Preface

The contents of this monograph is a selection of papers from the annual navy conference, co-hosted by the Institute for Security Studies, the South African Navy and the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Cape Town on 17 October 1996, with the exception of the paper by Mafaniso Hara on Exclusive Economic Zones. The theme for the 1996 conference was The Utility of Naval Power, and it was held at the BMW Pavilion at the Waterfront. The annual navy conference has become a regular and prestigious event on the calender of the Department of Defence and once again maintained the traditional high standard set by previous conferences.

In his opening address to the conference, the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Rusty Evans, comments on the debate dealing with the renewal and updating of the fleet and argues that it is the right of the SA Navy to present its case. However, it is ultimately "... the task of the South African Navy to convince the public that a strong navy will contribute to the prosperity of South Africa in particular, and Southern Africa in general." This is true, but providing for the defence of the country is a primary function of Government, which must ultimately decide how much it wishes to spend on its insurance policies. Evans states bluntly that "[t]he South African Navy is at present reaping the result of past policies. These directed much of the defence budget towards the other branches of the former South African Defence Force. Clearly, outdated and obsolete equipment is preventing the Navy from effectively exercising its maritime function to defend South Africa's coastline of 3 000 km and its interests within the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The Navy's usefulness as a foreign policy tool is severely curtailed and needs to be addressed urgently."

In his article Professor Martin Edmonds discusses defence and security in the 21st century with his analysis strongly rooted in the realpolitik. He is salient in his remark that, in a world that is becoming increasingly fragmented, volatile and unpredictable, "... national survival is no longer immediately at risk. Instead, widely defined national and international interests have become vulnerable, with no clear indication of how these can best be protected. The post-1989 world might arguably be characterised as one in which the question of 'against' what military force is designed to be, has been replaced with one which asks 'for' what military force is designed to be." Yet, Edmonds is at pains to point out that, contrary to the thinking of most post-modernists and scholars focusing on security "... the nation-state remains, and is likely to continue to remain for the foreseeable future, the principal actor on the international stage." Equally sobering is his warning that "[s]tates will resort to military force when they perceive their core interests to be in jeopardy." The nature of the armed forces of developed countries, in particular, has changed – becoming leaner, better equipped and more mobile, while market interdependence and alliance politics have become strong inhibitors of inter-state conflict. Edmonds discusses a host of changes in the nature of any future war, including changes in civil-military relations, the armed forces and the like. In his analysis, he distinguishes between so-called first, second and third wave armed forces, arguing that there is an immutable relationship between the manner in which societies create wealth and the way in which they fight their wars. Agrarian (first wave), industrial (second wave) and information/service (third wave) societies therefore have different characteristics, strengths and weaknesses.

Edmonds is a strong believer that "[n]avies are ... ubiquitous. Their value lies in their flexibility and their relevance to the kinds of future world security scenarios that are being projected among leading decision-makers ... Furthermore, navies are accepted as a benign form of power, operating in international space (unlike airspace or land), a diplomatic high value asset in a world where the emphasis is on avoiding the coercive use of military force." This excellent article provides a sound backdrop against which the remainder of the articles in this monograph are projected.

In his paper, the Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, presents the annual policy review of the SA Navy. Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson uses the policy framework provided in the 1996 White Paper on Defence as the point of departure to define and describe the maritime and naval contingencies that have been used as a basis by the SA Navy in formulating its various strategies and its force design. The essence of the Navy concept of operations is the defence of Durban and Richard's Bay on the east coast and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon's Town on the west coast. These two areas are "... defended by means of a horizontal layered approach where harbour patrol boats patrol the waters of the harbours and mine hunters and minesweepers keep the harbour approaches clear of potential mines. Strike craft patrol the inshore waters, harbour approaches and the intermediate area. Corvettes patrol the balance of the maritime defence area out to 200 nautical miles (370 km). Submarines would patrol underwater through the entire maritime defence area. Combat support ships help to ensure that this force can conduct operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support." This requires a total core combat force of six strike craft, four corvettes, four conventional submarines, four mine hunters, four minesweepers, 39 harbour patrol boats, plus combat support ships, and diving and hydrographic services.

Despite having presented and argued its case both in private and public for more than a year, the procurement programme of the SA Navy that would enable it to meet its defence obligations, has apparently now been held hostage, first by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of Parliament and lately by Cabinet for several months. The irony of the situation is that there appears to be consensus that the long delayed procurement of corvettes will proceed – the only remaining question is 'when'. This is an untenable situation with cost implications that has already possibly cost the South African tax payer several million dollars. It has also been a source of intense frustration and substantial additional costs (that will inevitably be passed on to the South African Government) for the various shipbuilding consortia, that will again have to bid for a deal that is moderate by international standards. In addition to other urgent acquisition decisions that need to be made – ranging from replacement helicopters to combat vehicles – the South African National Defence Force is increasingly faced with block obsolescence of many of its major weapon systems, while the defence budget continues to be tapped to fund budget increases by other departments. Recent media reports have warned of a collapse of morale in the SA Navy, after having been starved of funding for several decades. The morale problems are in no small way due to fact that the Navy is becoming hollow and is in serious danger of being figuratively sunk. It is within this context that the clear and concise 'Annual Policy Review' of the Chief of the SA Navy should be read. There is an urgent requirement for politicians, the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet to buckle down and translate rhetoric into action.

The future commitments of the SA Navy, demanded by government policy, particularly foreign policy, are aptly supported by the papers by Dr Greg Mills on South African- Latin American Maritime Co-operation and Mr P J Botha on Security and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Rim. Looking to our potential commitments across the vast expanse of ocean to the west, Mills argues that the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) with its four 'windows' of action, places a number of obligations on South Africa. He says, "It is not enough for politicians simply to commit South Africa to participation in an expanded ZPCSA or to the Valdivia Group [the grouping of South Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, Chile, Australia and Uruguay which was established with the intention of focusing attention on issues of mutual environmental concern],without taking into account all the 'normal' functions and tasks expected of the naval forces ... if South Africa wants to expand its links with Latin America in the maritime domain, and if it wants to take up its rightful place and play a meaningful role in world affairs by accepting the responsibilities that go with the image of a responsible power, it will have to possess the necessary capabilities to enforce these political ideals. To this end, the SAN will have to be provided with the tools necessary to carry out all these expanded roles." He argues that the present reality is one in which "... South Africa's naval complement is little better than that of Uruguay, a country that has a coastline of 1 000 kilometres (South Africa's is 3 000 kilometres), and a population of 3,1 million (42 million in South Africa). Yet, if an attempt is made to find a model for South Africa's naval responsibilities, Argentina or Chile would probably be the closest fits: medium powers with populations of 33 and 14 million respectively, and with interests in Antarctica."

Looking towards the east, Botha addresses the way forward in dealing with security issues among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Thus far the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace has proven to be ineffectual in this and other fields, and he suggests that a separate Indian Ocean Regional Forum may be the appropriate structure within which "... [i]ssues such as maritime search and rescue, law of the sea, resource management and security, marine scientific research, the safety of sea lines of communication, as well as the concerns about drug trafficking, piracy, the illegal movement of people, and natural disasters, could ... form part of a comprehensive security agenda." Although the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IOR) has been making steady progress, among others adopting a charter in 1996, this does not include security-related aspects that could avoid potentially divisive security issues among its member states, as these could detract from its primary focus on trade and economic development. Despite strong Australian pressure, the feeling among the remaining IOR members is that security issues should be dealt with bilaterally or in a forum created for that purpose. Such an Indian Ocean Regional Forum or comparable body will place additional demands upon the SA Navy, apart from those already evident from SADC member states, many of whom have made repeated appeals to South Africa to police their waters.

The final article in the monograph is by Mafaniso Hara and deals directly with the role, tasks and obligations of the SA Navy. South Africa has declared a 200 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone and has ratified the Geneva Convention on The Continental Shelf. In this sense, South Africa sees the continental shelf as part of the Republic. Hara discusses the obligations that the Geneva Convention, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS lll), and related conventions and treaties place upon developing countries to enforce their jurisdiction. In many cases, the potential costs of the maintenance of an Exclusive Economic Zone through policing, law enforcement and conservation measures, outweigh the potential benefits that countries could gain from it, with the result that marine resources may be under threat from exploitation. In the case of countries such as Angola, foreign vessels take an estimated eighty per cent of the total fishing catch. Others such as Namibia and Mozambique, lack the means to police their waters. He argues that, "[w]hile South Africa has generally been successful in imposing its jurisdiction over its waters since it declared a 200 nm Exclusive Fishing Zone on 1 November 1977, there are still reports of infringements from time to time ..." and that "... the emotional and irrational public outcry against 'foreigners' pillaging the country's resources has no basis apart from the occasional incursions ... in Angola, Mozambique and also in South Africa in the future, two approaches are likely to be appropriate for regulating marine fisheries: community based approaches for the inshore artisanal fishery, and [monitoring, control and surveillance] MCS systems based on sea and air patrols for the offshore industrial fishery." Against this background, co-operation will be required in two areas, namely research, and in monitoring, control and surveillance activities. In the latter, collaboration may extend to the policing of EEZs – already included bilaterally in a treaty signed between Namibia and South Africa during 1991. The conclusion of a regional monitoring, control and surveillance system would be hampered by inequalities and the value that countries attach to securing their marine resources.

During 1997, the South African Navy will celebrate its 75th anniversary. The highlight of the celebrations will take place in Cape Town during the weekend of 5-6 April with an International Fleet Review in Table Bay. About 35 warships from South Africa and foreign navies are expected to participate in the Fleet Review. Approximately 3 500 to 4 000 foreign sailors are expected to attend the celebrations. If there is no sense of urgency within the Ministry of Defence, Parliament and Cabinet with regard to the procurement programme of the SA Navy, it may be a hollow event, signifying the extent of the decline of the Navy, rather than a celebration of its vibrancy.