Chapter 6

FINAL DD&R PROGRAMMES AND WHAT'S TO COME

Published in Monograph No 83, April 2003

Sustaining the Peace in Angola
An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration

João Gomes and Imogen Parsons

The general demobilisation and reintegration programme (PGDR) and the ADRP

On 10 October 2002, the Government of Angola made available a final version of its General Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (PGRD).98 This general reintegration programme stemmed largely, as was previously discussed, from the compromises made by the government and UNITA in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Annex 4. In addition, the PGDR mirrors the concerns of the World Bank and other donors by incorporating required MDRP criteria, as will be seen below. In fact, a comprehensive understanding of this programme is only possible in conjunction with the reading of the World Bank led multi-donor mission last Aide-Memoire on the Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.99 These two documents remain at present the most reliable sources of information on the subject under discussion.

Moreover, when the World Bank led multi-donor mission returned to Angola for a follow-up visit from 28 September to 17 October, one last condition for appraisal was needed. This last condition was the provision by IRSEM of a draft unified demobilisation and reintegration plan. Such programme, entitled ‘General Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme’ (PGRD) was presented to the mission. The PGDR is a three-year programme (including the period from April 2002), which prioritises the reintegration of the new caseload of UNITA ex-combatants, which at that time was constituted by 85.585 FMU gathered in 38 quartering/gathering locations. Because the emphasis is placed almost exclusively on the reintegration of the new case-load, in opposition to the technical recommendations given by various partners, ex-combatants demobilised in the previous processes will be included within a larger programme of assistance to the reintegration of peoples displaced by the war. The practical conflation of resettlement and socio-economic reintegration of former combatants became in this way a reality. Yet, are special provisions for the reintegration of ex-combatants considered in the PGDR?

Although the PGDR’s ‘guiding principles’ are to a large extent similar to those that underpinned the ‘Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of ex-UNITA Military’ (see box below), three substantial political actions are prioritised:100
  • Demobilisation of 85,585 ex-soldiers of the ex-FMU in a first phase and in a second phase, after an evaluation of the strategic security needs of the government, gradual demobilisation of 33,000 of the FAA;

  • Support to the social and economic reintegration of all ex-soldiers demobilised in the localities they choose to settle, to be achieved through the granting of support that will cover basic socio-economic reintegration needs during the process of returning to civilian life;

  • Facilitation of the reallocation of government military expenditures to social and economic sectors by supporting the socio-economic reintegration of all ex-soldiers that are eligible within the programme, contributing therefore to the optimisation of the government’s military expenditure.

Box 7:
PGDR Guiding principles

  • The PGDR is considered an intrument of social and economic stabilisation and is a contribution to the process of peace consolidation and national reconciliation in the short term; its success depends on the sonsistent political will of the government of Angola, of the support of the international community within the framework of the programmes as well as within the framework of the MDRP;

  • The PGDR includes all ex-soldiers demobilised within the framework of Peace and National Reconciliation, with emphasis on the post-Luena period. The framework of this programme integrates all other programmes that until now have been designed for the target group;

  • Equal opportunities and specialised assistance is guaranteed to all ex-soldiers and they will have the opportunity to choose the most appropriate option for reintegration. The PGDR will allow for ex-soldiers to freely choose the place of resettlement or return and the modalities of economic reintegration;

  • All issues as regards pensions and social security will be dealt with outside the programme;

  • Implementation is open to partnerships with public and private entities, including NGOs, religious organisations, churches and civic organisations.

  • Execution of reintegration activities shall respect the following principles:

    • allow for the preferential opportunity for execution to local groups with experience in community reintegration activities;

    • tenders for partnerships that require special qualifications;

    • approval of projects will be done by a special committee within which IRSEM will coordinate; this committee will also monitor reintegration under coordination from IRSEM.

Although the demobilisation and demilitarisation phases were by then complete, this programme retains elements and references to both, which create a certain degree of confusion. After all, for most part of the year, this programme was under continuous revision and updating, partially a result of the speed at which quartering proceeded, partially a result of donor pressure in the negotiations under the MDRP programme. Consequently, although the programme’s provisions on demobilisation have to be considered retrospectively, they provide clues on the actual procedures implemented during the period from April 2002 to October 2002. In addition, as was pointed out above, only two years remain in the implementation of the PGDR, corresponding to the implementation of its reintegration components.

The programme makes clear that the rapid demobilisation of UNITA ex-combatants in the current context was a result of the need to ‘sustain the Peace, minimise the costs of quartering, facilitate the economic recovery of rural areas and reduce the risks of insecurity in the QAs/FAs’.101 In fact, as pointed out by the mission, the statement that all remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol would be implemented by October 15 was ‘widely interpreted to mean that the quartering areas occupied by the former military forces of UNITA (ex-FMU) would be closed by that date’102 but the government announced that the closure of quartering areas would only begin on October 20. However, as was previously pointed out, there are still 30 gathering areas and the latest available information provided by the Minister for Assistance and Social Reintegration points to the month of April 2003 as the most likely deadline for the closure of the gathering areas.103

As regards financing, the PGDR confirms that the government financed in total the disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion components of the programme. Consequently, only the reintegration component was (at the end of last year) expected to be supported by a mixture of IDA credit, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), donors providing financing outside the MDTF, and government counterpart funds. The estimated overall cost of this programme, including the Government-financed components, was then estimated at about $145 million. Of this, the government’s contribution would constitute approximately $60 million, the IDA credit about $30 million, the MDTF about $40 million, and donors providing financing outside the MDTF the remaining $15 million. On October 8, 2002, a PPF advance (PPF Q342-0 ANG) in the amount of $1,250,000 was signed. The expected refinancing date for the PPF advance is February 28, 2002. However, as of February 2003, the government announced that it had spent $125 million of its own funds in the process so far, with no mention of .

The mission had some concerns about the progress of demobilisation related activities, however, which were under the control of FAA and IRSEM and in October were still underway.104 Disarmament had already been completed, as noted above, but registration of ex-combatants who had previously been overlooked (including disabled who were not in the quartering areas and those who had been captured or fled during 1998–2002), collection and analysis of socio-economic data and taking of identity card photos were still underway. This was of concern because targeted reintegration assistance requires that every ex-combatant possess a unique and non-transferable ID card. Consequently the mission recommended that ‘discharge from the quartering areas await the distribution of a discharge certificate that will enable ex-combatants subsequently to acquire unique non-transferable military ID cards and ADRP benefit cards in a secure manner’.105 In addition, concerns were voiced in terms of pre-discharge orientation. In fact, although IRSEM was developing an updated detailed information, counselling and referral programme (PRONAISAR), in some quartering areas pre-discharge orientation was being given on the basis of the earlier 23 May government programme referred to above. There was still a significant lack of accurate information about the ADRP in the quartering areas while a number of uncoordinated civic education and information activities by different agencies and government ministries could lead to unrealistic expectations and undermine the credibility of the government’s programme. The mission therefore recommended that pre-discharge orientation materials be revised in order to ‘manage ex-combatants expectations regarding the scale, timing and composition of future reintegration assistance’.106

Another issue of concern related to the transportation of ex-combatants from the quartering areas upon their resettlement and return. Provincial governments were tasked with this responsibility as part of their oversight of resettlement and return in their provinces, but they proved unable to adequately undertake this task. It was for this reason that the management of the process was given back to the FAA in late November early December, which explains delays in the closure of quartering areas.

In terms of transitional support, there are contradictory stipulations in the PGDR and the World Bank October 17 Aide-Memoire. In fact, the PGDR stipulates that ex-combatants in the quartering areas (the new caseload) were to receive transitional support to cover their basic needs and their dependent’s during their initial social and community reintegration. This would include a contingency support payment of $100 in Kwanza equivalent and a resettlement kit including food items (to be distributed by MINARS). In practice however, the government ‘decided that all registered ex-FMU in the QAs who will be discharged from military service will first receive, at discharge, five months of salary (to cover the period from April through August) in one lump-sum payment’. And, has was previously pointed out, as of February 2003, the government had paid the 5 month salary component to 71,434 ex-combatants at a total cost of approximately $26 million, while 9,500 ex-combatants are still to receive this payment.

The mission had viewed with concern the impact that a large lump-sum payment in the quartering areas well in advance of transportation to areas of return might have. In the event, the distribution of this money had the effect of raising prices in markets in quartering areas exponentially, disadvantaging those who were not paid, and it is unlikely that much will remain for resettlement purposes. Furthermore, the payment of the five months of salary equivalent to the stay in quartering areas (from April to August) has the potential to create expectations that further payments will be made, to cover the period from August 2002 to the end of the quartering period, now estimated to be in April 2003. In any case, it is anticipated that after ressetlement and return, reintegration assistance cannot possibly be made available to all ex-FMU for the initial 12 months.107

Profile of ex-combatants

Ex-combatants profiles and expectations are critical for the adequate planning of reintegration activities. While the World Bank’s Aide Memoire provides a comprehensive analysis of the preliminary data gathered in the quartering areas, the information provided in the PGDR is not only incomplete but is based on socio-economic profiling from earlier demobilisation attempts. In fact, the PGDR considers that, based on general observation, the target group (new caseload) demonstrates a small degree of heterogeneity and the majority of ex-combatants are young and in active age (although incapacitated technical and professionally). The majority have spent many years in active combat (more than 10 years service), have a very low standard of education and evidence high levels of psychological trauma as well as varied disabilities. In terms of expectations, the majority are anxious to stop being a soldier and prefer options geared towards agriculture, professional training, education, industry and commerce. The majority were rank and file soldiers and minor officers and have a family larger than the average (6 people). Expectations for residency in rural areas where they originate were the rule. For the operationalisation of reintegration activities, the PGDR then uses the profile that characterised the average soldier to be reintegrated under the Lusaka Protocol (see box 2 above).

On the other hand, the World Bank’s Aide-Memoire contains a much more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic data gathered in the quartering areas. The sample used was constituted by 30,309 ex-combatants from 20 quartering areas out of a total of 36 quartering areas, and therefore should be taken as preliminary.108 Consequently, although the mission points to some of the dataset’s limitations it strongly recommends that the full dataset, covering all 85,500 ex-FMU be processed and analysed as rapidly as possible, so that detailed planning for ADRP implementation can be completed in a timely manner. This concern follows expert recommendations based on other DD&R processes that,
…in order to help ex-combatants to reintegrate it is vital to identify both the aspirations and capabilities of the demobilized population. Indeed, the success of the transition from demobilisation to reintegration is closely linked to the number of comprehensive and meaningful surveys of the population previously undertaken.109
Initial analysis of the data indicates that the vast majority are male (99.8%) and single (59.7%), with less than a quarter of a percent being female. The average age of the ex-combatant is close to 33 years while respondents’ ages ran from 15 to 65 years old. Average period of service is slightly over 14 years and over half of the interviewees claim to have fought for a period from 6 to 22 years. As regards education, over 70 percent did not receive formal education above the fourth grade, although ’even when the majority claimed to have attended up to fourth grade of basic education, their age and length of service may have rendered them functionally illiterate’. In addition, another 10 % acknowledged not having received any formal education at all. Women (although represented in a small number) evidenced a higher level of education, with close to 7 % of them considered at the “middle” level.

Interestingly, in terms of the activities that ex-combatants were engaged in before joining the FMU, a significant number, 41%, said they were doing nothing, while only 22% declared to have been involved in a productive activity. The most important areas of activity before joining the FMU were as students (14.5%), nurses (21.3%), agriculture (7.9%), mechanics (8%) and drivers (5.8%). UNITA ex-combatants also included carpenters, traders, electricians, brick-layers and radio technicians. Nevertheless, the mission alerts to a possible methodological error in the survey in that the distribution of areas of involvement prior to joining the FMU shows several coincidences with expectations for future activities, revealing possible confusion in the responses from the interviewees. A similar survey carried out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)/IRSEM covering 4,731 ex-combatants in 8 quartering areas in 4 provinces found 55% had been ‘self-employed’ before joining UNITA, of which almost half (48%) were working in agriculture.110 This indicates that over a quarter of all respondents had been employed in agriculture.111

When asked about immediate needs and assistance requirements, many veterans opted for all the available options put before them. Because the focus was not on assessing the status of the population and thus identifying its needs, but rather a direct question around ‘what do you want’, over 60% of the respondents claimed to be in need of housing assistance and also in need of job placement assistance. When asked about their interest for vocational training, once again the vast majority identified this as a high priority. In fact, 72% deemed training as an immediate need. Finally, when asked about the possible areas for further training, the most popular responses included agriculture (19.1%), formal education (20.5%), nursing (10.3%); farm activities (8.7%) and mechanics (8.1%).112 And, in spite or as a result of many years of military life, a small proportion of ex-combatants surveyed expressed interest in continuing involvement in military life through their permanent incorporation into the FAA. In fact, slightly less than one out of every ten respondents showed interest in remaining active as a member of the Angolan Armed Forces.

As regards resettlement and return, over 80 percent indicated that they came from either Bié, Benguela, Huambo, Huíla or Kwanza Sul and over 75 percent that they intended to return to one of those provinces. There is not yet a clear detectable pattern in terms of possible inter-provincial migrations. Most of the interviewees expect to resettle in the same province where they joined the FMU or where they are currently quartered.

Socio-economic reintegration: from soldiers to civilians

…the demobilisation and resettlement might have to be implemented quickly, but reintegration is by nature a slow social, economic and psychological process. Successful reintegration into civilian life depends to a large extent on the initiative of the ex-combatant and their families and on the support they receive from their communities, the government, NGOs, or foreign development cooperation. In the longer-term the reintegration also depends on the process of democratisation, including the recovery of a weak (or collapsed) state and the maturing of an independent civil society.113
The PGDR’s clearly identifies the peaceful coexistence between ex-combatants and residents of areas of resettlement and return as a critical priority for the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In the Angola case this is especially important because the majority of soldiers stayed for long periods of time in the armed forces. This also applies to their families who moved constantly as a result of the conflict. To facilitate peaceful coexistence at local level the PGDR suggests that an evaluation of the perceptions of local communities of ex-combatants and vice-versa be undertaken, in conjunction with awareness raising of rural communities by churches and traditional authorities of national reconciliation priorities. In addition, the PGDR plans to inform and sensitise ex-combatants to the content and ‘spirit’ of the PGDR including a discussion of the rights and duties of ex-combatants in the community; civic education programmes (i.e.HIV/AIDS, etc) and promote debates, as well as use the media to promote educational messages.

Literacy courses as well as practical courses and civic education are considered key to all reintegration activities. Consequently, a first priority is increasing the capacity of IRSEM’s provincial offices including the development of functional links at provincial and municipal level with other organisations. In addition, activities complementary to socio-economic reintegration should be introduced, especially for the socialisation of ex-combatants. As regards economic expectations of the target group, the programme continues the emphasis on a re-launching of the agricultural sector, emphasising the urgent need for a sub-programme centring on support to agriculture. In terms of reintegration, the main activities will consist of PRONAISAR services which will provide psycho-social support to ex-combatants during what is anticipated to be a difficult transition phase; support to economic reintegration; focused assistance to social reintegration and support to the medical and economic rehabilitation of disabled ex-combatants as well as to child soldiers.114 Each ex-combatant will have access to a single reintegration opportunity and the choice of reintegration option will be a function of the socio-economic profile of the ex-combatant as well as his or hers expressed wish. In this regard, the PRONAISAR is critical as a way of helping ex-combatants to know about the opportunities made available by the programme. In addition, an effort is made to allow ex-combatants to work for the public administration sector in community activities, rehabilitation and project development. The PRONAISAR will also give psycho-social support during the difficult phase of transition.

The PGDR also intends to support ex-combatants to find income generating activities and employment through agreements with private entities as well as micro-credit activities. A special component of this will be counselling and referral advice on small business development. To this end, IRSEM’s provincial offices will establish partnerships with entities whose vocation is training on business skills. In addition, because many ex-combatants expressed their wish to return to their rural areas, access to land is a key element for the successful reintegration in the rural areas. Access to land will be in accordance with Angolan law and facilitated by community participation. Other sub-projects will include additional employment generation activities (public works, promotion of micro and small businesses); adult formal and non-formal education; agricultural rehabilitation (access to land, instruments, demand and service extension); medical rehabilitation services and family reunification services. In addition, the PGDR foresees additional socio-economic support to vulnerable ex-combatants (child soldiers, soldiers with disabilities and women) through a ‘reintegration fund’ (Fundo de Reintegracao).

The World Bank mission report clarifies and expands the main highlights of the PGDR, as discussed above. In this sense, overall reintegration assistance will fall into four main categories:
  • Economic reintegration

  • Social reintegration

  • Special assistance to vulnerable groups such as underage ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants

  • Information, counselling and referral services
Moreover, as was previously pointed out, the Bank and its MRDP partners defined their intervention as a short-term measure, intended to merely begin the process of long-term economic recovery with special emphasis on the ‘mending of the social fabric’, and to the extent possible, such support would assistance would be provided to ex-combatants at the community level and in such a way as to enhance community reintegration. Activities should therefore be relatively short-term (i.e. support is provided for a planting season or a 4–6 month training program), relevant to the local economy (such as through traditional apprenticeships), and implemented by existing partner organizations currently active in the different areas of reintegration as defined below. In this sense, the ADRP will make available two different types of opportunities to ex-combatants as regards reintegration assistance: a primary opportunity (based on the ex-combatants personal preference and guided by his or hers socio-economic background and chosen places of return) and complementary opportunities (types of assistance that would further support the economic reintegration of ex-combatants—for instance through micro-credit, job placement, etc.—and for which an ex-combatant would have to qualify).115

As regards implementation, IRSEM will contract out the provision of reintegration activities to a number of different implementing partners (including UN agencies, NGOs, CBOs, churches, government institutions and other agencies working in relevant areas of assistance). It is expected that the majority of reintegration activities will be contracted out to larger “primary” contractors that would be responsible for sub-contracting out services and activities to smaller “secondary” sub-contractors such as training institutes, agricultural NGOs, churches, and so on. According to the mission, ‘the purpose of the primary contractors is to supplement IRSEM’s contract management capabilities and help rapidly expand extension of services, provide specific technical know-how in a given area of reintegration, ensure quality control of the service provision by secondary contractors, and support capacity building of service providers. An estimated 75–80% of the total value of the reintegration component will be implemented in this manner, while the remaining 20–25% will be directly contracted by IRSEM with specific retailers for geographic or technical areas not covered by the primary contractors’.116

Economic reintegration

…economic reintegration contributes to financial independence and self-reliance which is viewed as essential for achieving objectives of demobilisation at the social and political level. Demobilised soldiers have to cope with an environment which is characterised by high rates of urban and rural unemployment or underemployment.117
In terms of economic reintegration, the ADRP will provide support to demobilized soldiers for productive and income-earning activities in four main areas: agriculture, training, community works activities and finally, promotion of income generating activities (see box).

Box 8:
ADRP Economic Reintegration Priorities

  • Agriculture (subsistence agriculture kit, small animal husbandry/fishing, gardening, and food processing);

  • Training (traditional apprenticeships, on-the-job training, and formal vocational education);

  • Community works activities (road repair, rehabilitation or reconstruction of public infrastructure, garbage collection, reforestation);

  • Promotion of income-generating activities (micro-business training, advisory services, job placement, access to tool kits, and possibly micro credit).

Agriculture

We have previously pointed out that agriculture is high on the government’s agenda for the economic recovery of the country and has been prioritised as the economic activity of choice for internally displaced peoples being resettled and returned. After all, Angola had once a diversified and prosperous agricultural sector, producing surplus coffee, sisal and cotton for export, and possesses an unparallel natural resource endowment in the form of fertile and varied agricultural lands. The same rationale has been used for the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In addition, the mission points out that the emphasis on agriculture is also a result of the fact that 19.1% of the sample surveyed had preferred training in agriculture and that therefore ‘the ADRP expects that a large portion of reintegration support will be provided through the agriculture sub-component’.118 In order to provide basic inputs that will guarantee the self-subsistence of ex-combatants and their families in the period immediately following resettlement and return, the ADRP will make available a subsistence agriculture kit to all ex-combatants returning to rural areas. This agriculture component will be implemented by partners already working in the agricultural sector (FAO, WFP, GTZ, CARE) through the provision of support to returning ex-combatants and their families as well as the provision of appropriate seeds, tools, and basic inputs such as fertilizer, veterinary drugs, and technical assistance. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension services under the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário is identified as a potential source of complementary support. Nevertheless, this emphasis on agriculture is not without its difficulties and obstacles. Among others, the mission highlighted the existence of conflicting land tenure laws and disputes over access to land as individuals and communities return to former home communities, and the existence of mines which are a considerable obstacle for agricultural development. Land conflict in particular has been highlighted by a number of NGOs as a major potential source of conflict in the future. A controversial new law on land tenure is currently under review, with NGOs claiming it is likely to further prioritise the rights of commercial farmers over the historical owners of the land and that it does not sufficiently consider customary law or the rights of communities, as opposed to individuals to own land.119

The prioritisation of agriculture has met with a fair deal of criticism, if not concern, by observers of this process. Experiences elsewhere, namely in Mozambique, showed that the resettlement or ex-combatants in rural areas for the purposes of agricultural activity may be easily reversed. Mats Berdal has pointed out that ‘in Mozambique, a steady stream of demobilized soldiers in search of employment have, since early 1995, moved from rural communities (where they had been transported in 1994 as part of the demobilization package) to urban areas where there has since been a marked increase in social unrest and criminal activity’.120 However, in the absence of adequate surveys of employment opportunities in both the formal and informal sectors (even though anecdotal evidence points to severe scarcity in employment opportunities throughout the country), agriculture becomes the activity of choice since ultimately it guarantees some form of subsistence livelihood.

Community works activities

Another component of the economic reintegration of former UNITA combatants, the rehabilitation or construction of essential infrastructure (schools, health posts, feeder roads, small bridges, markets, administrative buildings, agricultural infrastructure, water supply and sanitation systems) is prioritised as a means to sustaining the demobilised soldier for an average of six-months. As the mission points out, there are already a number of initiatives at community level currently being undertaken by provincial governments (such as the Bank-supported Social Action Fund, FAS), by national and international NGOs, as well as churches and community-based organizations. As was pointed out above, the involvement of returnees in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of their chosen areas of resettlement has been emphasised in the norms for resettlement and return. In fact, the involvement of ex-combatants in the reconstruction of their communities of resettlement and return is one of the possible ways to promote reconciliation at the local level by making individuals responsible for the development of their communities also allowing for a deeper contact between IDPs and ex-combatants resettled in the same area and diminish the differences between returnees and resettled. In this regard, the mission points out that, ‘a secondary objective is to support social reintegration and promote reconciliation, as the ex-combatants will be integrated into work projects with other community residents, IDPs or returnees’.121 However, donors have traditionally voiced concerns on the sustainability of creating a ‘public works’ force composed of ex-combatants, viewing it as unsustainable in the long term. In fact, this was largely the reason why the idea of a Fourth Branch of the FAA did not go ahead during the Lusaka Process. Consequently, it is crucial that if ex-combatants are to be involved in physical reconstruction and rehabilitation that this should be done in their areas of resettlement and for a limited period only.122

Training

Training has been considered a fundamental element in successful reintegration policies. However, experiences in other settings, including the experiences of the International Labour Organisation, have emphasised that ‘training of ex-combatants for direct employment has to be based on labour market studies and should be strictly demand-driven’.123 Furthermore, training will only be beneficial if supported by adequate surveys of existing skills in the target population, which should go beyond formal technical skills to include other less obvious skills such as practical knowledge and abilities, as well as attitudes and norms. In fact, Irmgard Nübler has found that while data on existing skills is mainly collected in interviews, ‘the literature on empirical research methodologies discusses a range of reasons why the data obtained from self-reporting may not be reliable’ in that ‘the world of skills is diverse’.124 Nevertheless, the results of the socio-economic survey undertaken seem to point to an excessive preoccupation in assessing formal and technical skills of ex-combatants (as students, nurses, mechanics, etc) in detriment of an analysis of competences.

The training component has also been prioritised in Angola, and seen as guaranteeing the employability of former combatants.125 While the ultimate objective of training is to enable ex-combatants to successfully enter into and participate in the formal or informal job markets, it should be emphasised that there are other beneficial elements to training, which are not often discussed. In fact, training can serve as a vehicle for the social reintegration of the ex-combatant, by giving him or her skills which are considered valuable to the community as a whole. The potential integrative effect of training directed at the needs of the community as well as the socialisation benefits provided to ex-combatants by training environments should not be underestimated. In addition, as pointed out by Irmgard Nübler, ‘training settings can contribute to developing a sense of identity that is not linked to the previous roles in the military’.126

Within the ADRP, the emphasis is placed on short-term, flexible and cost-effective training, geared especially for self-employment and other skills needed for reconstruction. Such training is devised in three different ways: traditional apprenticeship, on-the-job training, and formal training. In this regard, it points out that, ‘based on an assessment of the current economic conditions, and the initial profile of the ex-combatants, the areas of likely training will include: rural/agriculture-based skills such as food processing/preservation, repair of agricultural tools, soap making; small-scale construction skills including carpentry, masonry, brick-making; basic auto/motorcycle repair, bicycle repair, panel beating, tin-smith; and other skills or services as the market dictates’.127 The mission alerts to the need for training that mirrors local labour opportunities and uses existing training structures, such as skilled artisans, government training institutions, public and private co-operation facilities, private sector partners (for on-the-job training), NGOs, CBOs and religious organizations. Training should be given, to the extent possible, at local level for the reasons highlighted above. As regards formal training, the National Institute of Employment and Professional Training (INEFOP) should be strengthened to respond to expected demands. In the employment process, existing employment centres of the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security (MAPESS) are considered the main implementing partner for on-the-job placements.

Income Generating Activities

The promotion of income-generating activities is regarded as a complementary benefit to ex-combatants who meet minimum qualifications, to be determined by IRSEM and primary implementing partners. The ADRP envisages four types of support: business management training, micro-credit assistance, job placement services and possibly the provision of tool kits. Activities under this sub-component would also be initiated on a limited basis and only after the primary reintegration opportunities are up and running sufficiently well. Nevertheless, all ex-combatants would be eligible to apply for this type of assistance regardless of what other assistance they have received under the reintegration component. The mission considered that in the case of micro-credit, the ADRP will also take advantage and support existing successful credit schemes currently operating in Angola, such as the micro-credit program of Development Workshop, or that of Banco Sol. Job placement services would likely be provided through the Government’s Employment Centres, for which the ADRP suggests the sharing of marginal operating costs. Business training may be provided as a stand-alone activity or in the context of skills training for those ex-combatants that demonstrate an aptitude and inclination toward self-employment.

Implementation

The ADRP developed an innovative scheme for the implementation of economic reintegration activities. In this sense, as the main implementing organisation, IRSEM will work in close partnership with a number of what are considered large implementing partners (termed ‘primary contractors’) who will then either develop specific activities themselves or identify and contract local-level sub-contractors (termed ‘secondary contractors’). According to the mission, ‘IRSEM, the GoA [government], and the MDRP partners agreed that this two-tier implementation structure is required, given the large scale of the operation, the need to mobilize as many different types of service providers as quickly as possible, the desire to promote horizontal parity in the benefits distributed to different needy groups (ex-combatants, refugees, and IDPs), and the limited technical capacities of IRSEM in the various reintegration areas’.128

Social reintegration

The objective of the social reintegration sub-component is to promote the peaceful return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities of choice, prioritising the following actions:
  • to sensitise communities to the return of demobilized soldiers;

  • to discuss and improve ex-combatants’ understanding of their civic rights and responsibilities;

  • to inform and provide counselling to ex-combatants about sexually-transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and other health-related issues;

  • to complete conflict analysis and reconciliation activities in areas of real or potential tension; and

  • to support joint activities, works, cultural events, and so forth that will help rebuild social capital in the communities of return.
Support for the peaceful return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities of choice is an extremely critical element in Angola. The protracted nature and the severity of civil war in this country has produced a fragmented and deeply scarred society, which now must learn how to live peacefully together. The enormous pressures that will inevitably result from the simultaneous resettlement and return of displaced peoples as well as reintegration of ex-combatants at local level constitute perhaps the most serious threat to peace in Angola in the medium term. Consequently, these diverse groups, which may have specific grievances against one another, must learn to accept each other if reintegration is to be successful. The need to address trauma and fear at the community and individual level is therefore an imperative. Will the pre-discharge orientation program (PRONAISAR) that IRSEM’s provincial offices are expected to implement with community-based organizations, churches, and other networks and initiatives currently promoting peace-building facilitate the harmonious reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced peoples? One must bear in mind that the average ex-combatant spent close to 14 years in the armed forces, and therefore actions directed at psycho-social support for the reintegration, reconciliation and healing at local level are paramount (see box). In reality, reintegration should mean that the soldier becomes not only a civilian but also a citizen, equal to all other Angolan citizens. And this requires a strong civic education component. As highlighted by the mission, ‘this coupled with the lack of previous work experience and low educational levels of many of the former soldiers, will require social support starting in the quartering areas and following them to their return communities’. In addition, the mission adds that ‘working on joint community initiatives at a village level can bring ex-combatants, IDPs and war affected families together to address common problems. Civil society organizations, churches and traditional leaders are important in this process’.129

Assistance to vulnerable groups

The ADRP emphasises the need to support disabled ex-combatants and underage ex-combatants. While existing socio-economic data initial indicates a very low percentage of disabled (less than four percent), the mission considers that this is largely inconsistent with reports from both the FAA and UNITA as well as with historical data on the Angolan conflict and conflicts in other African countries. In fact, the preliminary findings may be a result of the fact that ‘a large number of disabled ex-FMU were too weak to participate in the quartering exercise’ and therefore were not represented in the survey.

Box 9:
ADRP Social Reintegration Activities

  • Community level sensitisation and confidence building programs;

  • Awareness on civic rights and responsibilities with ex-combatants and the communities;

  • Mine awareness programs;

  • Information and counselling on STDs, HIV/AIDS, health and sanitation;

  • Media campaigns through radio, posters, pamphlets and print media;

  • Conflict analysis and reconciliation activities in areas of real or potential tensions to develop concrete interventions to diffuse potential conflict; and

  • Community activities (cultural, sporting events or work projects) which promote social cohesion and help to rebuild social capital in return communities.

As regards under-aged combatants, the ADRP will, in close coordination with MINARS and the child protection network in Angola, assist child soldiers and other minors associated with both armed forces. In this regard, the mission estimated that the target population under this sub-component will reach 6,000 (of which about half are under-aged combatants and half are other minors). And, ‘as there was no registration of underage combatants in the QAs (underage males were simply evicted from the QAs for registration in the family areas (FAs)) and estimates of the number included in this group are still preliminary, the projected target population is a best-guess estimate based on previous Angolan and international experience’. In this sense, ‘assisting underage ex-combatants and other separated minors in the QAs/FAs, implementing partners, including UNICEF, Christian Children’s Fund, Save the Children, the Red Cross, the Catholic Church, and others would provide assistance in identification, family tracing, temporary shelter and care, mediation and family reunification. Activities are already underway to this end and reunification underway. In addition, the program of assistance to be jointly developed by the child protection network (CPN) and MINARS will include support for psychosocial counselling, education support and vocational training. It is expected that the CPN will be able to provide complementary financial support for this sub-component of the ADRP.130

Information, sensitisation, counselling and referral services (ISCR)

The ADRP will also support services that inform and sensitise ex-combatants to the challenges and opportunities in their new lives. This service would assist demobilized soldiers in several ways. First, it would respond to inquiries about access to reintegration opportunities that are available under the ADRP; to counselling on job-seeking strategies; and to information and counselling on training and employment opportunities. Second, it would serve as a mechanism to refer ex-combatants to such opportunities (e.g., demining activities, public works, community infrastructure rehabilitation, etc.), thereby seeking to ensure the integration of the demobilized into broader recovery efforts. In particular, this service would proactively identify opportunities and negotiate placement of demobilized soldiers in both public and private jobs as they became available. The ISCR service would also identify and inform the demobilized soldiers about other public services for which they may be eligible, such as health care, education, or pension benefits. IRSEM Provincial offices will take the lead responsibility for this service and liase closely with the Employment Centres (Centros de Emprego) of the Ministério da Administração Pública Emprego e Segurança Social (MAPESS), and the Governor’s and Municipal Administrators’ offices to identify specific public works opportunities.
Institutional responsibility

The CNRSPDD is given the political management of the programme while IRSEM and the FAA (in accordance with their institutional responsibilities) will be responsible for its implementation and follow-up. Consequently, the CNRSPDD will be responsible for the legal sustenance as well as political orientation of the programme while not being involved in its practical execution. Its responsibilities are to:
  • advise government in questions related to demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;

  • identify and solve problems regarding substantive policies related to the reintegration of ex-combatants;

  • monitor the work of IRSEM and other government agencies;

  • assure the inter-ministerial commission required by the programme; and

  • develop other activities that assure the successful realisation of the programme’s objectives
We had pointed out earlier that the Joint Military Commission (FAA/FMU) continued to be responsible for the coordination of ex-combatants in the quartering areas and that the FAA were responsible for the disarmament, registry, selection and licensing of the demobilised; the preparation of ID cards; the collection of socio-economic profiles; logistics within the quartering or gathering areas and the incorporation of the 5,047 military within the FAA. MINARS and IRSEM continue to be responsible for pre-demobilisation orientation in the quartering areas; the distribution of resettlement kits; the payment of the contingency subsidy and the transportation of the licensed military to the areas of destination. These groups will be organised by provincial commissions of the CNRSPDD in accordance with its directive 01/GC/CNRDPDD/02.

In addition, IRSEM’s responsibilities will include:
  • to prepare annual detailed implementation plans;

  • to implement and coordinate the PGDR in its reintegration component for which it will establish cooperation with other government departments, local and international organisations, private sector and donors;

  • to transparent and responsible management of the PGDR’s resources; and

  • to monitor and evaluate the PGDR on the basis of a data base that incorporates all the information gathered in the QAs. An Information management System will be established by IRSEM.
Following World Bank’s advice, reintegration projects will be sub-contracted by MINARS and IRSEM to ‘large agencies’ who will then be responsible for contracting ‘small agencies’ capable of implementing specific reintegration sub-projects. For this end, IRSEM in cooperation with the multi-donor community and the ‘large agencies’ will prepare a strategy as well as a annual budget for the identification and formulation of profiles for the type of services needed bearing in mind demand and supply factors.

The Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) will be an autonomous body that provides services to IRSEM for the implementation of the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP). The ADRP is expected to be effective for a three-year period, starting in or around January 2003. The FMPU will ensure that all contracting, procurement, disbursement and financial management functions required under the ADRP are carried out in accordance with standard and accepted guidelines of the donor agencies supporting this program. It will also have responsibility, on behalf of IRSEM, for internal control functions for donor and Government counterpart funding of the ADRP. It is estimated that the FMPU will have responsibility for overseeing the management of up to US$ 100 million, of which approximately $80 million may finance sub-projects implemented by partner organizations active in the areas of reintegration, training, etc. These activities will be funded through sub-contract arrangements for which the FMPU will have financial monitoring responsibility. IRSEM will remain responsible for managing all technical aspects of the program. Implementing partners may be non-governmental organizations, line ministry units, or community-based organizations currently active in Angola. It is expected that some 75 percent of the total value of ADRP sub-projects will be contracted through larger national or international primary contractors (15 to 25 contracts), while the remaining 25 percent will be contracted through smaller service providers that will directly implement integration activities (50 to 100 contracts) (see GoA Project Document, “Implementation Arrangements”, for further details). The proposed financial mechanisms for the disbursement and control of funds through these sub-contracts will be discussed in detail in the administration and accounting manual of procedures which remains to be prepared.

Box 10:
ADRP Final Recommendations

  • The government should establish a joint technical working group with dedicated staffing including FAA, MINARS and IRSEM to conduct integrated planning of the demobilisation process, the hand-over to civilian authorities and the management of ex-combatants’ expectations;

  • Discharge of ex-combatants from the quartering areas (planned to begin on October 20) should proceed only following the photographing of each ex-combatant and the distribution of a discharge certificate that will enable ex-combatants to acquire unique non-transferable ID cards and ADRP program benefit in a secure manner;

  • IRSEM’s pre-discharge orientation materials should be revised as needed to reflect more accurately the 10 October programme especially in relation to reintegration activities;

  • Child protection agencies should be permitted meaningful access to underage ex-combatants in the family areas (FAs) to register them and initiate the provision of specialised reintegration assistance;

  • The government should strengthen planning for transportation of ex-combatants and their dependents from the QAs to their areas of return by incorporating the experiences and logistical knowledge of the FAA at provincial and national level into the planning process and by seeking technical assistance from international agencies with experience in population movements;

  • Government should consider improving transitional assistance provided to ex-FMU following discharge, in particular by agreeing the payment of one or two further cash payments in the ex-combatants areas of return.