2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 A number of comments and recommendations were conveyed to the survey team for inclusion in this report by countries participating in the survey. The exact recommendations per country are listed at the end of each country-specific report. Many of the recommendations were similar or overlapped with others. The purpose of this part of the report is to summarise and categorise these comments and recommendations. No attempt has been made to prioritise particular recommendations through the order of presentation. Certain comments or recommendations do not fit neatly into a particular category, or overlap with another category. A measure of overlap/repetition has indeed been allowed, in order to convey differing nuances on similar issues. This portion of the report does not interpret or comment upon the comments and recommendations, as the observations and recommendations of the survey team will be covered in Parts 3 and 4.

2.2 SCOPE

2.2.1 The various comments and recommendations are summarised under the following headings:

2.3 COMMON POLICY, GUIDELINES AND DOCTRINE

2.3.1 There is an urgent need for the development of policy at the political level which would provide conceptual clarity as to the boundaries of peacekeeping, so that countries may participate more fully and confidently in future peace operations.

2.3.2 There is a need for a common approach and doctrine for peacekeeping efforts at the international level. This should be clearly articulated, perhaps by the UN, so that troop contributing countries can better understand the ‘rules of the game’. The contribution of the OAU in this regard would be to ensure that such doctrine takes account of Africa’s values, customs and traditions. This should apply to the full range of peace operations, from observation and interpositioning to peace enforcement.

2.3.3 The primary area of concern lies in the area of ‘aggravated peacekeeping’, where self-defence needs may lead to a loss of neutrality and impartiality, making it difficult for the peacekeeper to respond appropriately to events.

2.3.4 The OAU should provide guidance for sub-regional efforts to enhance peacekeeping capacity through the articulation of a clear and appropriate doctrine for peace operations, and the establishment of a pool of qualified regional instructors who could assist in imparting the relevant knowledge and skills.

2.3.5 Serious difficulties have been experienced in the realm of command and control during participation in UN peacekeeping, due to the diversity of languages used throughout the command hierarchy, and to distortion in translation and interpretation of military terms and concepts. It is therefore strongly recommended that the need for standardised terminology and language of command be considered when constituting a peacekeeping force.

2.3.6 Effective communications and command and control arrangements are essential to the success of African peacekeeping endeavours.

2.3.7 There is a need for the collation of ideas on peacekeeping training and the establishment of some form of commonality within Africa. Operational experience has highlighted the need for a much larger measure of doctrinal and procedural standardisation if African contingents are to work together as part of an effective peacekeeping force. While African countries collectively have vast experience in peacekeeping, the difference in approach between individual countries is equally vast. There is a pressing need for the integration of various national efforts in this regard.

2.3.8 The OAU should work towards the development and dissemination of a standardised concept of operations and set of SOPs for peace operations. Differences of approach as expounded on the continent by the UN, the French, the British, the Belgians and the USA lead to the confusion of potential troop contributors.

2.3.9 It is important that potential troop contributors are provided with knowledge of the type of mandate they would be expected to fulfil, and of the legal aspects thereof. The legalities of specific mandates must be clearly interpreted for troop-contributing countries. A major problem with the ECOMOG operation has been the absence of a clear legal framework within which to operate, and the peacekeeping force was formed largely by the concern and goodwill of Liberia’s neighbouring countries, rather than by the legitimate precepts of international law.

2.3.10 Potential troop contributing countries need much clearer guidelines from the UN and the OAU before embarking on a peacekeeping training programmes for their armed forces.

2.3.11 If peace operations in Africa are to be effective, the adoption of a common doctrine and common training standards is imperative.

2.4 GREATER CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION

2.4.1 The UN should consult more widely with regional organisations, such as the OAU, before mandating a peace support operation in the relevant region. This would enable the Security Council to draw on regional organisations’ knowledge of the causes and history of the conflict, and contribute to the formulation of more appropriate and realistic resolutions.

2.4.2 The OAU should emphasise and continue to support efforts to enhance sub-regional peacekeeping capacities in order to build on the co-operative frameworks which already exist.

2.4.3 Too much emphasis on co-operation within sub-regional groupings such as SADC and IGADD may dilute the relevance and effect of the Central Organ of the OAU.

2.5 SHARING AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

2.5.1 Relevant experiences and lessons learnt from previous and ongoing missions are not being shared/disseminated widely enough to enable officers to remain abreast of the latest thinking and developments in the peacekeeping realm. It is therefore recommended that steps be taken at the level of both the UN and OAU to investigate and improve current practices in this regard. The establishment of an African peacekeeping forum, or the convening of an inter-army seminar, where officers with peacekeeping experience could exchange views, should be considered.

2.5.2 An effort should be made to develop an information exchange system between existing peacekeeping training centres, both internationally and especially amongst African states. The latter should be co-ordinated through the Central Organ of the OAU in order to consolidate the existing system and avoid confusion and duplication of effort. Ideally, this type of co-ordination should be extended to cover all international efforts to enhance peacekeeping training.

2.5.3 There is a need for the exchange of information and expertise at the international level, but especially within Africa. The starting point for such exchanges should be a seminar, or series of seminars, of 3-5 days duration, convened by the OAU, for experienced representatives of all institutions and centres that are directly concerned with the conduct and evolution of training and preparation for peace operations. The first such seminar should aim at the articulation and explanation of all existing programmes, with special reference to the particular areas of specialisation of each institution. This information could then be used in the formulation of proposals for a logical division of labour which would enhance standardisation and promote the establishment of regional centres of excellence.

2.6 TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

2.6.1 The issue of training cannot be viewed in isolation from policy and doctrinal issues. For example, differences in tactical doctrine between Francophone and Anglophone troop contributing countries have created a crisis for ECOMOG. There is thus a clear need for the regional harmonisation and standardisation of peacekeeping training.

2.6.2 Difficulties have been experienced in working with various national contingents whose standards, doctrine and training differed markedly from that of other countries. This aspect relates also to differing standards in the provision of logistics and logistic support by various national contingents. This has significantly affected the smooth direction of operations. It is therefore strongly recommended that common standards and unified training procedures be adopted.

2.6.3 The acceptance of a peacekeeping force by the host country is essential. Cultural awareness should therefore be emphasised as an essential element of pre-deployment training.

2.6.4 Regional centres of excellence should be designated and developed for peacekeeping training, and such centres should conduct programmes directly related to the demands of contemporary peace operations. The Zimbabwe Staff College, for example, has already been designated by the UN as such a centre of excellence in Southern Africa for the training of commanders and staff officers for peace operations. Similar centres of excellence could be identified in other countries of the region for training in logistics, field engineering, military policing, medical support, etc.

2.6.5 Where sub-regional peacekeeping courses are presented, a certain percentage of the students should be from other areas in Africa.

2.6.6 The spare training capacity which exists within certain African countries should be used to the benefit of other African countries. Such arrangements would obviate the need for countries to spend scarce resources on acquiring training capacities which already exist on the continent.

2.7 CO-ORDINATION OF EXTERNAL INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

2.7.1 The OAU should play a distinct role in co-ordinating the various international initiatives, such as those of the French, British and Nordic countries, in order to improve the efficacy of such aid and move towards some sort of standardisation of peacekeeping training on the continent. This may include setting criteria for peacekeeping training efforts at the OAU level.

2.8 STANDBY UNITS

2.8.1 The establishment within each African country of a standby unit of peacekeepers should be considered. The size and structure of such units would depend on the various national abilities and resources in this sphere.

2.8.2 Dedicated units, charged with specific areas of specialisation, should be earmarked in respective African countries. These units should be equipped and funded by African governments, and be available for rapid deployment under OAU command and control for peace operations.

2.9 STRENGTHENING THE OAU

2.9.1 The OAU should work towards the establishment of a cell of competent military staff officers with UN peacekeeping experience, i.e. former commanders and staff officers who have served in UN operations. This cell could be of immense assistance, not only in advising the General Secretariat, but also in establishing a common set of guidelines and principles for UN peacekeeping.

2.10 MANDATES AND MEANS

2.10.1 Where the principle of non-interference as contained in the UN and OAU charters is abrogated because of a compelling humanitarian imperative, involvement should be within the framework of a clear UN mandate, and under decisive UN leadership (not under the auspices of any particular country).

2.10.2 The principle governing participation in peace support operations is not whether the operation has a Chapter VI or a Chapter VII mandate. Indeed, national contingents may be more confident if deployed with a mandate that would enable them to use an appropriate level of force under circumstances where this essential for the safety of personnel and the accomplishment of the mission. The utility of this aspect of the mandate for any specific mission is therefore dubious, unless contingents are adequately and appropriately armed and equipped for the type of contingencies envisaged.

2.11 LOGISTIC ASPECTS

2.11.1 The establishment of a UN logistics base in Africa would help to resolve the logistics dilemma created by the demands of peacekeeping for many of the region’s armed forces. It would also indicate a firm resolve for involvement in terminating violent conflict, and thus act as a type of deterrent to armed conflict among African peoples. The establishment and utilisation of such a logistics base would also be an important confidence-building measure and enhance co-operation throughout the continent.

2.11.2 The pre-positioning of equipment in a regional logistics base would enable earmarked forces to train on such equipment well in advance of deployment. This would help solve the problems caused by deploying soldiers who are unfamiliar with the equipment upon which they depend.

2.11.3 There is an urgent need for logistic support to African troop contributors, who are presently paying a very high price through attempting to marshal their own resources for peacekeeping in other countries.

2.11.4 Apart from the well-documented problems of logistic support per se for African forces, there is an essential need for harmonising and standardising logistical systems and procedures, as well as the whole concept of logistics, if the idea of inter-operability is to become a realty. Logistics training should become a prominent focus of peacekeeping training efforts. UN logistic training teams could travel to African countries to assist in such an endeavour.

2.11.5 There is a pressing need for greater inter-operability of equipment, adequate logistic support, and efficient medical services.

2.12 GREATER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES

2.12.1 Conflict resolution in Africa is primarily a political task. Agreements should be reached through dialogue rather than imposed through the use of force. The OAU and its member states should therefore make use of far more aggressive diplomacy in order to secure a peace accord before turning to the military for assistance in resolving violent conflicts.

2.13 COMMUNITY EDUCATION

2.13.1 The type of conflict which is becoming endemic in Africa can only be resolved in the long run through the inculcation of a culture of peaceful dispute resolution at the grass roots level. This would involve various civic education programmes directed towards communities at various stages of the socialisation process, i.e. from the elementary school level through to adult education. The feasibility of introducing such programmes in Africa may be investigated by the OAU.

2.14 WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND BANDITRY

2.14.1 There is deep concern about the proliferation of small arms, such as AK-47 and G3 rifles in the northern parts of Kenya. Many of these arms were introduced by refugees and bandits who followed the refugees. The problem of combating armed banditry absorbs an increasing amount of military manpower, and detracts from the potential pool of human resources for future peace operations.