

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations System in Angola. *Angola: the post-war challenges*, United Nations, Common Country Assessment, 2002.
2. See in this regard, World Bank, *Aide Memoire. Angola demobilisation and reintegration program*, World Bank, Luanda, October 17, 2002, p 18.
3. See in this regard K Kingma, *Post-war demobilisation, reintegration and peace-building*, International Conference and Expert-Group Meeting on 'The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and Its Relevance for Development Cooperation', Bonn, 30–31 August 1999, p 1.
4. M Berdal, Disarmament and demobilisation after civil war, *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Adelphi Paper 303, 1996, p 41.
5. Programa para o Regresso e Reassentamento das Populacoes Afectadas Directamente pelo Conflito Armado, p.1.
6. United Nations System in Angola, op cit, p 11.
7. Ibid.
8. See J Gomes Porto with R Cornwell and H Boshoff, Death of Savimbi renews hope for peace in Angola. And yet, can the *Black Cockerel* fly?, *African Security Analysis Programme Situation Report*, 26 March 2002. <www.iss.co.za>
9. United Nations System in Angola, op cit, p 11.
10. Data provided by Provincial governments in June 2002 and OCHA in September 2002.
11. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola (OCHA), *Humanitarian Update*, 19 December 2002. The conclusions of the vulnerability assessment were presented to donors in December. These included: 1) Despite an improvement in food security, approximately 1.8 million persons, representing 12 percent of the population, is food insecure. The highest concentrations of food insecure populations are in Huambo and Bié Provinces. 2) Forty-three percent of the locations assessed, particularly in the northern and central regions of the country, are at moderate or high risk of food insecurity. 3) Vulnerable residents in newly accessible areas, new IDPs, returnees and demobilised soldiers and their families who did not have access to agricultural inputs for the current

agricultural campaign may face food insecurity during the “lean period”. 4) Monitoring of food security and more complementarity between emergency assistance and medium-term rehabilitation activities are necessary to prevent further deterioration.

12. While the budget for this emergency six-month programme was calculated at approximately 89.044.698 USD, the total cost of resettlement and return for this case-load was calculated at 267.134.094 USD. It should be noted that the 350.000 UNITA people are considered in a separate programme. The breakdown for the global resettlement and return plan for 1.550.000 people is as follows: Mine Clearance (INARROE: USD 5.264.911,15); Food security for 6 months: USD 76.794.750,00; Child protection and demilitarisation of child soldiers: USD 1.170.000,00 (50.000 people); Food production kits: USD 43.341.100,00 (310.000 families); Health: USD 5.890.000,00 (1.550.000 people); Nutrition: USD 960.000,00 (66.200 people); Education: USD 10.333.333,33 (516000 people); Shelter kits: USD 46.500.000,00 (310.000 families); Water and sanitation: USD 4.030.000,00 (310.000 families) and Transport and logistics: USD 54.250.000,00.
13. Including: preliminary evaluation of the conditions in the resettlement areas; organization and registering of target groups and transport of populations at local and inter-provincial level.
14. Provincial and local administrations: with the implementation of the decentralisation strategy approved in 2001, local and provincial administrations will have the responsibility of coordinating and implementing reconstruction activities. UNDP plans to foster local capacity to implement reconstruction activities under a project entitled ‘Pilot Reintegration and Recovery Programme’ to foster the reintegration of internally displaced people in eight municipalities in the two provinces of Huambo and Kwanza Sul.
15. United Nations System in Angola, op cit, p 13.
16. Conselho de Ministros, Decreto No1/01, Normas sobre o Reassentamento das Populacoes Deslocadas, *Diario da Republica*, Sexta-Feira, 5 de Janeiro de 2001.
17. Ibid.
18. This sub-group is called ‘Sub-Grupo de Deslocados e Refugiados’. In this regard see, Conselho de Ministros, op cit, article 2.
19. Conselho de Ministros, op cit, article 3 and article 5.
20. This is particularly the case with the choice of housing areas, agricultural areas, water supply and basic sanitation facilities as well as construction of social infrastructure which should be defined by local administrative authorities, including traditional authorities. See ‘Programa para o regresso e reassentamento das populacoes afectadas directamente pelo conflito armado’.

21. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola (OCHA), *2003 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, Part I*, November 2002, p 6.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola (OCHA), *Provincial Emergency Plans of Action for Resettlement and Return*, August 2002.
24. The workshop brought together more than 150 government, UN and NGOs representatives from all 18 Provinces.
25. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola (OCHA), *Humanitarian Update*, 19 December 2002.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. The other two were the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF); and the Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA).
29. As Margaret Anstee points out, 'the CCPM was to be the apex of a complex network of joint monitoring mechanisms at every level, in every region, and on every subject germane to the Peace Accords...in keeping with the concept that responsibility for implementing the Peace Accords lay with the Angolans, the only full members of the CCPM were to be representatives of the government and UNITA, and meetings were to be presided over alternately by each side with decisions taken by consensus'. See M Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the cold war. The inside story of the collapse of the Angolan peace process, 1992–93*, MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996, p 11–12.
30. The first United Nations Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM I, had been created in order to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a process which lasted from 1989 to 1991.
31. United Nations Security Council Resolution 696, 30 May 1991.
32. See Saferworld. *Angola: Conflict Resolution and Peace-building*, Report co-ordinated and edited by Simon Higdon, Saferworld's Conflict Management Researcher, September 1996.
33. *Financial Times*, 11 May 1992
34. M Joan Anstee, *op cit.* P 13.
35. A Vines. *Peace Postponed: Angola Since the Lusaka Peace Process*, p. 15
36. D. Sogge. *Sustainable Peace*, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe

37. D Sogge claims government troops probably left due to lack of pay and food supplies in the camps whereas UNITA were more likely to stay due to the presence of their families and children nearby. D Sogge, op cit.
38. Saferworld, op cit.
39. M Joan Anstee, op cit, p 56.
40. IRSEM: Instituto de Reintegracao Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares is the government's agency in charge of the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. It was created by decree in 1995, replacing the Gabinete Inter-Ministerial de Apoio aos Desmobilizados das Forcas Armadas (GIANDA) formed in response to the provisions of the Bicesse Peace Accords of 1991. It responds to MINARS (ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsercao Social). IRSEM board of directors is composed of members of FAA and UNITA (one deputy director). It does not have any institutional link with the Ministerio dos Antigos Combatentes. During the initial phase of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, IRSEM (with support from UNDP, OIM, GTZ and others) took responsibility for implementing a number of projects and activities in the areas of vocational training, infrastructure, community resettlement, and micro-credit. Its projects have had limited impact.
41. Lusaka Protocol, Annex 4, Section III
42. A Vines, op cit, p 9.
43. Saferworld, op cit.
44. For example, without the need to comply with the 'triple zero clause', the government greatly strengthened its armed forces with the purchase of close to \$3.5 billion worth of arms and ammunition, as well as commissioning the retraining of its armed forces and critical support services to Executive Outcomes, a security firm based in Pretoria.
45. A Vines, op cit.
46. International Organisation for Migration, Report on IOM Angola Demobilization-Related Activities – 1997, IOM, Geneva, 1997.
47. N Howen, *Peace-building and civil society in Angola: A role for the international community*, DFID/FCO, October 2001
48. International Organisation for Migration, op cit.
49. PNUD-UNOPS, *SeCoR Relatório Annual 1998*, 1 January 1999.
50. UCAH/DRO, *Study for the identification of social and economic expectations of demobilised soldiers*, First Draft Report, December 1994
51. Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UCAH/DRO), *Identificação das expectativas sociais e económicas dos militares e desmobilizados das FAA e da UNITA*,

- Draft Report, Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit, UN Angola 1995; UCAH/DRO, *The Identification of Social and Economic Expectations of Soldiers to be Demobilised*, Final Report, Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit, United Nations Angola 1995
52. UCAH/DRO, *Reintegration strategies for demobilised soldiers under the Angolan peace process*, United Nations Angola, 1995
 53. Nicole Ball, *Complex crisis and complex peace: humanitarian coordination in Angola*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA Online. <www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/angola/>
 54. *Ibid.*
 55. World Bank, *Angola country report*, September 29 – October 1 2002.
 56. See J Gomes Porto with Richard Cornwell and Henri Boshoff, *op cit.* Also J Gomes Porto, *Angola at DD+040. Preliminary assessment of the quartering, disarmament and demobilisation process*, African Security Analysis Programme Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 04 June 2002.
 57. In the 'Memorandum of Understanding', the parties reiterate their unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the relevant legal and political instruments, in particular, the Lusaka Protocol and the resolutions of the United Nations' Security Council relative to the Angolan Peace Process.
 58. It defines an amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict; the modalities of the cease-fire; the disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA's military forces; the integration of UNITA generals, senior officers, captains and junior officers, sergeants and men in accordance with existing structural vacancies; the integration of generals and senior UNITA officers into the national police; the demobilisation of excess UNITA military personnel and disbanding of UNITA military forces and finally, the vocational re-integration of demobilised personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national life
 59. In fact, a number of Portuguese, American and Russian military experts joined the Technical Group providing technical assistance as regards disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration components of this process.
 60. In fact, on 30 March UNITA had declared its combined force levels at 54,583. See also Annex 1 to the 'Memorandum of Understanding' entitled 'Document Relating to the Quartering of the UNITA Military Forces'. This document specifies that 'the quartering of the UNITA military forces must provide the living conditions necessary for the stay of the military in a total number of up to 50,000, comprising about 12 General and 47 Brigadiers, about 1,700 Senior Officers, about 17,350 Captains and Junior Officers, about 3,150 Sergeants and about 27,740 men, for the duration of a period of time from the welcoming of the personnel

until their integration into FAA and the National Police and the vocation reinsertion of the demobilized personnel; and that 'the quartering of the UNITA military forces implies, also, on the one hand, the accommodation of 12 Generals and 47 Brigadiers, in cities close to the quartering areas and, on the other hand, the organization and securing of areas for the accommodation of the families of the military, close to the quartering areas, in a total of up to 300,000 individuals, including men, women and children'. In a subsequent interview with General Paulo Lukamba held in Luanda during October 2002, the authors were told that the discrepancy between the initial declared 50,000 troops and the final 85,585 troops quartered was not deliberate misinformation by UNITA but a consequence of the fact that no single UNITA regional commander knew exactly the total number of UNITA soldiers.

61. Data based on press statements by the Joint Military Commission.
62. United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Networks, 04 April 2002.
63. Jornal de Angola, 18 February 2003.
64. Data based on press statements by the Joint Military Commission.
65. In this regard see, *inter alia*, UNICEF, *Angola situation report Apr 2002*; IRIN, *Angola: donors prepared to assist 'sensitive' demobilisation process*, 8 May 2002, <www.irinnews.org>; Anne Fouchar, *End of War , Beginning of Hunger*, MSF Article, 8 May 2002, <www.msf.org> ; Medecins Sans Frontieres, *Emergency in Angola – An Operational Update*, 28 May 2002 as well as IRIN, *Angola: Focus on Quartering Areas*, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27878&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA>
66. Medecins Sans Frontieres, *Angolans left to die: The failure of humanitarianism*, Brussels, October 2002.
67. World Bank, *Aide-Memoire. Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program*, Luanda, August 16, 2002.
68. Ibid.
69. Data provided by the Joint Military Commission.
70. DFID, *Programme and technical assistance to Angola disarmament demobilisation and reintegration process*, August 2002 – September 2002, 30 September 2002, p.20.
71. K Kingma, *op cit*, p 9.
72. M Berdal, *op cit*, p 36.
73. In this regard see World Bank, *Aide-Memoire. Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program*, Luanda, August 16, 2002.
74. OCHA, *Humanitarian situation analysis*, November–December 2002.

75. *Jornal de Angola*, 18 February 2003.
76. *Ibid.*
77. See Annex 4, 'Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol'. In this Annex, the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized includes specific mention of civic training and socio-economic promotion. The following are considered pressing needs: (i) guarantee initial assistance to the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces; (ii) guarantee general and specific training for the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces; (iii) ensure their supported reintegration into national life. In addition, the process of vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces will be conducted through the following methods: (i) the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces as part of the national Reconstruction Service; (ii) the vocational reintegration of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces, as part of the national labor market, in particular, in the public and private sectors; and finally, (iii) the vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces as part of the Populations Resettlement Program.
78. *Comissao Intersectorial para o Processo de Paz e Reconciliacao Nacional (Comite Executivo)*, 'Programa de Reintegracao Social dos Desmobilizados dos Ex-Militares da UNITA', Abril 2002.
79. In this regard, the programme is clear: 'it is necessary to uniformise unity of action, of thought and delivery of resources, so that, reintegration activities become part of the fight against poverty, of diminishing socio-political and economic disparities, and national reconciliation'. In this regard, the immediate objectives of the programme are: to contribute to the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation; to contribute to the speedy social, economic and professional reintegration of the target population in the civilian, family and communitarian context; to contribute to the reduction of the poverty of the target population; to contribute to the social decompression of urban areas/centres, by attracting the target population to rural areas by offering better living conditions; the promotion of development centres in areas where populations are forced to settle and finally, the promotion of professional training of UNITA's ex-military so that they can, in the short term, compete in conditions of equality in the job market. See *Comissao Intersectorial para o Processo de Paz e Reconciliacao Nacional (Comite Executivo)*, 'Programa de Reintegracao Social dos Desmobilizados dos Ex-Militares da UNITA', Abril 2002.
80. Please note that the target population considered in this programme totals 43.408, not counting the 5007 that will be absorbed by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the 40 that will integrate the National Police. Following initial observations of the target group, the programme's working profile of UNITA ex-

combatants is as follows: mostly young males in active/working age with low levels of education; majority are rank and file soldiers and low ranking officers with an average of between 5 and 10 years of service in the military; majority support demobilisation and prioritise reintegration options in the agricultural, education and industry sectors; majority expects to be resettled in rural areas of origin and finally, the majority have a family larger than 6 people.

81. The sub-programme on agriculture for example, targets 2260 ex-military and spells out the activities that the immediate integration of ex-combatants as workers in the agricultural sector should entail: monitoring of forestry and livestock resources; forestry repopulation and fight against desertification. It also includes elements of income generating activities in the areas of fishing, creation of forestry perimeters and flower cultivation. The sub-programme on professional training, costed at USD12500000 and with a two year duration is meant to provide for the swift training of UNITA's ex-combatants in skills which, as was previously mentioned, will improve the socio-economic life of the country and provide work for the trainees. The executing agency is INEFOP as well as other private entities. Yet another sub-programme regards the 'absorption' by the Ministry of Health (MINSa) of new specialists and old professionals that may have been victims of the armed conflict, focusing on capacity-building and training of individuals who might need re-qualification in order to be incorporated in MINSa.
82. World Bank, *Aide-Memoire. Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program*, Luanda, June 4, 2002, p 5.
83. The Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) operationalises a comprehensive strategy for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities in the greater Great Lakes region of central Africa by outlining measures to structure and channel international assistance in support of efforts that assist ex-combatants to return to peaceful, sustainable livelihoods. Note that the World Bank's role in implementing the strategy and program of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is threefold: (i) as manager of the MDRP Secretariat; (ii) as administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund; and (iii) as co-financier of national programmes. In this regard, see World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilisation and Reintegration*, Report No. 23869-AFR, March 25, 2002, p.iii and iv.
84. In this regard see World Bank, op cit.
85. Ibid.
86. A unified national demobilisation and reintegration programme able to provide targeted support to all ex-combatants, would include the numbers considered by the 'Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of ex-UNITA Military' discussed above (now up to 80.000 UNITA ex-combatants, reflecting the unforeseen growth in the number of quartered soldiers), 33,000 Angolan Armed Forces and approximately 160,000 combatants identified for

demobilisation and reintegration under the two former peace processes. Nevertheless, the fact that an ADRP should consider this combined number should not detract from implementation and financing limitations obtaining in Angola.

87. The mission considered cash to be the preferred option for the delivery of TSN for the following reasons: the government has paid cash in previous demobilisations; cash has lower transaction costs; it is easy to distribute; it empowers combatants; it stimulates a supply response from local producer and traders. Furthermore, because the banking system is inexistent in the majority of Provinces, the payment of a TSN could be effected by a Financial Management and Procurement Unit contracted by IRSEM. To encourage the optimal use of TSN the programme would provide extensive counselling on the use of reinsertion assistance prior to demobilisation.
88. M Berdal, *op cit*, p 44–48.
89. World Bank, *op cit*.
90. World Bank, '*Angola country report*', September 29 – October 1, 2002.
91. K Kingma, *op cit*, p 10–11.
92. See Presidencia da Republica, Despacho no5/02, Regulamento da comissao nacional de reintegracao social e produtiva dos desmobilizados e deslocados, *Diario da Republica*, I Serie No44, Terca Feira, 4 de Junho de 2002.
93. *Ibid*, p 514.
94. *Ibid*. Article 5.
95. In this regard see World Bank, *Aide-memoire. Angola demobilisation and reintegration program*, Luanda, August 16, 2002.
96. *Ibid*.
97. A discussion of a final draft will be developed below.
98. Ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsercão Social, Instituto de Reintegracao Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares, *Programa geral de desmobilizacao e reintegracao*, 10 de Outubro de 2002.
99. World Bank, *Aide-memoire. Angola demobilisation and reintegration program*, Luanda, October 17, 2002.
100. Ministerio da Assistencia e Reinsercão Social, *op cit*.
101. *Ibid*, p 2.
102. In this regard see World Bank, *op cit*.
103. *Jornal de Angola*, 18 February 2003.

104. According to the PGDR, procedures for demobilisation included: the quartering of eligible soldiers; verification and identification of military to be demobilised; design of non-transferable identification cards; gathering of socio-economic data; medical examinations; PRONASAR (actions on information, awareness, advice and reference including civic and moral education modules); attribution of a social kit; attribution of a USD\$100 equivalent called 'contingency value' upon return to destination areas and finally, support to transport to destination areas and finally, under aged soldiers (SMI) will be separated from adult soldiers and transferred to adjacent areas. The government had also claimed, however, that demobilisation had already been completed.
105. Following the government's announcement that discharge from the quartering areas would begin on October 20, the FAA and IRSEM established a plan for ensuring the secure delivery of military ID and program benefit cards. The process will include the following steps: (i) every ex-combatant will be photographed before discharge and issued a discharge certificate; (ii) the FAA will prepare unique non-transferable photographic ID cards and IRSEM will prepare program benefit cards in Luanda; (iii) these cards will be sent to IRSEM provincial offices for distribution in areas of return; (iv) on reporting to an IRSEM provincial office, (a) the veteran will present his discharge certificate, (b) the corresponding ID card and benefit card will be located, (c) a printout of the ex-combatant's registration form will be located, and (d) the photograph on the ID card will be verified against the ex-combatant's face. To ensure system integrity, no documents will be delivered to third parties or representatives of the ex-combatant (all processing will be done with the ex-combatant himself). In addition, where the photographic image is not clear enough, the ex-combatant will be questioned about the information recorded in the registration form (e.g. father's name, mother's name, date of birth, and so on). Once a positive identification is made, the ID card and the benefits card will both be delivered to the ex-combatant; an annotation of the delivery will be made in the copy of the registration form, and the ex-combatant will sign or thumbprint the record. For all cases presenting special problems (missing cards, incorrect names, and so on), a special mechanism involving referral of the matter to the FAA will be implemented. In the judgment of the mission, these procedures, if properly implemented, will suffice to ensure the integrity of the program's ID system.
106. World Bank, *op cit*.
107. International experience indicates clearly that ex-combatants will make good use of cash payments to further their own reintegration. A series of cash payments over time will enable an ex-combatant to cover his own and his family's basic material needs during the early part of his transition to civilian life; it will also enable him to finance the initial investments needed to start generating his own income. Cash payments provide the time necessary to allow an ex-combatant to make his own plans for reintegration and they also empower him to make choices according to his own priorities. *Ibid*.

108. For the mission's assessment of the limitations of this survey refer to World Bank, op cit.
109. M Berdal, op cit, p 45.
110. International Organisation for Migration, *UNITA ex-FMU soldiers demographic, socio-economic profiles for return and reintegration planning activities*, Geneva, October 2002, p.25
111. This may reflect the possible errors in the World Bank study, or perhaps the geographical location of the study which was exclusively carried out in the Central Highlands
112. Many of the veterans were involved during the conflict in landmine laying and demining activities, presenting a valuable pool of expertise and information for future landmine removal activities. Over half of the respondents claim to have past experience in this field, with 59.4% saying that they have participated in laying landmines and 60.9% confirming they have participated in demining activities.
113. K Kingma, op cit, p 2.
114. It should be noted that these guidelines were developed bearing in mind the general expectations of the target group and the studies undertaken in previous demobilisation attempts.
115. As the mission notes, 'a complementary opportunity would not be an entitlement, but rather a form of assistance that would be available to those ex-combatants that meet minimum criteria'. A third category of general assistance would be available to all ex-combatants regardless of their access to either primary or complementary opportunities. This includes social reintegration support as well as information, counselling and referral services.
116. World Bank, op cit, p 19.
117. I Nübler, *Human resources development and utilization in demobilization and reintegration programs*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper 7, January 1997, p 3
118. The ADRP expects that this sub-component will focus on a few different areas of production or processing, including food crops such as maize, beans, manioc and potatoes; small animal husbandry; gardening; apiculture; artisanal fishing; or provision of equipment to groups for rice hulling, fish smoking, or other areas of food processing.
119. See IRIN, *Angola: Call for more consultation on draft land law*, 7 February 2003; IRIN, 'Angola: Land reform needed', 26 April 2002. Land was nationalised after independence but the switch from a planned to a market economy in 1991 and the associated privatisation of land resulted in commercial farmers gaining access to large quantities of land and the customary rights of many being ignored.

120. M Berdal, *op cit*, p 40.
121. World Bank, *op cit*, Annex 4.
122. Given that many community works and rehabilitation projects are in the planning phase, it is anticipated that this sub-component will increase its outputs during the timeframe of the ADRP. The indicative targets are 2,000 placements in year one of the program, 3,000 placements in year two, and 5,000 placements in year three. In the preparatory phase of the ADRP, a study must be undertaken of existing and projected community works initiatives that may be potential partners.
123. I Nübler, *op cit*, p 18.
124. *Ibid.*, p 12.
125. The type of training that a ex-combatant will have access to will be determined by three factors: their individual preference, their aptitude, and the opportunities to apply the training following completion. This selection process will be handled through the counselling and referral arm of IRSEM, with the support of the identified prime contractor and local-level training providers.
126. I Nübler, *op cit*, p 20.
127. In addition, the report says that 'while there are many potential obstacles to absorbing ex-combatants into the small-scale formal and informal economy, the overall improvement in the security situation as well as the general increase in economic activities throughout the country will provide positive impetus to reintegration along these lines'. World Bank, *op cit*, p 22, 23.
128. *Ibid*, p 9.
129. *Ibid*, p 24.
130. *Ibid*, p 11.3