73. The development of new ‘capabilities’ obviously influences the development of doctrine and vice versa. The workshop provides the opportunity of engaging more expert opinion on this subject. Possible areas of interest are:

How can forces employed in PSOS achieve better surveillance of potentially (or actually) hostile forces in theatre?



New approaches to crowd control.



New ways to find and arrest indicted individuals, despite efforts made to guard them.



New ways of offsetting the problems created by the very large distances and land areas found in PSOs in Africa.

74. On a broader canvas, participants were asked to consider the utilisation of more strategic assets, such as:

theatre-wide surveillance using ‘national technical means’;



operational methods required in the ‘enforcement’ phase: a contribution to a cease-fire imposed on unwilling factions; and



operational methods required in an ‘implementation’ phase of a peace or cease-fire agreement.

75. ‘Hi-tech’ assets are very useful in themselves, but also point the way to innovative solutions to the ‘who contributes what’ to future operations, as a solution to well-known burdensharing problems. These new approaches offer more possibilities for effective action (and present ways of avoiding negative media reactions) during PSOs. Some doctrinal problems may also be overcome simply by bringing new technologies to bear on the difficult areas.

76. The syndicate was therefore invited to focus on the following questions:

What perennial problems in PSOs need a technical fix?



What do the emerging technologies mean for doctrine?



Are African militaries geared to deal with (if not acquire) the new technologies — and can we isolate PSO application from broader military utility?



What impact will these changes have on the ‘who contributes what’ debates?

Summary of points raised in discussion

77. The syndicate preferred to discuss communication skills and training standards in general, rather than technology, to improve PSOs in the African context.

78. The problems were an inability of troops to communicate effectively with local people and a lack of cultural sensitivity to local hierarchies and customs. It was suggested that local radio broadcasts in a vernacular language service should be used to ‘inform and entertain’ the local population, but care should be taken to employ transmitting equipment and language that would be audible and acceptable to the target population. Perception management techniques must take the challenges of communications to remote areas into account.

79. Furthermore there was often a lack of skill in developing HUMINT resources and techniques and the employment of female troops/observers where such conduct was unacceptable to the local people. Female members of missions might be highly effective as negotiators, conciliators and information gatherers, but care should be taken not to offend local sensitivities that would vary from area to area, and from population group to population group. Better civil military co-operation between military/aid agencies can also support the HUMINT effort (but contrary to aid agencies’ impartiality and neutrality commitment, and so not likely to be accepted), as would better public relations with village elders and chiefs.

80. There was also a general need expressed for the development of new techniques in crowd control. Crowd control may not be a job for soldiers, but rather for police. In African PSOs, however, there is often an absence of functioning police agencies. Time should be set aside to train soldiers for crowd control. The effective use of non-lethal weapons may improve crowd control — especially when PSO forces are under the media spotlight. The general aim of the greater use of non-lethal weapons would be to reduce casualties and minimise collateral damage.

81. There was little discussion of emerging technologies. Nevertheless, there was agreement that increased surveillance capabilities at the tactical level (remotely piloted vehicles or RPVs) and at the operational (theatre-wide) levels would be advantageous.

82. The lack of modern equipment (especially in RISTA) in the forces of African troop contributors has put them at a disadvantage in recent PSOs. The solution would be for more support to be provided from better equipped troop contributors. There was little further discussion on the detail of ‘who contributes what’, but it was agreed that better equipped states should be invited to support PSOs in Africa to make up local shortages (e.g. in airlift, surveillance, etc.).

83. As far as new operational techniques are concerned, it was agreed that the concept of minimum force may not be sufficient to meet the challenges of contemporary African PSOs and needs reconsideration. The concept of minimum necessary force warrants further elaboration and consideration. But there is also a need for new contact skills other than the use of force, especially negotiation skills based upon sound cultural assessment. There is thus a need for training in conflict resolution techniques, including aspects such as better communications, identifying intentions and achieving greater transparency.

84. With regard to transparency, verification techniques to facilitate the transition to higher order peace processes could be managed jointly by an independent assessor and the involved parties. The purpose would be to verify that decisions taken and agreements reached are based on reality, and not on lies or distortions. Any observed failures in this realm will be exploited by those who have an interest in sabotaging the peace process.

Unfinished business/Recommendations for further research

85. The syndicate steered away from addressing the technical possibilities in the field of ‘new operational approaches’ to PSOs in detail, especially in the areas of force protection through improved RISTA, non-lethal systems for crowd control and non-lethal countermobility measures — and how these could apply to African PSOs. They emphasised the need for training in communication skills and HUMINT techniques, rather than technical matters.