of, far greater numbers of officers. For example, the NEC currently envisages that there will be some 5,400 polling stations that will require security and monitoring.103

Practical assistance to the local police has been seriously limited by the lack of funding available to CivPol. Nevertheless, CivPol has managed to build two police stations for the SLP, the one at Lunsar a result of the contribution of some US$14,000 by Norway. The Commissioner of CivPol, Mr Joseph Dankwa (Ghana), has mooted the establishment of a trust fund within UNAMSIL for the provision of further material assistance to the SLP by CivPol.

The dominance of the CCSSP, which operates according to UK policing standards and procedures, has been the source of some disagreement with UN CivPol, who view UNAMSIL as an African mission. An example of the differences between Western and African training methods is that the UK and other European countries do not support the regimentation of police training, something that is central to the African style of training.104 (Ironically the regimental style was inherited largely from the British army's training of colonial police in former times).

It is felt that UNAMSIL CivPol should have a say in the selection of police advisors for the UN mission, especially as has is not been deemed worthwhile for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to dispatch a Selection Assistance Team (SAT) to countries volunteering only two or three officers for service in UNAMSIL. It could also be argued that if African CivPol were regarded as a priority, a small SAT from Freetown would be in a better position to perform this function than a team from New York.105