Contents

Editorial

Destruction of surplus stocks: South Africa's progress

Demilitarising Youth

Mozambique: The Lasting Landmines Legacy

Securing Uganda's Borders

Peace Challenges in Angola: Implementing DDRR

Civil Society and the UN Small Arms Programme of Action

Small arms control measures
Implementation Updates

UN Firearms Protocol


UN Programme of Action on Small Arms


SADC Firearms Protocol


Civil Society Network in West Africa


Eritrean Demobilisation


Kenya: Destruction of seized illegal weapons


Tanzanian National Implementation Plan

Mine Ban Treaty

Editorial comment

May 25th marked the commemoration of Africa Day, a day that observes the founding of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The OAU, in its efforts to seek alternative ways to address economic development, good governance, the rule of law , democracy and conflict prevention, has moved towards the creation of the African Union. The launch of the AU will occur at the Summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. Through the mechanisms in place within the framework of the African Union, including the CSSDCA and NEPAD, the AU will address factors hampering peace and economic growth in Africa.

Decades of conflict across Africa have saturated the continent with small arms and light weapons. These weapons hamper development throughout Africa with their lethal properties.

For African peace and security to be sustained, efforts to combat the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons at national, sub-regional and regional level must continue. In West Africa, PCASED have led discussions that saw the creation of National Focal Points in a step towards implementing the ECOWAS Moratorium. In Southern Africa the Firearms Protocol is being ratified by SADC Member States, and countries have already identified practical projects. Angola, in the throes of fragile peace, also commenced DDR where already more than 60,000 UNITA fighters have registered at quartering camps.

Africa’s progress towards recovery received a boost with the recent elections in Sierra Leone that were preceded by a peace-building process that included a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. As stability returns to Sierra Leone, efforts to reduce the number of weapons in circulation could help to reduce the risk of weapons being used for crime and violence. African countries are facing a new future as they launch the AU. A platform of peace and security that would advance the development of Africa’s people is a core principle of the AU. Combating the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons forms one area of this platform. Through concerted and harmonised efforts in implementing Declarations and Protocols, and continued evaluation of these measures it is hoped that these, accompanied by effective DDR programmes and other practical projects will reduce the illicit supply of and demand for small arms and light weapons.

Destruction of surplus stocks: South Africa’s progress

The South African government has over recent years publicly expressed grave concern about the impact of small arms on communities in Southern Africa, as well as the devastating effects of small arms in the region on development and reconstruction.

South Africa focuses its efforts to curb small arms proliferation on four specific programmes:

Tighter control of legally owned firearms, through in part, the implementation of the South African Firearms Control Act1 that will be at the cutting edge of this issue.



Preventing the movement of illegal firearms across national boundaries. To this end, Cabinet took a decision to make Border-Line Control a primary function of the South African National Defence Force.



Strengthening mechanisms to control the transfer and transit of arms. A Conventional Arms Control Bill is currently being drafted for submission to Parliament.



Ensure strict controls on state-owned firearms and implement a policy to destroy surplus stocks.

The South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) took the decision in 1998 to destroy all state-held redundant, obsolete, unserviceable and confiscated semi-automatic and automatic weapons and purpose-built sniper rifles of a calibre smaller than 12.7mm. This decision was ratified by Cabinet and the Department of Defence (DOD) took the decision in 1998 to destroy all surplus, redundant, obsolete and confiscated weapons in its possession, a total of 271,867 small calibre weapons.

The total cost for the destruction of the weapons was estimated at R1.9 million (US $190,000). The Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) provided funding for the project. Norway contributed R420,000 and it was estimated that approximately R450,000 would be accrued from the scrap metal to defray the overall costs.

Basic information had to be established before the destruction process could be started. This included gathering information on:

Types and quantities of small arms and light weapons to be destroyed.



The locations of these weapons.



The intention to collect the weapons at centralised or decentralised points before destruction could commence.



The condition of such weapons.



The desired method of destruction and the location of such a capability.



The desired level of audit and verification of the weapons.



The desired method of transport of the weapons and the cost implications thereof.



The desired level of security to protect the weapons.

From this initial survey, a four-phased approach was adopted that included:

Data Gathering


Investigation of destruction options


Identification and access to human, financial and material resources


Implementation

THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS

The DOD selected the fragmentiser approach, which was found to be both cost and time effective. The fragmentiser cuts and presses the metal into small parts. The 271,867 weapons resulted in 1,385,000 kilograms of metal. The DOD recovered R450,000 of the total project cost through the sale of the scrap metal.

COST DRIVERS

The destruction of the weapons is in itself not a costly exercise. Indeed, a small return is gained via the destruction process from the scrap value of the remains and debris. It is rather other factors associated with the destruction that are the cost drivers.

For many countries these may be somewhat prohibitive. The South African experience therefore is listed below.

Transportation. Transportation by either rail or road are the only real transport options available due to the weight and size of the weapons. This is possibly the single biggest cost driver.



Verification and Audit. For purposes of transparency, the DOD insisted on a rigorous system of verification and audit. This was to ensure that the destruction of each weapon, spare part and accessory could be certified. This is a manpower intensive process that requires the commitment of many scarce resources and skilled inspectors. This involves many costs over a long period of time for travel allowances, accommodation and meals.



Security. Given the nature of the task, security during the loading, transport and destruction of the weapons was of utmost importance and could not be compromised. This involved deployment of security protection elements, convoy drills and effective counter-intelligence gathering. Once again, this precaution is an expensive undertaking.

This article was written by Mr Nick Sendall, Director Matèriel Resources Policy in the Defence Secretariat and Brigadier General Zondagh, Director Logistics Management on the staff of Chief of Logistics. This article is written in the personal capacity of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Defence or the South African Government.

Demilitarising Youth: the Challenge of Inventing Peace
Angela McIntyre

For millions of Sierra Leonean, Angolan and Congolese children, peace has become something mythical, or at best a distant memory. Over the past decades armed conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have wreaked destruction on civilian populations, destroyed infrastructure and distorted economies. These conflicts have effectively erased the lines between civilian and military targets and in the process run roughshod over values and norms that would protect children and youth. In all of these situations, inherently youthful populations have been pillaged through the recruitment of young people into armed forces, some as frontline fighters.

For generations socialised in warfare, the incentives to build a peaceful society are no longer there by example. For children and youth, who represent the overwhelming majority in Africa today, peace must be invented from nothing, by and for their own generation. For thousands of ex-combatants, the prospect of reintegration means first facing the disintegration of a way of life in which order revolved around arms and violence.

Governments that have signed international agreements to protect children neglect their commitments on the grounds of civil war and have even continued to rely on children for military manpower. Yet demographics tell us that there is little reason for the existence of governments in Africa other than to serve children and youth. Over 50 per cent of many African populations consist of children under the age of 18, while those under 35 can make up as much as 70 per cent. Will these governments now commit themselves to supporting constructive, social and economic incentives to ensure the buy-in of youth to sustainable peace? The past year has been unprecedented for the commitments to disarmament that have emerged. January 2002 saw the end of the disarmament and demobilisation of government, paramilitary and rebel forces in Sierra Leone, among them some 5000 children and thousands more young adults. The death of Jonas Savimbi in Angola brought about a ceasefire and subsequent demobilisation process and in the DR Congo, efforts continue to maintain the ceasefire while political decisions are made.

But there is one element of peace building still in need of urgent attention, if youth are not to carry indefinitely the deep sense of betrayal at the loss of their childhoods and of educational and economic opportunities. Young people recognize their ambiguous status as both victims and perpetrators of violence in the eyes of their elders. Yet small, precious exercises in youth and child participation in conflict resolution are cause for enormous optimism. Research among former child and youth combatants reveals a generation demanding to go to school, to learn vocations, to speak for themselves and to define their own peace on their own terms. The Special Session on Children held by the United Nations General Assembly in May of this year has set a precedent for the participation of children. It can only be hoped that governments follow through on their commitments to a World Fit for Children.

When the war ends, the real conflict resolution begins. As the international peace mission in Sierra Leone begins to draw to a close, local exercises in reconciliation must begin. This will not occur without harnessing the potential of youth, this time for peace and progress, and making them true stakeholders in the new society.

Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict entered into force in February 2002. To date, 24 countries in Africa have signed the Protocol, while four are States Parties: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Namibia and Rwanda.

Mozambique: The Lasting Landmines Legacy
Noel Stott

Mozambique is considered one of the African countries most affected by mines. The landmines were planted during a two-decade civil war, which ended in 1992. Areas mined included towns, villages, water sources, power sources, pylon lines, dams, roads, tracks, paths, bridges, railway lines, and military installations.

The most commonly accepted estimate of landmines in Mozambique is the United Nations’ figure of 2 million mines. However, these estimates are largely based on reviews of hospital admissions and registers of prosthetic workshops which are incomplete and do not provide information on victims who died before reaching the hospital. The total number of casualties caused by landmines between 1980 and 1993 is estimated to be about 7,000 casualties. Today landmines continue to hamper rehabilitation and development projects.

Mozambique has signed and ratified the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), which entered into force on 1 March 1999. Although Mozambique is still drafting national implementation legislation, in April 2002 the Mozambican government announced that it had destroyed 2,000 stockpiled antipersonnel land mines in Moamba, Maputo Province, and intended to destroy an additional 30,000 in terms of the Mine Ban Treaty.

In August 2001, the National Demining Institute (IND) published the results of the country’s first ever comprehensive “Landmine Impact Survey”. Carried out by the Canadian International Demining Corps, the Survey aimed to “collect, record and analyse information on the location of known or suspected mines areas throughout the country, and to provide an overview of their social and economic impacts”.

It found that virtually every part of Mozambique experiences negative social and economic consequences from landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) contamination; that some 791 communities were landmine-affected and 1374 communities lived in what have become known as “Suspected Mined Areas” (SMA).

In addition, the Survey results showed that:

Landmines continue to affect all 10 provinces;



9% of the population is directly affected by mines;



Landmine incidents continue to occur (with about 172 new victims being recorded while the study was being carried out);



Suspected Mined Areas make up some 562 square kilometres.

Presently, a number of humanitarian demining operators work in Mozambique as well as a number of smaller humanitarian and commercial mine clearance agencies. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) is being established that will be based in Mozambique, but with a global scope.

It is hoped that the new survey will provide the Mozambique government and these organizations with much needed data to develop and implement a mine-action work plan based on priorities that is also responsive to the socio-economic impacts of landmines.

Securing Uganda’s Borders
Eleanor Abrahams

Small arms and light weapons’ proliferation continues to be a major concern with devastating consequences for civilians - men, women and children. The spread of weapons across borders, often undetected, has further destabilised communities who live along these borders. Banditry, crime and cattle rustling have become common activities along the border between Uganda and Kenya.

A recent joint meeting of Kenyan and Ugandan officials identified illegal firearms as a major cause of cattle rustling and banditry along their common border. The result has been a heavy toll in human life and livelihoods. The two governments have agreed to work together to stop weapons trafficking and cattle rustling between the countries. This follows on-going efforts by the Ugandan government to combat the problem of small arms proliferation, which led to the establishment of a formal disarmament committee in 2001 and efforts to disarm ethnic groups in the Karamoja region of Uganda in 2002.

The disarmament initiative in Karamoja has been in two phases. The first was a period of voluntary disarmament of the Karamojong and provided an amnesty up to 15 February 2002. According to sources, only 7,676 guns out of an expected 40,000 were collected during the voluntary phase.

Following the amnesty, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in February 2002 proceeded to launch a forcible disarmament operation in the Karamoja region. This disarmament operation involved police methods in identifying and searching target areas. The enforced method of disarmament took place in parallel with a continued voluntary disarmament initiative. As disarmament of the Karamoja continues amidst growing insecurity, the government faces the challenge of convincing the ethnic groups in the north-eastern Karamoja sub-region to disarm.

Challenges of Peace in Angola
João Gomes Porto

The civil war in Angola came to a formal end on 4 April 2002 with the signature by the two belligerent parties, the government of Angola and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), of a cease-fire agreement entitled the ‘Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol’.

Intended to replace annexes 3 and 4 of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, which remains for both parties the accepted and legitimate framework for peace in Angola,2 this cease-fire agreement defines:

An amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict



The modalities of the cease-fire



The disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA’s military forces



The integration of UNITA generals, senior officers, captains and junior officers, sergeants and men in accordance with existing structural vacancies



The integration of generals and senior UNITA officers into the national police



Demobilisation of excess UNITA military personnel and extinction of UNITA military forces



Vocational re-integration of demobilised personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national life

Institutional Structures

Two institutional structures were created to oversee the coordination and management of this process: a Joint Military Commission (JMC) and a Technical Group (TG). The responsibility to promote and oversee the application of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ as a whole lies with the JMC, which is headed by a military representative of the government (president and executive member) and a military representative of UNITA (executive member). As Permanent Observers, the JMC includes a military representative of the United Nations as well as a military representative of each of the ‘Troika’ of observer countries (Portugal, United States and Russia). The TG’s main responsibilities include assisting the JMC in the performance of its duties, by among others, drawing up detailed timetables and defining specific activities to be carried out. The TG is composed of up to 20 military experts of both the Angolan Armed Forces as well as UNITA’s Military Forces. In addition, the Permanent Observers contribute with up to 10 military experts each to the TG. At present nine regional TG’s have been created.

There is no provision in the agreement for any formal third party monitoring or verification role (as was the case with the United Nations’ mandate under the Lusaka Protocol, which established UNAVEMIII). In fact, both parties have reverted to an institutional structure similar to that used in 1991-1992 when the responsibility for verification and compliance with the demobilisation process defined in the 1991 ‘Bicesse Peace Agreements’ lay directly with the belligerents under a Joint Political Military Commission (CCPM).

The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ provides for the quartering, demilitarisation and demobilisation (QDD) of a total of 50,000 UNITA troops. In addition, 300,000 family members are to be catered for in areas adjacent to assembly locations. This figure has been revised upwards several times and by 24 May, 67,967 UNITA soldiers were assembled in quartering areas (see table below). Furthermore, from an initial 27 quartering areas defined in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, currently
35 assembly locations are spread in
15 of Angola’s 18 Provinces.

The timetable has also suffered from a number of alterations, in particular as regards the start of the QDD process, delayed due to technical and logistical constraints. As a consequence, rather than starting the day following the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 4 April, the process officially began on 20 April, date of the first official meeting of the JMC. The 20th of April has therefore been identified as DD+001 and the beginning of the QDD (DD+002), the 21st of April. According to this new schedule, the QDD process should be completed on 7 June (DD+047). The tables below, based on press statements by the JMC, shows how this process has developed so far.

Challenges and Constraints

The QDD process in Angola has advanced at an unusually fast pace, to a large extent a reflection of the military conditions prevailing at the end of the war. On a political level, UNITA’s Management Commission has been consistent in its desire to put an end to the war and comply with its obligations under the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’.

No breaches of the cease-fire have been reported and the quartering of UNITA’s military forces has proceeded largely in an orderly fashion.

Nevertheless, due in part to the speed at which troops have been quartered but also as a consequence of the lack of adequate planning, resources and logistical capability by the government of Angola, the situation in the assembly areas has been described by several humanitarian agencies as critical. The JMC has recently recognised that upon arrival in the quartering areas, UNITA’s military forces face serious levels of malnutrition and disease. This critical situation extends to the areas surrounding the quartering locations, where 159,659 family members are stationed. The remoteness and inaccessibility of a large number of these quartering locations have made the situation worse.

As regards the demilitarisation process, concerns have been voiced pointing to a worrying discrepancy between the number of troops in assembly areas and the number of weapons that have been handed-over (see Table 2). This is an essential element of the QDD process, and a guarantee of sustainable peace in the short-term. The lack of adequate logistical capability in the quartering areas for the collection of personal identification information and the registration and verification of weapons has contributed to delays in the disarmament process. Furthermore, observers of this process fear that UNITA may be holding back the delivery of weapons so as to guarantee that the process will be dealt with properly. Even though a return to war is highly unlikely at this moment in time, the widespread existence of weapons is cause for concern, particularly as regards a possible increase in cases of banditry and looting.

The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Engaging Civil Society
Richard Mugisha

The UN Conference on Small Arms, held in July 2002, was a first step in the right direction towards furthering controls on small arms and the momentum gained should be maintained.

The greatest challenge now is the interpretation of the resulting UN programme of action on small arms. Many of its provisions are vague, which may allow loopholes to circumvent implementation.

The Programme of Action does, however, give a clear role for
civil society organisations to work in support of efforts to control the proliferation and misuse of small arms. For example, NGOs should try to interpret the initiatives in local languages for the public and also encourage countries to do the same. This will make the work of awareness and dissemination easy. It should be remember-ed that in Africa there are many ethnic groups, languages and dialects. This represents the fabric of society and should be respected at all times. Any initiative on small arms should be inclusive enough to benefit communities.

NGOs will play a major role of monitoring the implementation of the program of action. Periodic evaluations will be necessary running alongside programs of research, advocacy, awareness and public education.

“I have often said that war is the worst enemy of development, and broad-based development the best form of long-term conflict prevention. Almost all the work of the United Nations is aimed, one way or another, at breaking the vicious cycle of depravation and conflict, and replacing it with a virtuous cycle of development and peace.”

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

Small arms control measures
Implementation Updates

United Nations Protocol on Illicit Firearms

The UN Firearms Protocol was adopted in May 2001 as a supplement to the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime. The Protocol is legally binding and includes measures to stop the trafficking and illicit manufacturing of firearms internationally. Main provisions of the Protocol include:

International standards on marking weapons at manufacture and import


Criminalisation of illicit manufacturing, trafficking or possession as part of national law


Confiscation of illicit firearms and their disposal or destruction


Standard systems of import and export controls, including end use certificates


Systems for registering and licensing arms brokers


Information sharing, training and technical assistance

The first two countries to ratify the Protocol are Mali and Burkina Faso. An additional six African countries had signed the Protocol by 1 June 2002.

United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms

The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms is the outcome document from the UN Small Arms Conference in July 2001. The Programme of Action outlines a series of measures that countries should take at the national, regional and international level for control small arms and prevent the illicit trafficking of these weapons. Although not legally-binding, the Programme of Action has been adopted by the UN General Assembly by consensus and constitutes an important step in efforts to gain a global common agenda to control small arms.

Main provisions of the programme of action include:

Establishment of national coordination agencies


Legislation and regulations to control the import and export of weapons


Collection and destruction of surplus weapons


Criminalisation of violations of arms embargoes and illicit manufacture, possession and use of small arms


Management of stockpiles of state-owned weapons


Controls on arms brokering


International standards on tracing and marking


Support for technical assistance, capacity building and training


Biennial progress meetings (2003 and 2005)


Review conference in 2006


Annual national reports to the UN

An expert group has been established to discuss the feasibility of an international tracing regime. It will meet three times, the first in July 2002, before reporting to the UN General Assembly in 2004.

SADC Firearms Protocol

To date, three Member States have ratified the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials. The Protocol will enter into force after two-thirds of the 14 SADC Member States have ratified it.

Civil Society Network in West Africa

A meeting of civil society organisations in West Africa has resulted in the launching of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), a regional network of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). The conference brought together NGOs from several West African countries to discuss issues including security and small arms, conflict prevention and security sector reform. A coordinating group of NGO representatives from Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone, will set up focal points to gather and exchange information with its members on all aspects of the illicit trade in small arms. (IRIN, 22 May 2002)

Eritrea: Demobilisation

May saw the start of the first phase of the demobilisation of 5,000 Eritrean soldiers in a pilot project prior to the demobilisation of 200,000 male and female soldiers.

Kenya: Destruction of seized illegal weapons

The Kenyan government has announced plans to burn approximately 20,000 seized illegal weapons. The burning of the weapons is to take place at a public ceremony later this year and reiterates Kenya’s commitment in addressing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was established as a national inter-ministerial initiative to coordinate and implement policies and programmes to combat illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, including a review of the national Firearms Act that is presently underway.

Tanzania: Implementation of the National Plan on Small Arms

The Tanzanian government is moving ahead with the implementation of its national plan to manage arms in the country. The plan, which has three pillars, was initiated in February 2002. A survey to gauge the attitudes and perceptions of communities about small arms was conducted in 2001. The results were published by the Institute for Security Studies and Saferworld in March 2002 (publication available at www.issafrica.org).

Mine Ban Treaty

As of 25 May 2002, 48 African countries were States Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the most recent African country to accede (2 May 2002). The countries in Africa that have not yet acceded to the Treaty include the Central African Republic, Comoros, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Somalia.

Eight years of Operations Rachel

The Mozambican and South African police services have recently completed their most recent joint effort to destroy arms caches in Mozambique. Operation Rachel 8(1) took place over three weeks in May. Covering eight of Mozambique’s ten provinces, the joint police operation located and destroyed more than 2,200 firearms and
1.2 million rounds of ammunition.

The Operation Rachel programme started in 1995 as a means of destroying the arms caches left in Mozambique after the end of the civil war. The operations have moved farther into the country, away from its borders with South Africa and into more remote areas. To date, 18 operations have been conducted, 21,600 firearms, 1,610 anti-personnel landmines and 5.1 million rounds of ammunition (see table)

The success of the operations relies on close cooperation with local communities who have knowledge of weapons caches in the area. This information is used to pinpoint the caches and teams are sent to the area to destroy the arms, ammunition and explosives on site. With funding from the European Union and private sector support from the Delta Motor Corporation of South Africa, Operations Rachel will continue in 2002.

Visit the OAU Amall Arms Website:
www.small-arms.co.za and the updated ISS website www.issafrica.org

This newsletter is funded by the donors of the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.

For more information, please contact the ISS Arms Management Programme,
PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, Pretoria 0075.
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 460 0998
email: iss@iss.org.za