



Chapter 3

THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I

PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Selection and application

0301 The principles of war apply to the conduct of PSOs as to any other military operation. However, the distinct nature of PSOs requires the consideration of the extra principles defined in this chapter, and that the principles of war are given a particular interpretation and/or emphasis. The following list is a compilation of these principles and their relevance to the conduct of PSOs. The judgement of those responsible for planning and executing a PSO will temper the weight and the application of each one.

Objective

0302 Every military operation must be directed towards an attainable objective or endstate. In a joint and multinational PSO of long duration, involving many civilian organisations and agencies, military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way in achieving the political endstate or an actual element of that end-state. Military activities may be designed to assist the further development of the PSO by other civilian agencies. Such complex issues must be addressed in the formulation of the mandate and mission plan in order to achieve both unity of effort and purpose among all military and civilian organisations and agencies involved in the PSO. In the context of a PSO, the principle of *objective* relates directly to the other principles of *unity of effort, co-operation, civil-military co-operation and liaison*, and indirectly to *mutual respect, transparency and credibility*.

Perseverance

0303 The achievement of the political endstate in PSOs will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. Protracted development plans may curtail the military aspiration to achieve operational tempo, and lead to military impatience and frustration. However, the pursuit of short-term military success, at the expense of long-term social, economic and political

gains should be resisted. The principle of *perseverance* relates directly to the *objective, sustainment, economy of effort*, and all other principles addressing the interaction with the civilian agencies in the mission.

Unity of effort

0304 The complexity of any likely PSO, and the necessity for continual military interaction with a large number of international organisations, NGOs and private voluntary organisations will probably make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents, and between the military and civilian components of any operation.

0305 Unity of effort also acknowledges that co-ordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved through dialogue and consensus and not by command. It can best be achieved through the development of a political/military mission plan. The SRSG or HoM will have prime responsibility for the co-ordination and achievement of unity of effort. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the authorising political body and national political bodies and, at the operational and tactical levels, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation. Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential in achieving unity of effort.

Flexibility

0306 The multi-agency environment in which PSOs are conducted, and the multifunctional nature of the challenges to be confronted, require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility. Detailed orders will often be overly prescriptive for the management of a PSO environment; hence, the requirement to be fully aware of superior intent and the political context of the PSO, and the practice of mission analysis and the adoption of a manoeuvrist approach. The principle of *flexibility* relates directly to that of the *freedom of military movement*.

0307 The successful management of PSOs involves the management of change and the transition to peace. Within the constraints of the mandate, and thus their ROE, forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum outside assistance. A PSF should be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should also be considered.

0308 Thus, flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PSOs and, in particular, peace enforcement that has to be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence, ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PSO force structure. ROE

support within the international community, contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the JOA. Legal issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Security

- 0315 Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection a command responsibility in all military operations. In its mandate and political and military directive, the PSF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military orders and ROE.
- 0316 On occasion, aid agencies may employ local civilians or expatriates as guards and escorts. When they do, their security status, precise responsibilities and operating procedures will require co-ordination with the activities of the PSF. This interaction must be regularly reviewed by the JFC.
- 0317 All military personnel involved in an operation must be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their tasks. While they cannot be forced to do so, civil agencies operating within a mandated military JOA should be encouraged to make their personnel appropriately aware of the risks and dangers they may face.

Promotion of co-operation and consent

- 0318 The promotion of co-operation and consent and the willing and active involvement of all parties and the local people will be fundamental in achieving a lasting and self-sustaining peace in all PSOs. The wider support of the international community will also play a part in sustaining the operation. Any force activities that may result in a loss of consent should therefore be balanced against this requirement.
- 0319 A general loss of consent by a PSF resourced and configured for peacekeeping alone, may have grave consequences. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for peace enforcement should be manageable, but will eventually need to be recovered if the operation is to progress towards the desired endstate.

Impartiality

- 0320 PSOs must be conducted impartially without favour or prejudice to any party and in accordance with the mandate. This is essential to retain their trust and confidence. At some stage in a campaign, a PSF may be accused of being partial and this may have a negative effect on the credibility of the PSF and its ability to accomplish its mission. Whenever possible, such accusations should be refuted and all actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartial status of the PSF. Effective communications and transparency of operations are key in maintaining at least the perception of impartiality with

a legal principle that is enshrined in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

0334 **Compliance, justice and consent:** Closely linked to consent are assessments concerning the projected levels of compliance with the PSO. Compliance may already exist or may need to be encouraged by inducements and rewards, or enforced by coercion. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary precursor or adjunct to the promotion of co-operation and consent. Coercive compliance is not an option for a lightly armed peacekeeping force. A generally compliant environment allows the PSF to fix recalcitrant elements and create the operational space necessary to promote co-operation among the remaining elements of the population. In the conduct of PSOs, if the immediate military object is to bring an end to any fighting, commanders must talk to the leaders of those engaged in the fighting. However, this tends to leave the victims of violence and those who already wish to live in peace voiceless, and almost inevitably means that those involved in the fighting determine the terms of any settlement. In this way, crimes against humanity and violations of the fundamentals of international law may be rewarded. In such circumstances, peace with impunity and without justice is unlikely to receive the consent and wide support which is necessary for its continuation. Thus, the creation of self-sustaining peace requires that commanders do not focus their activities exclusively on those involved in the fighting, but work to promote the co-operation and consent of those already engaged in peaceful activities.

0335 **Consequences of a general loss of consent and non-compliance:** There are various ways that a PSF might lose consent. A belligerent faction may simply decide to remove consent and compliance unilaterally. Consent may also be lost if a PSF is perceived as taking sides, or if it uses excessive force in what is considered an inappropriate or illegal manner. Credibility, linked to consent, may also be lost if the PSF does not respond to breaches of the mandate to enforce international laws and take action to control major abuses to basic human rights such as ethnic cleansing. A loss of consent and non-compliance may result in an escalation of violence, sustained opposition to the PSF and a possible loss of control. In such circumstances, a PSF may find it necessary to divert its efforts to force protection tasks rather than the accomplishment of the mission.

0336 **The management of consent:** In addition to the promotion of the co-operation of the local people, much of the conduct of a PSF will be designed to manipulate the threshold of consent, in order to create more operational space and greater freedom of action. This can best be achieved by the deployment of a PSF with sufficient capability to deter hostile actions, or by the judicious application of force to demonstrate and reinforce credibility. When force is used, it will be necessary to have a keen feeling for the impact that actions may have, not just on local consent, but also on the consent for the operation as a whole. When general consent is in doubt, its stabilisation and promotion should be a priority task, but when it is more certain, it may be possible to use more robust methods in confined areas without affecting the overall level of consent and the accomplishment of the mission. At all levels, political leverage, sanctions and the threat of credible force or its

combat, the perception of the parties will be of less immediate concern than for a peacekeeping force. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations. The impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.

0341 **Impartiality and the conduct of operations:** Circumstances leading up to deployment may have already created a biased agenda and compromised the impartial status of the PSF. In such a case, every effort should be made by the PSF to redress this perception and to promote the impartial status of the mandate and the intended impartial conduct of the PSO, both internationally and in the theatre of operations. Great care must be exercised, at all levels, before and during the conduct of a PSO not to compromise the impartial nature of the operation.

0342 **Impartiality and transparency:** It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of a mission if the parties are made aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions and likely techniques to be used by the force. This will place a premium on the requirement for an active information strategy, reinforced by the civil-military co-operation programme and an effective liaison system. A failure to communicate could foster suspicion and may prevent the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of the operation may depend. However, the requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of peace enforcement, may render transparency inappropriate.

0343 **Impartiality versus neutrality:** Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. To do so limits the potential to exercise initiative and flexibility, promotes passivity and, as a consequence, limits the development of the mission. Impartiality, perhaps better described as principled impartiality, requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality does not. The conduct of PSOs will be impartial to the parties, but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

0344 **Consequences of a loss of impartiality:** A perceived loss of impartiality may have serious consequences. It can result in a loss of trust and the confidence of the local factions and cause them to withdraw consent, and thus limit the options that may be available to the PSF. At worst, a perception of partiality and a consequent loss of consent could lead to widespread non-compliance and unrestrained violence, resulting in heavy military and civilian casualties and the failure of the mission.

Minimum necessary force

0345 The principle of minimum necessary force controls the use of overwhelming force to only those circumstances where it is necessary and then places tight constraints upon collateral damage. A misuse of force may have a negative effect on the consent for an operation and thus the ability of a PSF to achieve its long-term goal of peacebuilding. Any use of force therefore should be

carefully managed. In a PSO involving parties with a working infrastructure, including good communications, the negative effects of any use of force may be more difficult to contain and control. However, in a situation of chaos, or where the parties are unco-ordinated and independent, considerably more force can generally be used, as long as incidents remain isolated. In peace enforcement, the capability and willingness to use force are primary characteristics, but when force is used, it should be applied prudently and all positive measures should be taken to avoid civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage. Nevertheless, in peace enforcement, all necessary force, including overwhelming force, may have to be used when challenged, to have an immediate impact, deter further acts of non-compliance and maintain credibility. Whatever the circumstances, the use of force should be seen as a tool to set the conditions for the development of peace in the long term, rather than the means of defeating a designated enemy. The details of how and when force can be used will be specified in military orders and ROE.

0346 The use of force and self-defence: Military forces should not confuse the wider use of force with the inherent right of self-defence. The right to use reasonable force in self-defence is enshrined in international and national law. However, what constitutes self-defence needs careful and precise definition in terms of hostile acts or intentions and defence of oneself, of other members of the military force, military equipment and facilities, civilian members of the wider operation and civilian equipment and facilities. There are two broad conceptual views of the use of force in self-defence:

a The broader interpretation is that a force that is threatened during the conduct of its mission, can use force in self-defence and in defence of its purposes. For example, should a PSF, with ROE limited to self-defence, witness an attack by one party on another, the only way the PSF can use force to defend the party being attacked is to intervene and put itself in the line of fire. Thus, the peacekeeping force may be able to use force within the definition of self-defence.

b The narrow interpretation of self-defence would suggest that the PSF should not deploy if there is a risk that the use of force may be necessary. However, not to intervene when confronted by widespread abuses of basic human rights and ethnic cleansing, may be regarded as a dereliction of military duty. At least, this is likely to be the perception of the international media. A narrow and neutral concept of operations which limits itself to observation and reporting, will not be appropriate in circumstances of widespread violations of basic human rights and ethnic cleansing, even if it does reduce the risk of casualties to the PSF. To take the narrow approach may undermine the credibility of the PSF, not just with the wider international community and the parties to the conflict, but also with aid agencies that operate unarmed and generally unprotected.

0347 **The UN's interpretation of self-defence:** The UN's interpretation of the use of force in self-defence is ambiguous. peacekeeping has traditionally been described as a non-coercive instrument. Yet, since 1973, the guidelines

approved by the Security Council for each peacekeeping force have stipulated that self-defence is deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. This is a broad conception of self-defence, which could only be implemented by a PSF capable of combat. In both the mandate and its directive to the SRSG, HoM or JFC, the UN should clearly define the circumstances when and how force can be used. This direction should be commensurate with the nature of the mission (peacekeeping, peace enforcement or other), its operational objectives, and the combat power of the PSF in relation to that of the parties.

0348 **Consent and the use of force:** In PSOs, the need to build or preserve consent may restrain, but does not foreclose the use of force, especially in a state of chaos associated with a complex emergency. In cases of clear breaches of the mandate, the flaunting of international law and the abuse of human rights, the use of force may serve to enhance the credibility of the force and the consent for the operation, nationally and internationally. It may be that the force loses local consent, but if this can be isolated, wider consent may be promoted. In certain circumstances, consent may serve to marginalise opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force. If general, consent for the operation can be promoted to such a degree that it reduces armed opposition to the status of maverick banditry, then the use of force, which is within the prescribed limits of the ROE, may enhance consent for the PSO. In such circumstances, consent can thus facilitate, not hinder the use of force. A clear communication of the requirements of the mandate and the principles underpinning the PSO, with an explanation of the rewards for compliance and penalties for non-compliance, may serve to rationalise PSO actions, refute accusations of partiality and enhance credibility and consent.

0349 **The use of force and linkage:** The use of force by a peacekeeping force will usually be confined to self-defence. The use of force by a peace enforcement force is not so constrained. Having established its credibility, however, it will be unusual for a peace enforcement force to initiate the use of force without first trying other methods of deterrence and coercion. The use of force by a peace enforcement force will generally be in response to an act of non-compliance or an offensive action initiated by one or more of the parties. When a response does require the use of force, the negative effects on the overall conduct of the operation will be minimised if the response can be linked directly to the threat, and is demonstrably designed to eliminate that threat and no more. This does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of an immediate follow-up as a response to an incident. However, a follow-up must be seen to be legal, proportionate, politically justified and linked irrefutably to the aggression that triggered the response. The more this is in doubt, the greater the political risk of escalation.

0350 **Other options:** There are other approaches and techniques that can be used to gain and maintain the initiative when the use of force is not appropriate. These techniques are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. At the political, strategic and operational levels, it may be possible to apply political leverage,

harmonised and effective logistic support effort.

Section V

THE MISSION PLAN

0363 The mission plan is the mechanism used to translate the multifunctional and multidimensional conceptual framework described above into practice. It is designed to synchronise, co-ordinate and direct the various lines of military and civilian operations towards strategic objectives and the achievement of the political endstate. The mission plan is usually drafted by the SRSG or HoM, albeit with the advice of the PSF commander. In a mission plan, there may be multiple, concurrent and sequential lines of activity. Some of these will be single-agency, others multi-agency and all will be interlinked and require crossreference and co-ordination. In such a mission plan, co-ordination may be difficult because some component agencies, not being under operational command, may work to their own agendas and perceive any association with the military force as being counterproductive to the conduct of their own operations. The military campaign or OPLAN will represent the military line of operation in the mission plan.

0364 The mission plan should designate the operation's main effort. At the strategic level, this may be to demonstrate the unity and determination of the international community to bring the parties to the conference table. At the operational level, this could be supported by joint operations, the enforcement of maritime embargoes or blockades and air exclusion zones. At the tactical level, this could involve the creation of a secure environment free from human rights violations in which civilian agencies can start to redress the symptoms and underlying causes of the conflict. As the situation stabilises, the main effort at the operational level could switch to local elections, the re-imposition of a legal system and finally reconstruction activities, including justice reconstruction that will have been a subordinate line of activity throughout.

0365 Set in its wider context, the mission plan can be seen as a multidimensional construct that provides commanders with an intellectual rationale for multidimensional operations, and the allocation of resources and the designation of main effort to their respective lines of operation, in accordance with the intent of the higher commander. The mission plan is not prescriptive, but will require commanders to revisit their estimates with every significant change in circumstance and allow them to modify their OPLANs accordingly. A manoeuvrist approach to operations, which tells commanders what they are to achieve, rather than a more prescriptive approach, which tells commanders in detail how they are to achieve their missions, provides the prerequisite flexibility for the execution of a complex political, military mission plan.

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Section VIII
THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

- 0368 Engagement in a PSO by the international community, individual nations and NGOs may be incremental, *ad hoc* and multifunctional. Many donor-funded agencies may be engaged in development and other programmes, possibly involving military elements before the deployment of a military force. The deployment and conduct of a military force, however, will generally cover the phases listed below. Allowances are required within each phase for changes in the mandate, the nature of the operational environment and other activities. It may prove necessary to deploy a number of national contingents as part of a UN or other military force each under a national contingent commander. These contingents may be joint in nature and have a national support element to serve as a co-ordinating headquarters for the reception, staging, and onward movement of personnel and material as well as the sustainment of the force.
- 0369 **Preparation:** The preparation phase covers all activities prior to departure, including warning, reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training. The preparation phase of a PSO is a national responsibility, giving guidance on the standards of training, equipment and personnel strengths to be achieved.
- 0370 **Deployment:** The deployment phase starts with the departure of the national contingents of a PSF from their home bases and ends with their arrival in the designated JOA. The deployment phase is basically a national responsibility, and the JFC having a co-ordinating and overview role.
- 0371 **Operations:** The operational phase begins with the arrival of the elements of the PSF in the JOA, and covers their reception, move to base camps, preparatory measures, their tactical deployment forward into their respective areas of operations, and the subsequent conduct of operations. Establishing the PSF's security and self-sufficiency will be prime planning considerations in the early stages of an operation. Other initial and preparatory activities will include briefings, reconnaissance, liaison visits, training and administration. If taking over from another PSF (e.g. hand-over from a peace enforcement force to a peacekeeping force), the PSF's tactical forward deployment may be conducted as a relief in place operation.
- 0372 **Redeployment:** Any redeployment phase starts with a cessation or handing over of operational tasks. The nature of any redeployment may vary from emergency extraction to planned withdrawal, routine roulement or, in the case of a peace enforcement operation, the hand-over to a peacekeeping force. When appropriate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international relief agencies or civilian authorities. Post-operational activities will embrace all after-action activity, including post-operational reports, the submission of lessons learned

