IS THERE A DOCTRINE DEFICIT ON PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA? WHAT GOOD IDEAS, RELEVANT TO THE NEEDS OF MILITARY FORCES IN AFRICA, CAN BE FOUND IN THE DOCTRINE OF NON-AFRICAN STATES?⁸

Task

61. In Western states, doctrinal thinkers have been preoccupied with questions of consent: hence the quarrels over Chapter VI or Chapter VII (traditional peacekeeping versus PSOs). Progress in the development of doctrine for PSOs in the African context needs to take account of theories developed elsewhere in the UK, the US and in the former Soviet world. What has been developed in Africa — perhaps not as a completed doctrine package but in incremental offerings from experienced military officers, diplomats, academics and aid agency workers? Doctrine for ongoing and future PSOs in the African context must be informed by certain African realities that are inevitably different from the environment that has shaped European and American doctrinal development.

62. The syndicate was therefore asked to focus on the following questions:

Is there such a thing as ‘UN doctrine for PSOs’? If so, what are its strengths and limitations?



If the UK and US doctrinal publications do not suit, where are they deficient?



How can we express the doctrine deficit with regard to Africa’s requirements?



How can the deficit best be approached — by a series of statements relating to Africa or a whole new doctrine?

Summary of points raised in discussion

63. The UN doctrine on PSOs consists of some training notes, manuals and videos covering tactical matters. There is also a 17-page document on the conduct of peacekeeping operations, but it is thin on detail. Similarly, peacekeeping manuals from the Nordic countries have emphasised ‘peacekeeping’ techniques at the tactical level, largely to the exclusion of operational concepts. Nordic publications emphasise techniques, drills and procedures — not really doctrine, in our terms.

64. The deficit is shown in the marked difference in standards of training of different national contingents arriving in UN missions. Several recent UN missions have collapsed because there has not been the will, nor the resources, to take firm action against belligerent factions when they threaten or mistreat UN troops. Even during the successful UNTAG operation in Namibia, there was clearly a training deficit. This meant that various (better trained) observers were used more than others. The worst trained were ‘rewarded’ by being given less work to do.

65. The greatest area of doctrinal deficit is, arguably, the absence of conceptual tools to guide decisions to trigger ‘peace enforcement’ (Chapter VI+) actions, as phases in Chapter VI operations or as independent acts of intervention. In Angola, the deficit was serious. Here the mistreatment of UN observers led to the collapse of UNAVEM II and later UNAVEM III. There was simply no concept for punishment of misdeeds by factions/parties. There are also many hard lessons from the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia where soldiers were disarmed by unarmed mobs. In these missions, inadequate doctrine and uneven training standards were very evident.

66. Training exercises within SADC have also shown up doctrinal weaknesses. The need exists within SADC to train according to a common doctrine. At the moment, standard operating procedures (SOPs) are being developed to fill the interim gap. However, these do not address critical facets such as multinational command arrangements and relations between the military and civilian agencies.

67. The doctrinal deficit in Africa centres around the need to define circumstances that should trigger peace enforcement (Chapter VI+) methods. There is a need for a more comprehensive doctrinal publication to address this issue coherently and provide, inter alia, operational concepts as well as tactical SOPs. The British Joint Warfare Publication (JWP 3-50 Peace Support Operations) attempts to address the issue of enforcement actions within PSOs, and is widely known. For example, the Kenya Defence College uses JWP 3-50 as its basic teaching document. In South Africa, JWP 3-50 has also influenced the recent white paper on South African participation in international peace missions, as well as the peace missions chapter in the new SA Army Joint Warfare Manual. Although there has been a significant recent revision of JWP 3-50, this does not take the unique dynamics of African PSOs into account.

68. For example, a significant problem area lies in the perceived impartiality of troops serving in UN missions in Africa, and of troops deployed under African regional arrangements. There have been cases of a lack of impartiality and also cases where perceptions of impartiality have caused difficulty on missions. With the trend towards increasing regional involvement in PSOs, the notion of impartiality needs to reflect African reality. For example, a policeman’s impartiality is not neutral — he has to be able to distinguish right from wrong and to treat wrongdoers differently from law-abiding citizens.

69. There is also the issue of command and control (C2), and what it will take to create tighter African coalitions with a strong lead nation and unified command. Moreover, it is necessary to know what works and what does not in order to facilitate the transition from PSOs in Africa to long-term peacebuilding. In short, to use a golfing analogy, the right golf club is needed for the task at hand. If we try to drive the ball for 200m with a putter, we are bound to lose the game.

70. Doctrine must be sensitised to other mission elements that will be operational in African peace missions. It may help if different national forces share a doctrine, establish communications, liaise and even train together.

Unfinished business/Recommendations for further research

71. The syndicate expressed a preference for a comprehensive approach to the existing doctrine deficit in a new publication, circulated for comment as widely as possible in the form of a draft. They recognised the problem of endorsement, and realised that the process of developing a common and integrated doctrine will necessarily be a continuous one that becomes more and more inclusive.

72. The syndicate also recommended possible research into the establishment of earmarked or standby forces, coupled to the introduction of a training strategy based on common doctrine that emphasises the subordination of units to the force commander.

NOTES

8. Tasks 3-6, involving questions with a military ‘flavour’, were dealt with by Syndicate A.