NO 3 SEPTEMBER 2002
Contents
Editorial
Even before the events of 11 September 2001, African Heads of State recognized “the growing links between terrorism and organized crime, including the illegal traffic of arms, drugs and money-laundering”, in the preamble to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism signed in Algiers in 1999. But it took the terror attacks on the United States and declaration of a ‘global war on terrorism’ to expedite the Convention’s entry into force on 6 December 2002.
The momentum needed to encourage Member States to ratify the Algiers Convention came from a high-level inter-governmental meeting held from 11-14 September 2002, in Algiers. Member States agreed to a Plan of Action for implementing the Algiers Convention and expressed strong commitment to all aspects of its implementation, including tighter control of weapons and explosives used for terrorism. They also reiterated their commitment to international legal instruments to combat terrorism, in particular United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373.
The Convention and its Plan of Action emphasize co-operation between states to combat the flow of small arms and light weapons. In Article 4(1) of the Convention:
“State Parties undertake to refrain from any acts aimed at organizing, supporting... or inciting to commit terrorist acts, or providing havens for terrorists, directly or indirectly, including the provision of weapons and their stockpiling in their countries...”
According to Article 4(2)(b) they are to:
“develop and strengthen methods of monitoring and detecting plans or activities aimed at the illegal cross-border transportation, importation, export, stockpiling and use of arms, ammunition and explosives and other materials and means of committing terrorist acts.”
Information exchange is highlighted in Article 5(1) and 5(2), whereby States Parties undertake to:
“strengthen the exchange of information among them regarding... acts and crimes committed by terrorist groups... their means and sources of funding and acquisition of arms, the types of arms, ammunition and explosives used... [and] information that leads to the seizure and confiscation of any type of arms, ammunition, explosives, devices or funds and other instrumentalities of crime used to commit a terrorist act or intended for that purpose.”
This renewed focus on terrorism in Africa has provided a fresh opportunity to mobilize international resources and regional political will to control illegal flows of small arms and light weapons.
Terrorism and Arms Transfers: Analysis of the Algiers Convention and Plan of Action
Kathryn Sturman
The Algiers Convention, Article 2(b), commits States Parties to sign, ratify and accede to a number of earlier international instruments, including:
- The Convention on the Marketing of Plastic Explosives, 1991;
- The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Explosive Bombs, 1997; and
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997.
Africa’s shortcomings in terms of its international obligations came under scrutiny at the meeting in Algiers in September 2002. Ambassador Curtis Ward, Advisor to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) pointed out that while 170 countries had filed first reports in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1373 by 3 September 2002, 12 African countries had not yet done so. He acknowledged that the mandatory requirements of the resolution “placed an immense burden on all states, and that states possessed varying capacities to implement them”. Curtis advised states that lack capacity to compile their reports to formally request assistance through the CTC. Several AU Member States indicated that they would do so.
Concrete support for implementing international instruments was offered by the Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Branch of the Centre for International Crime Prevention of the United Nations. He reported that the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) was planning to launch a Global Programme against Terrorism, which would provide legislative guidelines and ‘implementation kits’ to various countries. The project was being piloted in an African country to establish its practicality. Specifically, the ODCCP offered to provide technical help in combating organized crime, including arms trafficking.
The Algiers Plan of Action is premised on the need to strengthen the capacity of African states through intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination. It seeks to implement these commitments through a number of practical measures, for example:
- by establishing a common Terrorist Activity Reporting (TAR) schedule to allow member states to share information “over a secured electronic network”;
- setting up an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algeria, the modalities of which will be proposed by the AU Commission;
- training counter-terrorist units at national level, with international assistance.
The most glaring omission from the Algiers Convention is any reference to monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. However, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000 Article 23(2) closes this gap by providing for sanctions against a Member State which “fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union”.
The Plan of Action specifically sets out the monitoring and enforcement role of the new Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Commission of the African Union. Under Article 7 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC, adopted at the AU Summit in Durban, July 2002, the PSC is charged to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Convention and other relevant international, regional and sub-regional instruments to combat terrorism.
Pending entry into force, the PSC shall request all Member States to report annually to the Assembly of the Union on the steps they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism, and specifically, to implement the Algiers Convention, 1999. The AU Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security will examine and follow up on the reports submitted by Member States, and “provide advice on matters pertaining to counter-terrorism action including preparation of model legislation and guidelines to assist Member States”.
It is envisaged that this work on combating terrorism will be closely related to and coordinated with the power provided for by Article 7(n) of the PSC Protocol to “promote and encourage implementation of OAU/AU, UN and other relevant international Conventions and Treaties on Arms Control and Disarmament”.
Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration Gains New Momentum
Thokozani Thusi
The First Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa took place in Nairobi, Kenya in August 2002. Although the meeting was long over due according to the timelines set out by the Declaration’s implementation plan, it took important decisions aimed at ensuring renewed momentum around the implementation of the Declaration.
The most important feature of the conference was the acknowledgment by the states and the Secretariat that it was impossible to meet targets as originally set out in the implementation plan. The conference noted, “Realistic implementation of the approved Programme for Implementation is no longer viable”. As a result target dates and activities were rescheduled in a draft Implementation Plan for discussion and approval during the meeting. The document was subsequently adopted by the meeting.
Among the important targets reiterated by the meeting and prioritised by the revised plan is the establishment and operationali-sation of National Focal Points (NFPs). The revised plan sets out clear procedures for states, with specific target dates for the establishment of these focal points. Several countries during the conference reported some measure of progress in establishing their focal points, including Kenya, Uganda, the DRC, Sudan, and Tanzania. Recognizing different challenges faced by member states, states to the conference acceded to Ethiopia’s request for a two-month extension in establishing its focal point.
On the positive side, donors such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) have reiterated their commitment to the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration. The UK has committed $800,000 between 2001-2004 through the UK Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme. As part of such funding, focal points are entitled to $10,000 in total with half set aside for start up costs and the other half for planning meetings. The review meeting urged member states to make use of these funds.
On regional cooperation and coordination, the meeting resolved that NFPs submit progress reports based on their yearly programmes to the Nairobi Secretariat. This should be accompanied with a presentation of the following year’s implementation activities. States were also requested to facilitate the creation of national action plans aimed at coordinating activities related to the realisation of the goals of the Nairobi Declaration.
There are further resources available for public awareness and educational programmes. Each member state is entitled to the sum of $10,000 upon application to the Secretariat for activities related to this programme.
The combination of renewed resource and political commitment to the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration by all stakeholders means that the year 2003 promises to accelerate the implementation phase of the programme. This is good news to millions of people in East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes region who suffer from the scourge of small arms and light weapons each day.
Banning the Use of Children as Soldiers
Angela McIntyre
In January of 2003, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1460, heralding what Secretary-General Kofi Anan has called the “era of application” of the ban on the use of children as soldiers.
The resolution follows a report submitted to the Security Council in November 2002 that names 23 parties where children are being employed as soldiers, including rebel and government forces in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia and Somalia, as well as Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sudan, northern Uganda and Sri Lanka where children participate in fighting forces. Countries in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes are in progress, including Angola, Kosovo, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, were also mentioned.
Resolution 1460 expresses the intent of the UNSC to enter into dialogue with parties in violation of international standards in an effort to pressure the development of “time bound action plans to end (the) practice.”
The new resolution also urges Member States, in accordance with the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to control the illicit flow of weapons to parties that do not adhere to international standards applicable to the protection of children in armed conflict.
These standards include the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 25, 2000 and came into force February 12, 2002. 2002 also saw the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which classifies conscription, enlistment and use in hostilities of children under 15 in international and internal armed conflicts as a war crime.
Other recent landmarks in the international efforts against the use of children as soldiers have included a special DDR programme implemented under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) through which some 7000 children passed. UNAMSIL, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in Angola have employed Child Protection Advisors to ensure that the protection of children is given priority in peacekeeping.
In a recent statement to West African leaders, UN Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, commended the accomplishments in Sierra Leone and suggested that countries affected by conflict should look to it as a model. The Economic Community of West African States leads African subregional organisations in the development of child protection policy, with a specialised child protection unit that, among other things, promotes the implementation of child protection training within security forces.
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): Raising the issues in the context of the CCW
Leonard Blazeby, ICRC
The scourge of anti-personnel landmines has been acknowledged as a global problem for many years. The impact of these mines on civilians is well known and the international community has taken steps to eradicate the problem; through awareness programmes and legislation to prohibit the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.1
Another, equally devastating danger frequently occurs alongside that of anti-personnel mines - other unexploded munitions litter the ground after conflict and pose a similar threat of injury or death to the civilian population.
Known as ‘explosive remnants of war’ (ERW), this deadly legacy was discussed in the 1970s and referred in the main to small arms ammunition, submunitions, artillery and mortar shells, hand grenades, rockets and other unexploded ordinance. Although these weapons have a military use when first deployed, their relevance becomes depleted as time goes by, but their threat remains, particularly after the conflict has finished.
Some examples of the number of civilian casualties as a result of these explosive remnants of war are as follows: In Poland from 1945-1981 - 4,094 killed - 8,774 injured; in Laos since 1973 - 11,000 casualties; in Kosovo between 1999 and 2001 - 563 casualties. With regard to clearance rates, in Angola from 1999 to 2001 - 16,590 pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were cleared and in Mozambique from 1998 to 2000 - 23,705 UXO cleared.
There has been little discussion by the international community as to how to reduce the impact of these remnants of war in post-conflict situations. The main problems with ERW are that they not only have a direct impact on individuals, but they hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance, prevent people from returning to their homes, hamper reconstruction, diminish agricultural capacity and put a heavy toll on medical infrastructure.
Many of the difficulties with regard to ERW relate to the design or misuse of the weapon. In many instances unexploded ordinance result from the fact that they either fail to detonate as intended, have poor quality control or incorrect delivery, are the result of poorly designed fuses or there is a distinct difference between the conditions encountered during testing and real battlefield conditions.
The problems with this type of weaponry are foreseeable. Munitions which become ERW have ceased to serve any military purpose, they are weapons that are delivered in large quantities, are dispersed over a very large area, and are commonly the result of imprecise targeting or targeting errors, especially when air delivered.
Explosive remnants of war are to some degree controlled by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),2 adopted in 1980, regulating as it does those weapons which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The subject of remnants of war was canvassed during the Second Review Conference of the CCW in December 2001, which addressed proposals to strengthen and develop rules to minimise the effects of weapons.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made a proposal that States Parties consider the adoption of a new protocol to the Framework Convention to try to reduce the civilian casualties and consequences of ERW. The proposal had the aims of establishing responsibility for those who use explosive munitions, either to clear remaining munitions at the end of hostilities or to provide the technical and material assistance needed to ensure such clearance.
It also aimed to:
- require the rapid provision of technical information, by the parties to the conflict, to the UN as well as demining bodies, to facilitate rapid clearance and to minimise the risk to those undertaking clearance activities and civilians,
- require those who use explosive munitions that are likely to have long term effects to provide information to organisations conducting mine awareness and to provide effective advance warning to civilian populations about the delivery of such munitions, and
- prohibit the use of submunitions against any military objective located within a concentration of civilians.
A Group of Governmental Experts was established as a result of the Second Review Conference in 2001 to examine the difficulties of ERW and to identify possible solutions. During 2002 this Group met extensively and a recommendation that a new instrument be developed was eventually made. The recommendation stated that the Group have a mandate to negotiate a new instrument on “post- conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would reduce the risks of explosive remnants of war.”3
States Parties to the CCW adopted this recommendation in December 2002 and negotiation sessions on this instrument will be held in Geneva from 10 - 14 March, 16 - 27 June and 17 - 24 November 2003. Participants to the discussions will include representatives from States Party, observer States and various organisations. It is hoped that a new instrument will be adopted by the end of 2003.
It is not known whether the proposed instrument will be a legally binding document, such as a new protocol to the CCW, or an instrument of a lesser nature such as a declaration. However a legal instrument will most effectively protect civilian populations from the threat of ERW.
Further study will also take place on measures to improve the design of submunitions, such as cluster bombs, to help prevent them becoming ERW. This would include looking at improvements to fusing mechanisms and the requirement of a self-destruct mechanism if a munition fails to explode when delivered.
The existence of an instrument regulating ERW will be an important step forward in the development of international humanitarian law and in minimising the casualties to civilian populations which too frequently occur after conflicts have ended.
- 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.
- 1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.
- CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GoGE), Explosive Remnants of War: The way forward; note by the co-ordinator. Draft Proposal by the co-ordinator ERW.
South Africa’s Experience with the Destruction of Surplus Small Arms
Ambassador Jon Bech,
Ambassador of Norway to South Africa
Opening address at the ISS-Small Arms Survey Seminar, Pretoria, September 2002
We all know that the challenges posed by small arms and light weapons are huge, complex and multifaceted. What is needed is an integrated and comprehensive approach and a sustained effort in a number of areas.
In our own policy development Norway at an early stage came to the conclusion that measures to ensure responsible arms stockpile management and reduce surplus arms should be one of the priority areas for action. Clearly, the primary responsibility in this field lies with national governments, but the international community needs to contribute to the efforts to develop policies on stockpile security and reduction of surplus weapons and assist governments taking effective action in this field.
We also believe very firmly that a comprehensive approach to small arms must span from disarmament to human security and development. The demand for and misuse of small arms are clearly related to problems of poverty and insecurity. This is why Norway gives considerable attention and support also to practical disarmament measures such as collection and destruction of small arms in the context of crime prevention and peace building, human security and development.
The bulk of weapons collections and destruction programmes so far have been carried out in Africa and the Balkans. These are also the two geographical priority areas of Norwegian action and support.
Norway proposed the establishment of and has so far been the main contributor to the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) Trust Fund for Small Arms. We support the UNDP’s Weapons Collection Management and Destruction Programme and its practical disarmament approach and efforts to reduce the impact of small arms on the lives of peoples in affected areas.
In addition to the UNDP action in Africa, we have worked with the government of Mali on destruction, with Malawi and the surrounding countries on security sector reform and firearms control, and we are currently discussing cooperation with Mozambique in the context of “Operation Rachel”.
The most important Norwegian involvement in destruction programmes in Africa has been our partnership with the government of South Africa over the last three years.
From an early stage South Africa and Norway have both expressed concern over the impact of small arms globally and in an African context. We have been very pleased to see the leadership provided by South Africa in this field. And we feel that the government of South Africa took a very courageous and important step in 1998, when South Africa decided to destroy its surplus stockpile of small arms and light weapons.
In February 2000 the Norwegian and South African governments signed a first cooperation agreement relating to the destruction of 263,000 redundant and surplus weapons by the South African National Defence Force in the context of “Operation Mouflon”. One and a half years later, at the opening day and destruction day of the UN Conference on Small Arms, we signed a similar partnership agreement for the destruction programme by the South African Police Service of 85,000 confiscated and official firearms and 8.2million rounds of ammunition.
Today there is a broad international support for measures to enhance security and management of government held stocks and reduce surplus weapons. We see such measures as essential components in an international strategy and action programme to deal with illicit trafficking and reduce proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Collection and destruction programmes are also a well-established and widely accepted component of conflict prevention and crime prevention as well as community building and peace-building.
Generally speaking we should see the main aim of destruction as reducing availability and demand. Removing the tools of violence from a society affected by crime or conflict makes sense and often produce very tangible and quantifiable results. The concrete visible nature of the projects again invites political and public support and participation.
Collection and destruction are important security programmes, but they should be part of a broader effort addressing the root causes of violence. There is a clear and mutually reinforcing relationship between security and development. Efforts to remove or destroy guns, without addressing the underlying causes of conflict, are not likely to yield lasting results or impact on peace and security.
At the same time, the aims and features of collection and destruction programmes differ from one country to another or from on project to another. One set of issues is connected to official stockpiles security and reduction of surplus weapons held by governments. Collection and destruction programmes in the context of conflict prevention or crime prevention, peace-building or peace operations present quite different sets of issues. The debate still continues on how effective many of these programmes are, what purposes they should serve, and how they should be devised to have a maximum impact.
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We need to know more about the experiences and lessons learned of large stockpile management and destruction programmes like the one undertaken by the Government of South Africa. What are the national and regional impact of these programmes? What are the methods used and how successful have they been? How can we use South Africa’s experience to raise awareness about the issue, encourage best practice and inspire other countries to undertake similar programmes?
This effort is very important. On the Norwegian side we are pleased to cooperate with and be associated with the study now undertaken by UNIDIR, the Small Arms Survey and the ISS. In the light of our partnership with the government of South Africa in this field it made sense for us to support an assessment and research effort in South Africa’s experience and its implications.
We look forward to the lessons we can draw from South Africa’s important experience in this field.
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DDRRR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Henri Boshoff
With the conclusion of the Pretoria Agreement, the Luanda Agreement and the Pretoria Accord, the ongoing withdrawal of foreign forces and the easing of political obstacles to the process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) a new stage has been reached in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN mission, MONUC, which has a key role in the implementation of DDRRR has refined its strategy and is working in cooperation with the United Nations agencies and international actors involved.
The Force Commander, Major General Diallo has stated that in 2003 “My intent is to conduct operations to disarm, demobilise and repatriate foreign armed groups operating in DRC, whilst maintaining Phase 2 monitoring and verification where required, and appropriate military support to the parties as they implement the Pretoria and Luanda Agreement and the Pretoria Accord.” Thus, after many months of planning, DDRRR has become the primary focus of MONUC’s engagement in the DRC.
MONUC plans to execute the DDRRR process in four steps:
Step 1. Transition from Phase 2
Step 2. Preliminary DDRRR
Step 3. Progressive DDRRR
Step 4. Transition to Phase 4 (peace-building)
The concept of DDRRR sees the initial establishment of transit points at Bukavu and Goma, the key terrestrial border crossing sites into Rwanda. MONUC will use existing troops to guard these points until the first Task Force arrives at the end of March 2003.
The Task Force will enable MONUC to move into more remote regions in order to pass the critical DDRRR message to identified groups, to estimate numbers, to disarm and demobilise combatants and to assist in repatriation through the transit points or directly to their home countries. To this end the Task Force, working with small humanitarian response teams, will establish assembly areas close to where combatants and dependants are based. These areas will be where disarmament and demobilisation will be conducted. The planning is that each assembly area would be set up for short periods (approximately three weeks).
However it is recognised that in some instances it may be necessary to create larger reception centres if there are larger numbers of combatants wishing to enter the DDRRR process.
MONUC has established a DDRRR presence in Goma, Bukavu and Butembu. Plans are underway to for a similar presence in Kamina, Lubumbashi and possibly Shabunda to implement the process in those areas. By February 2003, MONUC had repatriated 780 combatants to Rwanda. MONUC also succeeded in arranging an exploratory visit by 69 Rwandan ex-combatants to Kigali, in cooperation with the Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM). MONUC is following up this exploratory visit with a view to repatriating all the ex-combatants at Kamina. In a set back to resettlement efforts, in October 2002 the TPVM and the government of DRC arrested seven Rwandan ex-combatants and returned them to Kigali. This led to 1, 981 people leaving the camp in Kamina.
MONUC has established a Joint Coordinating Committee on DDRRR in consultation with United Nations agencies, the Word Bank and the diplomatic community, in order to refine the division of labour and transform the DDRRR concept into a joint operational plan. In this context, the cooperation of MONUC with the World Bank is crucial.
The World Bank has initiated activities under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for the Greater Lakes Region, which is designed to support the consolidation of peace in the region. The programme was established to provide financial and technical assistance to national programmes, regional initiatives and special projects within the framework defined by the Great Lakes regional strategy for demobilisation and reintegration endorsed by nine countries involved in, or affected by conflict. During September 2002 MONUC participated in a seminar conducted by the World Bank in Nairobi to facilitate dialogue between DR Congo and Rwanda on DDRRR and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
MONUC is mandated only to disarm, demobilise and repatriate the foreign-armed groups listed in the Lusaka Agreement. However with the implementation of the Pretoria Accord circumstances may arise when Congolese groups or individuals present themselves at a MONUC reception centre to surrender their weapons and become part of a Congolese demobilisation and reinsertion programme. MONUC has been consulting with specialised agencies and donors about steps it could take, within its mandate and resources, to facilitate their subsequent demobilisation and reinsertion.
Small arms control measures Implementation Updates
Operation Rachel
According to South African President Thabo Mbeki, since 1995 more than 1,000 tons of small arms, landmines and other unexploded devices have been destroyed in Mozambique as part of the joint South African-Mozambican weapons destruction programme “Operation Rachel”. During 2002 two operations took place. The first up to May 2002 in which 2,246 small arms and light weapons and 1,200,000 rounds of ammunition were destroyed. The latest operation took place in October/November 2002 destroyed, among other items, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar bombs, grenade launchers and 4.5 million rounds of ammunition.
South African Landmine Legislation
South Africa’s anti-personnel mines prohibition bill has been passed by the Portfolio Committee on Defence and is due to be debated by South Africa’s National Assembly in early 2003. The bill, once signed into law, will make it an offence for any South African citizen or other person residing in South Africa, to manufacture, use, store or export anti-personnel landmines. Its passing will make South Africa only the third country in Southern Africa to have complied with Article 9 of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their destruction which requires States to implement domestic legislation outlawing anti-personnel mines.
Action on Small Arms in West Africa
During 25-29 November 2002 the World Council of Churches (WCC) together with Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in West Africa (FECCIWA) hosted a workshop on small arms in Ghana. The workshop brought together representatives from 12 West African countries. The purpose of the workshop was to provide ecumenical organisations opportunities to make interventions in the development of a regional plan of action to address the spread of illegal firearms and armed violence. A strategy document was devised which can be downloaded from: http://www.wcc-coe.org/ wcc/what/international/poa.html.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions
The UN General Assembly met from September - December 2002. During its session it adopted resolutions on issues related to disarmament and arms control. The full-text of all the resolutions can be located at http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf
Small Arms
The first biennial meeting of States will take place in New York from 7-12 July 2003. The biennial meeting will consider the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects at national, regional and global levels.
Conventional Arms
The UN General Assembly mandated the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, to be presented to the UN during 2003.
Contact Details
P O Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251 151 3822 Fax: +251 151 9321
email: oau-ews@telecom.net.et
Visit the AU Small Arms Website:
www.small-arms.co.za and the ISS website www.issafrica.org
This newsletter is funded by the donors of the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.
ISS Arms Management Programme,
P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, Pretoria 0075.
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 460 0998
email: iss@iss.org.za
Photo credits: Patrick O'Leary, Managing Editor, Fleetwatch
Design and production: Image Design • Printing: Cedilla
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