THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY

There is a need to manage security to prevent conflict. However, if not dealt with in the correct manner and in the right forum, it can be counter-productive. It can restrain countries and regions economically, and can lead to heightened tension.

The world is experiencing an economic and political renaissance. Conventional wisdom is no longer what it has purported to be, and traditional ways of dealing with the interaction between states are being reassessed. The main catalyst for this new environment has been the end of the Cold War. Was the Cold War still being waged, the approach to security in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) might well have been quite different. Although it may be said that the diminished superpower interest in the Indian Ocean has made dealing with regional security issues more difficult (because of the lack of a 'big stick' to beat states into submission), it has also created unlimited opportunities to deal with the intractable issues of the past and has opened the way for the establishment of mechanisms to ensure a measure of regional stability and growth. A change in mindset and innovation on the part of those dealing with security issues is required. It is necessary to learn from the mistakes of the past and vigorously pursue the success formulas that have been tested with time.

It is crucial that the correct mechanism(s) and structure(s) are used, if there is to be any hope of successfully managing security in the IOR. The question arises whether there are existing structures capable of achieving this objective, either in their current or in a restructured form.

In the past, security in the IOR was addressed by the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP). Is the IOZP a successful mechanism to address security issues, and does it have any relevance in today's changed environment? To answer this question, it may be necessary to reassess the way the world – particularly the western world – deals with global and regional challenges, especially in view of the recent successes in Asia in dealing with divisive regional issues. This was investigated in a paper by Major General D Banerjee, Deputy Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, that was presented at a conference on International Relations in the Indian Ocean, in Reunion in 1992.

General Banerjee comes to the conclusion that the IOZP is totally inadequate to meet present challenges: "The end of the Cold War has removed any necessity to attempt to prevent the negative consequence of superpower rivalry. Simultaneously, the second Gulf War shattered the illusions of regional security. Both these conditions have undermined the basic assumptions behind the concept of the IOZP. Its premises stand discredited and there is no means that will effectively resuscitate the proposal ... Some scholars have argued that a Conference by itself may be a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) and, therefore an IOZP Conference has the potential to generate greater understanding and reduce tensions. However, in this particular case the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee have shown that they more often add to the problems than they resolve them and they do not contribute to an effective dialogue. It is suggested that a better option may be to bury the dead and start anew."

In the fifties and sixties, various Asian heads of state promoted the idea of a zone of peace, with Sri Lanka taking the lead. The idea of an IOZP was first proposed at the meeting of the Non-Aligned Heads of State in Cairo in 1964 and was prompted by Mrs Sirivmo Bandarnaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. As Banerjee pointed out, these initiatives should be seen in the context of an era where the world experienced a proliferation of ideas and approaches to arms control and peace: "this created an environment where ideas of peace and disarmament received a certain acceptability no matter how unrealistic or difficult these were in practice, or what little preparation had gone into their formulation."

In his book, The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Zone of Peace, Dieter Braun stated that the raison d'être for the establishment of the IOZP was the awareness of the Indian Ocean Littoral States of the increased military and strategic activities of both the superpowers in the second half of the 1960s.

The basic elements of the IOZP were formulated at the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in 1970, with the proposal shifting thereafter to the United Nations. In 1971, the resolution on a Zone of Peace was voted on and it was declared "that the Indian Ocean within limits to be determined together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto is hereby designated for all time as a Zone of Peace." The thrust of the resolution was the elimination of the military infrastructure of superpowers and the halting of the escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean.

It was clear that the IOZP was the product of the geo-political environment of its time and focused on superpower rivalry. It dealt almost exclusively with conventional security issues and threats. Any prospect of progress was further bedevilled by the introduction of nuclear issues into the region. It is therefore not surprising that, even with expanded international support over the years, it has not achieved anything of consequence. It might be said that the only reason that the IOZP initiative continued to exist, was because it was easier to keep going through the motions than to face reality and admit defeat. As in other parts of the world, the superpowers remained omnipotent. There was no way of forcing them to comply with resolutions or initiatives that did not meet their own agendas. In fact Britain, France and the United States withdrew from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1989.

From the outset, it was also not suited to deal with the intractable issues it tackled. The approach was institutionally aligned and rigid. Issues could not be resolved because of the absence of a consensual, non-confrontational process. Had the approach been different and minor, with more soluble issues taken on, it might have ensured some advancement. It would have allowed progress and created an environment of trust where those involved did not feel they were being confronted by a zero sum situation.

It is now also apparent that a UN initiative is unlikely to gain the confidence of the Littoral States of the Indian Ocean, nor will be allowed to take the lead in tackling the security issues in the Indian Ocean. The present Ad Hoc Committee hopes that, with a change in approach, it can breathe new life and vitality into the Zone of Peace. Resolution 49/82 of 15 December 1995 requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean "to continue its elaboration of new alternative approaches, including those discussed during the session held in 1994, with a view to giving new impetus to the process of strengthening co-operation and ensuring peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region."

In 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee held five formal meetings and two informal meetings. At the 439th meeting, the chairperson stated that "the newly emerging international climate of confidence following the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tension consequent on the termination of superpower rivalry, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the commencement of the Middle East peace process, all ... augured well for peace in the Indian Ocean area, presenting new opportunities for regional and global co-operation in the Indian Ocean."

A revitalised Zone of Peace may have a complementary role to play in dealing with security issues, providing that expectations are realistic. It should furthermore be accepted that the driving force will have to be a localised initiative without the political baggage of the UN. It could convince the international community to support consensual decisions made in an Indian Ocean forum. The endorsement of decisions by the UN will add force to those that are decided by the Indian Ocean Rim community.

Barry Buzan supports this view: "In terms of the general character of the international system, the assumption is that the next few decades will be dominated by a move towards a considerably more decentralised form of international relations than that which prevailed during the Cold War, or come to that during the several centuries of European world domination that preceded 1945. There are two main reasons for this assumption. First is that the sources of power have become much more widely diffused throughout the system. The West achieved its extraordinary global control because it possessed assets not possessed by the other actors in the system: the political form of the national state, the knowledge and productive power of the scientific and industrial revolutions, and the mobilising power of nationalism and ideology. These assets are now thoroughly, if unevenly, spread throughout the international system. No longer can great powers easily occupy and rule large swaths of foreign territory and population. Second, is that all of the major centres of power in the international system – the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan – are notably introverted. None of them is willing to take on a strong leadership role in international society, and all of them are preoccupied with their own domestic affairs. The operation of the international system will be less marked by intervention (especially military intervention) more localised (especially in terms of military and political relations), and less focused at the global level (in terms of large scale ideological rivalries shaping behaviour all through the system)."

THE CONSEQUENCE OF INCORRECT POLICIES AND NEGLECT

Notwithstanding considerable cynicism, the IOR initiative has made steady progress, and with the approval of a charter at the last intergovernment meeting in September 1996 in Mauritius, and its forthcoming adoption at a Council of Ministers meeting in Mauritius in March 1997, it will become a reality. If it is argued that, at the very most, the Zone of Peace UN Committee can be the supporter and not the initiator of the security agenda, then the question arises whether the security agenda can be accommodated in the IOR.

The Australians in particular have pushed very hard to have security included in the agenda of the IOR, notably through their former Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. This has surprised the other countries that have formed the original Mauritius Seven group (M7) and launched the initiative – Mauritius, India, Australia, Singapore, Kenya, Oman and South Africa – because of the leading role Australia played in launching the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC).

Central to APEC's success is the shunning of divisive issues, and its concentration on those issues that can bring members closer and add benefit. In this way, for example, APEC has managed to deal with the intractable China/Taiwan issue, with both being members of APEC. As a rule, the most divisive issues tend to be security-related. For this reason, APEC has no security agenda. Even the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that came into being to counter the security threat resulting from the Vietnam conflict, discarded security issues in favour of more digestible economic and trade-related issues. Against this backdrop and in the light of the failure of initiatives such as the Zone of Peace, it is not surprising that most of those involved in the IOR initiative have been adamant that security issues would not be raised in the context of the IOR. It would be difficult enough to make a success of the IOR, given existing regional tensions and the different levels of economic development among the Littoral States.

In a paper delivered to the Transitional Executive Council's (TEC) Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1994, the following point was emphasised: "It is essential that the process eventually be inclusive rather than exclusive. Politics must be neutralised as a factor in deciding on the aims of the grouping. This has been effectively recognised by APEC and is one of the reasons for its success. Regional political issues must be subjugated to the economic goals of the group. As with APEC, it should be a purely economic and trade initiative. It must not have a political or security agenda."

Professors Mukul Asher, V V Bhanoji Rao and Ramkishen Rajan made the same point in a discussion document in May 1994: "Furthermore, unlike past alliances which dealt with wide-ranging issues encompassing politics, security and economics, there seems to be an awareness and acceptance that in the present post-Cold War era, the formation of economic alliances is crucial for sustained economic growth which, in turn, is essential for the retention of policy autonomy and the maintenance of overall national security. Regional alliances now focus primarily on economic-related issues."

South Africa has been consistent and insistent on this point, and is supported by the other five M7 members. Because of South Africa's firm conviction, it came as no surprise when progress was held back in the first year, and the initiative almost scuttled by two issues unrelated to trade and economics, namely membership and security. The disagreement came to a head when Australia launched its Track II International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) conference in Perth in June 1995. The conference insisted on ignoring the concerns of the other initiators of the process and included a workgroup session on security. This resulted in the only adverse publicity for IFIOR during the conference and acrimonious exchanges between the key players. South Africa made its position known to Australia in various meetings preceding IFIOR (as did the other M7 states). In a paper presented on 29 May 1995 to the SAFTO Indian Ocean Rim Conference, the South African position was stated clearly: "South Africa regarded this first second track meeting as exploitative in nature and accepted that it was the prerogative of the host country to decide who to invite. We went to Mauritius to listen and learn but we were adamant that there could be no compromise on two key principles. The first being that the process should be inclusive and not exclusive, particularly in view of our SADC commitments, we were not prepared to belong to an exclusive club. Secondly, we firmly believed that we should concentrate on that which binds us and avoid divisive issues. As with APEC, IOR should concentrate on trade and economic related matters. Issues such as security should be avoided and if there is a need to deal with security matters in an IOR context, they should be dealt with bilaterally or in a forum created for this purpose. This has been our position in Mauritius and this will be our position in Perth. We have informed the Australians of our concerns regarding security matters on the Perth Agenda and are consulting with other countries on how to deal with this contentious issue. I believe that we should have nothing to do with this part of the agenda."

South Africa has never been opposed to the discussion of security issues. In fact, it is considered to be extremely important to address a host of security-related concerns that confront the Rim, but not in the context of the IOR initiative. In discussions between the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and the South African Navy in 1995 this point was emphasised, as it was in discussions with Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and officials in Perth during the IFIOR conference. During these discussions it was suggested that security issues should first be dealt with bilaterally and that the recently established Asian Regional Forum (ARF) might be a model worth considering when dealing with these issues in a multilateral context.

The logic behind South Africa's reasoning was simply that it did not want the progress of the IOR initiative to be restrained by more complex security issues. If the forums were separated, they could each move at their own pace on the assumption that progress and the resulting benefits would sooner be attained if issues that only held benefit for those involved were dealt with.

At an ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on New Directions for ASEAN (September 1994), Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Deputy Director-General of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, put it succinctly: "Bilateral security issues, whose cumulative effect could be quite injurious to good neighbourly relations, are in many instances not fed into multilateral processes for management. A good example is the countries forming ASEAN, which do not even discuss these issues at ASEAN meetings, much less seek to manage them directly at this level. In practical terms South East Asian security is built more on the bilateral level through various bilateral mechanisms and processes than at the multilateral level. It is this belief that has lead to the creation of the Asia Regional Forum (ARF)."

Japan's Yoshida Doctrine is an excellent example of the benefits in separating economic and security issues. In this regard, Dr Garth Shelton writes: "If Japan had become involved in the politics of the Cold War and allowed itself to be dragged into regional conflicts it would certainly not have been able to achieve such impressive economic growth. The Yoshida Doctrine provided the necessary foundation for Japan's economic miracle. The magic formula used by Yoshida to produce the most successful Cold War foreign policy was simply to accurately identify and pursue with dedication, Japan's national interests. Japan's 'survival interests' (defence of Japan) were taken care of by a military alliance with the USA and the regional balance of power which prevailed in Asia. Japan was thus able to concentrate on 'vital interests' (economic development). Yoshida wisely prevented other 'major' (ideological issues) or 'peripheral' interests from undermining the pursuit of Japan's key foreign policy goal."

THE RECOMMENDED APPROACH

How should security issues be accommodated in the Indian Ocean Rim?

If the submission is correct that economic growth in the Rim could be an important catalyst in defusing potential regional conflicts and would make it easier to deal with security issues on the back of the trust already established, then it is important that security is dealt with in a way that does not inhibit economic growth. In this regard, the process is almost as important as the structure.

Dr Noordin Sopiee, the Malaysian member of APEC's Eminent Persons Group, contrasts the Western and Asian approach to the development of the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) and argues that the Asian approach is more suited to deal with diverse cultures, levels of economic development and remote geographic regions. He refers to the Western approach as the Cartesian way: "The Cartesian way emphasises legalistic forms, agreements, contracts, institutions and structures. If we wish to build APEC along such lines, we should adopt charters and constitutions, negotiate one agreement after another, sign as many contracts as possible, and build the broadest range of institutions, committees and structures. The Asian approach relies more on the meeting of minds and hearts, on consensus building, peer pressure, and on unilaterally sound and proper behaviour. To many Westerners, this appears mushy and soft-headed, cumbersome, not 'transparent', unpredictable, ponderous – and plain silly. It calls for enormous patience. It is frustratingly slow. By the same token, there is a great deal that is wrong with the Asian approach. Its only merit often seems to be the fact that it works. Yet, in the building of a community of such diversity, the Asian way is the only approach. The Cartesian method will mean the destruction of APEC."

Given the extent of the Pacific Rim, the complexity of security issues and the existing cultural diversity, the Asian approach seems more suited to the challenges facing Asia.

Just as certain experiences have been borrowed from the APEC and ASEAN initiatives in developing the IOR, it is worth exploring the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) as a possible model for an Indian Ocean Regional Security Forum. In view of the South East Asian success in this field and the fact that the region forms a significant part of the Indian Ocean, the development of the ARF may be relevant.

THE ASIAN REGIONAL FORUM AS A MODEL?

The ARF was launched at a dinner attended by eighteen foreign ministers in Singapore in July 1994. It resulted from a wish to address security issues outside the established and successful ASEAN association, in order to avoid putting it at risk. An interesting feature of the ARF is that it consists of the seven ASEAN states, the association's seven dialogue partners (the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the European Union), two countries with observer status at annual meetings of Asian foreign ministers (Papua New Guinea and Laos), and China and Russia. Its reach is therefore much greater than that of ASEAN.

Prof Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics and Political Science said the following about the ARF at the time of its formation: "Asia has addressed regional security in a more piecemeal manner by deliberately avoiding the problem of power which is at the centre of all international relations. Fundamental to this aversion is the absence of a common strategic perspective or a shared sense of security priorities among member states. In place of defence co-operation ASEAN has concentrated on avoiding and managing conflict through informal procedures of consultation and co operation."

The traditional approach in dealing with regional threats has been a policy of balance of power. This is not possible in ASEAN because of the lack of common purpose in member countries' projection of military power. The alternative to the balance of power, is the extension of ASEAN's model of regional security through confidence-building, to East Asia. Leifer believes that "underlying the initiative for the ARF is the prospects of employing the nexus of economic advantages as a basis for constraint on declared territorial revisionism by China."

The sensitivities and concerns that face ASEAN in dealing with matters of security are very similar to those faced by the countries of the Indian Ocean Rim. It is suggested that little progress will be made if the traditional western approach is used in dealing with these issues. A case in point is the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Some may argue that Europe has been successful with the Organisation on Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE - formerly Conference), and that this could serve as a model for dealing with security arrangements in the Indian Ocean, or in Asia, for that matter. Eiichi Furukawa, executive director of the Japan Centre for International Strategies, challenges this view and points out that the situation in East Asia (and one could add the IOR) is quite different. He writes that, "after the Cold War, the [O]SCE's main tasks are creating an institution, extinguishing the fires of local and ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and former soviet Republics, and assisting democratisation and free elections. What the Westerners are interested in is institutionalisation." The countries in the Indian Ocean and in Asia no longer require supervision by the west and believe they are mature enough to enter into dialogue with a view to establish co operation.

Unlike the OSCE, which is dominated by the US, the European Union and Russia, Furukawa points out that an important characteristic of the ARF is that it is "small country orientated rather than big country orientated." The subject matter dealt with by the ARF will be limited to security and political matters related to security issues. These will be tackled step-by-step, one of ASEAN's hallmarks. The ARF may not be interested or in a hurry to introduce the military-oriented confidence-building measures of OSCE, as western observers desire it to. Furukawa comes to the conclusion that the main purpose of the forum is to "remove future uncertainties and provide mutual assurances to countries in the region."

The objectives of an Indian Ocean Regional Forum (IORF) will also have a much broader focus than that of the OSCE and possibly that of the ARF. The issue to be addressed in the Indian Ocean is comprehensive security and not only the more conventional kinds of security issues. It would appear that an ARF structure would be better able to cope with this challenge.

It is surmised that there will be general consensus among the IOR states that both maritime co-operation and comprehensive security issues need to be addressed. The point of departure has always been where and how they should be addressed. Issues such as maritime search and rescue, law of the sea, resource management and security, marine scientific research, the safety of sea lines of communication, as well as the concerns about drug trafficking, piracy, the illegal movement of people, and natural disasters, could also form part of a comprehensive security agenda. All these issues can be addressed in an Indian Ocean Regional Forum.

Lastly, in anticipation of the possible formation of IORF, the format and functions of such a forum will have to be considered and debated. A point of guidance may again be the ARF, which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests should comprise of three kinds of forums: