EMERGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT

In May 1996 the Minister of Defence presented the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa to Parliament, which Parliament approved with the strong support of all political parties.

The overarching theme of the White Paper on Defence is the transformation of defence policy and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the light of momentous political and strategic developments within and outside South Africa. The White Paper on Defence addresses issues at the level of broad policy and establishes a policy framework and the main principles of defence.

The next step forward is to translate these policy formulations into practical implementation plans through a Defence Review process that is informed by consultation and consensus.

Although South Africa as a nation faces no foreseeable conventional military threats at present, we live in unpredictable times, with history having illustrated again and again how quickly a situation can deteriorate. In their latest book, Suid-Afrika en die Nuwe Wêreldorde, Leopold and Ingrid Scholtz quote Air Commodore N B Singh, the Deputy Director of the United Service Institution of India, who warns of the problems in predicting threats in the post-Cold War environment: "The new world order at the global, regional and sub-regional level is in the process of transformation due to interaction of newly emerging forces after the end of the Cold War. Challenges and threats to our vital interests in the [Indian Ocean] Region during the next 15-20 years may not be clearly identifiable and also cannot be accurately assessed in their degree and dimension. During this period of uncertainty, it would be wise for nations to be prepared to defend their vital interests by military means, if necessary, as a last resort."1

During a recent Defence Review regional conference, Professor Renfrew Christie presented a thought provoking paper entitled Strategic Alliances are the Deepest Defence, especially in the Nuclear Age. In this paper Christie provides reasons why the time is ripe for South Africa to right-size its Army, Navy and Air Force, to develop strong strategic alliances and to build an intelligent strategic defence force.2

The Defence Review is presently elaborating, in considerable detail, on the framework provided in the White Paper on Defence. Matters receiving particular attention are roles, functions, tasks, doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.

The logic behind the Defence Review's deliberations on the force design of the SANDF depends on the tasks foreseen for the Defence Force.

IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS

The identification of SANDF tasks is based on those constitutional provisions for defence policy that is contained in the White Paper on Defence, as well as an analysis of the internal and external security environment.

The new Constitution states that "[t]he primary object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force." It further states that "[t]he defence force may be employed in co-operation with the police service, in defence of the Republic or in fulfilment of an international obligation, (only under the authority of the President)."3

The White Paper on Defence states that "the SANDF may be employed in the following functions:

for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;



for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;



for service in the preservation of life, health or property;



for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;



for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and



for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment."4

The White Paper on Defence further states that all these functions do not carry equal weight and that "the primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression", with the other functions being secondary. Therefore, the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will be determined mainly by its primary function.

The analysis of the internal and external security environment entails identifying defence contingencies (situations in which the SANDF will or may have to be employed), assessing the probability of such situations arising and assessing the likely consequences for South Africa if the SANDF does not or cannot take the necessary steps to address such a situation.

UNDERPINNING FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE POSTURE

The determination of the manner in which the SANDF will fulfil its tasks is based on foreign policy pronouncements by the Government and provisions in the White Paper on Defence regarding posture.

According to Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister, Aziz Pahad, a leadership role is being thrust upon South Africa5 and South Africa cannot sit on the sidelines.

During the National Maritime Strategic Conference on Navies in Peace and War held in October 1995, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils stated that the demands for South Africa to become more involved in the area of regional security have become greater. South Africa – one of the few regional states with a naval capability – is called upon urgently to curb the pillaging and compromising of Africa's maritime resources. Kasrils stated that this concern for the maritime environment was not only limited to coastal states, and that a recommendation to landlocked states to become involved through service by some of their military staff on South African ships was enthusiastically endorsed.6

Similarly, the South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, in an interview with Helmoed-Römer Heitman of Jane's Defence Weekly, stated that South Africa's neighbouring states need help in protecting their coasts. "They come openly to us to request South African support and assistance. They complain that the marine life in their waters is being plundered by foreign ships. They are not even talking about security problems or some future military threat. The region wants and needs our support, particularly Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia."7

The defence posture for the SANDF is defined in the White Paper on Defence as being "primarily defensive."8 This pronounced strategic intent is consistent with the new emerging common security environment that exists in the Southern African region at present and is entirely appropriate.9 However, what is posture? Posture is defined as the combined (maritime) strategic intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities of a country, including the strength, disposition and readiness of its armed (maritime) forces.10

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The White Paper on Defence asserts that South Africa will employ the following principal strategies to protect the State and its people against external military threats in this order:

political, economic and military co-operation with other states;



the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means; and



the deployment of the Defence Force. The threat or use of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.

During his opening address on the occasion of the Second Consultative Conference of the Defence Review in Parliament on 12 August 1996, the Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki stated that "[t]he United Nations Charter, and our new Constitution empower us with the right to defend our sovereignty and impart to us the responsibility of deterring aggression ... The primary function of this National Defence Force, must therefore, be to act as a credible deterrent to would-be aggressors, to provide for a secure future ... Just as we are striving to promote the human potential of the SANDF, so too we must address the material needs in terms of equipment ... It is for the Defence Review process ... to provide us with concrete guidelines on the acquisition of essential main equipment ... This is necessary to avoid the serious problem of all our equipment needs peaking at the same time, and thereby imposing a severe financial burden on the next generation ... Your task is therefore challenging and carries with it a sense of urgency."

That the Government is serious about its defence capability and maintaining adequate main equipment is quite clear.

CONTINGENCIES

The focus in the formulation of strategy and the composition of the force design for the entire SANDF is based on a continuum of possible broad defence contingencies, ranging from invasions to threats to South Africa's off-shore assets. It is from these overall defence contingencies that the maritime and naval contingencies are derived.

The following contingencies have been identified and analysed in order to formulate various strategies and plan joint force designs.

Invasion: Invasion is defined as a major attack aimed at occupying South Africa, or part thereof, replacing the Government by force and conquering its people. At present the probability of an invasion is considered extremely small. However, given the catastrophic impact of a successful invasion, it cannot be ignored as a contingency. A seaward invasion will require substantial resources and will only be possible with the involvement of a superpower or a coalition of major powers. Factors favouring South African defences would be natural obstacles to the attacker, including the effects of the merging of the Indian and Atlantic oceans on the underwater environment. These are considerable as the mixture of warm and cold currents produces different thermal layers at various water depths, a fact that is tactically and operationally to the advantage of submarines.



Limited neutralising attacks: In this scenario a third party, such as a major power, seeks to neutralise South Africa from interfering militarily in the designs of that third party in Southern Africa. South Africa's approach to common security in Southern Africa implies that it opposes any major military aggression within Southern Africa. Such a scenario could also emanate from a peacekeeping operation that escalates. In such a scenario, the aggressor will have to neutralise the country's capability to project military power. Targets for such an attack would include air and naval transport capabilities, air and naval attack capabilities and mobile ground forces. If the scenario occurs as an escalation of a peacekeeping operation, South African ground forces may already be deployed in vulnerable positions away from their home territory.



Raids: Raids of lesser intensity may occur against South Africa for the purposes of coercion or castigation. Coercion would aim to force the country to change behaviour that conflicts with another state's interests or goals, and castigation would be retaliation for South Africa's actions considered offensive by such a state. Such raids could be launched by a major or a smaller power and may take the form of attacks from surface vessels, amphibious assault or invasion by clandestine forces. Since such actions may also be launched by non-government, radical organisations, the probability of such invasions must be considered as real.



Blockades: Blockades may be used by major powers or powers similar in size to South Africa to coerce the country to change behaviour that is in conflict with the interests and goals of that state. Blockades are particularly popular courses of action in low level conflicts to coerce opponents. Blockades may consist of interference in South Africa's sea lines of communications (SLOCS) through mining of harbours or attacks on shipping along the country's maritime trade routes.



Captured embassies, ships and aircraft: South Africa has a responsibility to protect its embassies, ships and aircraft outside its national borders. The threat against these assets is mainly one of international terrorism. Protection by host states may not necessarily be forthcoming or effective. Although the impact of such contingencies is relatively low, the probability of their occurrence is higher than most other contingencies.



Marine resources and maritime zone law enforcement: Maritime law enforcement is not a primary defence task. The specific contingency here would be of another state using military force to support its exploitation of South African resources.



Threat to islands: The level of the threat against the South African Islands – the Prince Edward Island group – and the impact if such a threat materialises, are of such a nature that no special or additional defence capabilities will be provided in the core defence capability at present. However, it should be noted that the South African sea areas around these islands are rich in potential food sources that can be utilised in the country.

It is impossible to design a defence force to cater for all possible contingencies within the present budgetary constraints. It is therefore necessary to make some difficult political decisions. The country's elected civil authorities will have to decide which contingencies will be funded and by so doing, will also have to accept the risk created by the consequent strategic gaps for which funding will not be made available.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

South Africa protects its maritime interests by securing access to the sea for international markets through its ports of entry, by guaranteeing its maritime sovereignty, through patrolling its sea lanes and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), by guarding its harbours, fish stocks and natural resources under the sea bed, and by ensuring the safety of international maritime traffic around its coasts.

South Africa has six major commercial ports and two naval bases – in Simon's Town and Durban. It is of vital importance that these ports should be kept open to shipping during times of war or tension. The present lack of funding for defence has determined that only two critical areas can be defended – Durban and Richard's Bay on the east coast, and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon's Town on the west coast.

To this end and based on these areas, two maritime defence areas have been planned. They are defended by means of a horizontal layered approach where harbour patrol boats patrol the waters of the harbours and mine hunters and minesweepers keep the harbour approaches clear of potential mines. Strike craft patrol the inshore waters, harbour approaches and the intermediate area. Corvettes patrol the balance of the maritime defence area out to 200 nautical miles (370 km). Submarines would patrol underwater through the entire maritime defence area. Combat support ships help to ensure that this force can conduct operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support.

South Africa's Peacetime Naval Force

The proposed Peacetime Naval Force has been designed to provide a core defence capability. This force allows for two patrol Corvettes, two patrol submarines, three strike craft, two mine hunters and two minesweepers for each of the two maritime defence areas. These vessels can be regrouped into other formations to respond to other contingencies as required.

Surface Combat Vessels

Corvettes are multipurpose maritime helicopter carrying combat ships with modest capabilities in many disciplines, including anti-submarine and anti-air and surface warfare. They are capable of conducting sustained operations in sea conditions, such as those off the South African coast. Their capabilities allow them to be used in a wide range of military, constabulary or other peacetime tasks. They are of particular value in maintaining a South African 'presence' when naval forces are used in deployments, port visits, exercises and routine naval operations in areas of national interest. This serves to remind local inhabitants and sea users of the effectiveness of the particular navy and the intent of the State that owns it. When a stronger message is required, these vessels could be used as part of a carefully tailored force with an offensive capability that could act as a signal of will and strategic intent of greater concern or to encourage a friend or ally.

The SA Navy has no vessels of this nature, having lost its destroyers and frigates between the mid-1970s and late 1980s because of obsolescence. It is awaiting political approval to procure four Corvettes, necessary for the core defence capability of the Peacetime Force.

The core defence capability requires a total of six strike craft that, together with the Corvettes, will provide a surface and anti-air warfare capability necessary to defend the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy presently has nine strike craft, on average seventeen years old.

Submarines

The essence of any navy rests in its surface combatants. However, there is a unique relationship between surface combatants and sub-surface combatants. The number and level of sophistication of surface combatants are determined to a large extent by the number and capabilities of the submarines. Without submarines, a navy would have to have a considerably larger number of surface combatants of greater sophistication and higher cost considerations to provide the same deterrent and defence value.

Submarines render small navies, such as the SA Navy, credible and, according to Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills in their recent book, Uncharted Waters, submarine ownership puts South Africa in a "different league."11

The SA Navy places a particularly high value on submarines primarily as a result of their ability to deter. This was clearly illustrated in the Falklands or Malvinas War of 1982 when a very modest submarine capability on the part of the Argentineans struck terror into the hearts of the British Royal Navy surface forces, to the extent that the latter were called to action stations a total of 1 500 times during the conflict when they thought they had made sonar contact with a hostile submarine. On the other hand, the presence of Royal Navy submarines kept the Argentine fleet within the 12 nautical mile limit throughout the most critical period of the war.

It is for this reason that a number of South East Asian countries have recently acquired, or are in the process of acquiring submarine capabilities.

It is also for this reason and resulting from lessons learned in the recent Gulf War – where the crucial reality of having a stealth ability to ensure a survivable deterrence in a technologically sophisticated battlefield has been accentuated – that the Iranian Navy has recently acquired and is presently expanding a submarine capability.

Submarines have excellent anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. Their inherent stealth, mobility, firepower, endurance, ability to control their visibility and survivability allow them to dominate many battle spaces. The potential aggressor has no idea that he is the subject of this continuous surveillance and preparation and, as such, is not provoked into retaliatory action.
The SA Navy presently operates three Daphne-class submarines built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These submarines are coming to the end of their economical service lives and serious consideration is being given to their life extension or to cost effective replacements. The SA Navy requires a total of four conventional submarines in order to protect the two maritime defence areas.

Combat Support Ships

The combat support ships in service are modern ships capable of providing replenishment to submarines and surface combatants at sea. These ships are capable of performing multiple tasks and are vital in peace support operations because of their inherent cargo and personnel carrying capacity.

Mine Countermeasure Forces

The core defence capability requires four mine hunters and four minesweepers for use in clearing mines from the approaches to ports within the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy has adequate numbers of these vessels that are used for other tasks, including sea fishery patrols, in times of peace.

Harbour Patrol

The core defence capability requires a total of 39 ski-boat-sized harbour patrol boats to carry out patrols in the harbours of the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy has 27 such boats at present.

Diving Services

The SA Navy has diving services for military purposes, including mine clearance diving and submarine rescue operations. The collateral utility of this service has proven invaluable both locally and regionally – such as during the retrieval of some 300 corpses from the Tanzanian ferry that capsized on Lake Victoria a few months ago.

Hydrographic Services

The SA Navy surveys the coast and surrounding seas using the survey ship SAS Protea, as well as providing charts and other hydrographic services for military purposes. Using the collateral utility of this service, the SA Navy provides hydrographic services to the local and international maritime communities in compliance with international obligations.

PEACETIME TASKS

The SA Navy is designed to fulfil its primary mission of defence against external aggression. Nevertheless, it has vessels, command and control facilities, personnel, skills and resources that can be used in the performance of other, non-military tasks as and when required. This is referred to as the collateral utility of the SA Navy. These tasks are regarded as secondary functions. The SANDF does not budget for collateral utility, nor are collateral tasks primary factors in force design and force levels. All naval vessels have an inherent capability to provide for peacetime tasks, such as search and rescue, humanitarian and disaster relief, and the patrolling of maritime zones.

Maritime Services

The SA Navy provides surveillance and enforcement support to relevant authorities for the protection of marine resources against illegal plundering, and of the marine environment against pollution, and maritime law enforcement with respect to piracy, drugs and weapons smuggling. Marine resources are steadily gaining importance and the marine environment is under growing pressure. The scope of the protection task can therefore be expected to increase. Naval vessels conduct extensive regular patrols as part of their normal employment. The Department of Defence currently allocates 1 500 hours of sea patrols and 750 hours of air patrols to the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism free of charge each year.

Disaster Relief

The SA Navy provides support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations that exceed the capacity of the civil authorities.

Search and Rescue

The SA Navy provides search and rescue support to the relevant authorities and in terms of South Africa's international obligations. It is an essential participant in the national search and rescue structure, SASAR, that is activated when required and co ordinated by the Department of Transport.

Antarctic Transport Support

The SA Navy and Air Force provide the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism with transport support to the Prince Edward Island group and the Antarctic as and when asked to do so.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not South Africa should have a defence force is no longer an issue. It has been accepted by Parliament that the country should have a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force that includes the need for a navy. This is derived from both the Constitution and the White Paper on Defence.

The Defence Review is presently elaborating on the framework provided in the White Paper on Defence, concentrating on such matters as roles, functions, tasks, doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, equipment, human resources and funding.

South Africa, with its island economy, cannot run the risk of an inadequate investment in its Navy. The concept of defending the coast is out of the question. There are only plans to keep two portals, the Maritime Defence Areas, open to secure access to the sea to international markets. The SA Navy plans modest surface forces in each of the maritime defence areas, based on a credible submarine deterrent.

Investing in its Navy transmits a message of seriousness about the protection of the country's economy and the protection of foreign investments.

Investing in a Navy is investing not in a war fighting capability only, but also in the fight against seaborne crime, disasters, pollution and the dangers of the sea. In respect of the peacetime tasks, the SA Navy recognises that it is not necessarily the chief role player, but it wishes to co-operate in a structured way with other state departments involved in the maritime environment where it has built up a wealth of knowledge and experience. This is in keeping with the way it is done in many countries, including ones much wealthier than South Africa. Such co-operation will, furthermore, see the SA Navy helping to ensure the safety and prosperity not only of the people of South Africa, but also the people of the Southern African region.

ENDNOTES

L Scholtz and I Scholtz, Suid-Afrika en die Nuwe Wêreldorde, Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1996, p. 107.



R Christie, Strategic Alliances are the Deepest Defence, especially in the Nuclear Age, unpublished paper presented at the Defence Review Regional Conference, Cape Town, 12 July 1996.



South Africa, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1996, p. 86.



Department of Defence, South African White Paper on Defence, Department of Defence, Pretoria, p. 26.



The Star, 19 September 1996.



R Kasrils, We Live in a Tough Neighbourhood – Extracts of an Address by Mr Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defence on the occasion of the 1995 National Maritime Strategic Conference, at Simon's Town on 26 October 1995, Salut, March 1996, p. 14



H-R Heitman, Interview with Minister Joe Modise, Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 January 1996, p. 32.



White Paper on Defence, op. cit., p. 20.



L Nathan, Changing of the Guard, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1994, p. 48.



J M Collins, Grand Strategy – Principles and Practices, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1973.



M Edmonds and G Mills (eds.), Uncharted Waters – A Review of South Africa's Naval Options, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1996, p. 74