Session Two - Plenary


Published in Towards implementation of the Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit trafficking

8-9 September 1999
Pretoria, South Africa

Seminar report

edited by Andrew McLean and Elizabeth Clegg

Operational aspects of tackling illicit arms trafficking: SADC, SARPCCO and the EU


Chairperson: Joao Ndlovu, SADC secretariat, Botswana

Virginia Gamba, Head, Arms Management Programme, Institute for Security Studies

There has been an increasing realisation over the last five years among SADC member states that the link between licit and illicit arms trafficking is very strong. Information from the police services in the region has shown that weapons gathered in law enforcement operations have a number of origins. Many of them were originally legally licenced arms or legally exported weapons.

There are three types of illicit arms: licenced firearms that have been stolen; legally exported arms that have been diverted or sold on through corruption; and arms obtained from organised trafficking by networks of dealers.

Tackling illicit trafficking, therefore, requires a comprehensive response. A combination of different approaches is needed:
  • co-ordinated training programmes for police, customs, border guards and the judiciary;

  • improved co-ordination between the different agencies responsible for aspects of the small arms problem, for example, through the establishment of interagency joint working groups; and

  • enhanced databases, communication systems and equipment for monitoring, tracing and controlling illicit arms flows across borders.
Improving intelligence gathering and sharing at a regional level is vital. Intelligence is the single most important factor in tackling illicit arms flows. Yet, while economic and social development is considered on a regional basis, and SARPCCO is taking great strides in policing, intelligence co-operation is still lagging behind. Developing this will be crucial in effectively tackling illicit arms trafficking.

Senior Assistant Commissioner Frank Msutu, Head of Interpol subregional bureau for Southern Africa/SARPCCO secretariat

The objectives of SARPCCO are to:
  • promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of crossborder crime;

  • prepare and disseminate information on criminal activities;

  • review joint crime management strategies;

  • ensure the efficient operation and management of criminal records and the effective joint monitoring of crossborder crime;

  • make recommendations to governments to provide effective policing;

  • develop systematic regional police training policies; and

  • carry out any relevant and appropriate acts and strategies to promote regional police co-operation.
The Interpol subregional bureau acts as the secretariat of SARPCCO and has a dedicated firearms trafficking desk, as this has been identified as a priority crime in the region.

Until now, SARPCCO member states have undertaken numerous bilateral operations on a range of issues, with nine having been conducted in the past year. There have also been joint operations between a number of countries. During these joint operations, 79 firearms and 20 071 pieces of ammunition were recovered. The chiefs of police have encouraged the continuation of this work.

SARPCCO operations are intelligence-driven. But the sensitivity with which firearms issues are treated by many countries has inhibited the development of firearms intelligence in the region. Countries are only now beginning to realise the benefits of contributing to the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracing System (IWETS) database which can trace stolen firearms.

The various legal systems and national laws in different SARPCCO countries have also inhibited regional progress in tackling illicit arms trafficking. Trafficking is currently dealt with under several archaic laws – customs and excise acts, firearms acts and state security acts. This is why the SARPCCO legal subcommittee is developing a firearms protocol to seek ways to harmonise firearms legislation in the region. A law dedicated specifically to firearms trafficking is needed. This could also deal with semi-official trafficking conducted by state agents, and could control and bring transparency to official transfers.

Regional needs


Capacity-building

There is a need to improve the capacity of police organisations in the region to:
  • track and investigate firearms trafficking across borders and internationally;
  • identify fraudulent shipping documents;
  • maximise the use of forensic science evidence;
  • appreciate the importance of firearms trafficking intelligence;
  • analyse and apply criminal intelligence during investigations; and
  • identify sources of firearms intelligence including the use of Interpol systems.
Legislation

Assistance is required to develop appropriate international firearms trafficking legislation.

Raising awareness

An awareness campaign is necessary throughout the region to sensitise the public to the dangers of firearms proliferation and trafficking, and to advise them on what they can do to prevent it. Pamphlets would have to be printed in different languages.

Resources

Most countries’ firearms registration systems are manual and at times poorly managed. There is therefore a need to improve national systems so that all firearms legally in private hands are accounted for. Computers and training may be required in most countries.

Training

SARPCCO has already successfully run a border control course co-sponsored by the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) in Pretoria in 1999. More courses of this nature are being organised, for example, Interpol presented a course on intelligence-gathering for intelligence co-ordinators from the whole region in October in Harare. But the capacity and need for training in other spheres remain great.

SARPCCO welcomes all the assistance that may be made available for human resources development in all countries in the region.

Dominique Bakker, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

Developments within the EU

In June 1997, the EU Programme on Preventing and Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms was adopted. It commits EU countries to strengthen efforts within member states, to strengthen co-operation between member states and to support efforts to third countries requesting EU assistance. It is in the context of this last provision that the Southern Africa Regional Action Programme was drawn up.

A second important EU document is the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, that promotes the harmonisation of member states’ interpretation of common export control criteria.
The third document is the EU Joint Action on Small Arms which promotes action focused on both prevention and reduction aspects of small arms proliferation.

In May 1999, the EU Council of Ministers for Development Co-operation adopted a resolution on small arms, embedding the issue in the EU’s development policy.

Finally, in June 1999, the EU adopted a political declaration on the prevention of illicit arms trafficking to and within the Great Lakes region. This declaration reiterates the intention of EU member states not to allow exports to regions of tension or conflict.

The Dutch National Committee on Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms

The above documents pose a number of institutional and operational challenges. To try and address these, a Dutch interdepartmental working group on preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms has been established, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with colleagues from the departments of Defence, Home Affairs, Trade, Justice and Finance. The aim of the group has been participation at working level among experts, dealing with this issue on a day-to-day basis. The main objectives of the working group are to:
  • create a network of responsible officials;
  • promote the exchange of information; and
  • co-ordinate the Dutch position in various international forums dealing with illicit arms trafficking.
The working group has already met four times. In addition to these meetings, the group visited the container scan recently acquired by the Dutch Customs Division in Rotterdam harbour.

The group is living up to expectations. A network has been established and is frequently used for the exchange of information and the co-ordination of activities, initiatives and positions. In order to maximise the group’s effectiveness, though, it is clearly advisable to draw up a clear mandate in advance and invite representatives of the various ministries in accordance with this mandate. It is also imperative to bring together the right mix of officials responsible for policy development and officials responsible for operational aspects.

Project on firearms-related crimes by the Dutch National Police Service

The Dutch National Police Service has recently launched a National Approach to Illicit Firearms project. This is the result of a number of reports and evaluations that were carried out over the past few years. These pointed out that there was a lack of knowledge and expertise in the Netherlands with regard to firearms-related crimes. There appeared to be no adequate procedures, and there was a distinct need for a clear, structured and workable national approach. Thus, a project consisting of nine subprojects, was developed in order to ‘revitalise’ the national policy against firearms-related crimes. So far, its implementation is considered a success.

The nine subprojects deal with a range of issues relevant to the framework of this seminar. The project dealing with institutional aspects, describes why and how each region should establish a Regional Firearms Bureau. It suggests the establishment of a national platform of regional co-ordinators to offer expertise and advice to the political level. Another project promotes the development of additional expertise by keeping current training programmes up to date and adding practical components to the training material.

A third project aims to monitor the legal firearms trade. It points out contradictions and inconsistencies in the current legislation and searches for ways to prevent licit arms from ending up in the illicit sphere. A final project worth mentioning involves international co-operation. It considers the need for operational and pragmatic co-operation at regional level by appointing national points of contact, stimulating the temporary secondment of experts abroad and preparing and implementing joint criminal investigations.

Owen Greene, Saferworld and Bradford University, UK

Developing regional agreements to combat illicit arms trafficking

SADC countries can benefit from existing experience with recent regional and international measures in this area.

Globally, Southern African countries should take full advantage of the ongoing negotiations for an international protocol against illicit trafficking in firearms. They should also build on the political agreements achieved during the summer of 1999 by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, on measures to prevent and reduce destabilising and excessive accumulations of small arms and light weapons. These are likely to form the basis for international agreements at the 2001 international conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

Regionally, members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) signed the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and their Component Parts in 1997, which came into force in 1998. SADC countries could usefully consider establishing one or more regional agreements containing key elements of the OAS Convention adapted to meet the needs of Southern Africa. These could include obligations relating to:
  • controls and information exchanges on international transfers of firearms;
  • marking, recordkeeping and tracing firearms; and
  • information exchanges on licenced manufacturers and dealers in weapons.
Similarly, SADC countries could develop ‘model laws’ relating to the manufacture and possession of, and trade in firearms and ammunition, just as OAS states did through their CICAD Model Regulations in 1997. These define minimum laws and sound regulatory practices for each participating country. They leave scope for each country to adapt the law according to its specific circumstances, but help to avoid loopholes or inconsistencies between national laws that can be exploited by arms traffickers.

Similar Southern African agreements should now be designed so that they are, at least, compatible with the international protocol against firearms trafficking. The negotiations for this protocol are still ongoing, and SADC countries need to ensure that its provisions are consistent with their needs. A SADC agreement in this regard should then be designed to promote implementation of the global agreement and to elaborate on and develop the provisions of the global regime according to regional needs.

The EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have focused on developing national and regional co-operation and capacity at the operational level, in the framework of political rather than legal agreements to tackle arms trafficking. For example, the ECOWAS Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) includes a series of programmes to improve information exchange, intelligence-sharing, border and customs controls, internal and crossborder policing, judicial systems, and the like. EU co-operation in this area, developed within the framework of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Illicit Arms, also includes such programmes. SARPCCO could usefully draw lessons, both positive and negative, from these experiences.

Marking and tracing

SADC countries should consider adopting stringent standards with regard to the marking of all firearms, including small arms and light weapons. The UN Group of Experts recommended that states should ensure that all small arms and light weapons are adequately marked at the point of manufacture, with information identifying the country and year of manufacture, the manufacturer and a unique serial number. It also recommended that states should ensure that no unmarked weapons are manufactured, stockpiled or transferred, and that unmarked weapons are promptly destroyed or adequately marked. SADC countries could independently and collectively implement such standards, and establish national and regional systems to help trace the lines of supply of illicit or destabilising weapons.

Stockpile management and disposal of surplus arms

Many illicit arms originate from military or police stockpiles or from the disposal of surplus arms. Measures to improve stockpile security and ensure the responsible disposal of surplus stocks must therefore be an important part of efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking. Operationally, this could involve improved recordkeeping and monitoring of weapons stocks – only through regular stocktaking can weapons losses be recognised reliably and timely. Moreover, many weapons stores are insecure, and vulnerable to theft or loss through corrupt practices. Measures to improve security do not only involve enhanced physical security, but also measures to reduce and dispose of the number of weapons in dispersed stores (such as police stations and minor military depots) which cannot be protected without incurring disproportionate expense.

South Africa’s recent decision to destroy over 250 000 surplus small arms has attracted international commendation. SADC countries should consider adopting a code of conduct on the disposal of surplus arms. Operationally, SADC countries could co-operate to promote the destruction of surplus or confiscated arms, and establish systems for monitoring and recording such destruction or disposal.

Arms transfer controls

One of the key features of flows of small arms and light weapons is that all states are potential suppliers – all states have small arms stocks that could be transferred. Yet, many governments have yet to come to terms with their responsibilities as potential arms exporters. Information exchange and consultation among Southern African states could help governments to assess the risks and issues associated with permitting arms transfers to certain destinations. Other relevant areas of co-operation in this context could be to develop co-ordinated strategies to combat the use of false transfer documents and end-user certificates, to limit the scope for diversion of arms transfers to unauthorised destinations, and to control the activities of arms brokers.

Discussion

Policing


The possibility of learning lessons from drug traffic policing to tackle illicit arms trafficking was discussed. Suggestions included:
  • supporting ‘buyer’ programmes in which agents infiltrate criminal gangs;
  • developing community-based intelligence programmes; and
  • tackling the financial sources supporting arms trafficking and seizing profits from illegal trade.
The issue of what European and Southern African police forces do with their surplus stocks of firearms was also raised. Apparently, it is often standard practice to sell these old stocks on the open market, thus fuelling proliferation. Surrey Police in the UK has just introduced a voluntary moratorium on selling surplus arms and has pledged to destroy them instead. It was agreed that this was a positive model which should be extended nationally and internationally.

Marking and tracing

There was wide agreement on the need to mark small arms so that they could be traced if seized – this is one means of encouraging responsible regulation. Different technologies were discussed, including the new development of ‘smart water’. However, it was noted that cost was a key factor and that systems had to be compatible internationally. It was agreed that closer dialogue with industry was needed on this issue. Considering that a large part of the small arms problem is the continued circulation and misuse of old weapons, marking should take place at points of transfer, as well as manufacture. To be effective, all marking systems need to be backed up with reliable recordkeeping and co-operation between countries to help trace weapons.

Production and accumulation

The strong link between licit and illicit arms supplies was repeatedly emphasised. Many people raised the issue of the continuing large-scale production and export of small arms from Northern countries. There was concern that production was creating demand. Some delegates suggested the imposition of quotas on arms production and export. On the other hand, the right of all states to legitimate defence, as entrenched in the UN Charter, was pointed out. But does this mean the right to accumulate unlimited supplies of arms?

It was agreed that the key issue was the need to restrict weapons holdings and acquisitions to just those required for legitimate defence. It is important to reach a common understanding of what this means in practice. Delegates agreed that the effective regulation of exports is required, based on agreed upon codes of conduct. As all countries are suppliers in some way, often because weapons transit through their territories, there is an obligation on all countries to enforce restrictions on transfers. It was also suggested that national evaluations and regional discussions on defence threats and needs should be encouraged.

Education and raising awareness

It was stressed that, alongside operational programmes, long-term education and programmes to raise awareness were essential to combat illicit trafficking. Many delegates felt that much more work should be done with communities to stress the damaging consequences of illicit trafficking and discuss their potential roles in tackling the problem. The idea of supporting community radio stations in the SADC region was very popular.