



Chapter 4

JOINT FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

0401 Early force deployments, in particular air and maritime manoeuvres, may be used as political signals of interest or intent and in support of a wider conflict prevention strategy. Should such a conflict prevention strategy, including early force deployments, fail, military resources may still be used to provide much of the operational information and intelligence upon which the political decision will be taken to commit resources or not. If, as a result of any decision and estimate, it is considered that a peacekeeping profile is sufficient, force considerations may be relatively simple. However, should a peace enforcement profile be considered necessary, the force will need to deploy joint, all-arm groupings capable of over-matching whatever level of opposition may be offered by one or all of the parties to the conflict. Each nation organises and structures its forces differently. The issues discussed in this chapter highlight generic joint considerations and, as such, the structure and grouping of considerations will not mirror those of every nation.

Section I

SPECIFIC JOINT CAPABILITIES

Special forces

0402 The characteristics of special forces have many relevant applications in PSOs, but their overt deployment in a politically charged environment can be highly emotive. Their ability to be deployed discreetly, at long range, with secure communications, makes special forces capable of short notice liaison, reconnaissance and other tasks. They are also suited to civil-military co-operation tasks, community relations and community information activities, as well as the raising, training and reform of local irregular armed groups and local security forces.

Engineers

0403 The demands for engineering skills, whether provided by specialist engineer troops or from all forces and services, will usually exceed supply. Engineers will inevitably be required to build accommodation and other life support facilities, including force protection. Other tasks include mobility and countermobility

operations, especially in humanitarian missions requiring the protection of the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Another major engineering task is likely to be the support to any civil development programme. This might include the supply or maintenance of civil infrastructure facilities, such as the provision of shelters, waste disposal facilities and electrical power, and the procurement, storage and distribution of water. Engineers and other ordnance clearance and disposal specialists, from whatever arm or service, will also be able to supervise the location and area clearance of mines and other unexploded ordnance.

NBC defence troops

0404 NBC defence troops (decontamination units, recce/survey teams) should be employed when there is the presence or threat or previous use of weapons of mass destruction or potential terrorist acts, or when the JOA contains civilian facilities with toxic materials or research laboratories, chemical plants or waste deposits and stockpiles.

Medical services

0405 Military medical services are designed principally to provide medical services to the forces and not to the indigenous population. However, in PSOs, they may also be required to support humanitarian operations and community relations projects, as well as to provide direct support to military operations. In addition, living conditions in PSOs, may be very basic and could pose a considerable health and hygiene hazard. Environmental health and hygiene reconnaissance and monitoring are thus vital for troop health and welfare. Despite the very basic living conditions that often prevail on operations, the expectations of servicemen and women, the public, media and parliament will be higher than might be expected for war. Standards of care must conform, as closely as possible, to those expected in peace.

Military police

0406 Policing tasks are and should be primarily conducted by civic authorities or specified civilian policing elements of the PSO. Military police are able to provide the JFC with a rapid investigation and management capability, including, if required, of war crimes; the investigation of complaints and claims made against the PSF; the prevention of crime, including looting and black marketeering; the maintenance and restoration of law and order, not just in a military context; the protection of designated high threat personnel; and the control of routes, traffic stragglers, refugees and other non-combatants. In PSOs, military police may perform these functions in close co-operation with national civil or UN police.

Military provost staff

0407 Military provost staff are able to advise and assist the national contingent and/or the JFC with the detention requirements in the JOA of national or multinational forces in support of the civil authority.

Section II
AVIATION

0410 Helicopters, whether jointly held or belonging to maritime, land or air forces, can perform a wide range of essential functions in PSOs. They are increasingly 24-hour capable and broadly independent of terrain, but are at times limited by weather (particularly ice and snow). They can provide air transport capability for troop movement or logistic resupply and perform reconnaissance. Armed and attack helicopters are a flexible combat force. Helicopters themselves are vulnerable and also need protective measures and avionics commensurate with the threat and scope of potential tasks in PSOs. Helicopters will inevitably be a scarce resource, and tasking should therefore be centrally directed to ensure the most effective distribution of their effort.

Reconnaissance

0411 Helicopters can provide first class local information. Their low operating altitude gives excellent perspective, while their rapid response and forward deployment can yield timely data. The electro-optical systems fitted to armed and attack helicopters can provide detailed imagery. From stand-off distances, this makes them inconspicuous to those observed.

Troop movement

0412 Troop movement operations can range from special forces support through patrol deployment and convoy escort to air-mobile operations.

Logistic support

0413 Utility and transport helicopters (UH/T) can resupply almost any area, and carry out a wide range of logistic tasks, from liaison to troop movement, resupply, engineering and signals support, to casualty and/or medical evacuation. Where possible, the sole reliance on helicopters should be avoided as their scarcity, cost and vulnerability will often make surface movement more appropriate over the longer term.

Armed action

0414 Combat aviation, in particular armed action, can provide a flexible and responsive deterrent force. Their potential to support other helicopter operations, provide presence or over-watch and, if necessary, conduct precision fire at long range, can place heavy demands on their availability.

Maritime operations

0415 Maritime helicopters are configured specifically for the maritime environment and, accordingly, can contribute significantly to surveillance and anti-surface

Section III
MARITIME COMPONENT

0416 In the conduct of PSOs, fundamental naval concepts such as defence, deterrence, protection, patrolling, surveillance, poise, sealift and amphibious tasks remain extant, but the nature of PSOs may require a particular restraint or emphasis in the application of the techniques required when applying these concepts. In the conduct of PSOs, maritime forces possess a number of distinct attributes which contribute to a wide variety of particular functions and capabilities. These are described below.

Naval attributes

0417 **Mobility:** Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over a very wide horizon, becoming selectively visible and offering a variety of coercive or inducement profiles.

0418 **Versatility:** Warships can easily change their military posture, undertake several tasks concurrently and be rapidly available to escalate if necessary. Furthermore, their mere presence in a region does not necessarily convey a particular intention or threat; although this could send the wrong message if not complemented by the appropriate diplomacy.

0419 **Lift capability:** Sealift allows amphibious and selected land and air forces to transit to and poise in JOA, and then enables maritime power to be brought to bear ashore, either independently or in support of joint operations.

0420 **Sustained reach:** Maritime forces have integral logistic support. The range and endurance that these provide, give individual maritime units the ability to operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support.

0421 **Poise:** Once in a JOA, maritime forces can remain on station for prolonged periods, either covertly or more openly to demonstrate presence. They provide the political and military leadership with a variety of options without the political commitment of deploying forces ashore.

0422 **Leverage:** Through suitable positioning, maritime forces can provide leverage to influence political events and shape military operations ashore.

Maritime tasks in peace support operations

0423 The application of maritime power is generally defined within three categories of environment: combat, constabulary or impartial activities in actual or potential conflict and more benign environments. Only those tasks specific to PSOs are described below:

a the active monitoring of a sea area, at sea or from the air, for any

- infringements of sanctions or embargoes and their enforcement;
- b patrolling and monitoring a maritime cease-fire line or demilitarised zone and the control of piracy and other contraband (drug interdiction) operations;
- c patrolling and monitoring sea areas to control and/or enforce economic or legal agreements related to the mission, e.g. fishery, seabed exploitation and international borders;
- d supervising the cantonment of vessels;
- e the contribution of organic aircraft, maritime patrol assets and helicopters to enforce a no-fly zone or in-JOA movement of forces, aid, refugees and casualties;
- f contribution of (amphibious) forces to riverine operations and support for the insertion from or withdrawal to the sea;
- g provision of seaborne medical and other logistic and humanitarian resources;
- h disaster relief operations and assistance to seaborne refugees;
- i provision of a neutral platform for peace negotiations;
- j mine countermeasures to provide access; and
- k conduct of military evacuation operations and non-combat evacuation operations.

Planning considerations

0424 Maritime forces (including maritime air assets) may play a role in all phases of a PSO from predeployment planning, deployment, the sustainment and conduct of operations, and withdrawal. Maritime considerations that should be integral to all joint operational planning include: generic naval C3 and surveillance capabilities, and more specific naval capabilities, such as the ability to open and protect sea lanes for the deployment and sustainment of a PSO, or the ability to project power ashore, either independently or in support of joint operations, including withdrawal. Littoral operations will require an enhanced co-operation between maritime and land forces. This might lead to a joint command over such a sea/land area or a well-established supported/supporting relationship. This co-operation should include planning, picture compilation, common assessment, mutual action/reaction, and mutual support.

.....

Section IV
LAND COMPONENT

0425 Land forces will usually have a significant role to play in all the tasks described in Chapter 5 and may employ all the techniques described in Chapter 6, as and when appropriate. Land forces will have a particular role to play in managing the day-to-day interface with the parties to the conflict and the indigenous population. This intimacy places considerable significance in ensuring that soldiers are sensitive to the nature and ethos of particular operations, in particular the potentially different approaches required by peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Special to arm considerations

0426 **Armour:** The use of main battle tanks (MBTs) will generally not be appropriate or practical in peacekeeping operations. However, it can be an effective statement of political will in peace enforcement operations. Armoured reconnaissance units are particularly useful in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, especially when a unit's geographical area of operations is large. The fire power, mobility, protection and communications of armoured reconnaissance vehicles and the training of reconnaissance troops, make them suitable for such tasks as liaison, control points, convoy security, quick reaction and clearing routes. The deployment of MBTs in the conduct of peace enforcement will depend on the scale of opposition and equipment available to local forces.

0427 **Artillery:** The deployment and use of guns, rockets and missiles will rarely be appropriate in the conduct of peacekeeping. However, mortar locating radars and other artillery locating assets may prove useful for the documenting and apportioning of responsibility for attacks and other violations. The deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), although not always a land force's asset, may have particular utility in all PSOs not just in monitoring hostile acts, but in force tracking and the monitoring of refugee movement. If guns were required for self-defence, it would generally indicate that a peace enforcement force should conduct the operation. In peace enforcement operations, artillery may provide a deterrent function, as well as providing a contingency capability to respond directly to escalations of violence. It may provide the only effective and timely response available to a commander over the extended ranges characteristic of PSOs, by the use of inherent range (particularly of 155mm calibre guns) and the tactical mobility of lighter guns. In operations designed to guarantee or deny movement, artillery, particularly air defence artillery, may be used to enforce no-fly zones. In the conduct of peace enforcement, mortar and artillery illumination, marker and, when appropriate high explosive ammunition, could be used as a demonstration of resolve to deter further hostile acts and to enforce compliance. Striking belligerent factions at a distance, whether in self-defence or perhaps to separate warring factions, may prove less emotive and therefore less prone to escalation than close combat actions. The introduction of precision

Section V
AIR COMPONENT

0429 The flexible and full-spectrum capability of air power capability makes it an appropriate tool for most PSOs. At times, aircraft operating from outside territory threatened by factions may avoid the need to insert, protect and recover a ground force. From the earliest stages of a crisis, air power can provide a deterrent, with implicit or explicit threat of escalation. Alternatively, it may prepare the environment for secure insertion of a ground force, and then complement other forces by its ability to be activated or suppressed rapidly in concert with progress on other military, humanitarian or diplomatic fronts. Finally, air power projection operations can be ended quickly, and without the problems of extraction in the face of intense media interest.

0430 Because air assets and their C2I structures will often be located outside the zone of conflict, there is potential for operational goals to diverge from those of forces more intimately enmeshed in the management of the dynamics of the relationships with the parties and the management of the situation on the ground. For instance, a strategy of enforcement from the air would compromise the impartial status of a PSO and render the situation more difficult to manage on the ground. Joint planning is therefore essential to ensure that all operations are fully integrated into and supportive of the overall OPLAN. Air operations in PSOs may be grouped into four roles, described below.

Reconnaissance and surveillance

0431 At the strategic and operational levels, air assets can make a major contribution to diplomatic and other efforts to prevent or limit conflict. Operating from outside a potential area of conflict, they can gather information without intruding into and risking exacerbating the situation. If PSOs become necessary, air reconnaissance offers a highly mobile and responsive source of information, which is independent of terrain and, to an extent, weather. Moreover, the reconnaissance may be overt or covert, air reconnaissance being ideal for the latter.

a A variety of fixed-wing borne sensors can see beyond a border without infringing it. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) can provide data on potential threat weapon systems and their compliance with agreements. High altitude photographic coverage can provide excellent detail, and some systems are night-capable. However, optical sensors, and to an extent infrared, are limited by weather. Radar systems provide excellent wide area, long-range coverage, with less detail but an increasing ability to detect vehicle and other surface movement.

b Satellites give extensive coverage for signal intelligence (SIGINT) and various types of imagery, though the latter can be affected by the weather. Their low and predictable revisit rates can result in significant gaps in coverage, but sovereignty issues do not affect them, and their

data is usually considered to be authoritative and impartial.

- c Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasing in capability, and reduce the risk of embarrassment through loss of manned systems. They can often give detailed confirmation of situations detected with wider coverage assets. High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAVs are costly, but have the potential to replace the much more expensive satellite systems. The smaller 'battlefield' UAVs are relatively inexpensive, but may lack key capabilities.

Strategic airlift and tactical airlift

0432 Fixed-wing air transport (AT) aircraft will generally be required in the conduct of a PSO. They can move significant numbers of personnel and materiel quickly into the JOA, and may be exploited to move food and emergency aid, conduct aeromedical, airborne and special forces operations, or evacuate nationals, aid workers and others caught up in the dispute. AT offers a high profile demonstration of national commitment that attracts major media coverage.

- a Strategic intertheatre air transport can permit rapid insertion of a light PSO force. However, strategic air transport requires diplomatic clearances, a favourable air situation, secure staging posts, fuel supplies and cargo handling facilities, though air-to-air refuelling (AAR) can reduce the need for staging fields and over-flight clearances. Furthermore, strategic air transport, especially heavy-lift, is a limited and expensive resource. A balance must be struck, therefore, with surface transport means to ensure that the deployed force is not only timely, but is viable and sustainable throughout the operational area.
- b Tactical air transport craft offer greater choice of operating areas, in an unfavourable situation and may be the only means of supply, using airdrop techniques where landing is not practicable. Threats may include sabotage, small arms, mortars and artillery, to aircraft on the ground and automatic weapons, man portable air defence systems (MANPADSs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to those in flight. Self-defence aids will be vital in a high threat environment. Vulnerability can also be reduced by integral freight handling systems to minimise time on the ground; short field performance to add potential landing sites and reduce vulnerability during approach and departure; and night and poor weather operating capability to exploit cover of cloud and darkness. Nevertheless, the possible requirement for significant surface forces to keep open the air, lines of communication need to be balanced against the undoubted value of the asset.

Control of the air

0433 It is widely accepted that the control of the air is a prerequisite for all military operations, including PSOs. Even a poorly equipped protagonist may be able to launch limited air attacks that achieve disproportionate

political results. In contrast, it may occur that offensive air actions by PSO forces are governed by restrictive ROE. Counter-air operations are likely to be reactive, and control of the air achieved through: protection of aircraft from attack by air or surface weapons; monitoring airspace to detect and confront unauthorised activities; imposition of an air blockade; and preparedness to attack all or part of any belligerent's air inventory where there is irrefutable evidence of non-compliance. There are a number of other considerations:

- a Remote basing and a disproportionately large area of operations could present great difficulties when imposing an air exclusion zone. Focusing resources, such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, on a limited number of bases from which attacks can be made may offset this. The requirement to obtain the authority to engage that is normal in PSOs makes it imperative to establish a robust C3 organisation to reduce the delay to a minimum. Furthermore, the existence of an air threat makes it imperative that the agreed ROE permit the JFC to authorise engagement in dire need.
- b SAMs may break a cease-fire, and MANPADS are extremely difficult to detect. Loss of a single aircraft or any personnel from any element of the PSF in a PSO can have major political repercussions, particularly if belligerent or warring factions seize aircrews. To reduce risk, aircraft can be packaged to provide mutual protection; high quality self-defence systems added; weapons restricted to those that can be delivered accurately from high and medium level; and night or all-weather capable aircraft used. However, all these increase the cost of providing air support to PSOs.
- c The airspace in the area of responsibility, while not necessarily hostile, may not be totally friendly either. Legitimate civil air traffic may be intermingled with potentially illegitimate traffic, training flights may need to be conducted within airspace earmarked for operations and enforcement of air policing may be constrained by the nature of the peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation; the terms of the mandate; SOFA; and ROE. This drives the need for a sound airspace control plan and de-confliction procedures.
- d The ongoing proliferation of offensive air technology leads to a substantial improvement of offensive air capabilities even among less developed countries. Tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles (CM) could find their way into the inventory of 'rogue' states. Thus, certain peace enforcement operations may have to be planned and conducted under the threat of air aggression. In specific cases, a latent threat of weapons of mass destruction may also need to be taken into consideration. Where such a threat exists, extended air defence forces, combining defensive and offensive force modules should be co-ordinated in a joint effort to counter the entire air threat spectrum, albeit in the air or on the

Section VI
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

0435 Apart from the normal combat service support (CSS) functions, certain PSOs, especially those with a humanitarian focus, will be almost entirely of a logistic nature. The operational environment for PSOs is often characterised by long distances, difficult terrain, a hostile climate, a scarcity of basic facilities and a lack of host nation support. Long lines of communication to the JOA may compound this, and an imprecise logistic concept developed in a multinational, multi-agency and *ad hoc* manner. This may have a considerable impact on the size of the logistic effort to sustain the force, let alone to enable it to operate effectively, and may well require the deployment of national support elements (NSE) including a co-ordinating headquarters. CSS advisors therefore need to be involved at the start of the planning process and be included in any reconnaissance. CSS considerations are likely to dictate major aspects of the PSF's conduct of operations, and may be of such priority as to require the involvement and employment of combat arms. The timely deployment of CSS assets is desirable whenever possible. Typically, in peacekeeping operations, units may deploy on light scales and with limited weapons and ammunition, transport, communications, equipment support, and medical assets. The operational imperatives of peace enforcement, however, dictate that a peace enforcement force should be sustained and fully capable of combat. In more benign circumstances, it may be appropriate for the civil sector to be allocated certain logistic functions to support the PSF and aid agencies.

UN logistics

0436 Experience suggests that UN logistics are not sufficiently flexible or dynamic to support the demands and tempo of dynamic military PSOs. Establishing an integrated support system involving both UN and national assets will require detailed planning. Traditionally, national contingents should arrive in the JOA with an agreed level of 1st and 2nd line support, and be self-sufficient for 90 days. In UN operations, 3rd line support will generally be provided from the outset by the UN or civil sector companies contracted by them. Deployments into a UN operation require a detailed in and out processing procedure conducted by UN logistic staff. This must be scrupulously conducted, because it will form the basis of future financial reimbursement by the UN. Centralised UN support may be supplied by a contractor or a designated lead nation. Any transfer of authority and logistic responsibilities will need to be carefully managed to cater for national and cultural idiosyncrasies. Experience would suggest that some national contingents may arrive underresourced and require assistance to sustain them. This can place unplanned pressures upon the logistic system.

Logistics

0437 In PSOs, it is quite likely that national contingents are placed under the command of other nations' headquarters. The logistic implications of this

Section VII
BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS

0440 Two important financial aspects need to be mentioned:

- the financial authority for the costs of maintaining the PSF in the JOA, to include local purchase; and
- the costs of civil-military co-ordination projects initiated intra-JOA and designed to assist a return to normality.

Authority

0441 The responsibility and authority for the funding of a national contribution to a PSO will always rest with the national governments. In the case of a UN operation, while the authority to establish a PSO belongs to the UNSC, the power to authorise the expenses of the operation rests with the General Assembly.

Funding methods

0442 There are two methods of funding a UN PSO:

- a **Assessed contributions:** Under the authority of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, PSOs are normally paid for by members of the UN on a scale worked out to take account of their ability to pay.
- a **Voluntary contributions:** A force may be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. Inevitably, the main burden of costs falls upon those states contributing the bulk of the forces and equipment.

0443 **Accounting**

- a **Pay and allowances:** Forces receive their pay and allowances through normal national channels. Some allowances may be recoverable from the UN. There may be some sensitivity about disparities in pay between individual national contingents.
- b **Billing:** The billing for PSOs is complex and, in order that it can be carried out successfully and nationally reimbursed, careful records and accounts must be kept from the outset. Inherently, this has the risk of unnecessary bureaucratic regulations.
- c **Civil secretary:** A deployed civil secretary (CivSec) will be an essential member of the PSF and required to take responsibility for proper accounting procedures and financial control and advising the FC and the NCCs accordingly. Among his duties is the promulgation of PSF-wide accounting procedures, giving advice to national contingent financial officers and contractors, and avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic

Handwriting practice lines consisting of 25 horizontal dotted lines.

