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CHAPTER 2 BOTSWANA

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Introduction

In the past few decades, Botswana has earned praise as a model democratic country whose values should be emulated by its neighbours in Southern Africa. With a relatively small population, the country has apparently managed to steer its economy towards success and has also maintained a monetary system whose currency is the strongest in the region. Despite the fact that Botswana's contribution to the overall Gross National Product of the 14 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is relatively small, the country is one of the celebrated success stories of sub-Saharan Africa.

A lucrative beef export industry linked primarily to European markets and a thriving diamond mining industry form the cornerstones of Botswana's economy. However, the latter has been in something of a crisis since January 2001, when South Africa's diamond giant, De Beers, announced its intention to delist from the Botswana Stock Exchange and ultimately move away from controlling global diamond production and instead establish a luxury-goods brand name. In addition, Botswana's flagship manufacturing enterprise, the Hyundai vehicle assembly plant established in the mid-1990s, ceased operating in January 2000 because of the liquidation of its South African parent company.

Despite a relatively stable political and economic fabric, Botswana is faced with serious problems that may severely undermine the development achieved so far. The first is the threat posed by HIV/Aids. National population censuses are conducted in Botswana every ten years and at the last count, in 1991, the population was 1.7 million, an increase of 41% since the 1981 census. Annual population growth, which was 3.5% in the period between these censuses, is now forecast at 2.2% by the United Nations and at 2.5% by the government, owing to the decline in fertility associated with more effective family planning and to the spread of HIV/Aids. A United Nations report estimated the incidence of HIV/Aids in Botswana in June 2000 at 35.8% of those aged 15–49 years—the highest rate in the world. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that Botswana has the highest death rate from natural causes in the world. There is a significant correlation between the estimates of the UN and the Economist Intelligence Unit, suggest-

ing that the country is experiencing a major social crisis. In response, a National Aids Prevention and Control Programme has been established, and a National Aids Committee promotes preventive measures among the population. A 1999 report of the United States Bureau of the Census estimated that, as a result of HIV/Aids, life expectancy in Botswana may decrease from a peak of 63 years in 1991 to only 29 years in 2010.

The second prominent threat is the burgeoning industry of organised crime. For a country widely seen as a bulwark of democracy and economic stability, organised crime and corruption pose a formidable danger. At a time when much of the region is battered by war, civil strife, and political and economic instability, Botswana's economic prosperity makes it a relatively attractive destination in the region. However, the influx of people into Botswana has unfortunately exposed the country to the hazards of organised criminal activity, which transcend boundaries. At worst there is the danger that the country may become a haven for very potent criminal organisations. It has been argued that the geographical location of Botswana makes it easy for organised criminal groups to use the country as a transit point for conveying illicit commodities from sources to markets. As a neighbour of South Africa, the largest source and the biggest regional market for a variety of criminal enterprises, Botswana is naturally vulnerable. Illegal drugs, mostly acquired in the East, are transported to South Africa along routes that sometimes include Botswana, and stolen goods from South Africa destined for countries to the north occasionally pass through Botswana with the aid of local criminal syndicates.

Organised criminal activity in the region is enhanced by the high level of unemployment, which encourages many people to make a living dishonestly. Various structural adjustment economic packages emanating from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have tended to worsen rather than improve the general living conditions in the region, including Botswana. As a region, Southern Africa remains a poor performer economically.

Botswana is landlocked and this has many implications, the most prominent being the difficulty of policing all its borders—especially in a region where borders are still widely perceived by affected communities as artificial colonial impositions. In many instances international frontiers separate people of the same ethnic group and they are thus generally ignored, especially if travellers are required to go through the cumbersome process of obtaining visas or permits. Migration regulation within the region is a difficult if not impossible task. As a result, various transactions take place outside the purview of frontier con-

trol and revenue officials. Botswana shares borders with four other countries in the region: Zambia and Zimbabwe to the north and north-east, South Africa to the south, and Namibia to the west and north.

Organised crime and corruption

There are as many definitions of corruption as there are forms of the phenomenon itself. By general agreement, however, corruption takes place when government officials receive payment or reward for granting a service of some kind.¹ In Joseph Nye's comprehensive definition, corruption is behaviour:

which deviates from the formal duties of a public role, because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascription relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding use).²

In criminology the analysis of corruption mostly involves the study of state crime, white-collar crime, and organised crime, and their regulation. The clandestine financing of political parties, for example, normally requires the use of bribes, kickbacks, and other forms of payoff.³ These practices, and activities such as tax evasion, fraud, undeclared slush funds, and planned bankruptcies, are prevalent throughout the world and governments commit enormous resources in attempts to curb or at least limit them. It would be naïve to assume that they do not exist. In many African countries the state and state institutions are not highly developed or well established and the state thus tends to be an empty shell. Explanations of this behaviour largely attribute it to social and cultural factors. Ultimately, in most African countries, the real business of politics is conducted informally and stealthily, outside the official political realm.⁴

Explanations of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa fall into two main groups. Firstly, there are continuity theories that explain contemporary corruption through centuries-old practices of exchange. According to these theories, some of the forms of behaviour that are considered corrupt in the West are in fact acceptable in terms of the norms and standards of African tradition and custom. Secondly, corruption in Africa is explained through theories of rupture. The underlying premise here is that corruption is a modern development caused by the erosion of ancestral values during the colonial period and immediately after independence.

Corruption can also be explained, according to Chabal & Daloz, as a key aspect of the instrumentalisation of disorder, that is, the process whereby political actors seek to maximise their returns in the confusion, uncertainty and sometimes chaos that characterise many African polities. Differently put, uncertainty, which normally obtains in politically unstable environments, is a key factor for corruption to thrive. Though there is an element of generalisation in these causal explanations of corruption, they have come to be accepted, at least in the West, as the reality of most African polities.

Other commentators, perhaps unable to identify the origins of the phenomenon of crime, have described it as being as old as mankind. History is replete with communities that viewed crime with abhorrence. Matsheza⁵ observes that crime has tended to advance in parallel to the development of nations and societies—as the latter have become more complex and sophisticated through globalisation, so crime has also become more complex. As a result there is a worrying trend of ever more sophisticated and organised forms of criminal activity undermining formal legitimate institutions and moral codes of behaviour.

Of particular concern today is the menacing danger of organised criminals operating in increasingly ruthless syndicates. Globalisation and advances in information technology seem to have given organised crime a new lease of life. Although technology has aided and reinforced social advancement, there is a general consensus that it has benefited organised criminals considerably. Various scholars and commentators, although welcoming technology as an essential element in the detection of, and fight against, organised crime, concur that the very tools that are employed to combat illicit activities are often used to commit crimes. Thus, technology developed for beneficial purposes often has unintended uses. In the SADC region crime may not be as sophisticated or prevalent as in the developed world, but it is a cause for growing concern.

Botswana

President Festus Mogae of Botswana, talking about the phenomenon of crime, defined it as a cancer that eats at the moral fibre, the economic resources, and the political responsibility of a nation. Transparency International has reported that Botswana is the least corrupt country in the region. Some have interpreted this to mean that corruption and organised crime do not exist in the country. However, investigations for this study revealed organised criminal activity and corruption, justifying the views about the growth of organised crime in Botswana held by the local chapter of Transparency International, the Di-

rectorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), the Botswana Police, the Auditor General, and the office of the Ombudsman. In addition, the print media are full of reported instances of corruption and organised crime.

Organised crime and corruption in Botswana take the following forms, which are discussed in more detail below: evasion of customs duty, motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, fraud, immigration fraud, and procurement corruption arising from government tenders.

Evasion of customs duties

This activity is facilitated by collusion between some employees of the Department of Customs and Excise and various courier firms.

The courier firms are engaged by companies and organisations in Botswana to collect their goods, documents and commodities, usually from South Africa. The couriers clear all the customs obligations and are eventually paid by their clients for the services rendered. However, they have clandestine arrangements with certain individuals in the customs department at the border posts, particularly the major border gates at Tlokweng in the south-east and Ramatlabama in the south.

When the couriers bring consignments from South Africa it appears they have a standing arrangement with officials either to evade the proper immigration formalities or to undervalue dutiable goods and commodities. Customs declaration forms are handed to selected officials, who do not enter the forms but retain them and later ensure that they are not introduced into the department's systems. Courier employees invariably deal with the same officials in order to evade taxes and duties. Ultimately the national treasury and the Southern African Customs Union lose large amounts of revenue to these syndicates.

Recently the courier industry has grown considerably, encouraging some employees to leave and establish new companies, thereby extending the tentacles of the syndicate. The growth in the courier industry has in a sense been artificial, since many of the new companies still owe allegiance to the established infrastructure of the 'parent' company and share its network of connections. A former employee of one of the companies maintains that "most of the ... employees are not aware of its relationship with the officials and even the company's clients do not know about it". The network brings together corporate senior management, mainly of Asian (Indian) origin, strategically positioned senior officials at the Botswana customs offices, and a few officials on the South

African side of the border. It is thus, in a sense, a transnational organised crime syndicate.

There are unsubstantiated claims that the syndicate is also involved in bringing foreign currency into the country illegally, in contravention of the Customs and Excise Act.

Penetration

While the courier companies seem to be ever-present, particularly at Tlokweng and Ramatlabama, it is clear that knowledge of the fraudulent activities is confined to a group of individuals. Quite clearly the Customs Department's top brass and even the general workforce are not party to the clandestine deals with the courier companies. At the time of writing this report, there were indications that the activities of the courier companies were the subject of an investigation.

Motor vehicle theft

The role of organised crime in the theft of motor vehicles in Botswana has been acknowledged at the highest level. Addressing the 16th Interpol African regional conference in Botswana in July 2001, President Festus Mogae stated that the theft of motor vehicles had increased and all indications were that unrecovered vehicles had been stolen by organised criminal syndicates.⁶

According to Botswana's Police Commissioner, Norman Moleboge, motor vehicle theft is a threat to the country which the police are taking very seriously. He admits that the criminals responsible constantly change their methods and

his department is thus forced to devote resources continuously to the problem. Because of the changing *modus operandi* and the sophisticated nature of these syndicates, there is not much optimism that vehicle theft will be eradicated soon. Official records indicate that up to 1,000 new vehicles are registered each month in Botswana, presenting an attractive target for criminals. Vehicles are the easiest items to dispose of given their utility

Year	Total number of vehicles reported stolen
1998	502
1999	555

value, but as a result of sterner sentences for car theft since the advent of the Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1995, opportunistic car theft is on the decline. However, organised and systematic theft is on the increase.

Although there is an upward trend in motor vehicle theft, the recovery rate is also high. Of the 555 vehicles stolen in 1999, 507 were recovered. According to police reports, the rate of recovered vehicles ranks as one of the highest in the region, with a recovery range of 86–91%. This rate is attributed to the high number of teenagers and drunkards who steal vehicles but usually abandon them to avoid being arrested for drunken driving. The other observation is that theft of motor vehicle appears to be concentrated in urban centres and confined predominantly to the region near the southern border with South Africa.

South	Gaborone 247	Molepole 46	Lobatse 33	Kanye 32	Mochudi 31
Central	Serowe 57	Letlhakane 4	Selebi Phikwe 33		
Kgalagadi	Maun 11	Tsalong 3	Gantsi 2		
North	Francistown 29				

Criminal syndicates specialising in motor vehicle theft

Before the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Theft Act, numerous criminal syndicates were involved in vehicle theft. Most of these have since disbanded as a result of the stringently applied penalties and the intensified joint operations by military intelligence and the police service in Botswana and across the borders.

Currently there are at least four criminal syndicates still involved in vehicle theft. A strong body of information among official investigators suggests that these syndicates are responsible for the significant increase in car theft in the country. From the geographical distribution of thefts it appears that almost all the major centres are covered, giving the impression that there are criminal groups in many centres of the country. The reality, however, is that almost all vehicle thefts are organised by a few small groups, all of which operate from

Gaborone where their core activities are concentrated. This could be strategic since the country's capital has the largest ratio of vehicles per population.

Organisation of the motor vehicle theft syndicates

Although at an operational level the syndicates are distinct, they seem to know each other and even cooperate to the extent of sharing intelligence about the police. They also tend to socialise at the same places and have mutual acquaintances and friends.

Common to all the known syndicates is the strong presence of foreigners, particularly South Africans. In one syndicate, which I shall call 'Mophato', there are several South Africans, a Zambian, a Zimbabwean and some Botswana nationals. While Mophato operates in Botswana there is every reason to believe that its leadership is in South Africa and that its members in Botswana are mostly used for general reconnaissance, to identify targets and to provide safe havens.

Modus operandi

Mophato members in Botswana have 'friends' in strategic organisations such as banks and government departments, including the police, immigration and customs, and they interact with them in two ways. The first is by direct bribery to obtain essential information on how to circumvent systems or legitimise their own illegal activities. The second way is for syndicate members to use various means to dupe their unsuspecting acquaintances into participating in their activities. This method is used mainly to lure females into becoming unwitting accomplices. The male members will target women working in strategic places and make what seem to be innocent advances, often enticing them with expensive gifts and money. In the process the women provide leads and information picked up at their places of work, and sometimes they even become accessories in the execution of crimes. The syndicates usually target young women with ambitions for greater material prosperity and those who are unlikely to attract attention at work.

In some instances the syndicates benefit from the voluntary assistance of staff who trade in confidential information about their department. This is believed to be the case occasionally at the Departments of Transport, Immigration and Customs.

The major task of the Botswana-based part of the syndicate appears to be to perform regular surveillance in order to study the movements of vehicles they intend to steal. This involves monitoring the owners over a long period to detect an established pattern of movement. Information is communicated to

strategists in South Africa so that agreement can be reached on the times and places where the vehicles are most vulnerable to theft. The plan would also include an exit route for the stolen vehicles. Mophato's market is believed to be mainly in South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

The role of women in the syndicates

Mophato and the other syndicates that were the subjects of this study are predominantly composed of males. Women only participate as peripheral accomplices, sometimes unknowingly. Apart from being used as sources of information, women may be required to provide accommodation or to facilitate the unrestricted movement of stolen vehicles. They have also been used as fronts in vehicle re-registration, as they are believed to attract less suspicion. In instances where the registration is not altered before the stolen vehicle is removed from Botswana, the syndicate usually engages the services of a Gaborone-based garage to modify certain of the vehicle's features.

Types of stolen vehicles

According to police statistics a wide range of vehicles is stolen, the most common being Toyotas. The bulk are stolen for short-term use and then disposed of—some, for instance, are stolen as getaway vehicles to facilitate a single armed robbery. Syndicates like Mophato, however, do not abandon vehicles since they constitute part of their core business. They tend to concentrate on luxury cars such as BMWs, as well as minibuses and recreational vehicles. Mophato mainly targets businessmen but more recently has also focused on the government fleet at the Central Transport Organisation, from which it has mostly stolen minibuses. Taxi operators throughout the region are said to be in dire need of the same kind of minibuses and it would thus appear that the syndicate targets vehicles for which there is a high demand.

Use of firearms in the theft of vehicles

Mophato's preferred *modus operandi* is to steal cars at gun point. The owners are then kidnapped, tied up and thrown into the bush to avoid an early alarm. On rare occasions some members remain to guard the victim until after the vehicle has crossed the border, making it difficult for the police to track the vehicle and apprehend the thieves. In the last half of 2000, Mophato members were linked to a spate of car thefts in Gaborone and the police apprehended four members of the syndicate who were suspected of stealing a car belonging to a Tlokweng businessman. They have since confessed to a number of other car thefts that took place in Gaborone and surrounding areas during the same period.

Drugs

From an official point of view drugs are not regarded as a serious problem in Botswana. The most commonly available drug is cannabis or *dagga*, which is either grown locally or smuggled into the country. However, small quantities of hard drugs such as cocaine, amphetamines and benzodiazepines do arrive in Botswana, usually by mail from Brazil and other South American countries, for local consumption. The recipients of these are mostly members of syndicates, in particular 'Mokgalo' and other known criminals.

There is a strong belief among intelligence personnel and in underworld circles that Botswana is used as

Table 3: Botswana police report drug analysis

Drug Name	Number of cases		
	1998	1999	2000
Cannabis	155	779	850
Cocaine	2	1	1
Amphetamines	1	–	–
Benzodiazepine	1	1	1

are not subjected to customs and immigration checks. It is thus possible to do a return flight between Botswana and a neighbouring country without going through customs procedures. Intelligence officers believe that some of the safari operations may be a front to conceal the real business of drug transportation. At the time of writing, this assertion had not been verified.

Money laundering

Like any growing economy, Botswana is susceptible to money laundering. The money involved is the proceeds of elaborate commercial crimes, some of which are achieved by or with the collusion of bank employees.

A classic money laundering case is that involving Mr. Stegtler, a bank manager at First National Bank in Gaborone. Using privileged information he—together with a team of South Africans, Botswana and a Dutch national—planned to launder at least three million pounds sterling to an account in the United King-

dom. Impersonating bank officials from Botswana they duped South African financial institutions to change US dollars into rands, which were fraudulently moved into Botswana at different times. Through the office of Stegtler the rands were then exchanged into British pounds and deposited at various times into an offshore account. The group used bank staff to bend laid-down systems and procedures and also contravened foreign exchange controls and the Bank of Botswana Act. As a result of this action the central bank could not regulate the in-flow and out-flow of foreign currency, leading to an oversupply of the rand on the market.

In a similar well-organised scam the Bank of Botswana lost R2 964 550. The money was stolen using the electronic bank communication system (Swift), and the crime was committed with the collusion of bank staff.

Fraud

The most glaring cases of fraud surfaced towards the end of the Financial Assistance Programme (FAP). FAP was formulated to provide direct financial assistance to enterprises on the assumption that they would become financially viable in the long run. FAP was introduced in May 1982 and its main objectives were to create and sustain employment and diversify the country's economy beyond the two traditional economic pillars of diamonds and beef. Depending on the size of the project, the scheme would disburse millions of pulas. As the DCEC noted:

Cases of abuse have involved collusion between FAP recipients and suppliers with the sole aim of defrauding government. Suppliers have paid equity contribution for FAP recipients and later recovered the funds through inflation of quotations and invoices. Invoices are frequently presented for payment before delivery of equipment. The effect of this pre-payment practice is that often the equipment is either not delivered at all or it is delivered after much delay or is not of the required standard.⁷

The existence of this loophole led to a situation where a team of unscrupulous businessmen, mainly suppliers, benefited handsomely from the scheme. In some instances businessmen teamed up, identifying prospective Botswana applicants whom they could use as pawns to defraud the scheme. They usually identified front men to co-ordinate their activities so that they could use as many applicants as possible. Most of the suppliers involved were South African, while others were from Asia and elsewhere.

A lifestyle mail order system is also being used to perpetrate fraud, involving the following basic steps: a registered company, using fictitious names, colludes with an information brokerage firm, which sells personal data about people. After obtaining the details of different people the company dispatches letters to them in which they are told that they have won a lot of cash in a competition. But before the money can be claimed the company requests the recipients of the letters to part with a nominal amount (sometimes BP76, the equivalent of US \$13.82 at the time of writing), to cover administration and handling costs. A good number of unsuspecting Batswana have already fallen prey to this scam, while the operators rake in thousands of pulas.

Immigration syndicates

As a middle-income economy, Botswana is attractive to political and economic refugees. Hoping for better employment opportunities some foreign nationals are prepared to do anything to get into the country and benefit from what they believe to be a diamond boom. The stringent immigration laws and procedures of Botswana have unfortunately created a market for enterprising criminal groups. Two syndicates are known to be in operation, one in the northern city of Francistown and the other in Gaborone.

Organisation

The syndicates are made up almost exclusively of expatriates, with locals being used only as couriers and sources of information. As is the norm across most of the criminal economy of Botswana, women play a peripheral role. There are basically two sources of business for the immigration syndicates: the first are people of Oriental origin, while the other is African based, comprising regional clients from within SADC, especially Zambians and Zimbabweans but also including would-be migrants from East Africa.

Modus operandi

Essentially the syndicates function by infiltrating the government system. They have official stationery, government stamps, and even the means to produce passports of various countries. On their payroll the syndicates have immigration and customs officials and police officers who not only provide confidential information but also assist in stealing equipment from government offices.

Each syndicate has a presence in various countries, where prospective clients are offered work permits, fictitious qualifications, and sometimes convenient

passports. The syndicate in Francistown has been linked to a growing number of individuals with fictitious qualifications, in both the private and public sectors. Recently a increasing number of architects, doctors and engineers have been exposed after they were found to be professionally incompetent.

The Botswana police recently apprehended key members of the Francistown syndicate when official stamps belonging to various government departments were found in their possession. A Kenyan national, Caesar Munga, who was found in possession of the official stamps, at first claimed that he was a Zimbabwean, but he possessed a valid Kenyan passport and on this he was said to be a clerk by occupation. This contradicts the information contained in the waiver he obtained from the Department of Labour, which describes him as a civil engineer in the employ of Pentaswana (Pty) Ltd. The detention of Munga has led to the arrest of other foreign nationals including Zimbabweans, Sudanese, Kenyans and Zambians. It remains to be seen whether the Francistown syndicate has been dealt a mortal blow.

Government tenders and the tendering process

There are countless systems and procedures within the government tender process, and cumulatively these result in the area being something of a closed book, closely guarded from public scrutiny.

In Botswana all large and national projects fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Tender Board (CTB), whose processes are often regarded as somewhat mysterious. A recent study conducted by the DCEC, the Botswana Confederation of Commerce and Industry and Manpower, and the Commonwealth Business Council (CBC) found that the public sector tendering system is full of irregularities and is run by cartels. The report further found that some members and former members of the board use privileged information to benefit companies in which they have shares and interests. Since most government officials have shares in companies that usually stand to benefit from the tendering process, it is widely believed that they regularly pass on privileged information on future government procurement requirements.

Organised crime in the tendering process

In a recent case a director of the roads department, Kebonyekgotla Kemokgatla, was found guilty in a magistrate's court of colluding with private contractors after accepting a bribe of BP100,000 to award a road construction tender. The case revealed skeletons in the largely subterranean tendering process. In court

Nicholas Zakhem, a Lebanese construction company magnate, admitted that he and a group of others had bribed powerful officials in both local government and central government. He also admitted that government officials in influential positions used their power in favour of his bid. One of these individuals has been identified as a powerful minister in the government, who at the time was a director in the company that was awarded the tender.

Modus operandi

From the confessions of Zakhem and the reports of the CBC and the Botswana chapter of Transparency International, it appears that cartels or criminal syndicates benefit from the tender process through the use of inside knowledge. By means of bribery the prospective contractors get confidential details about reserve prices and the scope of projects, information that gives them a great advantage over their competitors. With the help of such information these companies are able to prepare and refine their tender documents even before the tender is released. As a result of this, the same companies invariably win the tenders, not because they are more deserving but because they enjoy an unfair advantage.

Another method employed is to persuade public figures such as ministers, councillors and Members of Parliament to accept directorships in these companies. The CBC report catalogues the dissatisfaction of the business community resulting from political interference in the award of tenders. At local government level the situation is particularly gloomy as tenders are awarded by votes in council. Recently the same Nicholas Zakhem was awarded a multi-million pula tender to reconstruct a road in the Kgatleng District. This award was made notwithstanding strong protestation that his construction company did not have a proven record and that he had previously been implicated in unfair tendering.

It is therefore not surprising that the long-serving chairperson of the CTB, a former Minister of Finance and now the Chairperson of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, described the CTB as a body run by the Mafia. As he aptly put it, tenders at the CTB are signed and sealed at golf clubs and expensive restaurants even before the tenders are publicly advertised.

Government penetration by organised criminal syndicates

From this discussion it should be evident that organised criminal groups have permeated legitimate government business transactions and caused officials to

breach the code of acceptable conduct. As the Director of the DCEC, Tymon Katlholo, laments, the country is probably losing millions of pulas through tenders awarded to undeserving companies. The loss is not only financial but also affects the moral fabric of society in Botswana. The ultimate outcome has been slow delivery by government on projects that could substantially change the lives of many. Even worse, some companies have simply failed to meet their obligations and are in violation of tender requirements, which are not stringently enforced. The sad reality is that the penetration by organised criminal groups has led to a situation where fair players are sidelined and commerce is in danger of being monopolised by criminal syndicates.

As criminals penetrate legitimate structures, fairness and transparency are undermined. Eventually the culture of bribery and extortion will become so prevalent that before officials perform any service they will demand a bribe, and the erosion of honesty, transparency and fair play will have serious consequences for democracy and good governance.

Conclusions and recommendations

From the case studies presented above, it is clear that organised crime and corruption are swiftly becoming a major problem facing the Botswana government. If the situation is not adequately addressed, the subterranean criminal industry will flourish and this will have obvious deleterious consequences not only for Botswana but also for the region as a whole. If Southern Africa becomes a hub of organised crime on the continent, the inevitable consequence will be an erosion and dissipation of investor confidence. The region will then continue to lag behind other parts of the world that are making progress towards improving the lives of the majority of their people. More importantly, the efforts and initiatives of the SADC will be seriously jeopardised.

It is now a fact that organised criminal groups do exist in Botswana. In July 2001, Interpol concluded its biennial African regional conference in Gaborone by stressing the need to improve communications and technology with a view to the better coordination of action against crime on the continent as a whole. Although it has been established that the existing organised criminal groups in Botswana are limited in terms of complexity and scope, and are not as sophisticated as the more advanced syndicates in Europe, they are without doubt a danger to be confronted and it is important that a proper strategy be formulated to deal with a problem that has the potential to disrupt the country's development path. In Africa as a whole, organised crime and corruption are

growing at a rate that does not allow one to believe that the phenomenon will begin to recede soon. In fact, given the capacity limitations of law enforcement and monitoring institutions, there is every reason to be concerned that criminal activity might accelerate.

To avoid the worst scenario, Botswana needs to harness its efforts towards the following:

1. The Botswana Police should be given greater resources to enable the service to fight organised crime.
2. More specialised units should be put in place to deal with crimes such as money laundering, car theft and the general investigation of organised criminal syndicates.
3. The Departments of Immigration and Customs should work closely with the Botswana police to ensure that syndicates and other criminals are apprehended before they can enter or leave the country.
4. Interpol, the Southern African Forum Against Corruption and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation should make greater use of information exchange networks to improve transnational cooperation between police services.
5. The substantive provisions of the SADC Protocol Against Corruption should be integrated into domestic legislation in Botswana and across the region to ensure common legislation and to facilitate cooperation amongst law enforcement officers in the sphere of corruption control.
6. Information communication technology (ICT) should be made an integral part of police training to sharpen their investigations skills. Lack of ICT competence puts police at a big disadvantage in relation to the criminals they trail.
7. There should be coordination between all institutions of law enforcement within Botswana.
8. The tendering system should be more transparent to minimise opportunities for corruption and collusion.
9. Politicians should be barred from tender awarding processes, as this has been known to create problems of favouritism.

Notes

1. For further discussion see S Calvert & P Calvert, *Politics and society in the Third World: An introduction*, Prentice Hall, London, 1996.
2. For a more detailed discussion, see J Nye, *Pan-Africanism and East African integration*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967.
3. D Kelne & M Levi, The corruption of politics and the politics of corruption: An overview, in D Kelne and M Levi, *The corruption of politics and the politics of corruption*, Blackwell Publishers, London, 1996, p 1.
4. See P Chabal & J-P Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*, Bloomington, London, 1999.
5. P Matsheza, Role of media in combating crime, paper presented at the conference on media and corruption, organised by the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, August 2001.
6. President Festus Mogae, as quoted in the *Botswana Gazette*, July 2001.
7. See the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994, p 3.