Conclusions and Recommendations - Policing the Ports Reducing Illicit Trafficking in South Africa - Monograph No 84 May 2003


	Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Published in Monograph No 84, April 2003 Policing the Ports Reducing Illicit Trafficking in South Africa Anthony Minnaar In terms of firearm controls at ports of entry, the full implementation of the procedures in the Border Control Procedure Manual and the FCA will undoubtedly ensure that few procedural loopholes remain. Shortcomings that were observed during the field research relate to manpower, resources and levels of co-operation and information sharing. However, these apply mainly to the legal import or export of firearms and other armaments. The stricter security measures currently enforced ensure that very little smuggling of firearms is occurring through the ports of entry reviewed, as is indicated by the minimal number of confiscations that have occurred at these ports of entry during the last eight months. The assessment of the security measures at selected ports of entry identified a number of problem areas relating to physical security. First, the level of control applied to transit or transfer international passengers is often insufficient. Second, there is no screening of the baggage belonging to departing domestic passengers. Third, full reverse screening checks on incoming passengers and their baggage is not done except in the case of certain unscheduled or private flights. However, improvements on these three fronts would be impracticable, because they would require a considerable outlay on additional equipment, personnel and facilities, and would cause delays. Checks will continue to rely on risk identification, passenger profiling and random spot checks on incoming international passengers. Overall security measures at all three levels—perimeter and building safeguarding, passenger and baggage screening, and cargo inspection—at the three airports visited would appear to meet all international standards. This is partly attributable to the implementation of new structures, procedures and equipment begun in 2001. There is room for improvement in the areas of streamlining, manpower, information collection, intelligence analysis and inter-agency co-operation. However, the levels of security have been vastly improved since the publication of the US Assessment Report in December 1996 and the NIDS Report on Recommended Practice in April 2000. One shortcoming is that although on paper international requirements for security measures are being met, these standards are not always maintained in practice. Strict adherence to the practical implementation of both local legislation and international regulations must be enforced by means of supervisory checks, and regular security audits and assessments by independent inspectors. Systems checks should also be implemented on a regular basis to eliminate human error, and to prevent the exploitation by criminals of the ground-level components of all the security and other operating systems. (This would include the employees of the various agencies and operating companies at all ports of entry.) While lapses will (and do) occur, these point to human shortcomings rather than flaws in the systems. Moreover, the number of security breaches was low in the last six months of 2002. They included unscheduled absences of guards or supervisors from their posts; shoddy inspection of goods and of people leaving airport premises; and the bribing of certain airport officials or workers by organised crime syndicates to gain access to, or bypass, the security systems. As these breaches occur, they serve as pointers to possible refinements that could be introduced to improve the existing security systems. There are also other areas of concern, but these relate to perceptions of co-operation and management styles, inter-agency rivalry and the protection of ‘own’ areas of responsibility. Co-operation would appear not to be at the level envisaged by policy-makers. Officials have also expressed concern about what they see as the lax handling of security for transit or transfer international passengers. However, specific recommendations cannot be made unless a specific security audit is made of the actual transit facilities and procedures currently used at each airport Finally, the one area of universal concern is the reluctance of all agencies at ports of entry to share information and crime intelligence, although this has been dramatically improved since the beginning of 2002. The problem is not that information is not being shared between certain individuals at specific airports: rather it is that the information needs to be made accessible to all the officials who require it. It needs to be centrally co-ordinated, with all information databases integrated nationally. It should link firearms records at the CFR; police crime statistics; criminal records at the Criminal Record Centre; intelligence reports; SARs; records of cargo movement between SAA Cargo, Portnet, Spoornet and Customs; tax and financial information on companies from the SARS; immigration information; the MCS and details of traffic (both people and goods) through all ports of entry. These information systems should be backed up by the wider use of advanced technologies and electronic equipment. These would include electronic record taking, screening, x-raying, electronic fingerprinting, digital imaging for facial recognition, electronic ballistics testing, video cameras, scoping and substance testing of container contents. These should be supported by linked systems of risk analysis and profiling for both people and cargo. The combination of such systems and technology would result in a more effective intelligence-led detection and prevention approach to all security and crime problems at air, sea and land ports of entry in South Africa.. Firearms do not have the commercial value of cocaine or heroin. The returns are much smaller and the risks greater because of the bulk of firearms, and the large quantities needed to make such contraband commercially viable. Single components or individual firearms have a low resale value in South Africa. To bribe the requisite number of officials and workers in the control chain to assist in the smuggling of firearms would take up most of any anticipated profits. So, while bribery might well occur at ports of entry, this is more likely to apply to contraband other than firearms. Because bribery to assist the smuggling of firearms is thought to present a minor problem at sea and air ports of entry, no form of integrity testing or corruption prevention is considered necessary. At worst, what corruption has occurred in connection with firearm trafficking has been of an opportunistic nature, and for very small reward. Recommendations A number of recommendations can be made for refining the current systems and ensuring the effective implementation of control measures. These are based on the researcher’s investigations into, and assessment of, South African ports of entry. These recommendations include: stricter adherence to legislative requirements pertaining to ports of entry and international regulations; the wider dissemination of information on international and local regulatory requirements and best practice in security measures (covering inspections, physical security, cargo and people handling, baggage screening, aviation security) by means of comprehensive but easily understandable information pamphlets and/or information workshops; the development of training modules, short courses and certificate courses accredited by the SIRA;¹⁴⁹ regular security audits by independent inspectors of all aspects of security systems and operating procedures at ports of entry; wider use of information technology; the institution of nationally integrated databases linking all ports of entry to the various crime, cargo and people movement information systems; the conversion of all information, records and analysis to electronic systems; the sharing of information between all role players and relevant government departments; the launching of more joint co-ordinated anti-crime operations; the expansion and intensification of undercover operations; the payment of more substantial rewards for information received from members of the public and informer networks; the utilisation and application of crime intelligence in focused actions; the improvement of controls over unscheduled flights; the introduction of background checks on all permit holders at ports of entry; the stricter vetting of applicants for permits; the purchase and installation of additional x-ray and spectrum analysis machines; an increase in both the number of containers risk profiled and in the volume of physical inspections made; improvement of both the Customs and police sealing of containers by setting higher sealing standards, standardising seals and using more technologically advanced seals; the installation of overhead CCTV cameras to monitor any unpacking of groupage containers and the requirement that packages not released should be placed in a secured cage area from which their release can be controlled; the compulsory reporting of contraband other than explosives by operators of x-ray scanning and substance analysis machines at all ports of entry, so that the police can investigate; the development and implementation of specialised training by all agencies that do not currently offer it; the establishment of a more comprehensive, co-ordinated and efficient informer system that is shared and co-funded by all security agencies and operators at ports of entry and specifically the JIA; the scanning of all luggage, both incoming and outgoing, for international and domestic flights as standard procedure; the setting up of rural aircraft-spotting networks and the co-ordinatation of sighting information with air controllers’ databases on the registered flight plans of all aircraft; the erection of observation posts along land borders and the use of civilian observers or information providers; the use of focused publicity campaigns to raise awareness of firearms and smuggling; the expansion and improvement of the crime intelligence and analysis capabilities at ports of entry; the introduction of integrity testing for all security personnel, baggage and cargo handlers, and customs, immigration and border police officials; and the provision of corruption prevention training.