0201
The term peace support operation (PSO) is now widely used by many civilian agencies to describe their activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. In this manual, the term PSO is used only to describe military activities. PSOs are multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace. PSOs may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations. Outside of military circles, the term peacekeeping is often used erroneously to embrace all PSOs, including peace enforcement.

Distinction between peace support operations and war

0202
All military operations are conducted with a degree of restraint, be that only an adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict or the Geneva Conventions. What makes PSOs distinct is their impartial nature. PSOs are neither in support of, nor against a particular party, but are conducted in an impartial and even-handed manner. Rather than achieve a short-term military victory, PSOs are designed to enforce compliance with the operation’s mandate and to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace. Peace support force (PSF) actions are based upon judgements of the degree of compliance and/or non-compliance of the parties with the operation’s mandate and not against any bias or predetermined designation. The conduct of a PSF should be analogous to that of a third party referee and should remain that way even if only one party consistently fails to comply with the mandate and suffers the consequences. In peacekeeping mode, the level of consent is such that the referee requires relatively few resources. In peace enforcement, however, the referee requires enough resources to enforce compliance with the mandate, no matter how much the parties may object. But the referee must not become a party to the conflict. Referee status requires a very different approach from that of a player whose ambition is to defeat the other teams or teams.

A distinct mandate

0203
The distinction between PSOs, including peace enforcement, on the one hand, and other enforcement actions or war with a designated enemy, on the other, will be determined in an examination of the mandate and desired political endstate. A PSO mandate, including one for peace enforcement, should not designate an enemy, neither should it relate to military victory. However, a military enforcement operation with a designated enemy, rather than a peace enforcement operation, may attempt to change the correlation of local forces and impose a solution by force alone. Such a partial enforcement operation may need to be the pre-cursor to a PSO. A PSO mandate will generally refer to such issues as the restoration and maintenance of peace and security, and support for the principles of the UN and international humanitarian law. Mixing and muddling humanitarian and incompatible warlike objectives in the same mandate will generally result in an incoherent and unattainable political endstate. In PSOs, the active participation of the parties in the formulation and achievement of the political endstate will be essential. As military operations move towards war, the need to engage the parties in dialogue will diminish until ultimately, the strategic objectives specified in the mandate and the political endstate could be imposed on the parties without consultation.

Distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping

0204
When consent and compliance for a PSO is high, peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces will adopt similar approaches. Both peacekeeping and peace enforcement are designed to achieve the same endstate, that is, a secure environment and a self-sustaining peace. However, in the first instance, a peacekeeping force bases its operations on the consent of the parties and is not capable of exercising force beyond that required for self-defence. Such a force would find its freedom of action considerably more constrained than a combat capable peace enforcement force, should consent be uncertain or withdrawn. A lightly armed peacekeeping force, therefore, should not be authorised, or should not attempt to conduct enforcement tasks which may provoke hostile reactions that are beyond its ability to manage and that may escalate to war. Only a peace enforcement force prepared for combat and capable of effective coercion should be deployed into a potentially hostile environment.

The conceptual model

0205
A framework of PSOs and war is illustrated below.

For a peace enforcement force which finds on deployment that it is able to lower its operational profile to one more akin to peacekeeping, the consent divide is of little immediate significance. For a peace enforcement force with robust ROE, the transition to a peacekeeping profile or the exercise of coercion can be left to the judgement of the JFC.

Section II
DEFINING SUCCESS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0206
In PSOs, success will generally be related to the achievement of a number of predetermined strategic objectives which form elements of the overall political endstate and should be stated in the operation’s mandate. The nature of PSOs is such that these objectives will generally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of the political endstate will be the defining criteria for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of security-related military objectives will usually be a precursor, or milestone on the way to attaining the political endstate specified in the operation’s mandate.

0207
The achievement of military goals is relatively easy to state. However, the real or actual success of the operation is related to the daily circumstances of the local populace in the former conflict area and the realisation of a situation in which ‘conflicts are no longer solved by using force’. Unfortunately, such circumstances are difficult to quantify and translate into measurable political objectives. The achievement of milestones and the other strategic objectives related to the political endstate requires perseverance and the efforts of a wide range of civilian organisations and local agencies. The actual success of an operation will therefore be measured against the overall result and not just on the achievement of the military objectives.

0208
The achievement of the military objectives and the creation of a secure environment do not guarantee the establishment of self-sustaining peace. But without security (and justice), the reconciliation and other development programmes necessary to create a self-sustaining peace are unlikely to be effective. However, once the security-related military objectives have been achieved, the attainment of the political endstate will require the mission’s main effort to be switched from the PSF to the peacebuilding activities of the civilian components of the mission. Without such a switch of main effort and a commensurate switch of funding and resources, the operation is unlikely to progress beyond that of a military stalemate.

Section III
THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0209
In the conduct of PSOs, military success will generally involve the enforcement of compliance and the building of consent such that there can be an incremental hand-over of responsibilities to less high profile military forces, other security organisations and civilian agencies. For example, in a peace enforcement operation, the peace enforcement force may consider its military mission complete when it can hand-over its responsibilities to a peacekeeping force, possibly from the UN. This peacekeeping force, in turn, would aim to improve the security environment such that it could hand over its security duties to an international or indigenous police force, while continuing to develop the conditions in which civilian agencies can attempt to redress the underlying causes of the conflict. As these conditions are achieved, military success may be manifest in a draw down of the PSF profile and an incremental withdrawal of military forces. Success in PSOs is highly dependent on the effective management of change and transition.

0210
Mission success requires that the PSF must be adequately trained, organised, equipped and armed. This will also greatly determine its credibility with the parties and thereby its ability to achieve its operational objectives. A second criteria for success is the strict impartiality of the PSF and that will require active measures to counter the charges of partiality that will be inevitably raised. Finally, the professional conduct of the PSF must reinforce all aspects of the conduct of the mission. Key behavioural attitudes are the correct attitude and conduct of the PSF personnel, their resolute and consistent responses, especially in case of non-compliance, and a close and harmonious co-operation within the framework that the PSF constitutes.

0211
A specific precondition for success during most PSOs is consent for the presence and objectives of the PSF by the authorities in the conflict area and/or the leadership of the parties involved. Closely related to the issue of consent is compliance with the details of any peace accord by local (para)military elements of the parties. Consent and compliance will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.

0212
The JFC of a PSF must also take into account those factors that can inhibit the chance of success. The support for the operation with the international community and — no less important — with the local populace and the leadership of the parties is such a factor. Others are the implicit tension between ‘normal’ military missions (i.e. combat operations) and those conducted during PSOs, cultural aspects (i.e. related to the different cultural environment in the conflict area than that which a large part of the PSF is used to, and to the multinational character of any PSF), and also the greater complexity of PSOs in general.

0213
The multinational composition of almost any PSF and cultural differences among its personnel may cause friction. JFCs and staff will be of different nationalities and may have different styles of command and different staff procedures. Any friction between national contingents or individuals may be exacerbated by primitive living conditions, a lack of privacy, limited hygiene, language problems and routine, and even boredom that can make the execution of the simplest of tasks a real challenge.

0214
The complexity of the range of challenges posed by PSOs, in particular a feeling of impotence caused by limited ROE, can also be a reason for discontent within the PSF, and threaten the success of the operation. The parties may also try and exploit any national differences and disagreements to their own advantage and to disadvantage the PSF. Such actions by the parties can be predicted and should be pre-empted by sound leadership within the PSF. The road to success during PSOs can be difficult and long. The problems discussed before can easily jeopardise the success of the PSF and could even cause the failure of the mission. The identification of these threats in an early stage of the operation — preferably during the planning phase — is therefore critical. Commanders at all levels must be aware of the tensions that can arise and the threat that these tensions can pose to the achievement of the objectives of the PSO. By dealing with them early, the success of the military part of the mission and ultimately its overall success can be greatly facilitated.

Section IV
CONFLICT PREVENTION
Definition of conflict prevention

0215
The number and extent of ongoing conflicts in Africa and elsewhere would suggest that insufficient resources are allocated to conflict prevention strategies. For reasons generally related to national self-interest, the international community tends to engage in conflict management only when that conflict is at its most destructive and least manageable. However, an earlier engagement than is the current trend, may offer greater chance of success and, in the longer term, could prove less expensive. Conflict prevention activities are normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII. Conflict prevention activities may range from diplomatic initiatives, through efforts designed to reform a country’s security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, to preventive deployments of forces designed to prevent or contain disputes from escalating to armed conflict. Other conflict prevention activities may include military fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

Military tasks

0216
Military assets used for conflict prevention should be focused on the support they provide to the political and development efforts to ameliorate the causes of social tensions and unrest before the commencement of conflict. Military tasks will be tailored to meet the political and development demands, but will generally fall within the following categories of military task:

Early warning: Early warning of a potential conflict is likely to come from the normal monitoring activities routinely executed by nations. The earlier that nations and organisations are aware of an impending crisis, the earlier they can take appropriate political or military action to attempt to prevent the outbreak or escalation of hostilities. Additionally, early identification of problems allows time to develop more options and the opportunity to harmonise responses.



Surveillance: Military assets can monitor air, land, and sea activity. Transparent use of these surveillance activities may have a deterrent effect. It is important to stress the impartiality of such surveillance to the parties concerned and the international community.



Training and security sector reform: National support for training programmes and other efforts to improve and democratise a nation’s security sector (military, police, judiciary, etc.) can support wider development plans to improve the human rights situation in a country. Development funding by donors may be made conditional upon a measure of security sector reform and financial transparency and accountability. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may make loans dependent upon staying within defence funding limits that they prescribe.



Preventive deployment: One of the strongest crisis management signals that can be sent to demonstrate resolve is by agreeing to the deployment of multinational forces. This can be in the form of: exercises and over-flights; positioning maritime or ‘stand-off’ amphibious forces; by deploying air or ground forces to the region adjacent to the problem area; or deploying a force into the problem area itself. Timeliness and readiness, the extent and nature of the crisis and the degree of commitment at the time will influence the selection of force elements. Public information capabilities provide an essential conduit to signal intentions and to support such a deployment. Once deployed, the operations of the PSF could be similar to those of an interposition force involving tasks such as establishing and maintaining a presence, patrolling and routine training. It is important to maintain high visibility and a certain credibility (including external support or reinforcements) to deter, but not to threaten directly, potential aggressors.

Sanctions and embargoes

0217
Sanctions and embargoes could support PSOs. Sanctions and embargoes may be conducted in any PSO, with varying degrees of military, economic and political pressure. The UNSC may attempt to pressure parties to reduce the level of hostilities in a conflict by selecting economic/trade or other (including military) sanctions and implementing them, when appropriate, by imposing embargoes. Air and maritime assets are capable and trained to execute and support these operations. Ground forces also have capabilities that may be employed in this role, e.g. through border surveillance. In most cases, co-operation will be sought with customs organisations of nations, because of their specific expertise in this field.

Section V
PEACEKEEPING
Definition of peacekeeping

0218
Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.

The conduct of peacekeeping operations

0219
In the conduct of peacekeeping, a PSF should utilise all techniques available, other than the proactive use of force, to gain and maintain the initiative. Those techniques are generally defined in terms of consent promotion or, more traditionally, as ‘hearts and minds’ techniques. A loss of consent and a non-compliant party may limit the freedom of action of the peacekeeping force and even threaten the continuation of the mission. The requirement to remain impartial, to limit the use of force to self-defence, and maintain and promote consent should guide the conduct of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping missions and tasks

0220
Peacekeeping missions may involve a variety of tasks and activities, but will usually be designed to monitor peace and stability and to improve the humanitarian environment. Humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding activities will generally constitute an essential element of most PSOs. Although peacekeeping missions are predominantly land-oriented, they can also be conducted in sea areas, an archipelago or estuary, requiring close co-operation between naval, land and air forces. The designation of peacekeeping missions, tasks and techniques can be confusing and the same word can be used to describe all three. For example, there have been observation missions (the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 1993 — present), in which observation was the principal task and technique employed. Peacekeeping operations are broadly categorised into one of the following mission types:

0221
Observation and monitoring: An observer mission is the most basic and traditional peacekeeping operation and its fundamental purpose is to observe, monitor and report. This operation may range in size from only a few personnel to several hundred, and is usually accomplished by unarmed UN observers. The monitoring of human rights can have a deterrent effect against abuses.

0222
Supervision of truces and cease-fires: Such operations as the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO, June 1948 — present) may be conducted jointly at the strategic or operational level, or managed by a single service at the local tactical level. Should compliance be considered problematic, the judicious course of action would be to deploy prepared for combat from the outset.

0223
Interposition force: The objective of an interposition operation such as the UN peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, March 1964 — present), is to keep opposing military forces apart following a temporary cease-fire or more formal cease-fire agreement, and to prevent further conflict. An interpositional force with a peacekeeping-only profile may need the support of an ‘over the horizon’ force capable of peace enforcement to be credible and effective.

0224
Transition assistance: Transition operations such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-93), consist primarily of the undertaking of military tasks following an established cease-fire, but before the predominantly civil aspects of a long-term peacebuilding mission are in place. Ideally, they are conducted as a peace agreement is negotiated and, thereafter, as an element of its implementation. The objective is to support the transition from conflict to peaceful conditions, with a political structure acceptable to the nation and the international organisation. The PSF supports this process by fostering an environment in which the population can begin to return to a normal life and by assisting in the reconstruction of the local infrastructure to manage that process.

0225
Disarmament and demobilisation: Disarmament and demobilisation activities will generally be part of a broader political process that includes the reintegration of former combatants into society and a decriminalisation process. At the tactical level, this may include various arms control techniques and support to other locally negotiated initiatives. Arms control may be a key tool to achieve or maintain regional or local stability and is essential to confidence-building. As such, it can be an element that contributes to success across the spectrum of PSO activities. Military involvement is situation-dependent and, to some extent, mandate-dependent; it can range from benign inspections, verification and training activities through to deployment prevention, enforced demobilisation, and the cantonment and destruction of weapon systems.

0226
Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding requires the commitment of humanitarian and development resources to a long-term political process. Military forces can support that process by the creation of a secure environment, by the provision of support to civilian agencies and by the conduct of activities and projects which build confidence and persuade the former belligerents and indigenous population to become investors in the peace process. Military peacebuilding tasks and activities will generally be designed for high impact and to demonstrate an immediate benefit from the presence of the PSF. In such circumstances, advice should be sought from the development community to ensure that short-term military gains are not counterproductive to any longer term development strategies. Military enthusiasm to be of assistance should be balanced against the danger of creating dependency.

Section VI
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
Definition of peace enforcement

0227
Peace enforcement operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. In the conduct of peace enforcement, the link between military and political objectives must be extremely close. It is important to emphasise that the aim of the peace enforcement operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to comply with a particular course of action, i.e. to desist from abusing the basic right to life and dignity, and to support the peace process. The provision of adequate military forces to establish a credible deterrent and persuasive posture is critical to any decision to deploy military forces on a PSO. To remain credible, commanders must demonstrate that, should it be necessary, they are willing and able to conduct combat operations.

The conduct of peace enforcement

0228
Peace enforcement operations are coercive in nature, using force or the threat of force, if needed, to maintain or re-establish peace, or to enforce the terms of the mandate. However, the long-term demands of peace will require that coercive techniques are used with restraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote co-operation and consent, and persuade the parties and indigenous population to commit themselves to the peacebuilding process, i.e. a combination of the ‘stick’ and the ‘carrot’. The approach that the PSF intends to adopt should be communicated clearly and by every means practical to the parties in conflict in order to persuade them to desist from the use of force, comply with the mandate and to revert to democratic means to achieve their objectives. Therefore, a peace enforcement force must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to enforce compliance while also conducting a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign and providing support to the longer term peacebuilding process. Should the conflicting parties not be deterred or persuaded, and fail to comply with the mandate, the peace enforcement force must be able to react in an appropriate manner, based upon ROE compatible with mission accomplishment. ROE will be strictly controlled, with emphasis on the minimum necessary use of force commensurate with achieving the objective and minimising collateral damage. The minimum necessary use of force does not exclude the overwhelming use of force so long as that force is confined to the intended target, and short-term tactical advantages are not out-weighed by long-term political damage.

Protection of basic human rights

0229
PSF interventions increasingly occur in situations where there are widespread and ongoing abuses of basic human rights (the right to life and dignity), ethnic cleansing and genocide. Such abuses frequently occur in collapsed or collapsing states in which the rule of law has ceased to exist. Only a PSF prepared for combat can operate in such an environment and create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can redress the underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements of peacebuilding. However, any PSF will help to deter human rights abuses by its presence and by any reports it may send to UNHCHR and other human rights agencies.

Section VII
PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACE ENFORCEMENT
Assessment

0230
In determining whether a mission should be undertaken as a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement operation, a thorough estimate should be made of the operational conditions. As a priority, this should include the likely level of compliance of the parties in conflict to any intervening PSF, and their attitudes both to each other and to any peace process. Increasingly, experience indicates that mandates for PSOs may require elements of a peace enforcement nature.

Operational posture

0231
If a peace process has been agreed to the parties in conflict, and it is considered that there is a genuine will and intention to abide by that process, a peacekeeping force only capable of using force in self-defence may be adequate. In the event that there is either little inclination by the parties in conflict to agree to any peace process, or having done so, it is considered that there is a strong possibility that they will withdraw consent, and ignore agreements, then a combat capable peace enforcement force will be needed to ensure compliance with the operation’s mandate.

Transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement

0232
A PSF, specifically designed for peacekeeping, will generally be lightly armed and, therefore, incapable of enforcement. Any transition to peace enforcement, from a mission only mandated for peacekeeping, therefore requires a conscious political decision, a new mandate and ROE, and for the PSF to be reinforced and reconfigured, physically and possibly psychologically. It is normally not possible for such a PSF to move from a peacekeeping operation to peace enforcement without a very significant operational pause, unless the PSF deployed was prepared for peace enforcement from the outset.

Transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping

0233
The aim of a peace enforcement force should be to conduct itself judiciously so as to lower its operational profile to one more akin to peacekeeping as soon as judged appropriate. As such, the management of any peace enforcement operation very much concerns the management of change. Transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping will be judged by compliance at the local level and will require the gradual introduction of those techniques appropriate to peacekeeping. The aim is to expand those areas where there is consent and compliance at the expense of areas of minimal consent and possibly non-compliance. Should a peace enforcement force find on deployment that the level of compliance is high, it may be possible to lower its operational profile and adopt an approach more akin to peacekeeping from the outset. For such a PSF, a reversion to the use of enforcement techniques would be relatively straightforward, as long as the mandate and ROE had not been restricted.

Force profile — peacekeeping or peace enforcement?

0234
Decisions concerning the deployment profile of a PSF should be broadly based on the following diagram (Figure 2.2). The horizontal dotted line indicates a minimum level of consent necessary for the conduct of peacekeeping — ‘you cannot keep peace unless there is a peace to keep’ — and the vertical dotted line indicates the minimum force level, in comparison with any potential opposition, below which peace enforcement is not feasible — ‘you cannot fight wars from white painted vehicles’. In the top left quadrant, consent is high, thus a force can successfully conduct a peacekeeping operation with low combat capability. This is traditional, classic peacekeeping, e.g. UNFICYP. In the top right quadrant, consent may appear high, but is assessed as uncertain or fragile and there is an expectation that it might be withdrawn. In such circumstances, the judicious option is to deploy, prepared for peace enforcement, with the expectation that the deployment of such a force will deter hostile acts and ensure compliance from the outset. However, the deployment of a peace enforcement force may not always be the most prudent option. If, for example, all the parties perceive themselves to be responsible and trustworthy partners in any peace process, the deployment of a peace enforcement force may be regarded as indicating a lack of trust and thus prove counterproductive. In the bottom right quadrant, the anticipation is that the PSF will be opposed and that the use of force will be necessary to ensure compliance with the mandate. In the bottom left quadrant, consent for the operation is below the critical level necessary to conduct peacekeeping, yet the force does not have the combat capability necessary to enforce compliance against opposition. A peacekeeping force deployed in this quadrant will eventually lose credibility and the operation may become untenable. This quadrant should be avoided.

While decisions concerning the PSF posture are stark, as indicated by the choice of quadrant, the multidimensional nature of PSOs requires that commanders are allowed the maximum flexibility to develop the operation towards the attainment of military objectives and the political endstate. PSOs concern the management of change and transition, and co-ordination with a great number of civilian elements. The arrow marked ‘strategic direction’ indicates the direction that a PSO should aim to progress as compliance is enforced and built into consent and the PSF is able to switch its efforts to support civil development and the peacebuilding process.

Section VIII
PEACEMAKING
Definition of peacemaking

0235
Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions.

0236
Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means. However, military support to peacemaking is possible either indirectly (e.g. staff support or planning), or in the form of the direct involvement of military assets. Peacemaking may be conducted before physical conflict has occurred and could include conflict prevention tasks such as surveillance, or even the enforcement of sanctions.

0237
The planning and execution of these missions will be the same as for other elements of PSOs. It is important that commanders and their planners stay abreast of the political and diplomatic initiatives and negotiations to anticipate potential tasks or changes.

Sanctions and embargoes

0238
The enforcement of sanctions may be designed to deny the movement of people, supplies and military equipment and diplomatic, economic and trading privileges.

Section IX
PEACEBUILDING
Definition of peacebuilding

0239
Peacebuilding covers actions that support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

0240
Following a conflict, especially a civil war, the local infrastructure may be severely damaged, civil and political institutions inoperable, and hatred deeply embedded in the minds of the former warring parties. The situation may be exacerbated because one or more of the parties to the conflict oppose the final settlement, or because they objected to the role of the PSF. Peacebuilding actions are designed to cement a fragile peace and to contribute towards long-term stability by encouraging reconciliation. Military involvement will mainly involve the provision of a stable and secure environment in which civilian agencies can focus on the reconciliation and peacebuilding processes. Possible extra support tasks for the military could involve the training and reform of the local armed forces, e.g. courses in arms control and human rights awareness training. All to often, once the conflict has been brought to an end, the attention of the international community moves on, the peacebuilding phase of the mission plan is under-resourced and the operation stalemates.

Military aid to civil authorities

0241
Military aid to civil authorities embraces all those military activities to provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities and are normally undertaken when unusual circumstances or an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Disaster relief operations are normally the responsibility of the affected nation, but may need to be reinforced by the wider efforts of the international community and aid agencies.

Refugee/displaced person/migrant assistance

0242
The numbers, movement activities, and other characteristics of refugees/displaced persons and migrants will vary depending on the situation, but can range from small groups to many thousands. They may congregate in camps or towns, or may be continually moving. Such movement may be spontaneous, resulting from conflict or in the aftermath of a natural disaster. The political desire to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and other displaced persons may be the genesis for a PSO or other humanitarian operation. Military assistance to both refugees and displaced persons1 is oriented towards providing security and vital services to those temporarily displaced from their homes and vulnerable to exploitation and oppression. Military forces can assist in these activities, for example in demining, within their capabilities, but the principal responsibility for refugees and displaced persons rests with the host nation and specialised agencies such as the UNHCR.

Note

Definitions:
Refugee: A person forced to leave their parent country.
Displaced person: A person forced to leave their home but not their parent country.

Section X
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
Definition of humanitarian operations

0243
All PSOs have at their root the aspiration to improve the lot of those who are suffering in a crisis zone. More specifically, humanitarian operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. They may be conducted independently or as an element of a PSO. Humanitarian operations conducted by military forces may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. However, the prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialised civilian, national, international and government organisations and agencies, or NGOs. Specialist civilian direction of military humanitarian operations is necessary to ensure that military engagement, which tends to be the short-term and impact-driven, does not create dependency or run contrary to longer term specialised development programmes.

Humanitarian assistance

0244
In an emergency, military assets can take responsibility for specific humanitarian functions. However, they will normally be used to assist the efforts of aid and development organisations and agencies. This assistance might include specialist units such as medical, transport and engineer units, possibly reconfigured and reinforced to meet particular needs. Depending on the mandate, this support could also include management assistance, the protection of aid agencies, as well as the creation and maintenance of aid routes. In extreme circumstances, the PSF may have to take direct responsibility for the delivery of aid in order to maintain the flow. However, commanders should beware of taking on extra tasks that are not specified in the mandate, and are beyond their capabilities and higher commander’s intent.

Protection of basic human rights

0245
The protection of a non-combatant’s basic right to life and dignity is a fundamental element of all military operations. Should members of a PSF who are designated as combatants witness war crimes, but take no action to stop them, they themselves become parties to that war crime. The prevention of abuses of basic human rights and the imposition of justice will require a peace enforcement force that is appropriately trained and configured for such tasks.

Disaster relief

0246
Disaster relief operations will generally be conducted unilaterally, however, they may occur within the framework of a PSO. Should the scope of a disaster exceed a nation’s own capabilities, it may request international assistance. In such cases, nations will probably respond on a national basis.

Section XI
SPECTRUM OF MILITARY TASKS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0247
Multifunctional PSOs encompass both elements of traditional peacekeeping and new tasks that may involve both coercion and the application of military force to enforce compliance. The spectrum of likely tasks is listed below:?

the control and verification of compliance with peace agreements, cease-fire agreements or armistices — the exercise of control and the enforcement of compliance may require combat actions;



assistance in fulfilling agreements on peaceful settlements of a conflict;



contribution to conflict prevention through preventive deployment, training assistance and security sector reform projects;



guarantee, or denial of freedom of movement (FOM);



conduct, supervise or support of mineclearing, explosive ordnance (EOR) and improvised explosive reconnaissance and disposal (IERD), and mine awareness training programmes;



disarmament, demobilisation and assistance to reintegration operations, including those involving foreign military personnel;



support of humanitarian relief and assistance operations to civilian populations, including refugees and internally displaced persons;



eliminate human rights abuses and support the restoration of human rights within the broad context of a PSO;



assist in planning, monitoring and the conduct of elections;



support the restoration of civil order and the rule of law, including the apprehension of war criminals;



enforce sanctions and embargoes;



assist in the co-ordination of activities supporting economic rehabilitation and reconstruction; and



support to reconciliation and other development programmes as part of the peacebuilding process.

Section XII
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HYPOTHETICAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

0248
A hypothetical PSO is presented in the diagram, which is designed to illustrate the often ad hoc and incremental engagement of military and civilian agencies. The vertical axis represents the causes and symptoms that are generally associated with the development of a crisis or complex emergency, and the horizontal axis — time — which may be viewed in terms of pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. Just as no two crises or complex emergencies will be the same, neither will the response, and engagements will be incremental and ad hoc, and the activities of the incoming military force and/or other agencies will need to be harmonised and co-ordinated with those already engaged. The involvement of different agencies should be viewed as overlays that will affect, and be affected by those already engaged and should not be viewed as distinct areas of activity. The various lines within the body of the diagram indicate the functional lines of operation, linked to the possible objectives of the various agencies, which themselves will need to be linked, as milestones, towards the achievement of the political endstate — self-sustaining peace. Political negotiations and other diplomatic activities are not specifically shown because they are conducted throughout the PSO and should direct the lines of operation towards the political endstate. While the main body of the military force will generally be the last in and the first out of the JAO, many military specialists may deploy early and remain long after the main military force has withdrawn. The multifunctional nature of a PSO and the requirements of co-ordination, as indicated in this diagram, clearly illustrate the profoundly political nature of PSOs and the requirement for political control at the operational level.