

CHAPTER 2

REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS

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Introduction

Reintegrating ex-combatants into society is one of the major challenges confronting Sierra Leone. During the war, combatants committed widespread atrocities against civilians, including those in their own communities. These acts of violence created suspicion and fear about the prospect of ex-combatants returning to their communities in Sierra Leone.

Reintegration in Sierra Leone is impeded by the fact that, despite external aid, it is still an extremely poor country. Securing employment for ex-combatants represents a major challenge. The danger of disgruntled ex-combatants drifting into criminality or even renewed conflict remains a potential threat.

By August 2002 reintegration in Sierra Leone was well underway, but still incomplete. By October 2002 56,751 out of a total of 69,463 ex-combatants (including children) who had been discharged, had registered for reintegration. Of these, 14,220 had completed skills training and 19,073 were in ongoing skills training programmes, leaving a remaining load of 23,458 out of the total number of ex-combatants registered.¹

A number of problems are confronting reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone, despite the fact that they are generally making steady progress. Most notable are funding shortfalls. However, in December 2002 there seemed little prospect of combatants returning to conflict, and violence has failed to escalate with the entry of ex-combatants into civilian life. Furthermore, there seems to be a degree of acceptance among civilians and the government that combatants will have to be reintegrated if peace is to be consolidated. If this can be backed up with security and development, and events outside Sierra Leone do not destabilise the country, prospects look encouraging.

This chapter examines some of the key reintegration initiatives being undertaken in Sierra Leone, the way in which they are structured, and identifies the key issues and challenges if reintegration is to be completed.

Background to the reintegration process

The peace process in the 1990s and during 2000 was at times shaky and held back attempts at reintegration.² Even by 2001 there were delays in demobilisation at certain cantonment sites: some combatants, for example, refused to leave camps because of the slow release of entitlements. During July and August 2001 there were riots, demonstrations and beatings of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) staff in the demobilisation camps in Lunsar and Port Loko.³

However, by 5 January 2002 the prospects for forging ahead with reintegration looked more promising, with almost 48,000 combatants having been demobilised.⁴ Combatants were provided with basic necessities and orientation activities, such as trauma healing and psycho-social counselling, information and sensitisation seminars, and civic education. Transitional allowances (later referred to as reinsertion packages) were given to support ex-combatants during their first three months in chosen resettlement locations. Reintegration payments, financed by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), totalled almost US\$ 8.7m by the end of the first quarter of 2002. By the close of March 2002, 15,295 ex-combatants were engaged in medium-term reintegration support and 5,594 had completed reintegration activities.

But by mid-2002 there were increasing concerns over finance. In June it was feared that existing funds would dry up by August. The United Nations Secretary-General warned in May that a lack of funds was delaying the resettlement of thousands of former combatants. In June, there were around 20,000 ex-combatants waiting to go through the NCDDR process. One major problem was that reintegration virtually came to a halt during the elections.

Reintegration in Sierra Leone is clearly dependent on donors making a major contribution, as the Sierra Leone government is not able to absorb these costs. It is however making a financial contribution. One criticism that has been levelled at the process is that most of the donor funds have been invested in the disarmament and demobilisation component of the DDR process, leaving little for the reintegration phase. Currently, NCDDR is targeting ex-combatants with short-term reintegration programmes, but because of limited funds longer-term reintegration is being held back. Local NCDDR partners are having difficulties in delivering medium- and longer-term reintegration, due to a lack of resources.⁵

There are also concerns regarding the prospects of finding employment for ex-combatants. Although Civil Defence Forces (CDF), Revolutionary United Front

(RUF), and Sierra Leone army combatants had undergone short-term training in skills such as car repair and carpentry, the majority of ex-combatants had at the time not enrolled in any training programme. The question was asked whether these were appropriate skills to teach. Many ex-combatants had high expectations of acquiring skills and a job, and were disinclined to take up agriculture, the sector most likely to provide opportunities in Sierra Leone.

NCDDR and GTZ: key reintegration actors in Sierra Leone

By late August 2002 concerted efforts were being made to grapple with these issues. Two of the major actors taking forward reintegration in Sierra Leone have been the NCDDR, a government organisation, and the non-governmental German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ).

Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants led by the NCDDR have mainly focused on economic and social reintegration, reintegration for child soldiers, and special programmes for the disabled and for women. Their aim has been to help ex-combatants become productive members of their communities; to provide them with marketable skills and access to micro enterprise schemes; and to support social acceptance through information dissemination measures, social reconciliation, and sensitisation processes. They have also sought to support sensitisation by public education on the role of ex-combatants in a post-conflict society.

After the end of the disarmament process and the closure of demobilisation centres, the NCDDR demobilised a total of 69,463 combatants. This included 1,414 adults in phase I, 15,469 in phase II, 2,226 in the interim phase, and the majority (43,509) in phase III.⁶ These demobilised soldiers then became eligible to receive reinsertion or resettlement support, which included a transport allowance and basic household needs on return to their communities. By May 2002, 33,331 ex-combatants had registered with the NCDDR District and Regional Reintegration Offices for reintegration opportunities in the various sectors, and the NCDDR had been able to place 23,000 beneficiaries into various projects.⁷

GTZ's reintegration remit does not only include ex-combatants. Its activities extend to all sectors of communities in Sierra Leone, including residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs), women, children, and individuals who have contracted HIV/AIDS. It also has a strong engagement in rural areas and communities. Through its technical staff and programme staff it supports local

NGOs in reintegration activities, such as peace-building, training and education, rehabilitation, and economic empowerment. GTZ supports skills training and education in, for example, business management. Beneficiaries are given three months micro-project training, including managing funds, and are inserted into enterprises. In all, GTZ has 650 staff working on reintegration in Sierra Leone, and over 1,000 ex-combatants going through this process.⁸

Both NCDDR and GTZ have identified a series of problems that will need to be overcome if reintegration is to fully succeed. A major challenge has been to repair relations between ex-combatants and their communities. Ex-combatants have frequently had to overcome the resentment of communities recalling crimes committed during the war, and this has undermined efforts at social reconciliation. Furthermore, according to NCDDR, the provision of targeted assistance to ex-combatants has often been perceived as rewarding the perpetrators of the violence, and not as an investment in peace and security.

In fact, a number of factors, ranging from low investment to lack of local capacity, have hampered reintegration.

Firstly, much of the reintegration assistance is for a six-month period only, which is not sufficient to provide the in-depth training crucial for ex-combatants wishing to be competitive in the labour market.

Secondly, the high mobility of many ex-combatants, moving from region to region, has made it difficult to deliver timely assistance.

Thirdly, both local and international implementing partners have had limited capacity for delivering medium-term reintegration.

Finally, there has also been low investment in social and physical infrastructure in terms of creating employment and supporting job placement. Limited economic growth and the slow pace of private sector initiatives means that even when ex-combatants develop marketable skills, their opportunities are limited.

Economic reintegration

In the critical months following demobilisation, NCDDR has been supporting ex-combatants through reinsertion benefits. These have been calculated to represent in cash the average basic household needs of a family and an ex-combatant for the initial three-month period of their return to their community.

NCDDR's economic reintegration programme has sought to equip former fighters with productive skills and employment options so that they can return to civilian life. This return is dependent on the rehabilitation of basic social, economic and physical infrastructure and the revitalisation of social services. Some of the challenges that have confronted the reintegration process have been an acute shortage of relevant skills to support sustainable livelihoods, and the fact that many ex-combatants are not able to take advantage of opportunities in post-conflict reconstruction. Many ex-combatants have a limited educational background, no marketable skills, and consequently their absorption into the formal sector, including the civil service, is not feasible. Skills development has therefore been a key targeted area for NCDDR in terms of economic integration.

However, skills training development has been undermined by the loss of this capacity within Sierra Leone, and also by a lack of data on the needs of the labour market. Skills development of ex-combatants, NCDDR believes, needs to be linked to the emerging needs of the labour market. Its approach has been to target informal sectors through apprenticeship schemes, along with selected in-centre formal skills training. By May 2002 NCDDR had provided assistance to 10,000 ex-combatants for skills acquisition through apprenticeship and vocational training. In Port Loko and Freetown, for example, there have been 3,000 beneficiaries of apprenticeship schemes and placement into informal outlets. The other 7,000 beneficiaries were in skills training such as carpentry, car mechanics, building, plumbing, and metal work.⁹ Tool kits for trades such as carpentry, plumbing, and bicycle repair are provided after the apprenticeship or training scheme is completed.

However, ex-combatants with recognised formal sector employment skills have been provided with incentive skills to aid their employment, while also receiving support should they wish to continue formal education. NCDDR has provided counselling assistance on job-seeking strategies, training, and employment opportunities, and has also referred ex-combatants to labour intensive public works, or development projects implemented by other parallel programmes.

NCDDR claims that some of its greatest successes have been in formal education. By May 2002, NCDDR had placed 6,452 former fighters in school. It has provided sponsorship of school fees, textbooks, uniforms and a subsistence allowance for one year. Students have been placed in over 93 schools and tertiary institutions in the country, while there has also been sponsorship of students into university. Some ex-combatants have undertaken professional

qualifications in computer studies, accountancy and management.¹⁰ Parallel to this, NCDDR is working with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to give education to child soldiers through the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP). All these measures have been designed to give ex-combatants skills so that they can be in a position to contribute to national development.

Improving education opportunities has been seen as particularly important, as 36 per cent of ex-combatants surveyed never attended school and only one per cent of the entire 'fighting population' were schooled up to higher education level.¹¹

Another challenge in Sierra Leone has been the reduction of production through the loss of agricultural labour during the conflict. NCDDR has been promoting agricultural projects – in May 2002 these stood at 22 projects involving 3,788 beneficiaries. The problem has been compounded by the fact that most ex-combatants have not had access to land, while the notion of 'group' farming, given the sometimes negative attitudes to ex-combatants, has proved problematic.

Furthermore, perhaps surprisingly, although many ex-combatants are from agricultural backgrounds, they have generally not expressed a preference to return to agriculture. In a survey of ex-combatants, it was found that 33 per cent of respondents were farmers before the war.¹² One reason for the lack of take-up seems to be that support assistance in other sectors is more generous. Accordingly, NCDDR has had to re-adjust its agricultural support to attract more participation, and has been looking at cash support for farm wages and supplementary food. However, certain forms of farming, such as fishing and livestock, have proved more attractive for ex-combatants in Sierra Leone because of their income-generating possibilities.

Sierra Leone remains reliant on labour-based work, which is perhaps the best immediate prospect for ex-combatants, as it is localised and attracts participation within the community. However, ex-combatants have tended to avoid this. One alternative has been public work schemes, which have been supported with, for example, skills training and enterprise formation. Ex-combatants have been trained in building construction, road maintenance, and work supervision by the NCDDR in partnership with the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) and local contractors. By May 2002, NCDDR had supported more than 12 small works contractors, providing reconstruction of shelter, roads, police stations and post offices.

A challenge in Sierra Leone is the lack of job opportunities that can be accessed after training. In fact, there are limited job opportunities even for trained and skilled ex-combatants, says NCDDR. It continues to wrestle with the problem of finding alternatives given the absence of jobs for ex-combatants. To this end NCDDR has been looking at credible partners with whom to work, and has also been advising ex-combatants to form co-operatives and engage in income-generating activities. In fact, a very useful connection has been made with UNAMSIL, which has taken up 'stop-gap' projects that engage ex-combatants for short periods in income-generation, and are designed to encourage partners to invest.¹³

However, the lack of employment has, in a few cases, led frustrated ex-combatants to sell their tool kits, which were given to them to boost their livelihood prospects. These were supplied immediately after their skills training. However, as Sullay B. Sesay, Information and Sensitisation Unit manager, NCDDR, notes:

They were meant to assist the ex-combatants kick-start life anew, and continue to use them for survival purposes. When unfortunately livelihood opportunities are not immediately forthcoming, the ex-combatants sell their tool kits to offset their temporary frustration.¹⁴

A continuing problem is the lack of local partners who could deliver medium- and long-term reintegration. This is particularly the case in Kailahun District in the east, where partners who might in fact provide this are prevented from doing so because of security threats due to cross-border raids from Liberia, influxes of refugees, poor funding, and limitations imposed on working with ex-combatants.

Social reintegration/reconciliation

Social reintegration has posed problems for both ex-combatants and civilians in Sierra Leone. Ex-combatants fear they will be targeted and ostracised, while civilians fear a return of violence, or resent the crimes the ex-combatants are frequently alleged to have committed. NCDDR has set up social reconciliation programmes in areas of critical tension in the south, east and northern parts of Sierra Leone. This has been backed up by information dissemination exercises to try and foster trust between communities and ex-combatants. In fact, prior to demobilisation, NCDDR community sensitisation exercises were undertaken to ease the settling in of ex-combatants into communities. This was supported by

campaigns in the media and on radio stations. Traditional reconciliation mechanisms and structures were also used to break down barriers.

Ex-combatants themselves were targeted by NCDDR prior to their return to communities. Pre-discharge counselling emphasised community orientation, with a special re-entry plan. This social adaptation and development plan was developed jointly by NCDDR and other international organisations. Ex-combatants were also brought to *ad hoc* community reconciliation meetings in various parts of the country. In potentially serious cases, where war crimes were alleged, NCDDR acted as a facilitator with traditional leaders to facilitate the return of ex-combatants.

In a further bid to strengthen reconciliation, NCDDR has encouraged ex-combatants to undertake tasks that may be beneficial to communities, such as civil works, street cleaning, and helping to rehabilitate shelter. It has also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, and other projects that help to rebuild social capital.

One of the problems facing reintegration has been the latent hostility to ex-combatants among civilians in Sierra Leone. Reconciliation has at times been a grudging process. A representative from NCDDR involved in sensitisation notes that typical comments heard from communities are: “we are forgiving the ex-combatants for the sake of God”, or “we are forgiving them because the government says so”. For their part, ex-combatants have found the process extremely difficult when they are constantly reminded about atrocities and their days of belligerence. This has led to tensions in some communities.¹⁵

Reintegration efforts have also been undermined by the illiteracy of some ex-combatants who have been unable to understand sensitisation messages disseminated by NCDDR, although this has been partly addressed by live drama performances undertaken by some of NCDDR’s partners.

Furthermore, community resentment over the ‘special’ treatment of ex-combatants, a problem familiar from other DDR processes, has been an issue in Sierra Leone. In community sensitisation sessions and radio ‘phone-ins’, it has been commonplace to hear comments such as “those who have ruined us are being given the chance to become better persons financially, academically and skills-wise”.¹⁶

According to NCDDR this has in some instances been exacerbated by the behaviour of ex-combatants. It is alleged that ex-combatants have held on to

property looted during the conflict, despite the presence of the rightful owners in the community. In the case of RUF fighters, the fact that some have retained their attachment to the jailed RUF leader exacerbates resentment in communities who have suffered at the hands of the RUF.

An equally difficult problem is that some ex-combatants who acquired authority during the RUF occupation of chiefdoms are reluctant to relinquish their authority. The fact that some RUF fighters have joined the new army is a source of distrust of the military, while many CDF fighters consider themselves 'hard done by' and not adequately compensated, given the fact that they see themselves as 'liberators'.

However, NCDDR try to put across the message to communities that they will benefit, directly and indirectly, from the fact that ex-combatants are engaged in rehabilitating damaged societies, and that they will become independent and less likely to commit acts inimical to society.

NCDDR regards it as encouraging that it is now commonplace to see 'die-hard' RUF fighters roaming the streets of Freetown and other big cities without reprisals from those who suffered at their hands during the civil war. However, this process will not be properly consolidated unless more funds are made available to support community-based organisations engaged in peace-building between communities and ex-combatants.¹⁷

GTZ notes that many of the reintegration problems in Sierra Leone have revolved around finance and capacity shortfalls, and as NCDDR has also noted, attitudes held by a number of ex-combatants.

Many ex-combatants have envisaged their allowances being paid instantly. However, it has not been uncommon for them to experience delays in payments of between three to five months, causing widespread discontent. Some officials distributing benefits have been living in fear of violence from ex-combatants angry over late payments. The problem has in part a historical basis. In 1999 one of the main objectives of the peace process was laying the foundations for security, and in terms of DDR the government had to make promises that could not necessarily be met. This has contributed to shortfalls in the funding of reintegration, which NGOs have sometimes had to fill.

Further, the design of reintegration has not always been satisfactory. Three-month training programmes, GTZ believes, are sometimes of little value in terms of learning a trade. And something rather more substantial than the dis-

tribution of tools and certificates is required to make an impact. Furthermore, the often brief periods of training for ex-combatants, and their subsequent low skills levels, will not be helped by the current lack of a favourable economic climate in Sierra Leone. The reality is in fact that many ex-combatants will have little prospect of securing productive work when they return to their communities.

The attitudes of some ex-combatants have made their full reintegration into their communities difficult.¹⁸ A number of them have failed to acknowledge, or comprehend, that many killings during the conflict were morally wrong. In fact, some ex-combatants believe they deserve to be rewarded for their role in the conflict. Some RUF have tended to think of themselves as legitimate revolutionaries, while the CDF have tended to portray themselves as saviours of the people. To resolve this situation there will have to be a balance between encouraging ex-combatants to realise that wrongful acts have been committed, and forgiving them.

However, to put things in perspective, GTZ has noticed that there has been progress since 1998, when capacity for reconciliation was low, with a key sea change in attitude, beginning with developments in October 2000.¹⁹

GTZ concurs with NCDDR that if the reintegration of ex-combatants is to work, it will be important to ensure that their reintegration is not given privilege over that of civilians and communities, particularly when the latter are having to come to terms with economic stagnation and destruction caused by the conflict. Future resentment over these kinds of issues could be creating the basis for the new combatants of the future.

At a social level, some ex-combatants have drifted into ghettos, and have experienced housing problems. Social problems such as illicit marital relationships, the abandonment of child ex-combatants, delays in reintegration support, and the recruitment of former RUF fighters into Liberia, represent major barriers to a successful reintegration process.

NCDDR has, in fact, attempted to address these problems, as well as the negative perceptions of ex-combatants, by stressing that the economic reintegration benefits are not meant to compensate ex-combatants. Furthermore, skills training for ex-combatants will benefit communities, because by placing them in employment they will be less likely to become involved in acts damaging to the community.

Despite these difficulties, NCDDR says it has succeeded over time in minimising the open animosity that characterised early attempts at social reintegration. A key factor in this shift has been the involvement of community-based social reintegration organisations. By July 2002, NCDDR had targeted 64 out of 149 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone so as to engage local organisations in this work.²⁰

Reconciliation and justice

The relationship between communities and ex-combatants is critical to long-term recovery. Traditional reconciliation techniques, such as cleansing rituals, have made a considerable impact in terms of community relations. There have been cases of ex-combatants confessing to wrongdoing and receiving forgiveness from communities in parts of the country. In June 2002 an observer noted a feeling of:

Hope and relief...I found it amazing that they were looking forward so much, rather than wondering about the atrocities of the past.²¹

Furthermore, at places such as the Morideen Amputee Camp in Freetown, which is home to hundreds of men, women, and children whose arms and legs were cut off, there seems evidence of a remarkable degree of forgiveness.²² There also seems to be evidence that the reconciliation process has been significantly aided by radio work undertaken by stations such as Radio UNAMSIL, which started up in May 2000 and which produces programmes addressing issues such as crime, guilt, justice, tolerance, forgiveness, and peace.

To consolidate reconciliation, the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to bring suspects to account will be very important. There are difficult hurdles that the commission and also the Special Court for Sierra Leone will have to overcome (see Chapter 8).

Reintegration of child soldiers/disabled ex-combatants/ women soldiers

A feature of the conflict in Sierra Leone was the use of child soldiers. Many were abducted and forcibly recruited, and as well as being victims themselves, became involved in atrocities. Not only has their reintegration posed prob-

lems for communities – some families have been reluctant to accept them back – but they are also potentially vulnerable to abuse. NCCDR has especially promoted the need to protect and reintegrate children, while at the same time taking into account community needs. Child soldiers have been placed within family support structures and specific communities. This work has been undertaken in partnership with UNICEF.

Two initiatives have been adopted: the Training and Employment Programme (TEP), which targets ex-child soldiers between the ages of 15–17, and the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP), which supports individuals below 15 who have opted for formal education. CEIP, for example, had 2,001 ex-combatants and 260 separated children as beneficiaries, while by May 2002 there were 648 child ex-combatants in apprentice training in carpentry implemented by NCDDR. This training included support for nine months, the provision of training materials, a monthly subsistence support, a tool kit at the conclusion of training, and basic literacy training.

In parallel, there have also been schemes to support the medical rehabilitation of all ex-combatants with physical disabilities so that they can recover their mobility and health, and become productive and active members of society. NCDDR has a framework understanding with Handicap International to provide prostheses to disabled ex-combatants. In addition to micro-finance to accommodate the needs of disabled combatants, project-based counselling and psycho-social work has been undertaken.

It is acknowledged that there is a problem in terms of DDR and women soldiers in Sierra Leone, although the numbers of women involved in the conflict were relatively low at an estimate of twelve per cent.²³ Gender programming has been largely absent in NCDDR's work, and not enough attention has been paid to the challenges faced by women ex-combatants.²⁴

Conclusions

Reintegration is steadily proceeding in Sierra Leone. There are few signs of a wholesale rejection of the process by communities or by ex-combatants themselves.²⁵ However, potential problems lie ahead if sufficient funding and improved programmes are not delivered. Some of the training seems to be too short in duration to provide sufficient in-depth training, which is required if ex-combatants are to get jobs. Local capacities are not strong and both local and international partners seem to have only limited capacity in delivering

medium-term reintegration. Economic stagnation and a lack of infrastructure creation also seem to be factors hurting both Sierra Leone and the reintegration process. If there are failures to deliver in these areas over the medium and long term, there may well be increasing criminality²⁶ and tensions among ex-combatants, with consequences for Sierra Leone's future. Furthermore, reconciliation is not deep-rooted. In an unstable Sierra Leone these could be worrying factors for peace in the country.

Notes

- 1 Figures supplied to the author by the NCDDR by e-mail, November 2002
- 2 For insights into the DDR problems encountered in Sierra Leone prior to January 2002 see: M Malan, P Rakate, A McIntyre, (eds), *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight*, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph no 68, January 2002.
- 3 International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty', *Africa Report*, no. 35, 24 October 2001, p 14.
- 4 On demobilisation in Sierra Leone see: Government of Sierra Leone/The World Bank, 'Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilisation Program Assessment Report: Executive Summary and Lessons Learned', July 2002.
- 5 Figures supplied to the author by the NCDDR by e-mail, November 2002.
- 6 National Committee for Disarmament and Demobilisation (NCDDR), *Reintegration of ex-combatants: transition from war to peace – management of a complex DDR process*, vol. 1, May 2002, p 2.
- 7 *Ibid.* p 1.
- 8 Interview with GTZ staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone, August 2002.
- 9 NCDDR, *op cit*, p 5.
- 10 *Ibid.* p 7.
- 11 Statistics Sierra Leone, Survey on Reinsertion & Reintegration Assistance to Ex-Combatants, report submitted to the NCDDR, October 2002, p 1.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 S Sesay, Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, e-mail document describing reintegration developments supplied to author, 12 November 2002, p 2.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 NCDDR briefing, August 2002, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

- 16 Ibid.
- 17 S Sesay, op cit, p 4.
- 18 F Germano, GTZ, interview in Freetown, Sierra Leone, August 2002.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 S Sesay, Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, letter to author, 4 July 2002, p 2.
- 21 IRIN News Org., Sierra Leone: IRIN Interview with John O'Shea, Executive Director of GOAL, 12 June <<http://www.irinnews.org>>.
- 22 E Wongibe, *A Miracle of Peace and Reconciliation: Post-War Recovery in Sierra Leone*, D+C Report, no 5, 2002.
- 23 Statistics Sierra Leone, *Survey on Reinsertion & Reintegration Assistance to Ex-Combatants*, report submitted to the NCDDR, October 2002, p 1.
- 24 Sierra Leone Government document, *Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Executive Summary & Findings report (draft)*, 25 October 2002, p. 4.
- 25 A government survey of ex-combatants found that 77.7% of respondents said they were "satisfied with the reintegration opportunities proposed to them". Statistics Sierra Leone, *Survey on Reinsertion & Reintegration Assistance to Ex-Combatants*, report submitted to the NCDDR, October 2002, p. 2.
- 26 In summer 2002, to the surprise of many observers, there were few signs of violent crime rising in Sierra Leone and, further, the bulk of crime was not gun-related. However, the police do not rule out that the situation may deteriorate. Interview with Al Shek Kamara, Superintendent, Sierra Leone Police, August 2002, Freetown, and email of 9 July 2002 from Al Shek Kamara to the author detailing trends in crime.