The recent conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has seen interesting developments in co-operation between international bodies and the Organisation of African Unity. The success of the OAU initiative and intervention in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is laudable, even at this early stage of assessment. A factor in this success has been the speed with which the OAU intervened and, subsequently, its close co-operation with facilitators, the United Nations and the European Union. This article provides an overview of the OAU’s peacemaking initiatives and focuses on the implications of the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE), future OAU peace support initiatives and the emergent division of labour between the OAU and the United Nations. On the eve of the transition to the African Union, the contributions that the Organisation can successfully make within the context of a continent that remains wracked by civil conflict are of great importance. Its ability to react rapidly and intervene successfully will no doubt have a profound effect on the short-term implementation of the ideals of continental pacification.

Introduction

The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia began with a claim by Ethiopia on 13 May 1998 that, after clashes with Ethiopian forces on 12 May, Eritrean forces had invaded and occupied Badme and Sheraro, areas that Ethiopia claimed were part of its north-western territory.

In response, Eritrea acknowledged the continued existence of border disputes with Ethiopia, but counterclaimed that the hostilities resulted from unprovoked Ethiopian clashes and incursions on 6 May into the Badme area, an area that it claimed was part of south-western Eritrea. The United Nations Secretary-General immediately contacted the leaders of both countries, urging restraint and offering assistance in resolving the conflict peacefully. He requested that Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun from Algeria, his Special Envoy in Africa, assist in the mediation efforts of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

On 16 May 1998, US Assistant Secretary for State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, arrived in Asmara to launch a mediation effort that also involved the Rwandan vice-president, Paul Kagame. Two days after this intervention, the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, offered help to settle the dispute and appealed to the leaders of both countries to avoid escalating the tension. By the end of May, the US-Rwandan facilitators had presented recommendations to both conflicting parties. The four-point plan involved a withdrawal of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops from the disputed territory, the deployment of a neutral observer force, the return of civilian administration to disputed areas, and an investigation into the origins of the conflict.

By mid-June 1998, however, it was clear that these peacemaking initiatives had not borne fruit, as the hostilities escalated into full-scale fighting along the common border. By March 2000, it was estimated that over 370 000 Eritreans and approximately 350 000 Ethiopians had been affected by the war, which was also estimated to have cost 30 000 lives and led to arms purchases by both countries totalling some US $700 million. The humanitarian situation in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by the severe drought, which led to the emergence of a major food crisis that affected almost eight million people.

There is, as yet, little information available on the OAU-led peacemaking activities that eventually led to the cessation of hostilities and the subsequent OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). This occurred within the framework of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the deployment of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) as will be discussed below. The final section of this article will focus on a preliminary assessment of the implications of the OLMEE deployment for future OAU peace support initiatives and the emergent division of labour between the regional organisation and the UN.

Peacemaking initiatives

Fortuitously, the 68th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers and 34th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government were convened in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 1 to 10 June 1998, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Capitalising on this timely convergence of events and measures, the OAU was able to initiate, in rapid succession, a number of activities that were intended to put an immediate end to hostilities, and to get the parties to accept the recommendations of the US/Rwandan facilitation team.¹

The two parties accepted, on 9 July 1998, a document entitled Modalities for the implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement. In this document, Eritrea committed itself to redeploy its forces outside the territories it occupied after 6 May 1998. Ethiopia committed itself to redeploy, soon thereafter, its forces from positions taken after 6 February and which had not been under Ethiopian administration prior to 6 May 1998. The Framework Agreement and the modalities were endorsed by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which met in Algiers from 10 to 12 July 1999. However, Ethiopia insisted that it would sign only after the details of the implementation of the framework had been finalised, while Eritrea was ready to sign but compromised by accepting the proposal that the technical details should be worked out prior to signature.

After further consultations with the parties, Mr Ahmed Ouyahia, the special envoy of the current chairperson of the OAU, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, and Mr Anthony Lake, representative of the president of the United States, reviewed and finalised a document entitled Technical arrangements for the implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and the modalities. The August 1999 document called for the establishment of a neutral commission to determine the precise areas from which the two sides were to redeploy. The technical arrangements provided for the deployment of military observers to verify the envisaged redeployment. The document also called for demilitarisation and the delimitation of the entire common border between the two countries.

Again, Eritrea announced its acceptance of this document. Ethiopia reserved its position and requested certain clarifications, while reaffirming its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In particular, Ethiopia objected to a partial lack of consistency in the Framework Agreement and the modalities, which was also the case with a number of issues regarding the technical arrangements.²

With the war continuing unabated, the US and the European Union (EU) subsequently supported the convening of a first round of proximity talks in Algiers from 29 April to 5 May 2000. The talks were aimed at narrowing the differences between the parties and helping them to agree on consolidated technical arrangements for the implementation of the Framework Agreement and the modalities. This process culminated in the drafting of an OAU non-paper, which was accepted by Ethiopia as accurately reflecting its views. However, the process ended in yet another stalemate, with Eritrea favouring the early signature of a ceasefire agreement, and Ethiopia insisting on finalising the technical arrangements first.

Shortly after these talks, a seven-member special mission of the UN Security Council visited Addis Ababa and Asmara, on 8 and 9 May 2000, respectively. This initiative proved fruitless, as hostilities were again resumed with an Ethiopian offensive on 12 May 2000, with the apparent objective of recapturing all territory ‘occupied’ by Eritrea. These hostilities were condemned by the OAU and the UN Security Council, with the latter also calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the resumption of substantive talks under OAU auspices, and the imposition of a 12-month arms embargo against the parties.

After a series of subsequent interventions — by the Central Organ at ambassadorial level, the UN Security Council, the current OAU chairperson, and his special envoy — a second round of proximity talks was convened in Algiers from 29 May to 10 June 2000 to discuss the cessation of hostilities and other issues. These talks culminated in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. It was signed on 18 June 2000 by the foreign ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea, under the auspices of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, in his capacity as the chairperson of the OAU.

The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities committed the parties to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The parties also reaffirmed their acceptance of the earlier OAU Framework Agreement and the modalities. Under the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, the parties called upon the UN, in co-operation with the OAU, to establish a peacekeeping operation to assist in the implementation of the Framework Agreement. More specifically, the cessation agreement provided for:

the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, under OAU auspices, to monitor the implementation of the agreement;



the redeployment of Ethiopian troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under its administration before 6 May 1998;



the concurrent redeployment of Eritrea’s forces to a distance of 25 kilometres from the new Ethiopian positions;



the establishment of a 25 kilometre-wide temporary security zone; and



the establishment of a Military Co-ordination Commission (MCC) to facilitate the functions of the peacekeeping mission and to co-ordinate and resolve issues relating to the implementation of the agreement.

The UN Secretary-General described the agreement as the first, but extremely vital step towards the restoration of peace between the two countries. He informed the Security Council of his intention to dispatch an ‘appropriate’ number of liaison officers to each capital, to be followed by the deployment of a military observer group.³ On 30 June 2000, the Security Council, in Resolution 1312 (2000), decided to establish UNMEE consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorisation. Importantly, the Security Council commended the OAU in this resolution for successfully facilitating the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and welcomed the discussions between the secretariats of the UN and the OAU on co-operation in the implementation of the agreement.

It was against this background that the OAU mission, OLMEE, was established to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, in conjunction with UNMEE. The agreement and provisions for the establishment of OLMEE were formally approved by the 68th Session of the Central Organ of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa on 28 July 2000. The first elements of OLMEE assembled in Addis Ababa in August 2000, and the mission became effective on 9 October 2000 when the liaison office in Asmara was opened, and was fully functional by December 2000 when all the military elements reported for deployment.

In the interim, the parties had continued with negotiations aimed at a final and comprehensive peace settlement of the conflict. The talks, facilitated by the OAU and President Bouteflika of Algeria, resulted in the signing on 12 December 2000 in Algiers of a comprehensive Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By signing this agreement, the parties undertook "permanently [to] terminate military hostilities between themselves" and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The agreement, among others, requires the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to "delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border," and makes provision for the creation of a neutral Claims Commission to decide on claims from either side.

From peacemaking to peacekeeping

Overview of the UNMEE concept of operations

Reporting to the Security Council on 9 August, the UN Secretary-General outlined the mandate of UNMEE and recommended that a total of 4 200 military personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions and the necessary support units, should be dispatched to monitor the ceasefire and border delineation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The mission was to be deployed in three phases. The first phase involved the despatch of liaison officers to each capital. In the second phase, up to 100 military observers along with the necessary civilian support staff would be deployed. In phase three, the full peacekeeping operation would be deployed. On 15 September 2000, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s report and authorised the deployment of UNMEE until 15 March 2001 in Resolution 1320. According to this resolution, UNMEE is mandated to:

monitor the cessation of hostilities;



assist in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed to by the parties;



monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998;



monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;



simultaneously monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometres from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy;



monitor the temporary security zone to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;



chair the Military Co-ordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the UN and the OAU in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;



co-ordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it; and



co-ordinate the mission’s activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it with the humanitarian and human rights activities of the UN and other organisations in these areas.

The Security Council also emphasised that the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities linked the termination of the UN peacekeeping mission with the completion of the process of delimiting and demarcating of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.

As the main instrument for the implementation of the agreement, the military component has an authorised strength of 4 200, under the command of Major-General Patrick Cammaert of the Netherlands. This includes 220 UN military observers, as well as sector contingents (including the force headquarters) of some 3 980 troops and civilian personnel (see figure 1 for the concept of deployment).

As of mid-March 2001, some 4 130 personnel, representing about 98% of the force strength, had been deployed. This included 212 military observers in 15 sites in the temporary security zone, and 3 919 international staff and contingent troops drawn from:

Canada (546)⁴

Denmark (331 headquarters guard and administration)

Italy (116 air and military police staff)

Jordan (956)

the Netherlands (1 114)

Slovakia (157 demining engineers) and

advance elements from Kenya to deploy in the eastern sector, and elements from India (force reserve) and Bangladesh (demining engineers).

Although widely perceived as a ‘classic’ UN observer/interposition operation, UNMEE was also to be composed of "political, military, public information, mine action and administrative components." A civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) — Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila of Botswana — was therefore appointed as head of the mission. He has authority over the UN country teams in both countries. The UN offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara are to be complemented by regional headquarters based in Mendefera, western Eritrea, and Mekele, northern Ethiopia.

Mandate and mission of OLMEE

The establishment of OLMEE marked, in a way, the handing over of lead agency status from the OAU to the UN. Security Council Resolutions 1297 and 1298 (12 and 17 May 2000, respectively) had both condemned the continued fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea and demanded the earliest possible reconvening of substantive peace talks under OAU auspices. The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities had provided for "the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, under OAU auspices." However, in authorising the deployment of UNMEE by Resolution 1320 (15 September 2000), no mention is made of a lead role for the OAU. However, Resolution 1320 does stress the Security Council’s "commitment to work in co-ordination with the Organisation of African Unity and the parties" towards the full implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and requests the UN Secretary-General to co-ordinate with the OAU in this regard.

This nuance seems to acknowledge the political role of the OAU in securing the cessation of hostilities and the peace agreements. However, it implies neither a relegation nor delegation of Security Council responsibility for regional peace to the OAU, which also acknowledges the superior institutional capacity of the UN to launch and sustain a mission with the size and mandate of UNMEE. The mandate of OLMEE was thus underscored by the philosophy that the OAU should not duplicate what the UN can do best, and is based on complementing UNMEE in the implementation of the Agreement by:

monitoring compliance;

verifying troop withdrawals and redeployments;

monitoring the restoration of Eritrean civilian administration in areas evacuated by Ethiopia;

liasing with the parties; and

generally monitoring the temporary security zone.

To accomplish this mandate jointly with UNMEE, with accepted resource constraints, the main focus of the OAU mission is to show limited presence of the OAU in the temporary security zone. The primary mission of OLMEE is thus to complement, assist and co-operate with UNMEE to establish and maintain security in the temporary security zone, in order to monitor the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The OLMEE concept of operations

The concept of operations of OLMEE is closely influenced by that of the much larger UNMEE. This is understandable, as OLMEE is to assist and co-operate with UNMEE, which will play a more dominant operational role. With the exception of its composition, therefore, the phases of deployment and operational tasks and procedures of OLMEE have been co-ordinated with those of UNMEE as far as possible.

Thus, the deployment and operations of OLMEE have been planned to conform with the parameters dictated by the UNMEE concept of operations, and have therefore involved the co-location of OLMEE headquarters with those of UNMEE in Asmara, with a rear headquarters in Addis Ababa. In addition, capital liaison officers have been deployed for the purpose of showing limited OAU presence in the temporary security zone through periodic liaison visits to the three UNMEE sectors of Barentu (western sector), Adigrat (central sector) and Assab (eastern sector).

Initially, OLMEE was planned as an integrated civil-military mission. However, with the secretariat based in Addis Ababa, there has not been a strong need for the designation of a senior OAU representative and political officer in the field. These roles and functions may be undertaken by the Political Affairs Department at OAU headquarters, in addition to the civilian support staff. As a result, OLMEE is now largely a military mission, composed of the office of the OAU senior military representative to the MCC and the capital liaison component.

The MCC representative is the professional military head of OLMEE and its activities in the temporary security zone and adjacent areas. His primary function is to represent the OAU Secretary-General on the MCC, to liase with the UNMEE force commander, and to execute any other tasks that emanate from this responsibility.

The capital liaison component comprises the Asmara and Addis Ababa liaison teams. Each team of three military liaison officers and one non-commissioned communication officers is headed by a chief military liaison officer. The task of these four-member teams is to liase with the parties, as well as with the capital UN liaison officers and sector UN military observers in their respective areas.⁵ OLMEE had originally been planned to have three sector liaison teams, each consisting of nine officers drawn from Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia. For operational and administrative reasons, this concept was under-implemented as of December 2000, with the roles of the sector teams being played by the capital liaison teams.⁶

Strength and composition of OLMEE

The original strength of OLMEE, including the full civilian component, was estimated at 43 civil-military staff. Under its present mandate, however, the mission has an authorised strength of 27, comprising 11 military staff and 16 civilian support staff. The military component, which is headed by Brigadier-General Peter A Blay of Ghana, as the OAU senior military representative to the MCC, comprises his military advisor and orderly, six liaison officers and two non-commissioned communication officers.

As of January 2001, OLMEE was composed of military personnel drawn from six OAU member states:

Algeria (two military liaison officers with effect from 26 August 2000);



Nigeria (two military liaison officers with effect from 25 September 2000);



Ghana (OAU senior military representative and his two staff officers, with effect from 20 November 2000);



Tunisia (one non-commissioned communication officer with effect from 4 November 2000);



Kenya (one non-commissioned communication officer with effect from 9 November 2000); and



South Africa (two military liaison officers with effect from 1 December 2000).

Operational activities

Within the framework of its mandate, mission and conception, the OAU senior military representative to the MCC attends weekly meetings with the UNMEE force commander, and has also participated in the three MCC meetings that were held in Nairobi on 2 and 28 December 2000, and 6 February 2001, as well as on the Mereb River (Rama) in the temporary security zone on 28 February 2001.

OLMEE liaison officers similarly participate in weekly and periodic meetings with the UN and the parties. In Addis Ababa, the OLMEE capital liaison officers meet with the UN liaison officer and Ethiopian Ministry of Defence representatives. In Asmara, however, the weekly meetings are conducted within the framework of the Commission for the Co-ordination of UN Peacekeeping, an institution that was established by an Eritrean government proclamation in August 2000, as the focal point for dealing with all matters emanating from the Agreement.

In the field, the OLMEE liaison officers have participated in the opening of air/land corridors in November-December 2000; the clearing and exchange of 26 soldiers killed in action; in the ongoing conduct of joint reconnaissance in the sectors; and in planning and monitoring the rearrangement of forces from 12 February 2001.

Command, control and legal status of OLMEE

Political control of OLMEE is vested in the OAU Secretary-General through the delegated authority of the Department of Political Affairs. Notwithstanding the co-location of OAU headquarters with the OLMEE office in Addis Ababa, however, the two capital liaison offices are under operational command of the office of the MCC representative in Asmara.

To provide a legal framework for the establishment and operations of OLMEE in the mission area, the parties have been presented with draft copies of the status of mission agreement at the beginning of October 2000 for study, comments and acceptance. This agreement covers the legal status of the mission in the area and provides for the usual immunities, privileges and areas of host nation support and co-operation for the successful operation of the mission.

OAU-UN co-operation

Similarly, a draft memorandum of understanding has been forwarded to the UN, which aims at formalising co-operation with and assistance between UNMEE and OLMEE within the framework of Regional Arrangements as contained in the UN Charter (Chapter VIII). This document is considered to be crucial in overcoming the type of difficulties that have previously characterised co-operation between the UN and regional organisations. Considering the problematic nature of the co-deployment of the UN and the monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia (UNOMIL-ECOMOG 1993-97), the memorandum seeks to establish a meaningful framework for UNMEE-OLMEE joint operations. It also covers matters such as UN administrative and logistical assistance to OLMEE in some vital areas:

the provision of maps;

facilities for equipment maintenance and recovery;

water, fuel and power supply;

medical treatment and evacuation;

sharing of military police resources;

post exchange and recreational facilities;

air and road movement support; and

communication and electronic support.

The rationale for the support outlined above is that UNMEE, as the larger force, is expected to have better facilities, which it could place at the disposal of OLMEE from time to time, and on a reimbursement basis when necessary. In practice, co-operation between the UN and the OAU in the mission area has been quite satisfactory and in accordance with the spirit of regional co-operation envisaged within the framework of the agreement.

In this respect, OAU military liaison officers have participated in UN training in order to sharpen their mission skills, while UNMEE has also involved the OAU mission in operational reconnaissance missions to the temporary security zone, and in other appropriate activities. Besides daily joint OAU-UN liaison meetings with the parties in both capitals, UNMEE has placed its office facilities and air assets at the disposal of OLMEE for the delivery of mail and the movement of personnel and equipment.

At the command level and within the forum of the MCC, co-operation between the UNMEE force commander and the OAU senior military representative continues to be good. Nonetheless, OLMEE and UNMEE remain two distinct structures with parallel lines of political, operational and administrative command and control to Addis Ababa and New York, respectively. This, however, has not precluded joint operations, when necessary, and the sharing of political, public, operational and administrative information, reports, briefs and returns.

Financial, administrative and logistical aspects

The total budget of OLMEE for its first year’s mandate is estimated at US $1.8 million. This is composed of US $1.5 million for operational deployment and activities, and US $298 000 for pursuing the mediation/political process. To meet this requirement, the OAU is relying on donations into the General Peace Fund from its 32 partners. So far, a total of about US $2 million has been pledged for this cause.

The administrative and logistical support system for the mission is modelled after typical UN practice. The OAU provides each military staff member with a mission subsistence allowance to cater for his own accommodation, food and incidental expenses. Each individual is also issued with a limited scale of personal military clothing and gear from the stock of the OAU’s military logistics depot.

The OAU has also provided fully furnished and equipped leased office accommodation in both capitals, and for the first time ever, has imported organic transport (civilian pattern) for the mission. The operational communication requirements of the mission have been met by deploying data/voice encryption and two-way communication equipment donated by the US (in 1992) as part of the programme of establishing the 100/500-man observer logistics depot.⁷

Significance and setbacks

Despite its modest size, the role of OLMEE in the implementation of the ceasefire and peace agreements is significant. On the one hand, the involvement of the OAU in the peacekeeping operation reflects a comprehensive policy strategy of blending political and military efforts towards the ends of maintaining regional peace. On the other hand, the co-operation between the OAU and the UN at the military level also enhances the realisation of the objectives of the charters of both organisations, and lends both regional and international credibility to the UN intervention.

Given its limited role in the implementation of the Framework Agreement, the operations of OLMEE, especially its co-operation with the UN and the parties, have been smooth so far as a result of the commitment of the parties to the successful and expeditious implementation of the agreement. The fact that the deadline (mid-November 2000) for the signing of the status of forces agreement has not been met, has not been an impediment to OLMEE operations.

However, the first, and rather serious operational setback occurred at the second MCC meeting in Nairobi on 28 December 2000. These talks reached a stalemate, for political rather than military reasons (Eritrea objected to the incorporation of Badme, Zela Ambessa and Baada in the Ethiopian redeployment line). While the UNMEE force commander referred the matter directly to the SRSG, the Ethiopian authorities wrote to the OAU Secretary-General on the issue (on 2 January 2001), and the Eritrean authorities wrote to the UN Secretary-General (on 8 January 2000).

Following closely in the wake of the MCC stalemate, disagreement arose between the parties on the issue of a direct air corridor between the two capitals. Despite the existence of this disagreement, a direct air corridor was opened on 15 January 2001 under the authority of the SRSG. This had to be closed on 18 January, after Eritrea objected on the grounds that the route did not follow the pre-war route as agreed to elsewhere. Recently, Eritrea has extended the redeployment of its forces beyond the 3 March deadline, because of strong reservations about parts of the Ethiopian redeployment lines.

It is thus apparent that some measure of confusion and misunderstanding is inevitable in a mission of this nature. This has come to the fore with respect to reporting lines and the interpretation of prior agreements. However, these are not unique to UNMEE/OLMEE operations, and it was expected that these issues would eventually be resolved by the UN and the OAU, working through the mechanism of the Mediation Committee. The US and other members of the international community were also expected to deploy efforts to resolve the impasse expeditiously. These initiatives seem to have already borne fruit. For example, the third MCC meeting, which had been cancelled, was rescheduled for 6 February 2001, during which both parties accepted the compromise UN redeployment plans, though with some reservations, including the issue of direct air corridors.

Future OAU peace missions: Problems and prospects

Despite the lead role of the UN in implementing the Framework Agreement, the level of military involvement of the OAU also needs to be viewed within a wider context. Recalling that Ethiopia had insisted on the central role of the OAU in monitoring the ceasefire during the negotiations, it is relevant to ask whether or not the OAU could have accomplished such a mandate.

Certainly, the monitoring of the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities by the OAU would have posed gigantic problems and challenges for the simple reason that, unlike the UN, the OAU still lacks the requisite institutional capacity and experience for large-scale peace support operations and missions. However, the OAU Cairo Declaration (1993) acknowledged this aspect and confirmed the view that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability rests with the UN Security Council.

Consequently, the OAU defined the scope of its mechanism as focusing on preventive measures, and indicated that it did not plan to mount its own peacekeeping operations in the short to medium term. It is difficult to determine the extent to which this thinking, and the continued lack of direct major OAU military intervention in African conflicts, may be attributable to previous OAU peacekeeping failures (for example, the mission in Chad in 1981-82).

Some 13 African conflicts have hitherto elicited notable interventions by the OAU. However, only five of these engagements (including OLMEE) have led to the deployment of some type of OAU peacekeeping operation.⁸ Moreover, those operations dispatched since 1993 (under the auspices of the mechanism), have been very limited in size and scope. Given the long history of the OAU (since its inception in May 1963), the organisation has acquired and established considerable experience in political matters and diplomacy. Indeed, the OAU has adopted a number of decisions and resolutions over the years that directly attempt to enhance the political framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution.⁹

In contrast, however, the capacity of the OAU for peacekeeping missions was only formally institutionalised in 1993 through the Cairo Declaration, which established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as a vehicle for promoting the peace agenda of the organisation.¹⁰ Within the framework mechanism, the Conflict Management Centre (CMC) was charged with developing policy options and co-ordinating activities to support the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts (both interstate and intrastate).

In the context of peace support operations, the Field Operations Unit of the Conflict Management Centre was conceived as the operational arm of the General Secretariat for peace missions. Since its inception, however, the unit has been consistently understaffed — it was to be established with a staff of six senior military officers and six support staff. This situation has obviously frustrated continuing efforts at its full institutionali-sation.

Nonetheless, the concept of the unit also incorporated a military logistics depot to stock critical military personnel equipment, communication facilities and other combat service support gear and equipment for a 100/500-man OAU military observer force. The US already donated some equipment in 1992 to support OAU peace support missions.¹¹ The equipment base of the depot has since been augmented by additional donations from China, France, Germany and South Africa.¹² In addition, the traditional partners of the OAU have been making periodic donations into the OAU General Peace Fund in support of various of its peace support initiatives.¹³

However, the OAU would still be very hard-pressed with existing stocks to sustain a large number of military observers in the field. It should be noted, in this regard, that the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU (held in Harare in October 1997) recommended the implementation of a standby arrangement for a team of 500 civil-military observers (100 from each of the five subregions).

The OAU thus has an emergent but modest capacity for more comprehensive peace support missions, that still needs to find expression in an operational framework for the Field Operations Unit. This capacity stands in stark contrast to the consistently high levels of active African conflicts, the rather selective national policy interests of the developed countries, and the slow response of the UN Security Council to regional conflicts. Nevertheless, Article 53(1) (Chapter VIII) of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council "shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements and agencies for enforcement action under its authority ..."

Since 1990, however, multinational peace enforcement and large-scale peacekeeping operations have been deployed by African subregional organisations (such as ECOWAS and SADC), rather than by the OAU. Pertinently too, the continent has seen the initiation and implementation of a US-Western European concept of a ‘partnership for peace in Africa’ since 1996 under which limited assistance in training, equipment and funding is packaged on a selective basis for individual African countries or subregions in accordance with the policy interests and objectives of these countries.

This situation suggests the need for the OAU to appraise its strategy of maximum diplomatic/political (eminent persons, special envoys, good offices, and others) and minimum peacekeeping interventions (military observers, neutral investigators, election monitors). In addition to the obvious need for increasing OAU capacity for more substantive peace support operations, the OAU will also have to enhance its ability to co-ordinate and collaborate with other actors — not only with the international community, but also with subregional organisations, which have hitherto been perceived as operating with minimal OAU involvement.

Such an appraisal, of course, must be strongly informed by the report of the UN panel on peace operations, or the Brahimi Report, released on 23 August 2000.¹⁴ The panel was tasked by the UN Secretary-General to look at every aspect of UN peace operations, and to make recommendations on how missions can be more effective.¹⁵ The report not only "assesses the shortcomings of the existing system and makes frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change," it also presents a singular opportunity for the OAU to address some of the lingering inconsistencies in the UN system regarding African peace and security concerns. Moreover, the recommendations of the report tend to emphasise or suggest, directly or indirectly, UN-OAU collaboration in the following areas:

involvement of the OAU in harmonising the efforts of the UN Secretary-General in implementing the recommendations of the report, among others, by fully activating the UN liaison office with the OAU;



collaboration in information-gathering, analysis and early warning, especially the involvement of the OAU Situation Centre in the UN’s proposed secretariat for information and strategic analysis;



exchange of experiences and ideas on the implementation of the concept of transitional administrations by appropriate legal institutions within both organisations;



formulation of regional peacebuilding strategies (within the framework of a global Security Council peacebuilding strategy), including short and long-term strategies for credible preventive diplomacy, as well as election processes, and where this fails, or becomes necessary:



a demonstration of credible political will, readiness and support for adequately mandated and fully resourced peace support missions to enforce the mandate for global peace and security;



an appraisal of the provisions of the UN Charter on regional arrangements (Chapter VIII) in respect of enforcement actions by regional (and subregional) organisations and coalitions; as well as



long-term preventive actions focusing on good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, economic development, poverty alleviation, and others.

A preliminary analysis of the Brahimi Report also suggests that the OAU similarly suffers from the weaknesses that have plagued the UN system. The same antidote recommended by the panel for the UN Secretariat may therefore logically apply to the OAU. In order to facilitate the recommended greater UN-OAU collaboration, the OAU will indeed be obliged to keep pace with UN reforms, even if not to emulate them.

In this respect, there is a need to reappraise the organisational/institutional capacity of the Department of Political Affairs, the Conflict Management Centre and the Field Operations Unit in order to achieve appropriate functional staffing levels and manpower resources. This should lead to improved arrangements and levels of funding, better equipment and office work space/ environment, and greater integration of functional and manpower resources to facilitate joint functional early warning forecasts and contingency planning.

It has also been suggested that a more comprehensive OAU peace support strategy that is largely compatible with changes in the UN system should be developed by 2004. In addition to the institutional arrangements and organisational requirements already outlined, this strategy should address the issue of African national capacities and readiness for participation in UN and regional peacekeeping missions.

Against the ubiquitous lack of resources of individual African militaries for effective participation in such missions, it is also suggested that member states need to develop partnerships, a concept that fits well into the recommendations of the Brahimi Report on improving the UN standby arrangements system. Last but not least, a comprehensive strategy should cover firm arrangements for funding and financing OAU peace support missions. Increasing collaboration with the UN and the international community is inevitable, and African member states, one way or another, will have to bear an appropriate portion of the costs involved.

Conclusion

The success of the OAU initiative and intervention in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is laudable, even at this early stage of assessment. Despite sentiments that ascribe successes more to the perceived war fatigue of the parties and the providential timing of the OAU summits, the organisation must be given credit for sustaining the momentum of its early initiatives.

Another factor for the successful intervention of the OAU in the conflict is the speed of the Rwanda-US facilitation intervention and, subsequently, the close co-operation of the OAU with the facilitators, as well as the international community (especially the UN and the EU). A number of other influences have also combined to convince the parties to accept and respect the ceasefire agreement, before speedily reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. These include the moral weight of sanctions by the international community, coupled with the dire economic realities in the region and the depressing socio-economic cost of the war, including the massive numbers of internally displaced persons and crossborder refugees. Of course, the military costs of the conflict were extremely high, and combat deaths drew comparisons with the rate of military casualties experienced during World War I.

Given such ‘favourable’ circumstances, there is no reason to believe that OLMEE, as well as UNMEE will not succeed in the long run, despite some short-term reversals. In a wider context, the operations of OLMEE followed closely in the wake of a restructuring exercise conducted by the OAU Secretariat and the release of the Brahimi Report. Taken together, these developments could very well serve as a precipitate for widening and enhancing the scope and capacity of the Political Affairs Department for conflict management, prevention and resolution.

Notes

Colonel Festus Aboagye wrote this article while serving as the OAU Senior Military Expert for the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict in OLMEE. He writes in his personal capacity, and the views expressed are therefore not attributable to the OAU, OLMEE, or the Ghana Armed Forces.

For example, a high-level delegation of heads of state and government of the OAU Central Organ (Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and the OAU Secretary-General) under its current chairperson, was deployed to Eritrea and Ethiopia from 18 to 19 June 1998. The delegation engaged in urgent talks with the parties, urging them to cease hostilities, and accept and implement the recommendations of the facilitation team. A committee of ambassadors was also mandated, among others, to collect information on the development of the crisis, the status of Badme before 12 May 1998, and to maintain the momentum towards a cessation of hostilities. The committee was functional from 30 June to 9 July 1998. A ministerial council (Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe and the OAU Secretary-General) was later convened in Burkina Faso from 1 to 2 August 1998, to discuss and share the findings of the ambassadorial committee with the parties, which were also invited to the meeting.



These covered colonial treaties and international applicable law; cessation of hostilities and redeployment; restoration of civil administration; humanitarian issues and arbitration; peacekeeping mission; delimitation/demarcation; demilitarisation; consultations with the parties; and investigation into the origins of the conflict.



United Nations, S/2000/643, 30 June 2000.



The composite Netherlands-Canada contingent is expected to be withdrawn after a six-month tour of duty and to be replaced by Indo-Bangladeshi troops.



The liaison office in Addis Ababa covers the central sector (Adigrat), while the Asmara office covers the western (Barentu) and eastern (Assab) sectors.



The decision to under-implement the sector liaison component was based on overriding operational and administrative reasons, deriving from the mandate and mission of OLMEE and financial aspects, even though their presence in the temporary security zone and the full strength of OLMEE would have redounded with more political significance.



However, OLMEE communications so far have been in clear. The data/voice encryption remains available, should the need to transmit classified messages arise in the future.



Within the framework of the 1993 mechanism (which therefore excludes prior operations in Chad and Liberia), these are:

Rwanda in August-October 1993;
Burundi in December 1993 — July 1996;
Comores in August 1998 — (redeployment still possible);
Democratic Republic of Congo from November 1999 to date; and
Ethiopia-Eritrea from October 2000 to date.



They include: the declaration on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa vis-à-vis global changes (1990); the African Charter on popular participation in development and transformation (Arusha 1990); and the African Charter on human and peoples’ rights.



Among others, the framework mechanism established the mandates of the OAU Central Organ (16 member states), and the Conflict Management Division, later renamed the Conflict Management Centre, under the Department of Political Affairs in 1999, as part of the programme of enhancing the OAU’s capacity for peace support missions.



Specifically clothing, field kitchens and tents, vehicles, communication systems, generators, portable mine detectors and night vision devices.



These are from China (PR): field equipment, including tents and compasses; France: vehicles, communication systems, GPS, clothing/gear, inflatable boats, among others, delivered directly to the Comores; Germany: fragmentation vests and binoculars; and South Africa: water bottles, mess kits, first aid equipment and motorised inflatable boats.



The Fund (US $38 million) consists of the general peace fund and the special peace fund. The former (totalling some US $14 million) comprises contributions from within Africa through a 6% appropriation from the regular budget of the OAU, as well as voluntary contributions by member states. The special fund, totalling some US $24 million, originates entirely from external contributions.



United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.



The key recommendations covered:

* doctrine, strategy and decisionmaking for short and long-term preventive actions; peacebuilding strategies; peacekeeping strategies and doctrine; mandate formulation; information and planning; and transitional administrations;

* capacities for rapid and effective deployment covering timeliness; mission leadership;

* military, police and civilian personnel; and streamlining logistic and financial management;

* headquarters resources; and

* harnessing information technology (IT) and integrating the IT resources of the UN.