

NOTES

1. The lack of accountability of the post-independence government is related to the under-development of the concept of citizenship and participatory democracy. The colony conditioned the majority of Zimbabweans to acquiesce and comply with decisions and actions taken by politicians, regardless of their independent thoughts on the issues. They were compelled to act as no more than unquestioning recipients, and the cost of non-compliance was always excessive.
2. This is not to absolve the free market of its numerous exclusions and excesses, which lock out the majority poor from the premises of national governance, especially those of policy formulation and implementation.
3. This position is taken on the basis of indications that the magnitude of the economic crisis will eventually push Mugabe to capitulate.
4. N Bhebe and T Ranger, Introduction, in N Bhebe and T Ranger (eds), *The historical dimensions of democracy and human rights in Southern Africa, vol 2*, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 2002.
5. B Raftopoulos and T Yoshikuni (eds), *Sites of struggle: Essays in Zimbabwe's urban history*, Weaver Press, Harare, 1999.
6. NJ Kriger, The politics of creating national heroes: The search for political legitimacy and national identity, in N Bhebe and T Ranger (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war*, James Currey, London, 1995. The war also had innumerable positives and was, indeed, responsible for entrenching the culture of resistance to repression around which the current pro-democracy movements have been created.
7. I Mandaza (ed), *Zimbabwe: The political economy of transition, 1980–86*, CODESRIA, Dakar, 1986. This was achieved through three devices: the introduction of a bi-cameral legislature to safeguard white minority interests; the entrenchment for five years of twenty common roll seats for the white minority; and the entrenchment of the property clause for ten years.
8. Substantial resources went into providing primary healthcare, basic education and infrastructure development and housing.
9. There were many instances in which conservative white groups used human rights as a shield to preserve their colonial privileges and interests.

10. State security agencies were responsible for the disappearance, murder and abduction of over 30,000 civilians. These atrocities were frightening in their magnitude and the fact they targeted persons of a particular ethnic group, the Ndebele.
11. For example, this legislation became the basis for the ultimate deportation of Shadrack Gutto in 1988 as well as the detention without trial of student and labour leaders in the same year.
12. Given that the pronouncements by both Mugabe and Innocent Nkala amounted to saying, "we will annihilate the Ndebele", the mandate of the Fifth Brigade and CIO would necessarily have been so broad as to include anything and everything. In any event, most potential witnesses fled the country or went into hiding.
13. See *Journal of Social Change and Development* No 17 Special Issue (1987).
14. J Moyo, *Voting for democracy: A study of electoral politics in Zimbabwe*, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1992, p 30.
15. *Sunday Mail*, 14 June 1992; *Herald*, 15 June 1992.
16. Such as Shadrack Gutto, Kempton Makamure, Welshman Ncube, Jonathan Moyo, Geoff Feltoe, Solomon Nkiwane, Godfrey Kanyenze and Themba Dlodlo
17. F B Schiphorst, *Strength and weakness: The rise of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the development of labour relations 1980–1985*, unpublished dissertation, University of Leiden, 2001.
18. This notion of social exclusion became a key mobilization tool in the struggles for constitutional review in the late 1990s and ultimately the formation of the MDC in 1999. Most of the leaders of the women's movement became key players in the constitutional review processes of the National Constitutional Assembly and the Constitutional Commission.
19. Tekere later challenged Mugabe for the presidency in 1990. The current Zanu PF Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo, has done a thorough analysis of this election in his book, *Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe*, op cit.
20. The NCA is the largest and most effective civic coalition in the whole of Zimbabwean history. It has managed to build membership structures in every province and constituency within Zimbabwe. By February 2000, it had 700 institutional members and 100 000 individual members. NCA's leadership is popularly elected at a biannual congress.
21. L Sachikonye, *Democracy, civil society and the state: Social movements in Southern Africa*, SAPES, Harare, 1995.
22. FB Schiphorst, op cit, p 21.
23. *Parade Magazine*, November 1988, col 25.

24. See, for example; *Herald* 13 April and 12 May 1988 as well as the *Chronicle* 11 May 1988. John Nkomo accused the ZCTU leaders of indiscipline, selfishness and failing to promote the interests of workers. Later, Zanu PF openly attempted to impose party stalwarts like Charles Chikerema on the ZCTU leadership.
25. This capacity to network with other civil society organizations as well as its organizational advantages explains why ZCTU became the leading organization in the NCA and later on in the formation of the MDC.
26. See *Herald*, 2 February 1989.
27. See for example *Herald* , 22 October 1988.
28. See *Sunday Mail*, 7 August 1988 and the *Herald* 1 September 1988
29. Ironically, Tsvangirayi is facing a substantially similar charge arising out of events that took place in 2001.
30. See *Africa Confidential*, 1 December 1989.
31. The most notable of the scandals involving top government officials were the United Merchant Bank scandal that led to the near collapse of the Zimbabwe Building Society and the Cold Storage Commission; the War Victims Compensation Fund scandal; the VIP Housing Scheme scandal; the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) scam and the Grain Marketing Board scandal.
32. This general strike almost coincided with the Zanu PF Annual Congress held in Mutare, starting on 4 December 1997. In anticipation of adverse police interference, ZCTU made an urgent application for an interdictory order to the High Court, but despite the existence of a court order, the police still violently broke up the lawful protests in Harare. The strike attracted hundreds of thousands of supporters throughout the rest of the country and was largely peaceful.
33. When the March attempt was foiled, the state sought to amend the Labour Relations Act with a view to seriously curtailing the rights of workers to engage in strike action. This equally unsuccessful amendment had been brought in via the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act. ZCTU launched litigation against the proposed presidential amendment and before the matter could be placed before the court, the Parliamentary Legal Committee issued an adverse report.
34. *The Herald*, 18 October 1998.
35. This report focused on five major areas, namely health, social welfare, the economy and agrarian issues, constitutional issues and the political system.
36. This meeting was held at the Women's Bureau Centre in Hillside, Harare and was chaired by Gibson Sibanda in his capacity as president of the ZCTU.
37. *Daily News*, 13 September 1999.
38. A critical analysis of Zimbabwe's first 19 years of independence shows that many of these same commercial farmers supported Zanu PF and its leadership financially.

39. The race factor is a thorny one for many in the region, especially in South Africa. Thus Mugabe's anti-imperial and anti-white rhetoric resonated with many victims of apartheid. In a sense, once the spectre of an ever-present, megalomaniac white power elite was raised, Mugabe was eternally shielded from scrutiny of his shoddy human rights record.
40. See P Bond and M Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's plunge: Exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism and the search for social justice*, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2002, pp 83–84; 93–103.
41. M Curtis, *Comparative government and politics*, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1968, p 135.
42. WN Chambers & WD Burnham *The American party systems*, Oxford University, New York, 1975, p 5.
43. H Hess, *Party work in social democratic parties*, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, 1996, p 15.
44. H Bienen, *Armies and parties in Africa*, Africana Publishing Co., New York, 1978, p 67.
45. PH Merkl, *Modern comparative politics*, Dryden Press, Hinsdale, IL, 1977, p 95.
46. Ibid.
47. JM Makumbe and D Compagnon, *Behind the smokescreen*, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, Zimbabwe, 2000.
48. PH Merkl, op cit, p 96
49. W N Chambers & WD Burnham, op cit, pp 18–19.
50. D Easton, *A framework for political analysis*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965.
51. PH Merkl, op cit, p 14.
52. Ibid.
53. MDC, *Economic stabilisation and recovery programme (BRIDGE)*, Harare, August 2001. Note that at the time of writing, an 'Audit and Options' exercise is being conducted within the MDC to take account of BRIDGE shortcomings. For evidence of the incapacity of Zanu-PF to exit the economic crisis, see Government of Zimbabwe, *National economic revival programme*, Harare, February 2003; the NERP sends all manner of contradictory messages, including continued price controls (revoked a few weeks later), partial repayment of foreign debt, and commercialisation of parastatal corporations.
54. This the phrase adopted by one of the international justice movement's leading intellectuals, Walden Bello, following from arguments advanced earlier by a key

- African intellectual, Samir Amin. See W Bello, *Deglobalization*, Zed Press, London, 2002; and S Amin, *Delinking*, Zed Press, London, 1990,
55. Details behind the typology provided can be found in P Bond, *Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development and Underdevelopment*, Africa World Press, Trenton NJ, 1998,.
 56. P Bond & M.Manyanya, op cit.
 57. What sort of model for democratic transformation can be found south of the Limpopo? Notwithstanding the political success achieved in deracialising the South African state since 1994, there is a large and rapidly growing literature on what can accurately characterised as a socio-economic transition from racial apartheid to class apartheid. Statistics South Africa, the official government statistical agency, released a report in October 2002 confirming that in real terms, average African household income had declined 19% from 1995–2000, while white household income was up 15%. Households with less than R670/month income increased from 20% of the population in 1995 to 28% in 2000. Across the racial divides, the poorest half of all South Africans earned just 9.7% of national income in 2000, while the richest 20% earned 65% of all income. The official measure of unemployment rose from 15% in 1995 to 30% in 2000, and adding to that figure frustrated job-seekers brings the percentage of unemployed people to 43%. These statistics reveal worsening poverty; one symptom is that ten million people reported having had their water cut off in one national government survey, and ten million were also victims of electricity disconnections, mainly due to unaffordability. In addition, two million people have been evicted from their homes or land since liberation in 1994. See *Business Day*, 22 November 2002. My own contributions to documenting and explaining class apartheid are recorded in P Bond, *Elite transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa*, Pluto Press, London, 2000 and 2003; *Against global apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and international finance*, Zed Press, London, 2001 and 2003; *Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, development and social protest*, Merlin Press, London, 2002; *Cities of gold, townships of coal: Essays on South Africa's new urban crisis*, Africa World Press, Trenton NJ, 2000; and P Bond & M.Khosa (eds), *An RDP Policy Audit*, HSRC Press, Pretoria, 1999.
 58. *Wall Street Journal*, 12 April 1999.
 59. *Financial Gazette*, 12 March 1999. In April 2003, I confirmed with Nowak that these provisions – outdated after the luxury import tax withered thanks to the currency overvaluation, and price controls were largely removed – and the following paragraphs remain at the top of the IMF agenda.
 60. *Agence France Press*, 20 July 1999.
 61. *Herald*, 9 December 2000. However, it seemed that tempers improved over the

holidays, for in early 2001, another IMF report was partially published in the press, emphasising the need for devaluation: The International Monetary Fund has urged the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to scrap its monetary policy linking rates of interest with the rate of inflation, effectively pegging the bank rate at between 2 to 2.5 percentage points above the rate of inflation. However, the RBZ has been commended by the IMF for its decision, which has not yet been announced in the country, to depart from a fixed exchange rate system, see *Zimbabwe Independent*, 5 January 2001. The IMF had 'commended' too soon, as the decision to depart from reliance on an overvalued Zimbabwean dollar was never announced.

62. Or, at worst, the parallel-import of generic drugs from India, Thailand and Brazil, amongst other exporters.
63. Crisis in Zimbabwe has warned that 'human rights advocacy... is often uncritical of globalisation and its excesses. Resultantly, such advocacy is poorly equipped to found a post-nationalist order.' See Crisis in Zimbabwe (2003), '*Defining the way forward*', Document prepared for the Commonwealth, Harare, April 2003, fn10.
64. UNDP/PRF/IDS, *Zimbabwe: Human development report 1999*, pp 82–83.
65. The core Convention statement is reproduced in *Zimbabwe's plunge*, op cit, Appendix 3. My own personal perception is that the initiative can be compared to the African National Congress *Freedom Charter* of 1955; and on that basis, Zimbabwean civil society has within it the capacity — and increasingly urgent need — to establish something comparable to the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* adopted by the ANC and its civil society allies prior to South Africa's first democratic election in 1994.
66. For details, see *Zimbabwe's plunge*, op cit, Afterword: Beyond despondency, and P Bond, (ed) *Fanon's warning: A civil society reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, Africa World Press, Trenton NJ, 2002.
67. C Bundy, Colin, *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry*, Heinemann, London, 1979
68. BH Kinsey, Land reform, growth and equity: Emerging evidence from Zimbabwe's resettlement programme, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25 (2), 1999.
69. M Lipton, Rural reforms and rural livelihoods: The context of international experience in M Lipton, M de Klerk, & M Lipton (eds), *Land, labour and livelihoods in rural South Africa, Volume One: Western Cape*, Indicator Press, Durban, 1996; J van Zyl, The farm size-efficiency relationship, in J van Zyl, J Kirsten, & HP Binswanger, (eds), *Agricultural land reform in South Africa*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1996; K Deininger, & J May, Is there scope for growth with equity? The case of land reform in South Africa. Centre for Social and Development Studies Working Paper No. 29, University of Natal, Durban, 2000.
70. State, business affirm solidarity on land issue, *Business Day*, 15 November 2001.

71. JM Riedinger, Y Wan-Ying & K Brook, Market-based land reform: An imperfect solution. Paper presented at International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, Tagaytay City, Philippines, 5–8 December 2000.
72. See LM Sachikonye, Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis & Democratisation, *Review of African Political Economy*. No.91, 2002.
73. S Moyo, The land occupation movement and democratisation in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of neoliberalism, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30 (2), 2001.
74. J Chaumba, I Scoones & W Wolmer, New politics, new livelihoods: Changes in the Zimbabwean lowveld since the farm occupations of 2000, SLSA Research Paper 3. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2002.
75. B Rutherford, Commercial farm workers and the politics of (dis)placement in Zimbabwe: Colonialism, liberation and democracy, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 1 (4), 2001.
76. E Lahiff & B Cousins, The land crisis in Zimbabwe viewed from south of the Limpopo. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 1 (4), 2001.
77. For an account of struggles over land in KwaZulu-Natal see J Steinberg, *Midlands*, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2002.
78. E Lahiff, *Land reform in South Africa: Is it meeting the challenge?* Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, Policy Brief, no 1, 2001.
79. This is significant, as the restitution process is explicitly based on equity ('historical redress') rather than efficiency. Most restitution claims to date have been settled with cash compensation, rather than the return of land.
80. S Norfolk, I Nhantumbo & J Pereira "Só para o Inglês ver" – The policy and practice of tenure reform in Mozambique. Sustainable livelihoods in Southern Africa, Mozambique Case Study Paper, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 2002; C Tanner, Law-making in an African context: The 1997 Mozambican Land Law, *FAO Legal Papers Online #26*, 2002; J Hanlon, 2002, The land debate in Mozambique: will foreign investors, the urban elite, advanced peasants or family farmers drive rural development? Research paper commissioned by Oxfam GB – Regional Management Centre for Southern Africa, 2002.