Sierra Leone's current crisis is widely accepted as the result of the interrelated evils of bad governance and grinding poverty. Between 1968-1996, most state institutions, including multi-party democracy, the judiciary, the formal economy, the armed forces, the police and the independent media, were systematically undermined and/or corrupted. The election of the first civilian government in almost three decades in 1996 occurred before a cease fire had been agreed, and amidst real and threatened intimidation of the electorate. The subsequent 1997 coup, the 1999 invasion of Freetown and the expanding war in the north and east posed further threats to Sierra Leonean democracy. Nevertheless, the average Sierra Leonean has not eschewed the idea of democracy, and the next parliamentary and presidential elections remain a primary goal of the peace process.

The elections were originally due to be held in February 2001, but were postponed by six months. The Sierra Leone constitution provides for a postponement of up to six months at a time, with the consent of parliament, if the country is involved in a war in which its physical territory is threatened. The government asked for, and received, a six-month delay in the elections after the NEC reported that the security climate in the country would make elections impossible. In its Strategic Plan 2001-2005, devised in January and published in February 2001, the NEC proposed that voter registration begin in mid-September, and that the elections be held before the end of the year.

It was widely accepted that free and fair elections could not be held while half of the country remained in rebel hands. The situation was complicated by the fact that the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) finds its main strength in the south. If the rebel-controlled north and east were unable to vote, the election would undoubtedly be tilted in favour of the SLPP, and would be regarded as unfair.106

On 7 September 2001, parliament voted to extend by six months the country's state of emergency, which has been in effect since the restoration of Sierra Leone's civilian government in 1998. On 12 September, parliament voted to delay the country's presidential and parliamentary elections for an additional six months, agreeing with President Kabbah that the country was still too insecure to hold elections. A number of opposition parties and civil society groups opposed the extension, insisting that the country is no longer at war and that a constitutional basis for postponing the elections no longer exists.

On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling among members of civil society and some of the political opposition that elections should be postponed even further, in order to allow more preparation time. There have also been calls for a 'government of national unity' - an interim arrangement that might make an extended delay more palatable. This is unlikely to happen, partly because any suggestion that the RUF be brought into government again is unacceptable. In any case, the GoSL has already drawn several members of the opposition into the cabinet. It is unlikely to delay the elections beyond the first months of 2002, because that might compromise its standing in the international community.

The RUF also demanded an 18-month interim transitional government, to take over after the mandate of President Kabbah expired on 26 September 2001, but this was firmly rejected by the government.107 The various parties in opposition to the SLPP have, nevertheless, begun to gear themselves for an electoral battle.

Thirteen parties contested the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. On 18 September 2000, six political parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding, agreeing to unite in a 'grand alliance' to challenge the ruling SLPP party in the presidential and parliamentary elections. The new alliance includes the United National People's Party (UNPP), which received 21.5% of the vote in the 1996 parliamentary elections; the People's Democratic Party (PDP) (15.2%), the All People's Congress (APC) (5.7%), the People's Progressive Party (PPP) (2.8%), the People's National Convention PNC (2.5%), and the provisionally-registered People's Democratic Alliance (PDA), which had recently broken away from the People's Democratic Party.

Of the 22 political parties currently operative in Sierra Leone, 17 have permanent registration, while five are provisionally registered. Six parties hold seats in the current parliament, with the SLPP holding 27, with the next largest party (the UNPP) a distinct second with 17 seats, and the APC third with just five seats.

By the end of September 2001, about ten political parties, including the RUF party (RUF-P),108 had opened offices in Bo in preparation for an intensive campaign for the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in the country. The opening of the offices followed a press release from the NEC, which informed all political parties that the state of emergency in the country was intended purely to maintain security, and that the government would not prevent political parties from engaging in routine party activities, as long as the SLP were given prior notice of a public meeting. The opening of the RUF Party office in Bo is regarded as significant, because it is the first RUF party office to be opened in any part of the southern and eastern provinces, and because the highest level of destruction by RUF forces occurred in the Bo district. (The office in Bo is headed by the son of a popular ruling SLPP politician who at one time was regional co-ordinator of the Kamajor militias.)109

At the tripartite meeting in Freetown on 11 October 2001, the GoSL agreed to a National Consultative Conference (NCC), to be convened from 13-15 November 2001, under the auspices of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). According to the proposal, the conference (in which a wide spectrum of civil society will participate) is to be as inclusive as possible. It is to address all major outstanding issues on which clarity is needed, such as the electoral system; the relationship between the Special Court, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the national courts; and voter education. The outcome of the conference will not be binding on the government, and opposition politicians argue that the holding of the NCC, and indeed the substance of the conference, are merely attempts to take the heat off government.110

A major point of contention has been whether or not the proportional representation system should give way to a constituency-based system. The elections in 1996 were held under the proportional representation system, in which seats are allocated to each party according to the percentage of votes it has received nation-wide. According to the NEC, proportional representation made sense when large parts of the country were under rebel control. However, the constituency system anchors members of parliament within a specific geographic area, which, theoretically, promotes both more responsiveness to constituents and accountability on the part of elected representatives.

The NEC has thus decided on a compromise 'district block' system for the 2002 elections. The paramount chiefs of each of the 12 administrative districts are to retain their seats in parliament, along with 6 elected representatives from each district.111 This will bring the total number of parliamentarians to 84. However, many people feel that the particular interests of their districts will not be adequately represented, and that the districts are not equal in terms of population numbers and economic output.112

On 19 September 2001, the All Political Parties Association (APPA)113 issued a statement calling for the dissolution of the current NEC, suggesting that it be reconstituted in the interests of fair play, transparency, and the need for credible elections. The APPA also expressed dissatisfaction with the district block electoral system, and stated its preference for a system of multiple constituencies. The NEC's standpoint is that constituency-based elections are simply not feasible, because a proper census and voter registration appropriate to such an exercise could take up to three years.

On 12 October 2001, the Chief Electoral Commissioner, Walter Nicol, announced that the elections, which had been planned for December, might have to be postponed until 2002. Nicol cited ongoing security concerns among the electorate, despite progress in the disarmament programme, as the reason for postponement. The NEC subsequently set the election date for 14 May 2002, leaving little time for addressing the need for such essential preparations as voter education. UNAMSIL believes that the GoSL will stand firm on this date, in part due to a perceived limit to the patience of the international community which supports the peace process.

Although it is obviously not ideal to push for elections by May 2002, there are few palatable alternatives. Under the constraints set by both the constitution and the current state of emergency, elections have to be held before the end of June 2002. Otherwise, the GoSL will need to extend its mandate for a further six months, or agree to an interim government arrangement. The latter is clearly off the agenda from the points of view of both GoSL and the 'international community'.

The 'early' date for elections is clearly problematic, for a number of political and administrative reasons. No-one is in possession of ID cards; there has been no census; and there is no valid voters' roll.114 Fifty percent of the population are refugees, internally displaced persons (IDP), or returnees living in camps, and it is inconceivable that they can all be resettled by May 2002. The elections simply cannot be fair, nor can they be free.115

One of the most emotive and problematic outstanding electoral issues revolves around the stake that the RUF will have in the democratic process, and the consequent outcome. In a statement issued on 2 October 2001, the government noted that under agreements signed with the RUF, the government's only obligation was to remove the legal impediments to the RUF's transformation into a political party. According to the Lomé Accord, however, "[t]he Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process".116

The GoSL does not see the RUF as a serious contender in the upcoming elections. The RUF is not yet registered as a political party, and was only provided premises for its national secretariat in mid-October. Some GoSL officials think that RUF will be lucky to gain even one seat in the legislature.

UNAMSIL does not share the government's assessment of (or its public pronouncements about) the RUF as politically insignificant. Foday Sankoh is still a cult figure, and the lessons of Charles Taylor's victory in the Liberian elections are worth recalling. Freetown-based views on the RUF's popularity can certainly not be considered an accurate reflection of sentiments in the countryside.117

However, because of its commitment to assisting with the implementation of the Lomé and Abuja agreements (and supporting Security Council resolutions), UNAMSIL is often accused of being 'soft' on the RUF. For example, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has commented on what it perceives as an international three-pronged strategy towards the RUF, which is aimed at.118

The appeasement of the RUF through meeting its demands in the peace process as rapidly as possible;119



encouragement of the defection of commanders and the rank and file from the organisation, though the provision of overseas scholarships for the former and vocational training or schooling for the latter; and



the provision of assistance to the RUF in transforming itself from a military organisation into a political party.

The implication is that UNAMSIL supports such a strategy. The ICG has accused UNAMSIL of becoming "extremely close to the rebels", and of applying pressure on, and advocacy to the GoSL to release three of the RUF's most senior leaders on 5 September 2001. It describes the release of Pallo Bangura, Mike Lamin and Eldred Collins as a "major coup for the RUF".120 However, the Group's report omits some of the finer details, such as the fact that Bangura was detained in prison for a period of 16 months without trial, and denied access to legal counsel. Not even the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had access to him, as the GoSL refused to allow it, citing security risks to Red Cross personnel.121

While the second point (on the 'defection' of commanders) may equally reflect a component of the broad DDR programme which offers similar opportunities to ex-members of the CDF and SLA/AFRC, the ICG lends it special salience, and links it squarely to the third point (the transformation of the RUF into a political party). According to the ICG:122

"A main deficiency in the international strategy lies in failure to implement the defection strategy for high level commanders, and to use this ... for affecting internal debates among moderates and extremists. Such an approach could assist in transformation of the rebels into a peaceful political party."

The ICG report goes on to recommend 'take-it-or-leave-it' overseas scholarships for 'consistent troublemakers', in order to remove them from the peace process as soon as possible. Yet the report ignores on the very real obstacles in the path of the RUF in its attempts to become a legitimate political party.123 Indeed, the ICG report states that:124

"A third threat to the peace from the RUF comes from the rebels' desire to enter politics as a legitimate party. The danger is of an organization that, while willing to forge alliances with other political actors, is also prepared to use military muscle to achieve common objectives. ...In a conflict that has been sustained by illicit alliances and double-dealing on all sides, the possibility of the RUF finding political sponsors in Freetown is disturbing."

However, this perspective misses the point that the RUF's military campaign, including the atrocities it committed, were symptomatic of the deep anger of many civilians at years of mismanagement and exploitation. RUF atrocities certainly undermined the movement's political credibility, but the anger that led many youths to join the RUF did not dissipate. Instead, it helped undermine the counter-insurgency campaign, as government soldiers - who were underpaid, poorly-trained and often under-aged - were sent to confront an elusive enemy with whom they actually had a great deal in common.

The military response to the RUF has tended to be part of the problem rather than a solution. However, many of those who perpetrated some of the worst abuses against civilians, including junta leaders such as Johnny Paul Koromah, have now been absorbed into the SLA. Marginalizing the RUF as a political player on the grounds that it is evil incarnate, is therefore a far more dangerous strategy than engaging them in meaningful dialogue as a political party. As Keen puts it:125

"Around the world, proliferating weapons and deep-seated anger are fuelling conflicts that cannot be adequately understood, or combated, as the struggle between two teams, let alone between good and evil. Ultimately, whether in Africa's neglected conflicts or in the higher-profile attacks of September 11, the only defence will be to defuse the underlying anger."

The one way to defuse anger is to provide a credible promise of the ability to change the nature of governance through a fair democratic process. However, to stand a reasonable chance of competing fairly for political power via the ballot, the enormous bias of international opinion against the RUF will need to be countered in two basic ways:

by establishing the unambiguous truth about the nature and extent of war crimes and atrocities committed by all parties to the civil war; and



by clearly articulating and effectively disseminating the RUF's political vision, values and programme for Sierra Leone.126

For example, many residents of Freetown readily acknowledge that the vast majority of the awful mutilations that characterised the brutality of the 6 January 1999 sacking of Freetown were inflicted by ex-SLA, or former soldiers of the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council).127 However, most observers from abroad continue to hold the RUF solely responsible for these atrocities. This is one reason that the RUF welcomes the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and has expressed a preference for the TRC's work to be completed before any electoral race.

On the second issue (political vision), the RUF believes that the average Sierra Leonean has been rendered totally impotent by many years of misrule. Citizens - especially those who live outside Freetown - have paid taxes for far too long without receiving any benefits of government administration. The RUF feels that it is high time to end this alienation of government from the polity, and that the people should be given a sense of belonging to the country and the state. This can be achieved only through effective administration that addresses a broad range of basic human and civil rights and needs. The political mission of the RUF is, in short, to transform politics from a system of elite patronage to a structure working towards the benefit of all citizens.128

The economy also needs to be transformed from one of ruthless primary extraction to one in which substantial value is added to Sierra Leone's vast but finite mineral wealth. During an interview, Pallo Bangura pointed out that though he came from the gold-producing district of Tonkolili, he knew of not a single local goldsmith. According to Bangura, the socio-economic and political vision of the RUF can be captured in its desire to provide the people of Sierra Leone with both a ladder and a net. The ladder metaphor means that each individual should be free to rise to the highest occupational and social level possible, regardless of any ascriptive criteria. For those who fall, or fail to climb, government must provide a safety net of minimum social security benefits and services.

The political manifesto of the RUF still needs to be refined and expanded into a far more coherent body of thought and plan of action, but this is extremely difficult to do whilst the organisation is still battling to counter its negative image abroad and to acquire the resources and expertise required to become an effective political movement. The latter is particularly difficult, in light of the travel ban imposed on RUF leaders (waiver of which has to be authorised by a special committee of the UN Security Council129), and the need for face-to-face meetings in order to overcome the tendency towards outright rejection of the RUF, so successful has been the media demonisation of the RUF as inhuman limb-choppers. Moreover, the RUF has no access to the international, or even local media, an essential in putting its own story across.

The GoSL has noted that the UN travel ban was based in part on the RUF's "unlawful possession of large caches of arms and the reckless use of them to the detriment of the people of this country", and suggested that disarmament would remove the conditions which had led to the ban's imposition. "Instead of the existence of the travel ban being given by the RUF as a reason for their delaying to disarm, that should rather be the very reason for their accelerating the process of disarmament".130

The RUF do not deny that abuses took place at their hands, but the hands of many others who will be contesting the upcoming elections are equally bloody. They feel, therefore, that a cooling-off period of a year or two would be in the interest of all parties before electoral battles are fought, and would lead to more sophisticated campaigning on the real issues confronting Sierra Leone. The RUF are convinced that the GoSL and the UK are rushing the elections in order to preserve the status quo. The former had been clinging to the notion of rebels 'going back to the bush', and were thus taken by surprise when the RUF committed itself to disarm and began a serious attempt to transform itself into a political party.131

Omrie Golley and Pallo Bangura are emphatic that the RUF has no intention of reneging on its commitment to disarmament, and that the 'back to the bush' card cannot and will not be played. They are convinced that the attack by the GAF on the disarmament centre in Kambia, and the subsequent opening of a second front against RUF forces in Kono, were a deliberate attempt by the UK and GoSL to disrupt disarmament and force the RUF into the fighting option, so that they could be militarily destroyed and removed from the political landscape.132

The RUF see themselves as realists. They know that support for their conversion to a political party will not be forthcoming from the GoSL, as the RUF Party is the only one that presents a credible threat to the SLPP in the elections. In fact, far from making generous concessions under pressure from UNAMSIL, the GoSL continues to obstruct the RUF's attempts at conversion. For example, the RUF Party has only a temporary registration certificate. There is a constitutional proviso that requires the establishment of regional offices in the four provincial capitals of Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Makeni, before a final registration certificate can be issued. The government identified a property in Freetown that was acceptable to the RUF, and handed over the keys to RUF on 10 October 2001. The RUF has opened party offices in Bo and Makeni, but it has alleged government obstruction in their attempts to secure an office in Kenema. When the RUF has made moves to hire its own offices in this town, the CDF has moved quickly to intimidate potential landlords, making the conditions for final registration (and effective political organisation) virtually impossible to meet without sincere GoSL support.133

If there are indeed some international and regional players who wish to support the attainment of one of Kofi Anan's major criteria for the staging of elections in Sierra Leone, then there is much they can do to support the RUF conversion process (apart from large cash donations, which would be coveted by any political party in the world).134 For example, the RUF has detailed the following urgent needs: