The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, outlines the hierarchy of authority on defence matters. The chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) enjoys executive military command of the armed forces. This command is exercised under the direction of the minister of Defence in times of peace and under the direction of the president during a state of national defence; and the minister is, in turn, accountable to parliament and cabinet for the SANDF.

The White Paper on Defence (1996) states that parliament has a range of significant powers regarding military affairs in order to assert democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy. It has legislative powers, approves the defence budget and reviews the president’s decisions to deploy the SANDF in critical defence functions.

This is very different to the situation prior to 1994 when there was no parliamentary oversight committee system in place. The 1961 Constitution made little mention of parliamentary committees. The changes in the 1983 Constitution were inconsequential. It stated that the President’s Council may make rules and orders relating to the order and conduct of its business and proceedings, the establishment, and constitution and powers of committees of the council. Neither the 1961 nor the 1983 Constitution specified the nature, content or scope of parliamentary control mechanisms or processes.

After 1994, there was a revolutionary change in the functioning of parliament and its committees. The 1996 Constitution stated that multiparty parliamentary committees must have oversight over all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of parliament. Further, it outlined other mechanisms to be used to exercise accountability and oversight including, among others, the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and the Auditor-General.

The Rules and Orders of Parliament clearly stipulate the powers of the parliamentary committees. They have to:

deal with Bills and matters falling within their portfolio;



maintain oversight within their portfolio over the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation, any executive organ of state, constitutional institution and other body or institution;



monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations concerning any such organ of state or constitutional body;



consult and liase with any executive organ of state or constitutional institution;



perform any other function, task, or duty assigned to it in terms of the Constitution, legislation, rules or resolutions of the National Assembly; and



summon any individual or legal person to give evidence on oath or affirmation or to produce documentation; receive petitions, representations or submissions from interested bodies and persons; conduct public hearings; hear oral evidence on petitions; determine its own procedures; and hold meetings.

As a result, the defence policymaking process has changed to broader participatory processes in which a wide range of stakeholders are involved. In effect, parliamentary committees had shifted from being rubber stamps for the executive to being the actual ‘engine rooms’ of parliament.

There are two parliamentary committees charged with the task of managing the national defence function: the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) and the Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD).

The JSCD deals with broader matters of oversight and can investigate and make recommendations regarding budget, functioning organisations, armament policy and the state of preparedness of the SANDF. It may perform other functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the armed forces as prescribed by law. The JSCD includes members of the National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly. Not all 13 parties in parliament are necessarily represented in the JSCD.

The creation of the JSCD was necessitated by the nature of South Africa’s transition. The new democracy had to contend with distrust in the defence force and the proposed management of the military integration process. The culture, traditions and ethos of the forces being integrated into the SANDF were markedly different and required oversight in addition to that provided by the Ministry of Defence.

The PCD, on the other hand, discharges similar functions, although it is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in parliament. It comprises all 13 political parties represented in parliament. The work of the JSCD and PCD are thus complementary.

Room for improvement

The parliamentary committees dealing with defence have undoubtedly brought about greater accountability and have subjected defence activities to increased scrutiny. However, there is some room for improvement. Oversight is a process and not an event. The overseers have to exercise constant vigilance and deftness in establishing and maintaining civil-military relations. Oversight should be both proactive and reactive. Interventions should be proactive when issues can be anticipated. For example, committees should be allowed to visit military bases, and to use the information gathered to advise the executive and parliament on measures to correct a situation.

In 1997, the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) observed problems affecting the SANDF in its report to the minister of Defence. BMATT noted that some commanding officers were ignoring problems and that former non-statutory forces members were not receiving fair treatment. Yet, the shooting of white officers by a black compatriot at Tempe near Bloemfontein in 1999 took everyone by surprise. The Setai Commission of Inquiry highlighted the same problems identified by BMATT, but they sounded new to both the committee and Parliament. This example reflects the problems with reactive oversight, but it is sometimes necessary and unavoidable. It applies when the need arises to establish whether legislation is effective with the desired results. Practical implementation allows for proactiveness when, through monitoring and reviewing, problems can be analysed and advice provided on their resolution or a particular policy may be reviewed.

Another aspect of oversight is that it does not start and end with legislation. It is also necessary to exercise influence on the organs of state within the committee’s portfolio, as well as on the implementation and impact of legislation and policies passed by parliament. It involves monitoring, investigations and recommendations to the executive and parliament on how defence and security matters could be resolved or attended to.

A further challenge is how to exercise oversight responsibilities. The responsible minister cannot be bypassed to go straight to his or her department. It is better to exercise oversight primarily via the minister because he or she is ultimately responsible for the policy and direction of the department. If the need arises to call on the officials of a department, it is wise to ensure that the minister is aware of it and sanctions such officials. The role of oversight should not be obfuscated with micro-management. Eventually, the minister will have to explain, justify and defend the department and its policies to parliament.

The ruling party also has a role to play in oversight in a robust and critical manner, something which is not the sole terrain of the opposition. Meaningful and effective oversight must take place in a constructive and non-adversarial manner, as oversight is ultimately about accountability and good governance.

Civil society, including the media, has an important role to play in ensuring effective oversight. It is imperative to equip civil society to engage in matters of defence and security. The effects of apartheid are seen in submissions and public hearings, with a preponderance of ‘white’ views. Some creative and proactive measures should be devised in this regard.

In the parliamentary defence committees, the constructive and consensual approach has been extensively used and it has generally worked well. There is clearly substantial work to be done, but much has already been achieved. Vigilance should be guiding parliament’s defence committees in meeting the challenges of the defence and security establishment in South Africa.

JAMES NGCULU is a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, South African Parliament