

CHAPTER 3

SECURITY MEASURES AT AIRPORTS: JOHANNESBURG, DURBAN AND LANSERIA

Policing Johannesburg International Airport⁷⁰

At the JIA, the main focus of the Border Police is the policing of all crime that occurs at the border (port of entry). They inspect goods, search passengers, detect smuggling activities and monitor exit and departure flows. Within this policing function falls the inspection of all firearms and ammunition consignments. The Border Police operate on an information and profiling system, based on the scrutiny of manifests (relating to both goods and passengers) and on information received. Spot checks are also made on incoming and outgoing cargo goods and passengers.

The scrutiny of manifests involves establishing risk factors such as country of origin and false goods declarations (incorrect, inaccurate or wrong weight given, or under-valuation) and then profiling both cargo and passengers. (Risk factors for passengers include country of origin, flight and destination.) If profiling and scrutiny of the documentation raises any suspicions concerning cargo goods, a physical inspection is carried out on the consignment. This system is backed up by regular spot checks of incoming and outgoing cargo, which, being random, serve as a deterrent to persons wanting to smuggle goods or to circumvent the control systems. Also, the Border Police periodically conduct special operations, in which passenger profiling and baggage inspection play a greater role, to look for firearms or drugs.

Obstacles and problems

The current systems used by the Border Police are hampered by various practical shortcomings:

- At the JIA, scoping (the insertion of a telescope fibre optic camera into sealed containers) has not been as successful as anticipated, partly because scoping is a video camera system and not one that tests the air within a container for traces of chemical agents).

- There is no x-ray scanner big enough to inspect an entire container. Currently the Border Police at the JIA have only hand-held x-ray scanners to search for drugs and explosives.
- Although a pallet-sized x-ray scanner was acquired a year ago, it has proved too small for the purposes of the police. Also it is impracticable to transport pallets or smaller containers to the machine to be x-rayed. However, it is being used to scan smaller parcels, especially those carried on private and/or unscheduled flights.
- The documentation verification system is still manual.
- In the past, the Border Police had no access to Customs and Excise information, but since the agreement on co-operation between the two bodies was made at the beginning of 2002, the sharing of intelligence has improved. However there is still a need for formal decisions to be made on the exact nature and manner of the information sharing.
- Over the past year there has been a big increase (estimated at 38%) in cargo going through the JIA. This has multiplied the work load of the Border Police, and made it more difficult for them to fulfil their duties to develop profiles, make risk analyses and inspect cargo.
- Before 2002 the security companies screening incoming and outgoing passengers issued temporary permits for firearms. That responsibility was taken over by the Border Police at the beginning of 2002.
- Apart from the issuing of the SAP 53 for the CFR, which was done by the police, the inspection of actual firearm or ammunition consignments for export before 2002 was largely the responsibility of Customs and Excise, who checked seals and on occasion the contents of containers. Since 2002, inspections of consignments of arms and ammunition are undertaken jointly by Customs and Excise and Border Police officials. Additional security measures have been introduced by the South African Cargo (SAC), which has decided to treat firearms and ammunition exports as both 'Dangerous Goods' and 'Valuable Cargo'. However, big (in terms of bulk and weight) consignments of firearms and/or ammunition passing through the JIA have been few and far between over the last few years. Most arms exporters and importers prefer to make use of large containers and the facilities of either City Deep Internal Port or Durban Harbour.

- It is standard practice for Customs and Excise to inspect, clear for export and seal big consignments at the shipper's warehouse where it is packed, in keeping with the 'known shipper' principle. (This process is explained in a later section.) Currently the Border Police inspect the consignment only to check that the seal is intact. They would prefer to make a physical inspection of the contents and reseal the cargo at the point of departure (which is a sterile or restricted area, such as the Valuable Goods acceptance area at the SAA cargo terminal).
- The Border Police have identified a new trend in the movement of firearms through the JIA. Firearms (usually singly or in small consignments) are sent through the post, without the necessary permits. The x-raying of all parcels (a process that was implemented only in 2001) is now being used to identify packages containing firearms.

The Border Police have identified several potential loopholes in the systems used at the JIA that could be exploited for trafficking in firearms:

- **The mixing of international and domestic cargo.** Unlike some overseas airports, the JIA does not have specific terminals or areas that separate international from domestic cargo, although the South African Airways (SAA) Cargo Terminal has specific stacking rows within its warehouse for the different types of cargo. However, the JIA has plans to build separate cargo terminals for domestic, international and transshipment cargo.
- **Shortage of staff.** Border Police at the JIA need more members who are specifically trained to undertake physical inspections.⁷¹ Because of the current shortage of trained personnel, not all profiled cargo can be physically inspected.
- **Shortcomings in the existing profiling system.** The Border Police suspect that some contraband cargo (not necessarily firearms) is slipping through the current detection systems. There is therefore a need to make the system used for profile analysis an electronic one, and for staff to be trained to use it.
- **Lack of scanner capacity.** A pallet x-ray scanner big enough to handle all sizes of container, and another x-ray scanner to handle container-size consignments, should be purchased. Training is also required for the operators of these big machines. Additional control points equipped with

body scanners (walk-through metal detectors) should also be introduced to supplement those at existing passenger access and exit sites.

- **Poor reporting of contraband.** Smuggling detected by other security personnel at the JIA (and not by the Border Police) often goes unreported. Therefore the recording of contraband should be made compulsory for all agencies operating at the JIA, so that these activities can be investigated by the police.
- **Deficiencies in the Foreign Freight Terminal systems.** There is lax security at the Foreign Freight Terminal arising from too many agents and separate warehouses with insufficient warehouse packing space under cover. Additional CCTV cameras linked to a central control room in agents' warehouses should be installed. Cargo handling agents, freight forwarders and receiving shippers need to be linked to one cargo tracking system. Also, a central weighbridge is required so that the consignment weights declared on Way and Entry Bills or customs declarations can be compared with actual loaded-for-departure weights.
- **Exploitation of the lax control systems in some exporting countries.** Some countries lack sufficiently strict regulations and inspection standards for firearms consignments. This results in the importation of firearms that have not been inspected or properly cleared by the authorities in the sending country. These shortcomings point to the need for stricter enforcement on all exporting countries of international agreements on firearms.

Customs and goods control at the JIA⁷²

Each of the role players at the JIA has a number of functions, with interrelated (and sometimes overlapping) responsibilities. Basically this whole chain of actions and duties starts with the responsibility of the airlines using this airport to deliver passengers and cargo goods to the right area for disembarkation or embarkation, offloading or loading, which they do with the support of ACSA. Within this chain of movement both the Border Police and Customs and Excise play a control function.

The Border Police have a crime policing role, control over the issuing of permits, and responsibility for monitoring the movement of consignments containing firearms and/or ammunition. However, the legal obligation for the

control of the movement of goods across borders⁷³ rests with Customs and Excise (a subsection of the SARS). Its duties include checking goods to ensure that value and description declarations are correct and that documentation is complete; sealing inspected goods or clearing them for release; and checking that the correct taxes or duties have been fully paid. Accordingly the primary function of Customs and Excise is to monitor the movement of cargo goods, collect the revenue due, and inspect and release cargo.

In turn, the SAPS Border Police are entrusted with process flow monitoring: that is, with ensuring that systems work properly within the secured area and that passengers go through the correct channels. Obviously when Customs officers, in executing their primary function, find evidence of illegal movement or the commission of a crime, they will collaborate with the SAPS in dealing with whatever illegal act has been committed.

Customs have a Risk Profiling Team to prevent smuggling. This team identifies risks and smuggling trends, and conveys this information to the 'anti-smuggling' teams on the ground. These teams undertake searches and check cargo holds on the basis of the risk profile and information provided by the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) of Customs officers stationed at the various ports of entry in South Africa.⁷⁴

Identified shortcomings in customs functions

Surveillance and risk profiling

Customs JIA report that there are not enough CCTV cameras to cover their operations, although ACSA, which controls CCTV surveillance, has installed security cameras at a number of strategic points all over the terminal building. Customs and the Border Police would like to have continuous access to camera surveillance. That would entail not only being able to review a specific tape when a crime or suspicious activity has occurred, but being able to watch the actual monitoring. Customs would like to have their own monitor screen outside the actual monitor control room, so that they can access the system directly. Often Customs have difficulty in pointing out a passenger who is behaving suspiciously to an undercover officer, in time to intercept that passenger. The ACSA monitoring system is currently not designed to assist Customs detection or intervention.

One of the current drawbacks to the SAR system is that the analysed information is rarely passed on to the Border Police or Customs, or even to the

National Prosecuting Authority's Directorate for Special Operations (the Scorpions) for action. Furthermore, interventions on the ground should be entered into the record more frequently so that this information can go back into the analysis loop. In this way new requirements for interventions could be generated. Another drawback is that Customs are failing to detect contraventions because 'floor profiling' is still being done. (Floor profiling often means that when one passenger is stopped, other passengers representing a potential risk will pass unchallenged through the channel while the intercepted passenger is being searched.) More Special Units are needed so that a greater number of targeted operations can be launched in response to information received.

Information management

Structures have been established for managing information, but lack the requisite support. Also, these new arrangements suffer from a shortage of co-ordination and professional training. Overall the information management system remains fragmented.

All information generated by SARs is entered into a central database based on written reports by each officer of any suspicious activity observed and any detection or intervention made. The various customs officers at ports of entry are unable to enter this information directly to the central database via a linked computer, but instead have to record their findings in writing. The performance management system followed by Customs requires that each officer generate at least two written reports per month, which has slowed the process down even further. The system tends to be cluttered with "useless" (not relevant or specific) information inserted into the required number of reports merely to fulfil the performance requirement.

The passenger control process used by Customs is a stand-alone system at every port of entry. It is not yet linked to a central computer, which exacerbates the fragmentation of information. Moreover, SAR intelligence is not integrated with the DHA's Movement Control System.

Goods inspection

In the system of goods inspection used by Customs, couriered parcels are not covered by inspection regulations because courier companies are not consid-

ered to be clearing agents. Therefore they accept parcels using DA 306 forms, which are different to the DA 500 forms which apply to containers and larger parcels or packages of cargo. Moreover, most couriered parcels are declared as 'low value': very few are designated as 'high value'. Another factor is the volume of cargo that passes through the JIA each day. For all of the above reasons, couriered parcels tend not to be physically inspected.⁷⁵ At present the sheer volume of cargo processed means that spot checks are made only when indicated by risk profiling.

A second problem relates to cargo unaccompanied by manifests, particularly goods coming in on unscheduled flights. Owing to the current staff shortages, Customs is unable to check every cargo hold.

A weakness that might be exploited by smugglers is the current practice of taking incoming cargo to 'degrouper' stores, where pallets are split up and the contents sent to different clients. While in principle no degrouper stores or warehouses should be registered unless certain security requirements (for instance CCTV systems and 24-hour guarding) are met, security is known to be lax at some stores. In practice 60–70% of incoming goods are sent by road to different company warehouses, and are checked and cleared only on arrival. This implies that cargo can be tampered with or substitutions made while the cargo is en route to these registered warehouses.

Although perfunctory checks are performed on vehicles at the exit gates, persons and goods are not being screened when leaving the airport secured area because Customs do not have the staff or facilities to do so. Searches are conducted only on rare occasions, and then mainly on request (for example a warning about endangered species being transported) that they should check for specific cargo. Customs officers believe that all persons and goods should be checked on exit, because this would prevent anyone from collecting goods without a manifest. The official reasons given for failing to conduct such scans are a shortage of x-ray equipment at exit gates, and the argument that if the machines are used to scan both incoming and outgoing traffic the working lifespan of the equipment will be halved.

Unscheduled flights

Unscheduled flights are a major problem for goods control.⁷⁶ Currently the JIA receives a number of unscheduled cargo flights. Operators using Ilyushin or Antonov cargo planes of Russian origin work on the fringes of the formal cargo

carrier trade. Some of these use their aeroplanes as offices and sleeping quarters. They do not park in the official parking bays, where they have to pay for parking, but taxi to the far end of the JIA airport cargo complex. Ninety per cent of these unscheduled flights land and leave late at night.

An office to be manned by Customs and Border Police on a 24-hour basis is planned to make possible the full inspection of all unscheduled flights. Both of these agencies suspect that some of the unscheduled flights may be bringing in weapons and departing with loads of abalone or other contraband, although so far no evidence of smuggling has been found. The scenario for a possible smuggling pattern is as follows. The incoming flight carrying weapons or other contraband also has some legal cargo aboard. Somewhere along the flight path, the operators are suspected of dipping below radar detection height, landing on a makeshift landing strip, offloading and taking to the air again within a matter of minutes. They then fly to the JIA, land, unship the legitimate load of cargo, refuel, reload new cargo and take off. On the outward-bound flight they again touch down at the landing strip, load up with abalone or cigarettes,⁷⁷ and take off. Until low-level tracking capabilities are installed in South Africa, it is believed such illegal operations will continue.

The suspicions harboured by Customs and the Border Police are fuelled by the patterns observable in the unscheduled flights. Common factors are the late night arrival and take-off times; the small amount of legitimate cargo offloaded and taken on at the JIA; and the absence of operator offices in South Africa. Also, some of the pilots do not have residency permits (which might explain why they sleep in their aeroplanes and park illegally at the end of the runway).

The authorities need to deal decisively with the problem. This could be done by impounding or confiscating the aeroplanes thought to be used for these irregular flights, or by installing a network of mobile radar stations. Unfortunately this is an exorbitantly expensive exercise not warranted by the extent of the suspected trafficking.

Many of the Russian-built planes⁷⁸ used for unscheduled flights originally saw service in Angola. They are old and poorly maintained. Lack of airworthiness might be used as a pretext for grounding them. Unfortunately, the impounding and confiscation of aeroplanes on the grounds that they are used for smuggling is not within the Customs remit, but can be done only by the Scorpions' Asset Forfeiture Unit. Ideally, this type of asset forfeiture would also be included in the Customs & Excise Act, giving Customs the authority, at the very least,

to initiate a confiscation procedure prior to handing the investigation over to the Scorpions for further action.

Mail and parcels

Until quite recently the international mail centre at JIA had no x-ray scanners for the screening of all incoming and outgoing mail parcels. Mailbags sent for international despatch from post offices were also supposed to be screened. While this is currently being done, these mailbags (which originate from sources outside the JIA) are screened as a whole and not separately, as individual parcels or items. Such group screening makes it difficult to pick up any contraband, even firearms. Individual screening has now been instituted at the JIA mail centre for all parcels received for international despatch. A few firearms being sent out of the country in parcels have been identified and confiscated.⁷⁹ But it has been found that people shipping firearms out illegally have now resorted to sending them in pieces. Such piecemeal mailing of parts makes it difficult for the x-ray operator at the mail centre to identify a metal shape as belonging to a firearm, unless he or she has been specifically trained to do so. Alternatively, whole firearms or pieces of firearms may be wrapped in foam and tin foil, which changes the shape of the item, making it doubly difficult for operators to identify the object being screened as a firearm or part of a firearm.

Passengers

Customs receive the passenger manifests three hours in advance of an aircraft's landing, too late to do anything about inspecting either baggage or passengers unless they have prior warning or have done a risk profile of that particular flight. At the JIA, efforts are constantly made to adhere to the ICAO recommended practice of clearing passengers within an average of 45 minutes. In trying to stick to this time limit the agencies responsible for security controls are unable to screen all disembarking passengers, especially as both immigration and baggage collection processes have also to be completed within that short period. Accordingly the opportunity to identify a suspicious passenger is limited to the approximately 22 seconds during which that passenger is passing through the exit channel.

Currently Customs are working on developing an electronic system which will enable them to receive information on a passenger as he or she books in at

the international point of departure, and to correlate this information with that already stored in the Risk Management System. This can be checked against the record of that passenger (for example previous movements, frequency of flights and earlier destinations). In addition, access to the ACSA CCTV monitor system combined with a greater number of floor staff to undertake on-the-spot floor inspections would improve the whole detection and intervention system for passengers disembarking at the JIA.

Cargo

While the same problem is experienced to a lesser degree in the receipt of Bill of Entry and goods manifests for cargo, there is a longer turnaround period for incoming cargo at the JIA (approximately six hours). Plans are under way to make more of the documentation system electronic-based, so that in future goods manifests will be received before a flight lands. In this way more in-depth risk profiling and analysis of specific consignments can be carried out.

Overall Customs JIA do not have the capacity to examine every article passing through the facility. Even if they were to stop the flow to make more thorough inspections, this would create excessive delays and block the system. In practice they are able to physically inspect only an estimated four per cent of cargo. (This is in line with international norms.⁸⁰) Moreover, inspections rely on risk assessment and profiling, which means that most cargo is cleared on the basis of an examination of its documentation—where the ‘known shipper’ principle comes into operation.⁹¹ Customs trust these registered shippers to check the contents of cargo, pack them properly and complete all the required documentation correctly. Accordingly they pass such cargo on receipt of all the documentation without physically inspecting the contents.

The increase in air traffic through the JIA means that currently on average 88 international passenger and four cargo flights are received every day, with most commercial passenger flights also carrying parcels and cargo. Since passenger and goods manifests are often not received before arrival, a window enabling smugglers to slip through existing control measures is created. If no passenger manifests are received before a flight lands, Customs are unable to draw up a risk profile on the point of origin in advance. All they can do is look at the baggage tag on the passenger’s luggage, to find out where he or she has travelled from. Even this type of check can be frustrated, because some passengers pull this tag off.

Improving customs operations

Ways in which Customs can work more effectively in co-operation with police include the following:

- improving the rate of inspections (although this has manpower and technology implications);
- streamlining the flow process;
- establishing a full electronic system for all customs documents, goods and passenger manifests (to assist information tracking, the calling up of back histories of shippers and travellers, and analysis of patterns and trends to inform decisions on what consignments and which passengers to search);
- implementing their own random selection of cargo for physical inspections (as opposed to the police-based random inspections);
- making greater use of the SARS SARs by collecting and collating information from all kinds of sources at a central point, analysing it and passing the results back to customs officers at all the different ports of entry (which assists the selection of which consignments to investigate);
- developing a larger investigative capacity, and making investigations strongly information-driven;
- providing specialised training for scanner operators in contraband and firearms recognition;
- implementating a goods-based (as opposed to a crime-based) informer system and publicising this among all agents, shippers, forwarders and operators; and
- encouraging and publicising wider use of the anonymous toll-free number (SARS Hotline) for reporting customs violations.

Airport security

At the JIA the first layer of physical security is perimeter fencing and specific restricted areas (those for baggage handling and airside areas such as the

apron and hangars). This security is provided by an ACSA-contracted security company and consists of the following:⁹²

- access control at perimeter fence gates;⁹³
- perimeter fence patrols;
- electric monitoring of the perimeter fence; and
- the screening of personnel and cargo entering through the control gates.

Access control gates and screening⁹⁴

Since 1 April 2002 a new system of reverse screening, which means that personnel, goods and equipment are screened on entrance and exit, has been implemented at all gates. Previously much of the outgoing traffic was not screened. Now the permit is checked when the holder passes both in and out, and it is cross-referenced with the Register Book. All baggage is inspected, and the driver's cabin, the underside of the vehicle and the engine compartment of each vehicle are checked.

The access control guards work a 24-hour two-shift system, and the number of personnel at each gate is dependent upon the volume of traffic flow. Big gates have between five and six personnel on duty, while the smaller gates have one to three. A total of 118 personnel per day are currently used on these shifts. All guards are registered with the National Keypoints Committee and the Security Officers Board (SOB). The latter is being replaced by the new Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA), which required all new registrations to be made before the end of 2002.

Perimeter fence patrols and electronic fence monitoring

Perimeter patrolling is done by one 24-hour two-shift patrol vehicle with two personnel on board who are armed with pistols. (No patrol dogs are used for perimeter fence guarding at the JIA.) This vehicle is radio-linked to the JIA Joint Operating Committee (JOC) control centre. The perimeter fence is also electronically monitored in sectors. If there is any movement activity in a certain sector, the electric fence is activated. This sets off the monitor in the JOC Control Centre. The particular sector activated comes up on the screen, and

the patrol vehicle is notified by radio so that it can go and check on what has activated the monitor. The JOC monitor is manned on a 24-hour basis, and all activation incidents are registered in a log book. The patrol vehicle also has a log book in which any activation calls from the Control Centre are registered. If a number of sectors are activated simultaneously, the patrol vehicle inspects them in sequence. General day-to-day patrolling involves the patrol vehicle driving along the fence, whose condition is continually checked. If the fence shows any signs of damage or deterioration, the company responsible for 24-hour fence maintenance is requested to come out and repair it.

The purpose of both access control and perimeter fence patrolling and monitoring is to prevent any breaches. They represent the last line of checks and screening for any possible smuggling of goods and any tampering with or stealing from outgoing or incoming cargo.

Potential shortcomings

Over the last few years the JIA has grown in size. This has led to an increase in air traffic, passengers and goods.⁹⁵ Because a greater number of airlines operate from the JIA, the space allotted to foreign airlines (including areas for cargo and warehousing) has become congested, as have the traffic flows through all the perimeter access gates. More personnel are needed to man these gates and patrol the perimeter fencing.⁹⁶

With the implementation of reverse screening at exit gates, a major loophole for the illegal movement of cargo and goods has been closed. However, the current volume of in- and outgoing traffic through some of the gates makes 100 per cent reverse screening impossible. In practice random spot checks are made on outgoing traffic. Therefore there is a need for more thorough inspections of vehicles and cargo going through the gates. There are plans for the building of separate cargo inspection lanes (as distinct from ordinary non-cargo carrying traffic lanes) at certain of the gates,⁹⁷ and for electronic links between gates and cargo databases, so that the movement of incoming and outgoing cargo traffic can be tracked electronically.

Another problem is that gate personnel are not fully aware of all the documentation required for the movement of goods and cargo.⁸⁸ A training course in document recognition should be provided for all gate personnel. There is also a need for the various operating companies at the Foreign Freight Terminal to organize better warehouse control and security.⁸⁹ Because of the

lack of space, containers and other bulky packages are sometimes left standing outside the warehouses. This makes them vulnerable to theft or tampering. Also, some airlines leave cargo on the apron for long periods before transporting it to warehouses.⁹⁰ This delay provides an opportunity for anyone to tamper with, pilfer from or remove goods.

Normally each warehouse company has its own security personnel, but there is none at the government warehouse, which has only closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring.

Parking areas, cargo and airport terminals access⁹¹

The guarding of the parking areas at the SAA Cargo terminal and the airport terminal building represents the next line of security. This service is provided by another ACSA-contracted security company,⁹² which provides a general protection function. Its duties include patrolling all parking areas as well as access to restricted areas both at the SAA Cargo terminal and in the airport terminal building itself.⁹³ This is done by checking permits at points controlling entry and exit. Anything and everything that people carry is physically examined. In addition, outgoing persons taking anything with them must have a note authorising them to remove that object from the premises. Personnel going through these entry/exit sites or going onto the apron are also subject to x-ray screening.

The food that caterers bring in is checked all along the chain. It is prepared in a warehouse separate from the airport premises, checked, packed into containers, sealed and locked. The food comes through the gates of the airport in a sealed truck. The seal numbers are checked by the guards. Customs and Excise regulations allow for spot checks on food intended for international flights. It is not easy for anyone to slip goods into a food consignment (for example a catering container) unless that person knows the system very well. Also, to circumvent all these security checks successfully, a number of people along the chain would need to be corrupted before contraband goods could be loaded with the food on an international flight.

Terminal access security (embarkation)

At the terminals, embarking passengers move into security sites where all passengers are screened, boarding passes checked, and hand luggage put through the x-ray screening machine (and if necessary opened and physically

checked). The individual passenger also has to step through the walk-through metal detector machine. If necessary additional screening of a passenger will be undertaken, using a hand-held metal detector and/or a body search. Such security checks are also applicable to all transit and transfer passengers. By law, all pilots, air crew and their baggage also have to go through the process of in-terminal screening.

Baggage security⁹⁴

The next level of security relates to baggage. Baggage screening is undertaken by Aviation Co-ordination Services (ACS), a joint venture between ACSA and the airlines. Because this is an area in which firearm trafficking (and the smuggling of other goods) is possible, stringent control checks and screening have been enforced for some time. These have been even more rigorously applied since 11 September 2001, and there are plans to replace equipment and employ additional personnel to reinforce the screening system.

Currently the JIA has 100 per cent screening of all internationally-destined hold baggage (in other words, luggage and goods which are loaded directly into the hold of an internationally-bound aeroplane). All hold baggage is screened for explosives⁹⁵ and/or other dangerous substances like ammunition, or flammables like lighter fuel or aerosol cans. Although a certain number of flammable cans are allowed through, a disproportionate number in any one piece of luggage will be red-flagged. A physical check could also be carried out.

All luggage travelling to international destinations will follow a specific route of screening and inspection. At Level 1, all hold baggage for internationally bound passengers whose original departure point is Johannesburg will be placed on a conveyor belt after booking in, and proceed directly to an automatic scanner machine. This is the Z-Scan, an x-ray machine containing certain computer software for the detection of potentially dangerous objects inside luggage. Any bag that does not pass Level 1 (for whatever reason, for example because it contains electronic equipment) is automatically diverted to Level 2, where operators will review the image of contents of the luggage, projected on a screen.⁹⁶ The operator has seven seconds to check the image, make a decision and press one of two buttons (red or green). Green will allow the piece of luggage to proceed to the loading area, where it will automatically be deposited at the ramp for loading in a container. After that it will be taken to the designated aeroplane and loaded in the hold. If the red button is pushed, the piece of luggage will go on to Level 3 screening. Here the CTX

5000 spectrum analysis itemiser machine⁹⁷ undertakes a further screening of the luggage to determine the nature of the suspicious object. If the operator is again not satisfied with the image and analysis of the object, the bag will be taken off the conveyor and the bag tag checked. The passenger to whom the bag belongs will be contacted and asked to report to the reconciliation room. Here the bag is opened in the presence of the passenger, a representative of the airline on which the passenger is booked to travel, the operator and the security officer on duty. The contents are inspected and either passed or confiscated. An example would be the presence of six aerosol cans in the bag. At least four will be confiscated and the rest passed. The bag will be closed and allowed to feed back into the loading system.

Every piece of baggage either of unusual size or with fragile contents is separated from other baggage and sent to a different itemiser machine.

The baggage of passengers transferring from one flight to another is separated from other baggage being offloaded. It goes through the same screening process as other international baggage booked in at the JIA, and is then sent to the loading area for the connecting international flight. The entire screening process is completely secure once the specific piece of baggage has been weighed and placed on the conveyor belt. No-one is allowed into the baggage screening area without an access card. There are CCTV cameras at each loading ramp. The current systems are designed to deter any tampering with, substitution or insertion of any additional object into a bag after it has been screened.

Loopholes

While the actual baggage screening system would appear to be secure, there are other parts of the baggage handling process where smuggling can (and in the recent past did) occur. However, the circumvention of security tends not to happen during the actual baggage screening process or in the area allocated for departing international passengers. Instead it occurs in the areas for arriving international and domestic passengers, where reverse screening is not used (with the exception of certain private or unscheduled flights). Loopholes are also created because there is no screening of hold baggage for domestic passengers, whether departing or arriving.

One of the easiest ways to smuggle goods is for a passenger from an incoming flight to simply walk through the 'nothing to declare' gate on exiting from the baggage collection area. A second method is to leave baggage unclaimed in the

collection area. Unclaimed baggage is sent through the red line to be dealt with by Customs before being deposited in the unclaimed baggage office. An accomplice brings the luggage to the red line counter when it is very busy. In such circumstances the customs official is likely to wave such baggage through without inspecting it. This *modus operandi* requires the bribing of one officer and a member of the airport staff who works in the baggage handling section.

A further way of exploiting the current situation is that an international passenger could arrive, leave the bag unclaimed, and then travel to a destination inside South Africa. On arrival, the passenger could report the bag as lost. The JIA would trace it and forward it as domestic baggage. It could then be collected as such, without having been examined.⁹⁸

Cargo security at the JIA⁹⁹

The transport of cargo is governed by the South African CAA, which has adopted the relevant ICAO resolutions. (IATA's proscriptions deal more specifically with the way cargo should be shipped—for example certain packing requirements and specifications, and the role of indirect air operators in handling cargo.) Also, the US FAA requires any cargo to be subjected to specific security measures if it is to enter the USA. In addition, each airline has its own programme which dictates what level of security should be implemented for each type of cargo.

Cargo handlers usually work on the principle of 'known shipper'. This means that a registered agent or freight forwarder with whom the cargo handling company has built up a long association over regular shipments and can trust to implement all the security screening and Customs and Excise requirements, will be allowed to consolidate cargo without supervision. The shipper is allowed to combine parcels and smaller consignments from different exporters or clients into one big consignment, and to pack it onto a full loading pallet. A known shipper company is permitted to do consolidation, customs inspection, and weighing and sealing (in other words, clearing for export) at the company's own warehouse. Such a load will then be 'pre-accepted', so that it can be put through the cargo handler's acceptance processes much more quickly.

However, such known shipper consignments may still be put through security screening processes. A container may be scanned by the x-ray machine (if it is small enough to fit) so that the operator can check for harmful articles or

weaponry. But if the consignment is too big for the x-ray scanner it will be subjected to a physical inspection. If necessary the packaging will also be opened and the contents checked. This procedure is a specific FAA requirement for all cargo destined for the USA. In the case of the JIA, the SAA Cargo warehouse is the biggest cargo operator and has a number of the requisite x-ray machines and sophisticated security systems. But the smaller cargo handlers (with the exception of the courier company DHL), especially those using the Foreign Freight Terminal, do not have either the requisite equipment or comparably advanced security systems. So the cargo they handle has to be inspected by customs officials by hand.

An additional security measure is that each known shipper is also registered on the system, and issued with a 'draw card' that allows that shipper to collect (draw) the shipped goods from the warehouse upon release. The draw card is also used as an ID document or access permit when the shipper enters the cargo terminal either to deliver goods for transport, or to collect cargo. However, any 'walk-in' client who is not a regular shipper will be subjected to security checks, and all cargo handed in for shipment will automatically be physically screened and checked.

At the SAA Cargo terminal facility at the JIA, the whole warehouse is a 'sterile' site—that is, a restricted area which only persons with a security cleared permit may enter. At this terminal there are also specific access points in the perimeter fence surrounding this facility. SAA Cargo has contracted a security company independent of that used by ACSA for its warehouse. In addition, two security companies are contracted to perform different security functions. One is responsible for access control, while the other safeguards valuable cargo operations. One of the two also handles CCTV monitoring.

SAA Cargo issues its own access permits. While approximately 659 employees work for SAA Cargo, the JIA Cargo terminal currently employs 450. Staff access is strictly controlled. Personnel are allowed to park only in the specific SAA Cargo parking area, and must enter the facility through a specific access point away from the goods acceptance area. SAA Cargo terminal staff are not allowed to bring their own firearms or private cellphones onto the premises. All staff are screened and x-rayed on entry and exit, and the times recorded.

A number of security measures are implemented for goods acceptance and shipment. Goods delivered for acceptance into the SAA Cargo warehouse (unlike those originating from known shippers) are processed only through the designated counters. Smaller parcels are simply handed over the counter and

put onto the conveyor belt to the x-ray machine. For larger consignments the red line principle is applied. No agent, freight forwarder or client may cross a physical red line and enter the warehouse area without special permission. (Such permission may be granted if a customer has to feed a consignment of live animals, or make changes to, or check labels, for example.) All authorisation to cross the red line and movement across it is recorded in the Customer Escort Register. Each time the red line is crossed by the customer, he or she will be signed in and out and accompanied into the warehouse terminal by one of SAA Cargo's personnel.

Currently SAA Cargo makes use of two electronic cargo recording and tracking systems, namely SAFRON and ZEBRA. A manual system is also employed concurrently with the electronic ones. Once all the documentation (customs clearance certificate, consignment note, waybill and so on) has been checked, the manifest documents for the cargo will be prepared for a specific flight, pallet or consignment unit. This flight file will be filed and stored in the archive.

All parcels bound for international destinations are recorded in both a register and a screening register. The special security requirements for USA-bound cargo include separate record-keeping in a USA register book (for cargo) and in a USA-screened register book (for all screenings). The USA waybills are also stamped as having either been x-ray screened or physically inspected under a CCTV camera. The x-ray scanner is locked when not in use, and every operator coming on duty will perform a Stepwedge Test to check that the machine is correctly calibrated. This test is recorded as proof that the machine is operating to the required standard. The machine is serviced every three months by an external company which has a maintenance contract.

All cargo that is being transhipped will have its incoming manifest relabelled (barcoded). This means it will go through the whole SAA Cargo documentation process as if it was cargo being newly presented for acceptance. New screening stickers and documentation cards will also be issued, and the cargo is again subjected to security controls in accordance with ICAO's Annex 17 as a matter of course.

At the SAA Cargo terminal all dangerous goods (including firearms and ammunition) are marked according to the level of danger and stored separately. Radioactive material is stored in a locked steel cage. Dangerous Goods acceptance staff have all undergone training for dealing with dangerous goods. Consignments are checked by dangerous goods designated personnel to ensure that they have been correctly packed and comply with the pre-

scribed specifications. In addition, dangerous goods are inspected for the UN specification number.

The SAA Cargo policy on firearms and ammunition is that ammunition is handled as Dangerous Goods, and firearms are handled as Valuable Cargo. This means that the acceptance of such consignments differs from that applying to other dangerous goods. At the Valuable Cargo acceptance area there are armed guards who monitor the acceptance of valuable goods as and when such goods are presented. The whole valuable cargo area is under camera surveillance. Valuable cargo is accepted under guard, processed and placed in the strong-room vault (which is also monitored by a CCTV camera inside). When a consignment of valuable cargo is ready to ship, it is taken out to the holding area under guard, transported to the aeroplane on the apron, and loaded into the hold. The guards remain on the apron until the aeroplane has taken off. The Valuable Cargo staff are all specially trained and vetted.

SAA Cargo have incorporated other security control measures into the procedures governing acceptance of Valuable Cargo. For example the waybill and the customs clearance certificate contain a full description of the type of cargo being sent under the Valuable Cargo designation. However, the telex sent to the receiving station or cargo terminal, to inform the authorities there that such cargo has been loaded onto an aeroplane and departed, uses only the code VAL. No description of the commodity being shipped is provided. Accordingly there is no way that the type or value of any Valuable Cargo can be ascertained at the arrival end unless inside information is available. In an additional security measure, the CCTV camera monitoring room is manned by personnel from a different security company to that which supplies the Valuable Cargo guards.

In terms of cargo arriving by air at the SAA Cargo terminal, no goods or consignments will be released unless the Bill of Entry has been stamped as customs cleared, and all the other documentation is in order. Diplomatic bags are stored in a separate area which is also under CCTV camera surveillance.

Potential security loopholes

While Customs and Excise require a detailed description of goods on their customs declaration forms, the cargo accepting company takes measures to ensure the security of this information. While the Customs information system is essentially a closed one, there is a potential for information leaks.

Accordingly, specific security checks are required at various points to guard the integrity of all cargo information. For example the manual paper trail and access to the electronic recording system both need to be screened.

Firearms controls¹⁰⁰ at Durban Airport¹⁰¹

As at the JIA, at Durban Airport the Border Police follow the system outlined in the *Border Police Procedure Manual*. In brief, for the importation of commercial arms a SAP 312 is used. The issuing of the relevant import permit is done through the Designated Firearms Officer stationed at Durban Central Police Station, who sends the necessary information to the CFR in Pretoria. On approval of the permit by the CFR, the Register sends a fax to the SAPS Air & Sea Borders office in Durban. If the consignment is going out by sea the permit is handled by the Durban Harbour Border Police unit; if by air, then by the Border Police unit at Durban Airport. The importer's agent is then required to inform Customs via a DA 500 form that the consignment is ready for inspection. The import permit lists all the serial numbers of the firearms being imported. In the case of Durban Airport, the consignment is moved from the aircraft onto a pallet and brought to the cargo shed, where it is locked up in the valuables safe. This whole process is monitored by CCTV cameras (36 of which have been installed in the terminal building and in the SAA Cargo warehouse. Only one is focused directly on the safe.) These cameras are monitored in the control room, which is manned on a 24-hour basis.

The import documents are processed by Customs, and a detention stop order is placed on the firearm consignment awaiting inspection. Customs and the Border Police supervise the inspection in the presence of the senior clerk of SAA, and the importer or his agent. Each firearm is opened and checked by serial number (as listed on the import permit). After this inspection the firearms are replaced in the safe, which is locked by the SAA clerk. The inspection team returns to the Customs and Excise office, where a stop note report recording the outcome of the inspection is submitted. Customs then calls for a DA 74 (the customs release document). The SAPS personnel make a full occurrence book entry at the Border Police offices at Durban Airport, and fax a copy to the CFR. If any mistakes have been found on the documentation or permit, notification is sent back to CFR so that the error can be rectified before any release is authorised. At the end of each month the Border Police record is cross-referenced against that of the Border Police sea unit, to ensure that all consignments coming in both by air and sea have been checked.

Temporary firearms permits (SAP 312) issued at Durban Airport to tourists or hunters cover a three-month period. Full details of the applicant and firearm(s) are taken, and the applicant is also asked to specify at which port of exit he or she intends to depart, and the date. If the applicant is leaving from Cape Town, for instance, the Border Police units at Cape Town airport or harbour are given the necessary information. This is then entered into the MCS. Durban Airport Border Police have instituted a red flag system to denote that a person has brought in a firearm or firearms, so that when the person exits the country he or she is required to produce the identified firearm.

Problem areas in firearm controls

One of the problems experienced in the system of MCS red-flagging is that not all of the MCS systems at South African ports of entry are currently linked electronically. For example, if the person described above declared that he or she intended to leave the country from Cape Town Airport, and instead crossed at one of the smaller posts, say on the Swaziland border, the firearm red flag would not be picked up by the authorities.

None of the importers in the Durban area currently have secure vehicles to transport firearms from the airport or harbour to their place of business. This exposes them to the risk of being robbed of their firearms consignments while these are being transported. While there is no requirement in the law or regulations at present that such transportation should be done in an armoured secure vehicle, one of these could easily be hired on a once-off basis from any number of private security companies.

Baggage and passenger security at Durban Airport

At Durban Airport all baggage of passengers departing for international destinations is screened. For a period of eight weeks after 11 September, screening of domestic baggage was also done.

The stricter inspection measures that have been instituted at Durban Airport over a period of almost a year have led to a number of drug seizures. These have been followed by a decline in the number of international passengers passing through Durban Airport, particularly those in transit. Security officials suspect that this decline is linked to perceptions among smugglers that it has become much more difficult to use the airport as a route for any type of con-

traband. Durban Airport's security is currently assisted by three special sniffer dogs which have been trained to detect explosives.

When an unscheduled private flight comes into Durban Airport, all baggage carried on that flight is screened at the international section, in accordance with the reverse screening process.

To co-ordinate the overall security at Durban Airport, an Operational Committee (OPCO) meeting is held every morning between the managers of the various control and policing bodies at the airport. Overall security at Durban Airport would appear to be tight, although, as elsewhere, the Border Police and Customs suffer from manpower constraints.¹⁰²

Security loopholes and baggage problems at Durban Airport

One of the problems encountered at Durban Airport is the lack of control of international transit passengers. Often an international transit passenger will book in as if travelling on a domestic flight, but will have his or her luggage checked in to be sent all the way through to an international destination via the JIA. This luggage is offloaded at Johannesburg by the baggage unloading section and re-routed directly onto the conveyor belt to the loading point container for international destinations. This inadvertent circumvention of the international baggage screening system at the JIA occurs because of shortcomings in procedures. Transit or transfer luggage is supposed to be separated for screening at the JIA, but until recently this did not always happen, owing to the difficulty of getting the domestic airport of origin to mark such luggage clearly and separate it from domestic baggage. This meant that transit luggage was not routed through the international check-in counters for screening. With the tightening up of all screening procedures, such luggage is now separated before entering the loading area at the JIA. It is taken to a stand-alone screening machine outside the off-loading or loading area for screening, and then taken to the relevant loading point for its international destination. The separation process at the JIA is still heavily dependent upon human intervention. Accordingly the Border Police at Durban Airport have requested that the luggage of all domestic passengers departing from the airport be screened on a permanent basis. This would obviate the necessity of screening transit/transfer luggage from Durban Airport at the JIA.¹⁰³

Another loophole in baggage security is the exploitation of lost property or delayed luggage. Parcels or goods coming in from overseas are supposed to be

opened and inspected at the first port of entry (generally the JIA),¹⁰⁴ but this system can be circumvented. For example, a person wanting to smuggle goods into South Africa may arrange for luggage or a parcel to be 'lost' or delayed. In such a case that person would either arrange for the luggage or parcel to be left off the conveyor belt at the baggage collection point at the JIA, or fail to claim it. Such a person could then proceed to Durban, have the 'lost' luggage or parcel 'rush tagged' to Durban, and collect it. The parcel or luggage would not be inspected, since it would be classed as domestic.

Border Police officials at Durban Airport suspect that any smuggling of firearms occurring in the region is not being done through Durban Airport. Their reasoning is that strict screening measures are applied to international passengers, the whole airport area is secure, and there is CCTV surveillance in the cargo warehouse. Also the number of contraband and drug seizures in recent months at this airport have acted as a deterrent. They concede that certain aspects of security can (and will) be improved. These include reverse screening of all incoming passengers (not only for those on unscheduled or private flights), and the screening of departing domestic passengers.

Police officials conjecture that any firearm smuggling occurring in the Durban area is linked to the dagga-smuggling trade, and is carried out by low-flying aircraft landing at remote rural ground airfields. Moreover, they suspect that some operators might be obtaining concessions at airports not designated as international ports of entry, like Virginia (north of Durban) and Richards Bay, where there are no permanent Border Police or immigration officials. The assumption is that these operators land at such airports, offload the contraband goods they are carrying, and then proceed to Durban, where their legitimate cargo is cleared by Customs.

As part of the Border Police effort to address this problem, a national initiative, Operation Star Wars, was launched in May 2002. This operation aims to identify and list all minor airports and landing strips, inspect them, and gather information from local communities concerning any air traffic making use of these airports and landing strips at any time. This information is passed on to the local police station commissioner, so that monitoring can continue at local level and a network of observers and informers be developed. This will encourage a continual flow of information on aeroplane movements in that particular area. Commanders of land border posts are also becoming involved in the development of a Border Police intelligence-gathering capacity, in close co-operation with other structures like the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS). However, in combating air traf-

fic smuggling operations, the Border Police are still confronted with the very real problem of low flying airplanes evading the existing air control radar systems of the major airports.

Security measures at Lanseria Airport¹⁰⁵

Lanseria Airport, a privately-owned international port of entry, was in the past considered an airport with lax security.¹⁰⁶ In the mid-1990s the airport authorities and government agencies at Lanseria were regularly accused of failing to implement the security measures required for effective control of passenger and cargo traffic. SAPS inspections of operations found that while passengers were supposed to report to immigration officers and customs and excise officials, this requirement was seldom met. Some incoming planes would land and taxi towards their company's hangar, where passengers would disembark and goods be offloaded without any inspection. There were more than a dozen exits, which were poorly guarded during open hours and unguarded after hours. Furthermore, since traffic was relatively light at Lanseria, immigration, police and customs officers did not work between 6 p.m and 7 a.m. An 'honour system' was operative at Lanseria at that time. People whose flights arrived at the airport after hours were expected to telephone the Customs and Excise and immigration officers and report their arrival, so that these officials could return to Lanseria and go through the necessary procedures. Pilots flying in after 6 p.m. were also supposed to announce their arrival on a control tower tape recorder so that landing fees could be charged. However, it was found that often the pilots of planes landing late at night would fail to report their arrival, or would mumble so that airport workers listening to the tape the following day would be unable to identify them. Pilots involved in illegal activities or smuggling would arrive at night, park at the far end of the runway, unload or load whatever goods they were dealing with,¹⁰⁷ and fly out before the officials came on duty the next morning.¹⁰⁸

Lanseria Airport has been redeveloped since then. A new terminal building has been built, and general improvements have been made to perimeter and apron security, leading to a far more tightly controlled system. The airport is owned and operated by a private company, Lanseria Management Company, which uses its own security division to provide terminal building security. These arrangements now conform with ICAO and CAA regulations.¹⁰⁹ Various other security functions at the airport are undertaken by independent agencies: apron operations are under the remit of ACSA, while the Coin Security Company provides perimeter guarding.

The Border Police¹¹⁰ have also established a permanent unit at Lanseria, which became operational in late 1997. The system now adopted at the airport for goods, passenger and baggage inspection means that Coin Security screens all outgoing baggage, while the SAPS assist Customs with the inspection of all incoming luggage. Any suspicious incoming passenger or baggage is taken to the exiting passenger section for scanning, although the screening of domestic and international incoming passengers is not part of the normal security process at Lanseria. Although outgoing international and domestic passengers have two separate entries or exits, they are processed through the same facilities. The security officials on duty ensure that all passengers and baggage go through a screening process: baggage is x-rayed, and passengers pass through metal detector machines.

Lanseria does not handle any cargo containers exclusive of the mini-containers holding food for outgoing passenger planes. Apart from small parcels, cargo passing through Lanseria mainly comprises bulk goods such as mining equipment and heavy machinery destined for other African countries. If it is too big to be screened by the baggage scanning machines in the terminal building, the cargo is inspected by Customs and Excise, assisted by the SAPS, at the only registered bond warehouse at Lanseria.

All the pillar departments (SAPS, SARS, the DHA, Health and Transport) and airport management hold a Lanseria Operational Committee (OPCO) meeting every two weeks, to discuss any operational or security matters.

Lanseria has no transit facilities for cargo. In the past the SAPS found the Antonov cargo planes using Lanseria a source of concern. Many of these were being flown by Russian pilots who had neither permanent residence nor airline offices in South Africa. Instead the pilots managed their operations on the basis of Foreign Operators' permits, which the police also considered problematic. Some of these pilots would land, taxi to the end of the runway, avoid paying parking fees, sleep in their planes and then load up goods and fly out again. However, in the late 1990s, soon after the Lanseria Border Police unit was established, a number of these pilots were arrested, either for not having the proper operating permits or for having incorrect entry or residence permits. As a result, those not prepared to apply for the correct permits have moved away to airports in other African countries. Some are now operating from Botswana, Namibia and Angola. Currently most cargo agents using Lanseria are making use of South African-owned aircraft operating out of the airport.

The Border Police Unit also found that some cargo transport operators did not declare everything they carried. (It is relatively easy to hide contraband in large cargo planes.) Accordingly, since many of the flights into and out of Lanseria were unscheduled, the airport authorities, police and Customs required all agents to present all documents before the departure or arrival of such flights. In addition, they instituted a system (similar to those at other ports of entry assessed in this report) of gathering advance intelligence from a number of sources (such as the MCS,¹¹¹ goods manifests and customs declarations). The Border Police, Immigration and Customs and Excise at Lanseria now offer a 24-hour service, although all three agencies are under-staffed.¹¹²

Since the only scheduled flights at Lanseria are those of SunAir, the flight monitors inform all three agencies when flights are due. Officials meet these flights and carry out inspection and screening. Fortunately the control agencies have a good relationship with the charter companies (currently represented by 20 offices at Lanseria) who operate from the airport. These companies normally assist any of their passengers who need special permits that have to be applied for prior to their arrival, for example permission to bring a firearm into the country. The Lanseria Border Police send such an application to the CFR in Pretoria, where it is processed and returned before the passenger arrives. The information needed on the advance application includes the itinerary of the traveller requiring the permit. In cases where hunters apply for firearm permits to enter South Africa and then fly on to countries like Botswana or Namibia, exit or transit firearm permits are reissued on their departure.

While such permits are regularly required at Lanseria, permits for the import of firearms are rarely needed. Only two to three of these are processed per year.

Lanseria airport security¹¹³

All physical security at Lanseria Airport is provided in accordance with the ICAO and CAA regulations. All the designated keypoint areas are guarded on a 24-hour basis, and all access points to the international departure area have either a guard on duty or lock-up facilities. The airport perimeter fence is patrolled three times during each shift (one day and one night shift). The four entry gates in the perimeter fencing all have guards. In addition, each person who goes onto the apron is searched. Currently CCTV has been installed only in the terminal building itself. The CCTV cameras are monitored in a control room.

Lanseria has two walk-through metal detector machines for passengers, and two small x-ray machines for hand baggage. All outgoing passengers are screened, and there are plans to implement back-to-back screening (that is, to extend the process to cover all outgoing and incoming passenger traffic, whether international or domestic). Hold baggage is also checked. The airport management company is in the process of purchasing a big XS 2000 x-ray screening machine,¹¹⁴ which the operators are being trained to use.

Currently, security staff at Lanseria report to the SAPS any firearms or dangerous goods they find. They also follow the procedures set up for inspections. They check that the Dangerous Goods form has been filled in correctly. They then tag the goods with the airport company tag, for example the SunAir tag if the goods are being sent on a scheduled flight. The firearm or dangerous cargo is then deposited in the diplock. On arrival this is unlocked, and the item is taken by security personnel to the 'Search & Discharge' cubicle. There, after the requisite Customs and SAPS inspections, it is handed to the passenger.

Cargo handling security at Lanseria

At Lanseria there is only one registered¹¹⁵ cargo warehouse,¹¹⁶ which is essentially a transit shed. The company which owns the warehouse¹¹⁷ specialises in bulk cargo. Ninety-five per cent of the cargo it currently handles is mining equipment that is being transported to mining companies located in other African countries. Because most of the cargo handled is in bond, it has to be loaded under Customs and Excise and Border Police supervision. The company is obliged to submit the manifests for incoming goods to Customs and Excise and Border Police within one hour of landing. It is not allowed to offload unless both Customs and Excise and Border Police officials are present to clear the goods. But as at the JIA, Customs do not have the capacity to physically open and check the contents of every consignment. Also, some consignments of heavy machinery are packed and sealed at the consignee's premises. An example is Anglo-American, which occasionally despatches large quantities of equipment to countries north of South Africa. In such a situation, Customs merely checks that all documentation and declarations are correct before sealing the container, on the basis that a reputable company is despatching the goods.

However, Customs at Lanseria have instituted random inspections in which they enter the registered warehouse and physically inspect cargo, as a deter-

rent to operators attempting to undermine the security system. The operator of the warehouse also has a goods register for all incoming and outgoing consignments or parcels. This register is audited by Customs once a month, and all smaller parcels are inspected on release. All items not cleared within 14 days are also reconciled with the register, checked against the manifest and document number, and set aside.

Shortcomings in security systems at Lanseria

One of the shortcomings in passenger handling at Lanseria is that occasionally a domestic and an international flight arrive simultaneously. Depending on the volume of passenger traffic into the terminal building, these passengers may mingle, making it difficult for customs and police to single out incoming international travellers for screening. Lanseria management have plans to build duplicate facilities so that international and domestic passengers can be kept separate.

Potential problem areas

Currently no integrity testing or security background checks are performed on security personnel to ensure that no corruption or smuggling has been or might be undertaken by these staff members.

As at other ports of entry, there is no inspection (in terms of physically opening containers or parcels and unpacking them to check the contents) of consignments at Lanseria. This implies that unscrupulous exporters could smuggle contraband out of or into the country through the airport. This loophole will be closed only if 100 per cent physical inspections of all consignments at the cargo warehouse are made standard procedure. However, manpower and resource constraints preclude this option at all South African ports of entry.

Although smaller parcels could continue to be x-rayed by the scanning machines in the baggage screening section, another strategy might be to require all exporters of large consignments to inform Customs and Excise and the Border Police when they are packing such consignments. This would enable Customs and the police to visit the exporter's premises to inspect the goods while the packing is being done. This would allow for the consignment to be sealed before being despatched to Lanseria for loading and flying out. However, this system might allow for such consignments to be tampered with

between the exporter's premises and arrival at Lanseria. Therefore the current system of inspection on arrival and random checks of goods in the warehouse will have to suffice, with the additional safeguards of risk profiling and cargo selection for physical inspection or screening (as at the JIA and Durban Harbour).

Concluding remarks on airport security and firearms trafficking

It would appear that very few big consignments of firearms or ammunition pass through the JIA, Durban or Lanseria airports. Those larger consignments that are exported or imported seldom present any problem, since they are usually well documented. Moreover, adherence to international standards and regulations in most countries of origin ensures that very few firearms are smuggled into South Africa through international airports. Because smugglers of such items as firearms prefer to make use of large containers, they are more likely to send them on ships through seaports than to use airports. Guns, being metal, are also more likely to be picked up by the x-ray scanners used at the JIA, and by the baggage screening machines used for parcels at Lanseria. Finally, the Border Police and Customs and Excise have found very little evidence (in the form of firearms detected and confiscated) of trafficking in firearms through the JIA or Lanseria. Most of the smuggling exposed at the JIA consists of drugs, and contraband goods, both of which offer far better financial returns than firearms or ammunition.

While in the past Lanseria had difficulties dealing with unscheduled and irregular flights from other parts of Africa which were suspected of arms and contraband smuggling as detailed above, this problem has largely been overcome. This has been done by registering a cargo-handling warehouse, and by enforcing much stricter control measures on unscheduled flights and irregular cargo transporters.

To a certain extent the problem presented by tourists and hunters smuggling in firearms for hunting purposes has been checked by the institution of the stricter licensing procedures contained in the *Border Police Procedure Manual* and the requirements in the FCA, in advance of their coming into force. The taking over of the firearms control functions and inspections from the private security companies by the Border Police at Lanseria as well as at the JIA, has also assisted adherence to the existing Arms and Ammunition Act requirements. At all the airports assessed, stricter control measures are already being implemented.