While the Mende are dominant in Parliament, President Kabbah (a Moslem from the North) is not a member of this tribe.

For example, UNAMSIL now has four Mi24 Helicopter Gunships operated by the Russian Air Wing, in addition to some 27 Mi8 and Mi17 utility transport, and a number of Mi 26 heavy lift cargo helicopters.

Interview with Gebremedhin Hagoss, Chief of Policy & Planning, Freetown, 22 October 2001.

See Appendix A for the full text of the Abuja Agreement of 10 November 2000.

Interview with Gebremedhin Hagoss, op cit.

Participants to the Abuja meeting, held from 2-3 May 2001, included the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council's Committee of Six, the United Nations, the Sierra Leone government and the RUF. The Committee of Six comprises Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo.

UNSC, Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/857, 7 September 2001, par 61.

By 1994/1995, the RSLMF "had become a bloated, ill-trained organisation, which had become very much part of Sierra Leone's problem". I Douglas, Fighting for diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone, in J Cillliers and P Mason (eds), Peace, Profit or Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, ISS, Johannesburg, 1999, p 178.

Momoh's government was overthrown in April 1992 by a group of rebellious army officers who, under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser, formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC was replaced in March 1996 by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).

The EO force grew to about 250 at the peak of operations against the RUF (January to March 1996), before resuming a contracted level of manpower below 100 personnel from April 1996 to the termination of the contract at the end of January 1997. EO received an average monthly payment of about $1.7 million for the duration of its 21-month contract, which compares very favourably with the estimated $1-2 million per day needed to sustain the present UNAMSIL force.

Annan Distressed Over Sierra Leone Coup, Africa News Online, 27 May 1997.

P Ejime, Nigeria Says West African Countries May Act, Pan African News Agency, 27 May 1997.

By the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL had completed the first phase of the deployment of its military component, consisting of 40 military observers, a Chief Military Observer and a medical team of 15 personnel. The mission was supposed to provide help on the issues of national reconciliation and the demobilisation of former soldiers. However, it was never more than a 'lame duck' UN presence, of minor significance next to the regional ECOMOG force, whose total strength varied between 12 000 and 15 000 men. Nigeria provided between 10 000 and 11 000 of these troops.

UNSC, S/1999/20, 7 January 1999, par 10.

Sankoh was in a Nigerian jail at this stage, awaiting execution for the atrocities that he had commissioned.

Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, 7 July 1999. (The Lomé Agreement.)

Ibid.

UNSC, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, 7 March 2000, par 10.

UNSC, Resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), 7 February 2000, par 10.

UNSC, S/2000/186, op cit, par 23-24.

According to the Draft Military Reintegration Plan (Iteration dated 31 January 2000), the 45 000 'ex-combatants' are from the following groupings: CDF - 15 000; RUF - 15 000; 'paramilitaries'/mercenaries - 2 000; SLA - 6 000; ex-SLA/AFRC - 7 000.

UK sends taskforce to Sierra Leone, BBC News website, 7 May 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_740000/740070.stm>.

Ibid.

G Jones, British troops face UN threat to shoot, The Telegraph, 16 May 2000.

On 15 May 2000, Charles Taylor brokered the release of 157 of the estimated 500 UN personnel still being held hostage by RUF forces.

This occurred after some persuasion by Charles Taylor, who had in turn been urged to alleviate the crisis by the current UNAMSIL Force Commander, Lt Gen Daniel Opande. Opande had earned the respect of Taylor, and the highest honour of Liberia, for his service with UNOMIL. Interview with Col Douglas Mudave, Freetown, 27 October 2001.

The West Side Boys had taken up positions in the Occra Hills that dominate the Freetown peninsula. From this vantage point, the West Side Boys harassed the population and denied them freedom of movement.

Pratt provides several possible reasons for these attacks. The RUF may have sought to deal a blow to its own enemies and those of Taylor. CDF fighters (Kono-speaking 'Donsos' rather than Mende-speaking Kamajors) had probably been staying in or near some of the refugee camps in the 'Parrot's Beak' area of Guinea, and the RUF attacks may have been intended to create chaos among the refugees and to neutralise these CDF forces. Attacks further east on Macenta may have sought to neutralise ULIMO and other Liberian dissident forces. See D Pratt, Sierra Leone: Danger and opportunity in a regional conflict, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, 27 July 2001, p 9. <http://www.davidpratt.ca/sleone_e.htm>.

In the event, this operation never materialised. It was superseded by eventual progress in consultation among the leaders of the Mano River Union Countries.
30 D Farah, A Separate Peacekeeping, Washington Post Foreign Service, 10 December 2000, p A42.

For example, UNAMSIL remained under pressure to act faster from an increasingly impatient UK government. The UN response to this pressure was to ask for some 2 000 troops from the British "over the horizon force" to join UNAMSIL-a request that was obviously declined. Interview with Gebremedhin Hagoss, op cit.

Briefing by Col Douglas Mudave, Deputy Chief of Operations, UNAMSIL, SA Army College, Pretoria, 6 September 2001.

Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Zambia. Although all are considered as TCCs, many of the countries named here provide only Military Observers and/or CivPol Advisors, while the formed units are all from a handful of African and Asian countries-Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Zambia.

Interview with Major General Syed Athar Ali (Pakistan), Chief Military Observer, Freetown, 22 October 2001.

Interview with Superintendent Blair McNight (RCMP), Deputy Commissioner of CivPol, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Interview with Peter Tingwa, Chief of Political Affairs Section, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Interview with Ismael Diallo (Burkino Faso), Chief of Civil Affairs, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Interview with Ismael Diallo, op cit.

Interview with Gebremedhin Hagoss, op cit.

Interview with Rodolfo Mattarollo, Chief of Human Rights Section, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Interview with Margaret Novicki, Chief of Public Information and Mission Spokesperson, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Ibid.

UN, Report of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict, S/RES/1314, 19 July 2000, par 52.

Ibid, par 48.

GOAL, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch and a number of national and expatriate individuals report the existence a flourishing sex industry in Freetown, which is supported by UNAMSIL soldiers.

Codes of conduct and specialised training do not seem to address the problem adequately. Peacekeepers who have previously faced children as armed opponents in their careers may have difficulty internalising the notion of the privileged social space of children that underlies their treatment as prescribed by humanitarian law. Perceptions based on an eroded status (or a status that was low to begin with) for children will not be erased by a few hours or even days of human rights training. This suggests that universal value systems cannot be taken for granted as a foundation on which to train soldiers for rights-based humanitarian interventions, and that stricter preventive and punitive measures may be the only solution.

One such measure might be the appointment of an ombudsman, consistent with Section D of S/RES/1314 (Training and Oversight of United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel) referring to previous report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/1999/957) and proposing that

"...all peacekeeping operations include a public ombudsman to deal with complaints from the public about the behaviour of United Nations Peacekeepers. In that regard, it should be emphasized that troop-contributing states are under an obligation to investigate and prosecute violations of international humanitarian law committed by their personnel".

ISS interview with Roisin De Burca, Freetown, 26 October 2001.

Briefing to ISS, Lt Col Richard Hackett, MBE, Chief of Operations (Force), UNAMSIL HQ, 22 October 2001.

The Force Commander is a man who leads from the front, with scant regard for his personal safety. For example, on his second day in the mission area, Lt Gen Daniel Opande requested a UN helicopter to take him to Makeni, so that he could meet the RUF leadership. He has regularly reacted to reports of incursions or skirmishes by visiting the contact zone immediately, to reprimand the antagonists on both sides, and to remind them of commitments made under the Abuja agreements and the various tripartite meetings. Maj Gen Agwai is similarly renowned for his no-nonsense approach, and also enjoys the respect of both the force and the rebels. Interview with Col Douglas Mudave, D C Ops, Freetown, 25 October 2001.

Sierra Leone News, 26 February 2001, <http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0201.html>.

Sierra Leonean Rebels Agree to Resume Tripartite Peace Meeting, Xinhua News Agency Bulletin, 15 September 2001.

Briefing to ISS by Lt Col Richard Hackett, op cit.

An advance party of Nepalese soldiers arrived at the end of October. The remainder of the contingent, which at full capacity will make up a battalion of more than 800, were expected in the mission area during November. This would bring UNAMSIL close to its current authorised strength of 17 500.

The Force Commander has gone even to the point of ordering them to sign for UN equipment (tents and other goods) when the contingent-owned equipment has been in tatters. Some commanders fear the backlash from their capitals, as the value of such UN equipment is deducted from the total reimbursement value to the TCC, but the Force Commander has promised to provide 'top cover' should such a situation arise. Interview with Col Douglas Mudave, 27 October 2001, op cit.

Briefing to ISS by Lt Col T Beckett, MA/COS (F) UNAMSIL HQ, Freetown, 22 Oct 2001.

Interview with Dr Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), 25 October 2001.

The figures recorded refer to the number of former combatants reporting to the various assembly points. Since the actual number of weapons handed over to UNAMSIL is about two-thirds of the number of people reporting to assembly areas, the term 'disarmament' is somewhat misleading when used with such figures.

Sierra Leonean Rebels Agree to Resume Tripartite Peace Meeting, op cit.

Sierra Leone News, 19 September 2001, <http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0201.html>.

Briefing to ISS by Brigadier Samuel Odotei (Ghana), Sector 3 Commander, Kenema, 24 October 2001.

Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sierra Leone: Disarmament begins in two more districts, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 25 September 2001.

Interview with CMO Major General Syed Athar Ali (Pakistan), DCMO Col Charles Mankatah (Ghana) and COS (O) Col Mark Aulterleck (UK), Freetown, 22 October 2001.

OCHA, Sierra Leone: Government, rebels agree to accelerate disarmament, IRIN, 12 October 2001.

Briefing to ISS by Brigadier Samuel Odotei, op cit.

Information and statistics provided by the Executive Secretariat, NCDDR.

As of 20 October 2001, according to information and statistics provided by the Executive Secretariat, NCDDR.

According to Dr Kai-Kai, as quoted in Sierra Leone News, 30 October 2001.

Briefing by Col Douglas Mudave, op cit.

The GoSL signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on 8 September 2000.

UNICEF, Case Study of Children from the Fighting Forces of Sierra Leone, prepared for the International Conference on War-Affected Children, Winnipeg-September 2000, see 'Overview'.

Ibid, see section entitled 'Child Protection Jan-May 2000'.

Ibid.

The report on Sierra Leone of the Coalition Against the Use of Child Soldiers claims evidence that the CDF and SLA "continued to recruit and use children in combat in 2000...including some previously disarmed and demobilised child combatants". See <http://www.child-soldiers.org/report2001/countries/sierra_leone.html>. Patrick Zangalaywah, a CDF field commander, estimated that their forces in the eastern Kailahun district alone included 3 000 child soldiers. (CSUCS, Africa Report, April 1999, citing L Fofana, Militia admits recruiting child soldiers, IPS, Freetown, 29 June 1998).

Interview with Dr Francis Kai-Kai, op cit.

UNSC, Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, op cit, par 24.

AS Kamara, Sierra Leone: Government Gives Money for Disarmament Programme, Concord Times, distributed by All Africa Global Media (AllAfrica.com), 17 September 2001.

Interview with Dr Francis Kai-Kai, op cit.

Ibid.

Interview with Dr Mark Shaw, SAIIA, Freetown, 27 October 2001.

Information and statistics provided by the Executive Secretariat, NCDDR.

Includes NCRRR, UNDP, UNAMSIL, EU, USAID/OTI, UNCHR, UNICEF, DFID.

Interview with Dr Francis Kai-Kai, op cit.

D Pratt, op cit, pp 13, 20.

The rather high profile British military involvement in this dimension began with what was essentially a national evacuation operation, launched on 8 May 2000, and progressed incrementally from this point responding to the dictates of the prevailing security situation. ISS interview with Brigadier Nick Parker, Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone/Commander British Forces in Sierra Leone, Freetown, 25 October 2001.

Briefing by Brigadier Gordon Hughes, Commander BMATT South Africa and former Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone/Commander British Forces in Sierra Leone, SA Army College, Pretoria, 7 September 2001.

Except for the current Military Reintegration Programme (MRP) intake of approximately 900, who will receive nine weeks of training, they are all combat experienced and have already undergone some orientation training in the Interim Training Centres.

D Pratt, op cit, p 13.

Interview with Brigadier Nick Parker, op cit.

D Pratt, op cit, p 13.

Interview with Col Kes Boyah, Commandant, Armed Forces Training Centre, Benguema, 25 October 2001.

Sierra Leone News, 29 August 2001.

Informal interview with UNAMSIL officers, Freetown, 26 October 2001.

Interview with Brigadier Nick Parker, op cit.

Interview with Allimany Pallo Bangura (Secretary-General, RUF/SL), Michael Omrie Golley (Chairman, Political and Peace Council, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)) and Patrick Beinda (member of the Political and Peace Council), Cape Sierra Hotel, Freetown, 27 October 2001.

This is not a good police: population ration, but it is not off the scale. Comparative ratios in other countries vary greatly, and are generally presented without much reference to level of development or the incidence of crime. The closest 'per 100 000' figure is that for Spain, at 129. Sierra Leone's ration is 'better' than Zambia's (107), but less good than India's (134), Nicaragua's (145), and the Philippines' (155). It is less than half that of Australia (275), the US (300), or England and Wales (347), and it is much less than the ratio in some developing or transitional countries, such as Malaysia (429), Croatia (669), and the Russian Federation (1225). United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Global Report on Crime and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p 124.

Interview with Keith Biddle, Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police, Freetown, 26 October 2001.

Ibid.

Ibid.

For example here are no separate facilities for juvenile offenders. Moreover, because of crowding and poor sanitation in the holding cells in the main Freetown Police Station, detainees' basic human rights are being violated.

At present there are some 16-18 police-contributing countries, with two or three police officers drawn from each.

Deputy Commissioner of CivPol, Superintendent Blair McNight (RCMP).

Interview with Superintendent Blair McNight, op cit.

Ibid.

Interview with Joseph Dankwa (Ghana), the Commissioner of CivPol, Freetown, 23 October 2001.

Ibid.

D Pratt, op cit, p 13.

President Kabbah has been strongly influenced by London, which wanted to see elections by December 2001, or in the first part of the following year. The fact that interim government issue will not feature on the agenda for the National Consultative Conference is therefore not surprising. The GoSL agreed to the latter simply to give RUF something that would keep them co-operating with the peace process. Interview with Ismael Diallo, op cit.

'RUF-Party' may sound a bit disingenuous, but the exact name of the party has not yet been decided upon and is under discussion among the RUF leadership. Interview with Michael Omrie Golley, op cit.

Tension in Bo, Kamajors disarm, RUF reluctant, BBC Focus, 29 September 2001.

Sierra Leone: National consultative conference underway, IRIN West Africa, 14 November 2001.

The National Electoral Commission is preparing the groundwork to hold paramount chief elections next year in 54 of Sierra Leone's 149 chiefdoms. Since May 1991, 18 paramount chiefs have died in the east, 15 in the north, and 21 in the south. Sierra Leone News Agency (SLENA), 10 September 2001.

Interview with Ismael Diallo, op cit.

The SLPP is one of Sierra Leone's 22 political parties: the other 21 belong to the All Political Party Association, or APPA.

The electoral rolls are based on the 1985 census which, given its age and the dislocation that has occurred in the interim, provides a poor basis on which to prepare voter lists.

Interview with Ismael Diallo, op cit.

Lomé Agreement, op cit, Article III, par 1.

Interview with Peter Tingwa, op cit.

International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, ICG Africa Report no 35, Freetown/Brussels, 24 October 2001, p 10.

Those who have heard General Opande dealing with the RUF command would firmly disagree with the notion of 'appeasement'. The Force Commander has a no-nonsense approach when dealing with commanders, even at the highest levels of the RUF hierarchy. (Upon meeting the RUF interim leader, 29-year-old General Issa Sessay, Opande said that he had a third-born child of the same age, and would therefore not address Sessay as 'General'.)

International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, op cit, pp 7-8.

Interview with Michael Omrie Golley and Allimany Pallo Bangura, op cit.

International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, op cit, p 10.

This is not surprising. The primary recommendation of the ICG's April 2001 report on Sierra Leone was for the Security Council to "[a]bandon the Lomé Agreement and make no further deals with the RUF". The report also called for the immediate surrender of the RUF, and advocated the use of military force by the SLA/UK forces against those who refused to surrender. International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Time for a New Political and Military Strategy, ICG Africa Report no 28, Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001, p iii.

International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, op cit, p 10.

D Keen, Blair's good guys in Sierra Leone: British intervention has yet to transform a failed war on terror, The Guardian, 7 November 2001.

Interview with Allimany Pallo Bangura, Michael Omrie Golley, and Patrick Beinda, op cit.

Some go so far as to say that the GoSL actually instigated these atrocities, as part of the propaganda war against the RUF.

Interview with Allimany Pallo Bangura, Michael Omrie Golley and Patrick Beinda, op cit.

On 5 June 1998, the Security Council decided that "...all States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), as designated by the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), provided that entry into or transit through a particular state of any such person may be authorised by the same Committee...". UN, S/RES/1171, 5 June 1998, par 5.

According to resolution 1171 (1998), Council would be ready to terminate the travel ban "... once the control of the Government of Sierra Leone has been fully re-established over all its territory, and when all non-governmental forces have been disarmed and demobilised". UN, S/RES/1171, op cit, par 7.

Interview with Allimany Pallo Bangura, Michael Omrie Golley and Patrick Beinda, op cit.

Ibid.

Ibid.

It should be noted that, despite the events of May 2000, the basic framework for UNAMSIL's mandate remains the Lomé Agreement, which states inter alia that (Lomé Agreement, op cit, Article III, par 4):

"The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilising resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to: (i) Setting up a trust fund; (ii) Training for RUF/SL membership in party organisation and functions; and (iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section."

The ISS was requested to raise this issue with the South African Foreign Ministry. Specifically, the RUF would appreciate assistance in hosting and facilitating a workshop on the mechanics of conversion to a political party. Participants might include key functionaries from the RUF, the South African ANC party, and the Mozambican Renamo party. A more ambitious project would be to host, in addition to the 'technical' workshop, a seminar bringing RUF leaders and potential donors together to discuss the challenges of conversion and modalities for assisting the RUF in this process.

(During the last week of September 2001, a delegation from the African Union, comprising of representatives from Nigeria, Libya and South Africa, was in Sierra Leone to assess the country's infrastructural needs. The three countries had pledged at an earlier summit to assist Sierra Leone to rebuild its damaged infrastructure, and the mission was in the country to identify areas which needed assistance. South Africa is expected to provide material and logistical assistance, while the other countries had also pledged help.) Sierra Leone News, 26 September 2001, <http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0901.html>.

Reuters, 21 September 2001.

Sierra Leone News, 19 June 2001.

D Pratt, op cit, p. 7.

Ibid, p 9.

Sierra Leone News, 9 August 2001.

D Pratt, op cit, p. 14.

Smillie is a member of both Partnership Africa Canada, and of the UN Panel of Experts appointed in 2000 to investigate the link between the illicit diamond trade and arms smuggling. Quoted in an interview with Sierra Leone Web, Sierra Leone News, 31 October 2001.

Mohamed Yerima (a military spokesman for UNAMSIL), quoted in: Sierra Leone: AFP says diamond fever rages despite ban on illegal mining, Paris AFP in English, 5 October 2001.

International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, op cit, p 4.

Income for diamond diggers is reputed to be poor, but the dream of striking it rich holds people captive in spite of the strict control exercised over diggers and the small, if any, share of the profits they glean over and above survival rations. For example, the main street of Kenema is lined with gem dealers' offices, which display walls of the cheapest and flashiest electronic goods as incentives. What is not known about the demobilised element of the mining sector is whether their life-plans hold anything beyond the hope of making a lucky strike by washing gravel. Digging may in fact be a short-term coping strategy designed to fund the transition back into their families and avert the double disadvantage of going home both stigmatised from their involvement in the conflict and empty-handed. Social and economic reintegration are inevitably linked, but if reports of atrocities visited on their own communities are accurate, the near impossibility of acceptance may be somewhat mitigated by cash in hand.

If demobilised combatants are indeed flocking to the diamond fields, data gathered between 1993-1994 in the diamond areas suggests that it will be a temporary stop, since a very small percentage of the young who participated in this survey (around 9%) had aspirations to wash gravel for the rest of their lives. See P Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, The International African Institute, Heineman, 1996, p 145.

On this debate see for example, N Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vols I, II & III, 1995.

See J Mendez, Accountability for Past Abuses, Human Rights Quarterly Vol.19, 1997, p 255; A Neier, What should be done about the Guilty? New York Review of Books, 1 February 1990, p 32; L Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, Law & Social Inquiry Vol.1, 1995, p 20.

H Friman, The International Criminal Court: Negotiations and Key Issues, African Security Review Vol.8, number 6, 1999, p 3.

P Heyner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror, 2001.

See eg D Bronkhorst, Truth and Reconciliation Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights, 1990; P Heyner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, Human Rights Quarterly 16(597), 1994; P Heyner, Commissioning the Truth: Further Research Questions, Third World Quarterly 17(19), 1996; I Liebenberg & A Zegeye Comparative International Perspectives: The TRC in South Africa-Some tentative Observations, paper presented at The TRC: Confronting the Past Conference, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 11-14 June 1999 (distinguishing between truth and reconciliation commissions, government appointed commissions of inquiry into issues of misuse of power by the state or abuse of human rights by the ruling elite; ad hoc mixed approaches to dealing with the past and international tribunals); P Heyner, Reflections on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in Moments of Truth in Sierra Leone: Contextualising the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Article 19: Forum of Conscience, Appendix M, August 2000.

Article IX of the Lomé Agreement provides that: "In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the government of Sierra Leone will grant Corporal Foday Sankoh [the RUF leader] absolute and free pardon".

UNSC Res 1315 (2000).

Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915.

For example, Article 21 of the 1996 Abidjan Accord states that "The parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law".

Article IX of the Lomé Agreement provides that:

"In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone will grant Corporal Foday Sankoh (the RUF leader) absolute and free pardon.

After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government will also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement."
(emphasis added).

Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone S/1999/836, 30 July 1999, par 55. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/ 200/915, 4 October 2000, par 22.

UNSC 4035 Meeting, 20 August 1999.

Interview with Rodolfo Mattarollo, op cit.

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Articles 2-7.

Ibid, Article 1.

Letter by Human Rights Watch to the UN Security Council dated 1 November 2000.

Article 48 of the UN Charter.

See the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 2001.

See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, reprinted in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915, 4 October 2000.

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 2.

Ibid, Article 3.

Article 4 of the 1977 Protocol II additional to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 7.

D Pratt, op cit, p 19.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 9 of 2000, Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXXI, 10 February 2000.

Ibid, Article 3(1).

Ibid, Section 3(1) (Schedule).

Ibid, Section 3(1) (2).

Ibid, Section 6(1).

Ibid, Section 2(a).

Ibid, Section 2(b).

Ibid.

Ibid, Section 15(2).

Ibid, Section 18 (1) & (2).

Ibid, Section 8.

Ibid, Section 7(2).

Ibid, Section 8(e).

Ibid, Section 8(1) (g).

Ibid, Section 8(2).

Ibid, Section 9(2).

Ibid, Section 7(3).

Section 20 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission at a Glance, NCDHR Series no 7, 2001.

An NGO known as 'No Peace without Justice', in collaboration with the Special Court Working Group (which is a coalition of Sierra Leone human rights organisations working for accountability within Sierra Leone, and consists of 47 members and 17 associates) has begun sensitising the people of Sierra Leone in and outside Freetown to the nature of the Special Court. The coalition has already conveyed its messages through workshops, community-based organisations, print and electronic media in Port Loko, Makeni, Bo and Kenema.

Section 17 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act 6 of 1991.

Interview with RUF leadership, Freetown, 28 October 2001.

This indictment was issued on 7 November 1994 against Dusko Tadic.

Interview with Rodolfo Mattarollo, op cit.

NATO, AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations, 2nd Study Draft, 1999, p 6-7. See also Peace Support Operations (Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom), Joint Warfare Publication (JWP), London, 1999, p 3-50.

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, par 56-64.